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1.
We analyze the effects of structural merger remedies in a Cournot framework. In particular, we extend a basic model approach
by introducing restructuring investments that are necessary to implement divestiture remedies. We assume that such investments
increase the merging parties’ marginal cost of production and show that they therefore reinforce the effect of divestitures
on post-merger competition. As a consequence, if the competition authority does not take restructuring investments into account
while fixing the remedies, the size of the divestiture will be too large and hence over-fix the competition issue. This not
only causes an unduly increase of the market power of the competitor but also reduces the synergy gains of the merging parties
and therefore hurts consumers in the affected markets. 相似文献
2.
We consider the effects of a merger combined with a divestiture that mixes and matches the assets of the two pre‐merger suppliers into one higher‐cost and one lower‐cost post‐merger supplier. Such mix‐and‐match transactions leave the number of suppliers in a market unchanged but, as we show, can be procompetitive or anticompetitive depending on whether buyers are powerful and on the extent of outside competition. A powerful buyer can benefit from a divestiture that creates a lower‐cost supplier, even if it causes the second‐lowest cost to increase. In contrast, a buyer without power is always harmed by a weakening of the competitive constraint on the lowest‐cost supplier. 相似文献
3.
David A. Miller 《European Economic Review》2008,52(3):387-412
This article proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the problem. The implications of these general results are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer industry. The first is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist, by its mere presence, can deter the invention of complements, to its own detriment as well as that of society. The implications of policies such as patent protection, price regulation, and mandatory divestiture are considered. Three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product, a pair of horizontally differentiated firms that can add a new feature to their products, and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a complementary product. 相似文献
4.
Andreas Lange 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2012,52(4):573-583
Previous approaches on market power in emissions trading markets rely on the existence of a subset of competitive players. In this paper, I relax this assumption and treat market power as an endogenous concept which depends on the initial allocation of allowances. All parties realize their potential influence on the market price. This approach allows a clear comparative statics analysis of the impact of the allowance allocation on the efficiency of markets. I provide specific examples that illustrate the implications that stem from the proposed modeling approach relative to previous models. 相似文献
5.
Sarit Moldovan Author Vitae Author Vitae 《Technological Forecasting and Social Change》2004,71(5):425-442
It has long been accepted that word-of-mouth (w-o-m) communications play a key role in new product adoption and much interest has been directed to the positive impact of interpersonal communications on new product dissemination and adoption. Limited attention, however, has been given to the adverse effect of negative w-o-m and consumers' resistance to change, primarily since these negative forces are less visible, leaving no traces in sales data. In this paper, we explore how resistance may shrink market size. In light of the covert nature of negative w-o-m, we use cellular automata modeling to simulate and gain insights into possible resistance scenarios and their implications. We found that, once resistance is enrolled, advertising provides no more than a limited compensating effect, and positive opinion leaders have only low impact on market growth. In a second study, we explore an approach that undermines the effect of resistance leaders through the direct activation of positive opinion leaders prior to the initiation of unfocused marketing efforts. 相似文献
6.
Pehr‐Johan Norbäck Ayça Tekin‐Koru Andreas Waldkirch 《Review of International Economics》2015,23(5):811-845
Multinational firms not only make acquisitions, but also frequently divest affiliates. Affiliate divestiture is the result of many factors, some internal and some external to the firm. Using detailed confidential survey data of Swedish multinationals, we are able to examine divestiture decisions within the context of the world‐wide affiliate network of the firm. In contrast, most existing studies of multinational exit focus on one country only. A model of mergers and acquisitions with financing constraints generates predictions regarding the correlation between affiliate size and the decision to sell. Consistent with this theory, we find that larger affiliates are more likely to be divested, but an increase in relative size of an affiliate reduces the probability of divestiture. Additional network characteristics, the presence of other affiliates nearby and sales of affiliates elsewhere, are also positively correlated with divestiture. We find no support for the notion of footloose multinationals. 相似文献
7.
Timothy J. Brennan 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》1990,2(1):37-51
While cross-subsidization is understood theoretically as involving the sustainability of a cost allocation scheme, it is invoked in regulatory policy contexts, such as the divestiture of AT&T, where costs of serving unregulated markets may be borne by ratepayers of regulated monopolies. We analyze two cross-subsidization tactics—cost misallocation and distorted technological choice — under a spectrum of regulatory cost allocation policies. These tactics lead to higher prices in regulated markets and inefficient production in unregulated markets. Welfare effects are discussed; we conclude with observations on strategic behavior and regulatory policy. 相似文献
8.
