Quantitative monetary policies and the portfolio composition of commercial banks

In this paper two quantitative monetary policy instruments imposed on commercial banks, i.e., a loan ceiling and an investment coefficient are analysed. The loan policy imposes a ceiling on the amount lent to the private sector; an investment coefficient imposes a floor on credits granted to the government. Both instruments facilitate, through different channels, the finance of government deficits. For the two instruments two scenario's are contrasted: a moral suasion and an imperative policy scheme. The first policy is pursued if no sanctions are imposed by the central bank; the second scheme applies if such sanctions are part of the policy.     

Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to invest when a deregulation process is initiated and an unregulated firm enters the market as a result. The change in the marginal return to investment depends on how the investment changes the firm's virtual cost—the sum of its physical production and information costs. When the marginal return to investment increases due to deregulation, social welfare increases as a result of higher investment and more competition. Otherwise, the change in social welfare depends on the total of the effects in the fall of investment and increased competition. We also present conditions under which deregulation enhances welfare.     

The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?

We draw on established theoretical works in international political economy to compare the empirical effect of threatened and imposed economic sanctions on international trade. To deepen the analysis, we analyze whether there are any differential effects when different instruments of sanctions are employed, as well as whether the effect of sanctions is product specific. To do this, we use the gravity model and recent detailed disaggregated data on sanctions spanning the period 1960–2009. Our results show that the impact of threatened sanctions differs qualitatively and quantitatively from imposed sanctions. Whereas imposed sanctions lead to a decrease in the trade flow between the sender and its target, a threat of sanctions leads to an increase. The positive impact of the threat may be due to economic agents in both the sender and its target resorting to stockpiling prior to the actual imposition of sanctions to minimize any adverse consequences of the sanctions. These differential effects of threatened and imposed sanctions also extend to food and medicinal products, as well as when different instruments of sanctions are employed.     

Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation

“Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for the provision of public goods. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This effect can produce multiple equilibria with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved by imposing temporary taxes or subsidies, or through advertising that influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.     

Nexus between economic sanctions and inflation: a case study in Iran

Conventional studies have applied dummy variables to analyse the relationship between economic sanctions and inflation while we construct an index which is called Trade-Financial Sanctions (TF index). TF Index is a liner combination of indices which includes trade openness and foreign investment by applying the principal component model. Through the TF index and market exchange rate the impact of economic sanctions on inflation is analysed in the three phases of sanctions; free sanctions, heavy sanctions, and light sanctions. The results illustrate that the TF index decreases inflation when the Iran’s economy experiences free sanctions or light sanctions relative to when the economy is in heavy sanctions. Heavy sanctions create instability in the market exchange rates and widening the gap between the market and the official exchange rates. Furthermore, economic sanctions increase expected inflation among the people and drive higher inflation. Therefore, these results suggest that the government should work more seriously to solve the main obstacles of trade and investment inflows imposed by the economic sanctions.     

An experimental analysis of the effects of automated mitigation procedures on investment and prices in wholesale electricity markets

In this paper we report the findings of an economic experiment that examines the effects of an automated mitigation procedure (AMP) on prices and capacity investment choices of suppliers in a wholesale electricity market. Specifically, we examine the effects of different market power incentives on markets with and without an AMP. While we find that the AMP does not affect overall investment in capacity, the most significant determinant of long-run prices is investment in new capacity. The AMP also does not reduce long-run prices relative to markets without an AMP. Furthermore, our participants successfully manipulated the AMP’s trigger price. The data and a sample copy of the instructions are available upon request. This article reflects the opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any individual Commissioner.     

Which sanctions matter? analysis of the EU/russian sanctions of 2014

We use a quasi-natural experiment of reciprocal imposition of trade sanctions by Russia and the EU since 2014. Using UNCTAD/BACI bilateral flows data we take this unique opportunity to analyse both sanctions. In particular, we study the effectiveness of narrow versus broadly defined sanctions, and differences in the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on exports and imports. We show that the Russian sanctions imposed on European and American food imports resulted in about an 8 times stronger decline in trade flows than those imposed by the EU and the US on exports of extraction equipment. These results do not appear to be driven by diversion of trade flows via non-sanctioning countries. Hence the difference in sanctions’ effectiveness can be attributed to the limited retroactivity of Western sanctions, which allowed exemptions for exports made pursuant to contracts made prior to 2014.     

Industrial policy in developing countries

Traditionally, proindustry policies were associated with incentives for import substitution and an inward-oriented development strategy. This is no longer so. Whereas in the past, world-market orientation was seen as implying reliance on primary production, today policies favoring international competition and export orientation are considered compatible with policies favoring rapid industrialization. Differences of opinion on the appropriate degree of public intervention remain. The debate between “purist” laissez-faire advocates and those who believe in industrial planning, public investment, and generous subsidies often obscures the real need for reduction in antiexport bias, rationalization of incentives, and reform of public-sector activities.     

Sudden stops, banking crises and investment collapses in emerging markets

We evaluate whether financial openness leaves emerging market economies vulnerable to the adverse effects of capital reversals (“sudden stops”) on domestic investment. We investigate this claim in a broad sample of emerging markets during the period 1976–2002. If the banking sector does not experience a systemic crisis, sudden stop events fail to have a significant impact on investment. Bank crises, on the other hand, have a significant negative effect on investment even in the absence of a contemporaneous sudden stop crisis. We also find that openness to capital flows worsens the adverse impact of banking crises on investment. Our results provide statistical support for the policy view that a strong banking sector which can withstand the negative fallout of capital flight is essential for countries that open their economies to international financial flows.     

