Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization and the Environment

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects national and global pollution in a multi‐country model incorporating monopolistic competition and intra‐industry trade as well as inter‐industry trade. Each country produces skill‐intensive differentiated goods and labor‐intensive goods. Pollution is a by‐product of production but pollution abatement can be undertaken. Regardless of country characteristics, if the differentiated‐good sector is sufficiently cleaner (dirtier) then, without any change in environmental taxes, a multilateral reduction in import protection accorded to the differentiated good or to both goods typically leads to a decline (rise) in pollution in all countries. Pollution havens tend not to arise.     

On Gravity,Specialization and Intra‐industry Trade

Contrary to the popular belief, specialization is not necessary for gravity equations. This paper shows that the simple gravity equation holds if and only if the market share of an exporting country is constant across all importing countries. Specialization is just one special case satisfying this condition. The constant‐share condition can hold in a variety of situations where multiple producers compete with a homogeneous good. Further, this paper shows that the ratio of bilateral trade to the product of partner incomes is increasing in the extent of specialization and in the intensity of intra‐industry trade. Since the relationship is not model‐specific, the correlations among these variables do not support any specific model.     

Towards a More General Approach to Trade Liberalization

Despite the frequency with which they have been promoted as a model of development. East Asian trade policies have had little influence on the normative economics of trade reform. In contrast to directly dismantling protection, developing countries have often provided concessional import rights which override existing protection. These instruments include EPZs and duty remission. This paper accommodates these instruments of 'new trade liberalization' within a more general understanding of trade liberalization illustrating their similarities and their differences. Both old and new trade liberalization can, on their own, bring about complete free trade. Needless to say, so far, neither has!     

Are Underground Workers More Likely to be Underground Consumers?

We investigate the impact of working in the underground sector on the demand for underground commodities. Using a tax evasion model with costly information, we show that the presence of a network effect encourages underground workers to purchase underground commodities. The model is estimated using a unique Canadian microdata set for 1993. An increase in underground hours of work has a strong positive effect on the probability of purchasing underground commodities and on the level of expenditures. This relationship has a sizable effect on the impact of tax and enforcement parameters on the level of the underground economy.     

Endowment Differences and the Composition of Intra‐Industry Trade

The empirical relationship between differences in endowments and different types of trade is investigated in this paper. Although net trade (NT) and vertical intra‐industry trade (IIT) are both broadly viewed as reflecting endowment differences, we suggest that there will be systematic differences in the way their shares of trade adjust as endowment differences become larger. Empirical evidence for European Union trade with its 52 major trading partners confirms this. The share of horizontal IIT (net trade) decreases (increases) for all increases in absolute endowment differences, but the share of vertical IIT can both increase and decrease with increases in endowment differences.     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.     

The Roles of Innovators and Labor in a Schumpeterian Factor Endowments Based Model of Intra‐industry Trade

This paper builds a model of Schumpeterian innovation and trade that emphasizes endowments of innovators and labor as a key factor in determining the pattern of trade. The model suggests a strong complementarity between intra‐industry and inter‐industry trade. The pattern of inter‐industry vs intra‐industry trade is analyzed using the Grubel–Lloyd index. The theoretical model predicts that the prominence of intra‐industry trade is a nonlinear function of the ratio of the proportion of world knowledge domestically generated to the domestic share of the world labor supply. Strong empirical evidence for this key result is presented and implications are discussed.     

Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: A Demand‐Based Approach*

There is strong evidence suggesting that different income groups consume different bundles of goods. Hence, trade liberalization can affect welfare inequality via changes in the relative prices of goods consumed by different income groups (the price effect). In this paper, I develop a framework that enables us to explore the role of the price effect in determining welfare inequality. I find that trade liberalization does benefit some income classes more than others. In particular, I show that the relative welfare of the rich with respect to that of the poor has a hump shape as a function of trade costs.     

Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation

This paper provides an economics-based interpretation of the standard finding in the literature that democracies rarely fight each other. A general theory of conflict between two countries is presented and empirical analysis applies this theory to the question of why democracies rarely fight each other. The results show that the fundamental factor in causing bilateral cooperation is trade. Countries seek to protect wealth gained through international trade, therefore trading partners are less combative than nontrading nations. Democratic dyads trade more than nondemocratic dyads, and thus exhibit less conflict and more cooperation.     

Do Customs Union Members Engage in More Bilateral Trade than Free‐Trade Agreement Members?

This paper provides the first empirical analysis directly comparing the effects of customs unions (CUs) and free‐trade agreements (FTAs) on members’ bilateral trade, while addressing the biases arising from log‐linearization of the gravity model and crucial time‐invariant unobservables. Since Fiorentino et al. (2007 ) question the popularity of CUs relative to FTAs, considering the latter to be more practical in the current trading climate, such a comparison seems especially relevant. While Baier and Bergstrand (2007 ) find an FTA to approximately double members’ bilateral trade after 10 years, the results of this paper find CUs to have had a much larger impact than FTAs.     

Regional Trade Agreements and Cross‐border Lobbying: Empirical Evidence from the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

This paper documents participation of special interest groups in negotiations of the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement. Using data on the tariff reduction schedules mandated by the agreement, it shows that industries represented by strong lobby groups were faced with more favorable tariff reduction paths in both countries: phase‐out periods were longer at home and shorter in the partner country. This result provides evidence on the involvement of industry lobbying in negotiation of regional trade agreements and suggests that countries negotiating trade agreements are responsive to the interests of lobbying groups from across the border. Both results provide important implications for the political economy theory of trade agreements.     