Although there are mechanisms to control market power in the spot market, withholding investments can still increase profits and hamper adequate capacity expansion. We examine the effect on investment of one suggested approach to reducing market power, contracting longer term. We construct a stylized model of an energy-only market where two firms, each specializing in one technology, invest in a first stage, contract part of their production in the second stage and sell the rest in the spot market in the third stage. We compare this model to one of an energy-only market having two stages, investment and a spot market. We find cases where the contracts change neither capacity nor peak prices, where the foreclosing effect of one player blocking the other from contracts markets increases investments and reduces prices, and where the opportunity to foreclose the market can incentivize one firm to lower its investment and increase its pricing power to the detriment of consumers. The model relies on the simplest possible assumptions of imperfect competition (subgame perfect equilibria with Cournot agents). We illustrate the different outcomes in a numerical example with two load steps (peak and off-peak) where we change one parameter, the height of the off-peak time segment. We find cases with increased and decreased capacity as well as no change in capacity. Since there is no general characterization of the consequences of contracts in this simple example, there can be no characterization in more complicated models that contain the market structures included here, and regulators or competition authorities cannot rely on contracts to induce sufficient capacity expansion by reducing market power. One other market mechanism that has been proposed to induce investment, a capacity auction with predetermined capacity requirements, is a potential alternative to limit market power that deserves further exploration to determine the extent to which it can provide an adequate incentive to invest in the presence of market power. 相似文献
9.
In the United States, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) operate the power grid serving nearly 70% of electricity customers and are critical organizations for ensuring reliable system operations and facilitating the integration of new technologies and market participants. RTOs are designed to be stakeholder-driven organizations, with rules and policies crafted through a highly participatory process. While the decisions that RTOs make have implications for industry, society and the environment, their decision processes have not been modeled in any systematic way. In this paper, we develop a modeling framework for the stakeholder process of PJM, an RTO serving thirteen states plus the District of Columbia, adapting some of the seminal literature from political science and political economy on the theory of voting systems. This modeling framework can generate predictions of stakeholder process outcomes, identify strong coalitions among stakeholders and identify shifts in political power in the formulation of RTO market rules. We illustrate this analysis framework using a detailed data set from stakeholder deliberations of capacity market reform in PJM. Our model predicts that the current structure of the stakeholder process in PJM makes the passage of capacity market reforms through the stakeholder process virtually impossible because it creates strong coalitions that would favor or oppose changes to capacity market rules. In the capacity market case, we also identify a small subset of voters that act as swing voters and confirm that political power is shifted to these voters by deviations from otherwise strong coalitions and abstentions from the voting process altogether. Our framework represents the first attempt to model the decision-making behavior of RTOs in any systematic way, and points towards emerging research needs in evaluating the governance structure of RTOs. 相似文献
10.
In the second part of the past decade, the usage of fractional Brownian motion for financial models was stuck. The favorable time-series properties of fractional Brownian motion exhibiting long-range dependence came along with an apparently insuperable shortcoming: the existence of arbitrage. Within the last two years, several new models using fractional Brownian motion have been published. However, still the problem remains unsolved whether such models are reasonable choices from an economic perspective.In this article, we take on a straightforward mathematical argument in order to clarify when and why fractional Brownian motion is suited for economic modeling: We provide a fractional analog to the work of Sethi and Lehoczky (1981) thereby confirming that fractional Brownian motion and continuous tradability are incompatible. In the light of a market microstructure perspective to fractional Brownian motion, it becomes clear that the correct usage of fractional Brownian motion inherently implies dynamic market incompleteness.Building a bridge to application, we show that one peculiar, but nevertheless popular result in the literature of fractional option pricing can be well explained by the fact that authors disobeyed this need for compatibility. 相似文献
11.
Regulatory decisions often must be made in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and arguments presented by the affected parties frequently
add to, rather than resolve, that uncertainty. Here, we examine several of the deregulatory decisions affecting the long-distance
market that were rendered by the FCC over the two-decade period following the divestiture of AT&T. Our purpose is to provide
empirical evidence relevant to some of the arguments regarding market conditions that were presented during that period. Findings
suggest that some of the more prominent allegations are not supported by the data.
相似文献
12.
As understanding the market power–risk relationship in CEE banking systems is of the utmost importance to policy-makers in these countries, we investigate whether CEE banks must have greater market power to be safer. Our results suggest that more market power reduces the fragility of banking institutions, on one hand, and that banking market concentration tends to make these banks riskier, on the other. Our findings are robust to whatever form of market power-risk relationship and whatever market-power measures we use. More precisely, financial markets perceive CEE banks with more market power as less fragile, while the latter are also better capitalised with respect to the distribution of their returns. Moreover, they are even (much) better capitalised when they hold less-diversified and less-liquid assets and when they operate within a stricter banking regulatory environment, which suggests a risk-stabilising role for diversification, liquidity and the bank regulatory environment in these countries. 相似文献
13.
