VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.     

市场价值、生产效率与上市公司多元化经营:理论与证据

理论建模和实证分析表明,在股票市场资源配置缺乏效率的情况下,多元化经营对上市公司的市场价值和生产效率具有不同影响。多元化经营最大化了市场价值,但却显著降低了生产效率。这一发现揭示了新兴市场下多元化经营有着自身特点,它体现出一种市场机会主义的短视行为,并由此导致了公司投资扭曲和长期绩效损失。     

IMMIGRATION POLICY, CULTURAL PLURALISM AND TRADE: EVIDENCE FROM THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY

Abstract.   Examining data for Australia and 101 trading partners that span the years 1989–2000, we find immigrants from nations afforded preference under the White Australia policy exert greater proportional influences on Australian imports from their home countries compared to immigrants from nations not privy to such preference. Immigrants from this latter group of countries influence Australian exports to their home countries proportionally more than do immigrants from the former group. We also find immigrant-trade links vary across disaggregated measures of trade. The results suggest that cultural diversity, affected here by immigration policy, is relevant to a nation's trade patterns.     

TRADE POLICY AND MARKET POWER: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE

This article identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. We identify market power by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets following variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing‐to‐market is prevalent in all countries in our sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size. More importantly, we find that the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) is not isomorphic to that of tariffs. Whereas tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through rent‐shifting effects, NTMs reinforce the market power of nonexiting firms, domestic and foreign alike.     

INDUSTRY TRADE BALANCE AND DOMESTIC MERGER POLICY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM U.S. MERGER POLICY FOR MANUFACTURING SECTORS

The literature on antitrust in an open-economy setting is inconclusive with respect to the role played by trade balance on the tenor of domestic merger policy. Using a panel dataset composed of U.S. merger reviews by industrial sector over the 1982–2001 period, I empirically test the impact of sectoral trade balance on the level of antitrust scrutiny. The results suggest that larger trade balances lead to more vigorous antitrust scrutiny; thus "strategic" merger policy does not appear evident, and consumer surplus appears to guide U.S. merger policy even under the lure of international competitive gains.     

ENDOGENOUS ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper develops and tests a model that predicts a positive relationship between absolute levels of capital stock and how favourable are policies toward capital. The theoretical model we use is a model of campaign contributions and electoral competition, extended to consider the implications for factor mobility and hence the structure of production. There are two main predictions. First, countries with more capital stock tend to implement more pro‐capital policies. Second, in a two‐country model, the country that initially has more capital will be able to attract capital inflows from the other country. Given additional assumptions on the production side, this yields the prediction that the more different are countries' policies, the more different will be the set of goods that they produce. These predictions of the model are confirmed using panel data on cross‐state differences in policies and economic outcomes in India.     

ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY*

I characterize the optimal export promoting policy for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for duopolies, it is always optimal to subsidize exports when entry is endogenous, under both quantity and price competition. With homogenous goods the optimal export subsidy is a fraction 1/ε of the price, where ε is the elasticity of demand (the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade theory). Analogously, I show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous.     

CONSISTENT TRADE POLICY AGGREGATION*

Most empirical policy work requires policy aggregation. Trade policy aggregation exemplifies the aggregation problem poignantly, with thousands of highly dispersed trade barriers. This article provides methods of policy aggregation that are consistent with two common objectives of empirical work. One is to preserve real income. The other is to preserve the real volume of activity in the parts of the economy being aggregated. Both objectives must be achieved for consistent multicountry policy modeling. An application to India shows that the standard atheoretic method of aggregation overstates India's real income by around three times the global gains from free trade.     

新贸易理论、比较利益理论及其经验研究的新成果:文献综述

此文择要评述否定贸易理论四大命题(比较利益说、要素价格均等说、斯托尔珀-萨缪尔森定理、罗宾辛斯基定理)的理论研究和经验证据,以及最新的内生比较优势理论和区别分工网络效应和规模经济的新贸易理论.大量的理论研究成果证明,上述四大命题不可能是一般规律,它们只在非常不现实的假定条件、特别的模型和特定参数值范围内成立,而相关的经验证据也推翻了这四大命题.但是,交易效率改进会使更多的分工正网络效应被利用的理论,却是有着相当广泛适用性的规律.     

LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.     

ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME-SERIES APPROACH*

This paper provides a time-series analysis on the relationship between the extent of endogenous trade policy and both political and economic variables. The chosen trade policy indicator is the number of foreign-trade regulations passed each year for the benefit of a single firm or industry. The data are from Uruguay, 1925–1983. This country, which experienced an impressive economic decline, is an outstanding example of the rent-seeking society. The paper shows that endogenous regulations increased with discretionary policies, with adverse macroeconomic shocks and under dictatorship. It also shows that these regulations had a negative long-run effect on the growth rates of output and exports. The short-run effect was positive however.     

DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE*

In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.     

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES*

The “Partisan Theory” of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties typically weight nominal and real economic performance differently, with left-party governments being more inclined than right-party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. Given suitable assumptions about the structure of the macroeconomy, partisan models imply a political signal in demand management, output and inflation movements originating with shifts in party control of the government. In this paper I develop and test with postwar US data a revised Partisan model that allows for (i) uncertainty among policy authorities about the sustainable output growth rate and therefore about how aggregate demand expansions will be partitioned between extra output and extra inflation, and (ii) ex-post and projective learning and preference adjustment under such uncertainty. Dynamic numerical analysis of a small, stylized political-economic model based on these extensions of Partisan Theory generates within-sample forecasts that correspond remarkably well to the observed pattern of price, output and nominal spending fluctuations under the parties.     

GOVERNMENT‐MANDATED DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

We study an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly observable skills that are important to the private sector but not to the public sector. Government regulation allows native majority workers to be employed in the public sector with positive probability while excluding the minority from it. We show that even when the public sector offers the highest wage rate, it is still possible that the discriminated group is, on average, economically more successful. The widening Chinese/Malay wage gap in Malaysia since the adoption of its New Economic Policy in 1970 supports our model.     

PRODUCTIVITY AND BUSINESS CYCLES IN JAPAN: EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE INDUSTRY DATA*

Constructing a database of 37 industries, we examine whether the measured productivity in Japan is pro‐cyclical and investigate the sources of this pro‐cyclicality by using the production function approach employed by Hall (1990) and Basu and Fernald (1995). The aggregate Solow residual displays pro‐cyclicality. A large number of industries show constant returns to scale. No significant evidence for the presence of thick‐market externalities is found. Our results also hold when we consider labour hoarding, part‐time employment, and the adjustment cost of investment. The results indicate that policies to revitalize the Japanese economy should concentrate on promoting productivity growth.     

KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION, AND PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM PLANT-LEVEL DATA FOR IRELAND

This paper investigates whether knowledge accumulating activities, such as exporting, R&D, or worker training, can enhance plants' productivity. To this end, we use plant‐level panel data for Irish manufacturing. Our results importantly indicate that productivity enhancing effects of these factors are found only for domestic firms, but not for foreign multinationals located in Ireland. We postulate a number of potential reasons inherent to multinational activity possibly driving this result.