ADOLESCENT VIDEO GAME PLAYING AND FIGHTING OVER THE LONG‐TERM

I present new evidence of the link between video game play and fighting. The General Learning Model predicts that increased aggression from playing violent video games. These predictions are tested using a large longitudinal data set tracking adolescents over time. Consistent with previous research, there is a positive raw correlation between video game playing as an adolescent and aggressive outcomes, in this case fights, even more than a decade later. However, multivariate and instrumental variables estimators do not find a causal relationship. Some implications are: support policy for further interventions is undermined, future research should be more careful about identification threats, and similar methodological approaches can be applied to the effects of other new communication technologies. (JEL D18, L86, O35)     

TRIBAL CASINO IMPACTS ON AMERICAN INDIANS WELL‐BEING: EVIDENCE FROM RESERVATION‐LEVEL CENSUS DATA

After the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, tribal gaming revenues increased dramatically. Using a differences‐in‐differences methodology with 1990 and 2000 census data, this study finds that American Indians (AI) on gaming reservations experience a 7.4% increase in per capita income and reductions in both family and child poverty rates relative to AI on non‐gaming reservations. Large and medium casinos are associated with changes in well‐being while smaller casinos are not. These results are sensitive to the inclusion of the Navajo reservation, a large non‐gaming reservation with increased income during the 1990s. (JEL I32, L83)     

Video game demand in Japan: a household data analysis

Various economic studies of the video game industry have focused on intra-industry details. This article complements the approach by highlighting broader budget allocation by households. Using the ‘total households’ data of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, this article estimates the demand model for video games. Estimation results show the effects of household income and demographic factors and prices of goods on the expenditure share of video games. These results indicate the importance of explicitly considering a households' budget allocation, or at least, including information on households.     

Chasing after “good jobs.” Do they exist and does it matter if they do?

Most people believe that there are such things as good jobs—jobs that a worker would consider herself lucky to get. But for economists, the existence of good jobs is debatable. In this paper, I provide a definition of a good job based on various theories of the labour market: a job that involves a surplus captured partly by the worker. I use that definition to guide an empirical investigation of the existence and importance of good jobs. I conclude that good jobs do exist—that the labour market does not just function according to a Roy model with wage differentials reflecting only skill differentials, compensating differentials or bond posting—and that their impact on the overall wage structure is substantial. Finally, I discuss the implications of the existence of good jobs for policy setting and for assessments of the justice of a society.     

HEALTH INSURANCE,FERTILITY, AND THE WANTEDNESS OF PREGNANCIES: EVIDENCE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Health insurance reform in Massachusetts lowered the cost of both pregnancy (by increased coverage of pregnancy‐related medical events) and pregnancy prevention (by increasing access to reliable contraception). We empirically examine fertility responses and find no overall effect from increased coverage due to the Massachusetts reform. This finding, however, masks substantial heterogeneity. For married women aged 20 to 34—with high latent fertility and pregnancy wantedness—fertility increased by approximately 1%. For unmarried women in the same age range—for whom pregnancies are typically unwanted—fertility declined by 8%. (JEL I13, I18, J13)     

Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm

Summary. At an interim stage players possessing only their private information freely communicate with each other to coordinate their strategies. This results in a core strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players' alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. Now with new information thus obtained from each other, the players play a new game to re-write their contract. In all of the optimization and gaming just described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler's multidivisional firm. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997     

How do the determinants of firm survival change in the course of the industry life cycle? A fuzzy-set analysis

Industry life-cycle research on firm survival often tests the effects of innovativeness, entry timing, and experience from related industries. However, findings on how these effects change over different stages of the life cycle are scarce. To fill this gap, we perform a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis on a data-set of 58 video game device producers in six product generations. We find that innovation provides a consistent survival advantage only in the mature stage of the life cycle. We also find that experience accumulated within the industry loses its value in the mature stage, and the advantage shifts to de alio entrants only after shake-out. These findings are discussed relating to technological uncertainty, the role of internal and external knowledge, and the construction of sufficient technological performance.     

ALL IN: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING ON INTERNET GAMBLING RESTRICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) which prohibited financial institutions from processing transactions arising from online gaming activities, thereby severely hindering U.S. residents from participating in online casino games, primarily poker. Enactment of this legislation followed lobbying and political pressure from a variety of interest groups. By examining House roll call votes, we identify empirically the sources of political influence that resulted in passage of the internet gambling legislation. We find that party affiliation was of primary importance, with Republicans more likely to vote in favor of the bill. The percentage of constituents who are Evangelical Christians and also the number of gambling establishments in the district were positively associated with votes for the bill. However, contributions from the gaming industry decreased the probability a congressman would vote for the bill. (JEL D72, L83)     

ARE TELEVISION AND VIDEO GAMES REALLY HARMFUL FOR KIDS?

Are watching television (TV) and playing video games really harmful for children's development? By using a unique longitudinal dataset with detailed information on children's development and health, we examined the causal effect of hours of TV watched or of video games played on school‐aged children's problem behavior, orientation to school, and obesity. The results suggested that the answer to the question is yes, but the magnitude of the effect is sufficiently small to be considered as negligible. The results were robust to within‐twin‐fixed effects. (JEL I10, I20)     

Imitation and selective matching in reputational games

This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-run players have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game, but not in the trust game.     

Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.     

EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY DETERRENCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE

Community and specialized enforcement are recognized as important components of deterring antisocial behavior. To provide insights on the interplay between deterrence methods, we examine the empirical evolution of fighting and scoring in the National Hockey League using time series data. We identify structural changes that correlate with changes in player behavior and rules. In particular, we find that player behavior related to fighting changed 4 or 5 years prior to most rule changes aimed at reducing fighting. We conclude that the decline in fighting in hockey was more closely associated with a change in community rather than specialized deterrence methods. (JEL Z22, D71, L83)     

AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE POLICIES FOR ORGAN DONATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This paper examines the association between financial incentives and organ donations. Although the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibits financial compensation for organs for transplant, we focus on the impact of laws that influence the relative cost of deceased and live organ donations on the supply of organs for transplant. First, we hypothesize that states that have relatively stringent funeral regulations, which have been associated with higher whole‐body donations, will have fewer organ donations. Second, we examine the impact of two common state laws that offer financial compensation to live donors: one that allows a tax deduction for costs incurred and the other which entitles government employees up to 30 days of paid leave. We find no evidence to support that these laws affect organ donations. (JEL I11, I18)     

The effects of old and new media on children’s weight

Childhood obesity rates have recently been rising in many countries. It has been suggested in the literature that changes in children’s media exposure may contribute to explaining this trend. I investigate whether or not this hypothesis is supported by data. I contribute to the literature by focusing not only on television but also on new media – computers and video games. The Child Development Supplement to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics is used for the analysis. To address the endogeneity of children’s media exposure, I use dynamic and panel data models. This is another improvement upon the existing literature. Additionally, an extensive list of control variables is included in the regressions. I find that video game playing or computer use has no effect on children’s body weight. On the other hand, television viewing may increase children’s body weight slightly.     

Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences

Summary. This paper investigates Nash equilibrium under the possibility that preferences may be incomplete. I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences. These games with complete preferences can be derived from the original game by a simple linear procedure, provided that preferences admit a concave vector-representation. These theorems extend some results on finite games by Shapley and Aumann. The applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with examples from oligopolistic theory, where firms are modelled to aim at maximizing both profits and sales (and thus have multiple objectives). Mixed strategy and trembling hand perfect equilibria are also discussed.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 24 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, C72, D43.I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Benôit, Juan Dubra, Alejandrio Jofre, Debraj Ray, Kim-Sau Chung and the seminar participants at NYU and at the Universidad de Chile for their comments. I am most grateful to Efe Ok, for his comments, criticism, suggestions and questions.     

ON THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL TAX RATES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

This article examines the determinants of local tax rates. For the two main local taxes in Spain—the property tax and the motor vehicle tax—we test the existence of tax mimicking, yardstick competition, and political trends in a sample of 2,713 municipalities. Using various spatial models, the results support the hypothesis of tax mimicking, with coefficients above 0.40. We also show the relevance of political variables such as the ideology of incumbents and political fragmentation. The fact that incumbents with weaker political support exhibit stronger mimicking behavior is interpreted as evidence in favor of yardstick competition. Finally, we find that incumbents mimic neighboring municipalities ruled by the same political party, confirming the political trends hypothesis. (JEL C31, H71, H77)     

Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining

We report decision making in two-person extensive form game trees, using six treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to examine game theoretic hypotheses of decision making based on dominance and backward induction in comparison with the culturally or biologically derived hypothesis that reciprocity supports more cooperation than predicted by game theory. We find strong support for cooperation under complete information, even in single-play treatments and in games of trust, unreinforced by the prospect of punishment for defection from reciprocity. Only under private information do we observe strong support for noncooperative game theory.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, C92.     

Petty corruption

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium. I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful conversation.     

TRACING THE EFFECTS OF GUARANTEED ADMISSION THROUGH THE COLLEGE PROCESS: EVIDENCE FROM A POLICY DISCONTINUITY IN THE TEXAS 10% PLAN

The Texas 10% law states that students who graduated among the top 10% of their high school class are guaranteed admission to public universities in Texas. We estimate the causal effects of this admissions guarantee on a sequence of connected decisions: students' application behavior, admission decisions by the university, students' enrollment choices conditional on admission; as well as the resulting college achievement. We identify these effects by comparing students just above and just below the top 10% rank cut off. We assume that other student characteristics and incentives are continuous at this cut off. We find that students react to incentives created by the admissions guarantee—for example, by reducing applications to competing private universities. The effects of the admissions guarantee depend on the university and the type of students it attracts. The 10% law is binding and alters the decisions of the admissions committees. We find little evidence that the law increases diversity or leads to meaningful mismatch for the marginal student admitted. (JEL I23, I28)     

Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three‐Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction

We study pure indirect reciprocity by setting up a modified dictator game with three players A, B, and C acting sequentially. Subject A takes a share of a pie and passes the rest to subject B, while B divides the rest between herself and C. We find that this consecutive three‐person dictator game increases generosity compared with the traditional two‐person dictator game. We analyze the influence of social interaction and uncertainty. In treatments with certainty we observe pure indirect reciprocity: B indirectly reciprocates for A's behavior in the decision on how generous to be to C.