Trade policy and ecology

Trade sanctions on product exports are often used as measures for conservation of stocks of living resources. Two opposing approaches are investigated. The harvest approach argues that sanctions reduce the harvest, and thus protects the stock. It is shown that this does not consider the long run effects nor the effects of sanctions on the management system. The investment approach argues that increased price protects the stock, making the species a profitable investment. It is shown that this approach does not consider the asset effects of price changes, and that the sanctions usually increase the stock in an one species analysis. If the wildlife competes for land the conclusions may be different, but still sanctions usually works. If the manager has a joint management of several species, the stock effects of sanctions are ambiguous, depending on both the species interaction, and the profitability of the harvesting from each of them. In this case it is not possible to use intuitive reasoning, sanctions give distortions to all stocks simultaneously. The threat of extinction depends crucially on the unit cost in harvesting of depleted stocks. The paper concludes that trade policy is a too general measure for the management of living resources, and may implicate important economic distortions to the ecological system.This study is partially funded by the Research Council of Norway (Environment and Development). I thank Derek Clark, Tore Thonstad, Frode Steen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Contribution-proportional remuneration rule for employee inventions and its effects on effort and investment incentives

The practice of the Japanese court in case of a dispute between the employer and employee regarding the amount of remuneration for an employee invention has been to order that the additional profit from the invention be divided proportionally to their respective input contributions. We show that, if the employer’s investment and employee’s effort are weakly complementary, this rule causes the share effect (excessive incentives on the part of each party to expend investment or effort in order to increase his/her share of the surplus) to dominate the probability effect (insufficient incentives arising from the fact that each party obtains only part of the increase in the expected surplus), and thus leads to excessive investment and effort relative to the joint-payoff-maximising levels. If the court cannot capture the employer’s investment as fully as the employee’s effort, the employer’s investment may be too low compared to the joint-payoff-maximising level.     

Fashion statement

We study bilateral matching under private information about agents' characteristics. Assortative matching is the only equilibrium outcome in the absence of private information. When an information friction is present, the matching process can be improved if a payoff-irrelevant variable which we term “fashion” is introduced. Informed agents choose to adopt fashion as a signaling device. If success in matching is observed, other agents can imitate the signal. Thus, for fashion to be useful, it must constantly change. If there are more than two types of agents, both “high” and “low” fashion are needed to facilitate assortative matching.     

On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.JEL Classification: C91, C92     

How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market

I model inefficient resource allocations in M-form organizations due to influence activities by division managers that skew capital budgets in their favor. Corporate headquarters receives two types of signals about investment opportunities: private signals that can be distorted by managers, and public signals that are undistorted but noisy. Headquarters faces a tradeoff between the cost of attaining an accurate private signal and the value of the information the signal provides. In contrast to existing models of “socialism” in internal capital markets, I show that investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q is higher than first-best in firms where division managers hold equity (a result consistent with evidence presented in Scharfstein, 1998). When managers face high private costs from distorting information (equity holdings), headquarters may commit to investment contracts that place “too little” weight on private signals and “too much” weight on public signals (i.e. Q). This result has implications for managers in the design of capital budgeting processes and incentive compensation systems.     

Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.     

Exploitation and Growth

I develop a model of exploitation—coercive wealthtransfer—and growth based on social importance. Exploitationreduces growth since the return to capital falls with exploitationcosts. Initial relative wealth across groups—the measureof social importance—determines which group is the exploiterand how costly exploitation will be. The exploiter selects anexploitation path that maintains its dominant position and rarelymaximizes current transfers. Productive minorities and fast-growinggroups are most prone to exploitation. International sanctions,if strong, end exploitation; otherwise they increase exploitationand reduce growth. Segregation and apartheid are broadly consistentwith the theory.     

SHAREHOLDERS' UNANIMITY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS*

When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its optimal level of investment. In contrast, with binding borrowing constraints, constrained shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.     

Absenteeism: A comparison of incentives in alternative organizations

This paper uses a game-theoretic model to analyze the incentives workers may have to play “hookey” from work given that there is an outwardly unobservable probability of being sick and thus being unable to work. We compare incentives and equilibria in labor-managed firms (LMFs) and in profit-maximizing firms (PMFs), both in single-period and repeated games. We show, among other things, that in an egalitarian LMF there are circumstances under which members will not work when it is optimal to work, while the PMF suffers from the opposite problem; daily paid workers will work even when it would be better if they did not.     

Can racially unbiased police perpetuate long-run discrimination?

We develop a stylized dynamic model of highway policing in which a non-racist police officer exhibits a cognitive bias: relative overconfidence. The officer is given incentives to arrest criminals but faces a per stop cost that increases when the racial mix of her stops differs from that of the population. By observing the racial composition of jail inmates, she estimates crime rates of each race. Her overconfidence regarding eventual incarceration of criminals is shown to lead her to overestimate the crime rate of one race causing the long-run racial composition of the jail population to deviate from the “fair” one.