In liberalized power systems, generation and transmission services are unbundled, but remain tightly interlinked. Congestion management in the transmission network is of crucial importance for the efficiency of these inter-linkages. Different regulatory designs have been suggested, analyzed and followed, such as uniform zonal pricing with redispatch or nodal pricing. However, the literature has either focused on the short-term efficiency of congestion management or specific issues of timing investments. In contrast, this paper presents a generalized and flexible economic modeling framework based on a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. The model covers short-run operation and long-run investments and hence, allows to analyze short and long-term efficiency of different congestion management designs that vary with respect to the definition of market areas, the regulation and organization of TSOs, the way of managing congestion besides grid expansion, and the type of cross-border capacity allocation. We are able to identify and isolate implicit frictions and sources of inefficiencies in the different regulatory designs, and to provide a comparative analysis including a benchmark against a first-best welfare-optimal result. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a detailed representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, consisting of 70 nodes and 174 power lines. Analyzing six different congestion management designs until 2030, we show that compared to the first-best benchmark, i.e., nodal pricing, inefficiencies of up to 4.6% arise. Inefficiencies are mainly driven by the approach of determining cross-border capacities as well as the coordination of transmission system operators’ activities. 相似文献
14.
金融危机背景下中国碳交易市场现状和趋势 总被引:13,自引:0,他引:13
我国碳交易市场已经兴起,未来的碳减排潜力巨大。但我国碳交易市场的发展还很不完善,存在着交易价格过低、开发项目领域过窄等问题。作为一种战略性的资源,碳排放权的低价出售,可能会给我国带来风险。当前,受金融危机的影响,我国碳交易市场短期内将经历低谷,但长期看前景依然乐观。因此,应加强碳交易方法学研究,尽快培养碳交易专门人才,加快相关中介咨询、金融服务机构的建设,尤其要部署争取碳交易市场的定价权。 相似文献
15.
Patrice Bougette 《Research in Economics》2010,64(3):162-174
This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of asset transfers in preventing unilateral effects of a merger. We show that asset divestitures allow the remedying of certain price increases. Market size negatively impacts the scope of the divestiture package, while the number of merging firms increases with it. In spite of the required asset sale, parties’ profitability remains ensured in most cases. Buyers always make profit from their purchase if industry fixed costs are rather low. We also add the alternative of a second buyer and compare outcomes with both consumer and welfare standards. Furthermore, as many mergers lead to efficiency gains, we integrate specific cost synergies and show that the higher the synergies, the smaller the divestiture share. In the case when no buyers are available, we show that the option of divesting to a start-up entity is bound to fail if firms’ technology remains the same. Lastly, we find that product differentiation can reduce the efficiency of the asset transfer. 相似文献
16.
Nakil Sung 《Applied economics》2013,45(25):3037-3048
This study analyses the progress of market concentration in OECD member states’ mobile telecommunications markets and evaluates the relationship between market concentration and performance. Using annual panel data from 24 OECD member states for the 1998–2011 period, the study estimates regression equations for market concentration, mobile prices and profits. The empirical results indicate that the more concentrated the mobile market, the higher the prices and profits, providing support for the market power hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds, then market concentration can be a useful indicator of market performance. On the other hand, the applicability of the hypothesis is unclear for the second half of the sample period. The results provide evidence that regulatory policies influence the structure and performance of mobile markets. 相似文献
17.
This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structures (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, and Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases toward a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government. 相似文献
18.
In this paper, we consider conjectural variations in a simple static general equilibrium model under oligopolistic competition. The modeling of conjectures captures the role played by beliefs in a micro-founded model. So, the economy may have three kinds of symmetric general equilibria. Furthermore, these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by the conjectural variation parameter. Finally, we consider the implementation of a tax on the strategic behaviors in case of balanced-budget rule. The comparative statics illustrates the idea according to which the effectiveness of the multiplier mechanism to mitigate the market distortions depends on the symmetric equilibrium considered. Therefore, the effect of the tax on the prices and economic activity depends on the degree of market power which is conjectured by the agents. 相似文献
19.
In this paper, we follow the theoretical framework proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) to investigate the role of the state in resolving business disputes and its impact on enterprise performance. Using a survey of private enterprises in China, we first construct an index to quantify the power of the state vis-à-vis the market in resolving business disputes, and then find that enterprises located in regions where the government has a greater relative power enjoy better performance. Our results suggest that the regulatory state has played a positive role in the economic transition in China. 相似文献
20.
We undertake an analysis of regulatory consistency using a database of publicly available regulatory decisions in Australia. We propose a simple exploratory model which allows us to test for regulatory consistency across jurisdictions and industries without detailed knowledge of the regulatory process. We compare two measures using our approach—the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the proportion of firms' revenue requirement claims disallowed by the regulator. Our comparison suggests that the WACC is a very poor measure of regulatory consistency. Moreover, our empirical results may be interpreted as indicating that a range of measures ought to be considered when assessing regulatory consistency. Our results also provide an empirical foundation for theoretical modeling of regulatory processes. (JEL L51) 相似文献