Market Structure and the Environmental Implications of Trade Liberalization: Russia's Accession to the World Trade Organization

We investigate the environmental impacts of Russia's World Trade Organization (WTO) accession with a computable general equilibrium model incorporating imperfectly competitive firms, foreign direct investment and endogenous productivity. WTO accession increases CO₂ emissions through technique (?), composition (+) and scale (+) effects. We consider three complementary policies to limit CO₂ emissions: cap and trade, emission intensity standards and energy efficiency standards. With imperfectly competitive firms, gains from WTO accession result with any of these policies. If we assume perfectly competitive market structures, the negative environmental impacts of WTO accession are smaller and no net gains arise when environmental regulation involves energy intensity or efficiency standards.     

Trade,GMOs and Environmental Risk: Are Current Policies Likely to Improve Welfare?

Food with inputs from genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has met considerable skepticism among European Union (EU) consumers. The EU import ban on GM food has triggered a great deal of controversy and has been partly replaced by a mandatory labeling scheme. Although there is no measure in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that directly addresses the use of product labeling, WTO and others have been skeptical to mandatory product labeling on the grounds that they may be used as hidden protectionism hampering global welfare. This study has two foci. First, we examine how different policies for the production and use of GMOs might influence the market outcome in consumer food markets. Second, we evaluate the welfare effects of the policy measures. We find that mandatory labeling often increases domestic welfare and, may also enhance global welfare. On the other hand, a trade ban is more likely to decrease global welfare.     

Effects of a Free Trade Agreement on the Exchange Rate Pass‐through to Import Prices

This paper investigates the effect of trade liberalization on the exchange rate passthrough (ERPT) to import prices. To do so, it employs an empirical estimation of the effects of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the Mexican ERPT, and uses a Ricardian general equilibrium model. The model identifies two channels that explain how the trade liberalization alters the ERPT. The first channel is the direct relationship between the tariffs and the pass‐through by good. The second channel is the effect that tariffs have on the composition of imports, altering indirectly the aggregate pass‐through.     

The Role of Trade in Intra‐Industry Productivity Growth—the Case of Old and New European Union Countries

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the role of trade in productivity growth in a sample of 30 sectors in 25 EU countries in the period of rapid East–West integration (1995–2007). Shift‐share analysis is used to show that changes in value added per hour worked in these countries appear to be mainly due to positive developments (rising productivity) within single industries and only to a lower extent result from a shift towards higher productivity activities. Trade is found to be an important positive determinant of intra‐industry productivity growth in European countries. Exports and imports alike can be associated with efficiency gains, but intermediate good exchange and trade with New Member States exert a particularly strong influence on intra‐industry productivity growth in the EU.     

Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement

What is the role of domestic politics in facilitating or constraining a government's decision to participate in free trade agreements (FTAs)? This paper seeks to answer this question by focusing on the domestic politics in Japan over the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). In particular, we ask why the opposition to the TPP encompasses a much broader segment of society than is predicted by trade theorems. We show that a broader protectionist coalition can emerge through persuasion and policy campaigns by the elites, in particular, powerful protectionist interests expending resources to persuade the uncertain public.     

Intra‐industry Knowledge Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in Research and Development: Evidence from China's “Silicon Valley”

This study examines a specific channel of technology diffusion from multinational enterprises to domestic firms in less developed regions: research and development (R&D) activities of multinational enterprises in the host country. Using firm‐level panel data from a Chinese science park, known as China's “Silicon Valley,” we find that the R&D stock of foreign‐owned firms has a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry, while the capital stock of foreign firms has no such effect. These results suggest that foreign firms' knowledge spills over within industries through their R&D activities, but not through their production activities. In addition, we find no evidence of spillovers from domestic firms or firms from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, suggesting that the size of knowledge spillovers is larger when the technology gap between source and recipient firms is larger.     

Vietnam's Accession to the Asean Free Trade Area: Effects on Trade and Industrial Competitiveness

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

Intra‐household bargaining power and household expenditure allocation: Evidence from Iran

This article examines the role of intra‐household bargaining power on household expenditure patterns in Iran to see whether women’s empowerment can achieve similar results in Iran as we have seen it achieve in other countries of the world. This study is insightful because it tells us whether Iranian women, who have experienced both economic and noneconomic constraints over many years, can utilize increased power toward economic development. The bargaining power is measured by the sex ratio in the marriage market. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey in Iran, we find that greater bargaining power of women contributes significantly toward greater provision of education and health expenditure within the household, creating a potential for an increase in welfare for the next generation.     

Dual Poverty Trap: Intra‐ and Intergenerational Linkages in Frictional Labor Markets

This paper constructs an overlapping generations model with a frictional labor market to explain persistent low education in developing countries. When parents are uneducated, their children often face difficulties in finishing school and therefore are likely to remain uneducated. Moreover, if children expect that other children of the same generation will not receive an education, they expect that firms will not create enough jobs for educated workers, and thus are further discouraged from schooling. These intergenerational and intragenerational mechanisms reinforce each other, creating a serious poverty trap. Escape from the trap requires the well‐organized and combined implementation of a subsidy for schooling, support for disadvantaged children, and public awareness programs.