Is the Retail Gasoline Market Local or National?

This paper studies the effect of station density on prices in the retail gasoline market in the Czech Republic. We estimate the impact of the number of competing stations in various driving-distance ranges around each station on prices. We find that station density has a negative effect on prices; the effect decreases with distance and is statistically significant up to six kilometers. This suggests that the retail gasoline market is local rather than national.     

Product line competition and price promotions

Besides its familiar demand-redistribution effect, price promotion by a multi-product firm creates cannibalization, as lowering the price of one variety may erode the profits of its other varieties. We study endogenous product line selection and price promotions in a duopoly. In equilibrium, the ex ante symmetric firms may offer asymmetric product lines with unequal length. The two-product firm is more profitable. The single-product firm offers a larger mean discount and promotes more (less) frequently than its competitor when the former’s unit cost is relatively low (high).     

Why Abandon the Paradise? Stations’ Incentives to Reduce Gasoline Prices at First

The German petrol station market is characterized by strong intraday price cycles, which probably correspond to the well-known Edgeworth cycles. The prices go up strongly in the late evening or in the middle of the night, fall relatively heavily in the early morning, and then go up and down several times in the course of the day. Locally, the analysis is limited to the 26 petrol stations that plausibly form a common market in the Lueneburg region. This paper picks out the specific sequence in which, after generally rising prices during the day, a single supplier is the first to reverse the price trend and lower its price. For this purpose, current price reports are used to define the price reduction event down to the second, and to show only the valid prices of competitors prior to the event. All German petrol stations have to report price changes to the Bundeskartellamt's Market Transparency Department. Tankerkoenig then publishes the full reports. This results in one panel observation for each price reduction event. Out of nearly 300,000 price observations, just over 10,000 panel observations result. Fixed-effect logit estimates are used to test whether the theoretically and economically significant price differences of the Edgeworth cycles explain the behavior of the price cutters, or whether market structure factors, such as brand affiliation/independence of the petrol station, service offerings, or location characteristics predict price-cutting behavior. The novel recording of the price dynamics in the petrol station market by using the accurate petrol station price data to the second indicates promising research of extensive price data and avoids the enormous loss of information in the previously common calculation of average prices at certain times.

     

Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion

We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively the pricing strategy (perfect price discrimination or uniform pricing), and from the second stage onward collude on prices. We show that for intermediate discount factors and high firms’ asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing price discrimination. In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms’ asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates. When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Too close to be similar: Product and price competition in retail gasoline markets

We examine how product and pricing decisions of retail gasoline stations depend on local market demographics and the degree of competitive intensity in the market. We are able to shed light on the observed empirical phenomenon that proximate gasoline stations price very similarly in some markets, but very differently in other markets. Our analysis of product design and price competition between firms integrates two critical dimensions of heterogeneity across consumers: Consumers differ in their locations and in their travel costs, as in models of horizontal differentiation. They also differ in their relative preference or valuations for product quality dimensions, in terms of the offered station services (such as pay-at-pump, number of service bays or other added services), as in models of vertical differentiation. We find that the degree of local competitive intensity and the dispersion in consumer incomes are sufficient to explain variations in the product and pricing choices of competing firms. Closely located retailers who face sufficient income dispersion across consumers in a local market may differentiate on product design and pricing strategies. In contrast, retailers that are farther apart from each other may adopt similar product design and pricing strategies if the market is relatively homogeneous on income. Using empirical survey data on prices and station characteristics gathered across 724 gasoline stations in the St. Louis metropolitan area, and employing a multivariate logit model that predicts the joint probability of stations within a local market differentiating on product design and pricing strategies as a function of market demographics and local competitive intensity, we find strong support for the central implications of the theory.

Why offer lower prices to past customers? Inducing favorable social price comparisons to enhance customer retention

Price discrimination policies vary widely across companies. Some firms offer new customers the lowest price; others give preferential prices to their past customers. We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in behavior-based pricing by exploring how customers’ social price comparisons, i.e., comparing one’s price to that received by similar peers, impact the optimal structure of price discrimination. Social price comparisons have a negative (positive) impact on customers’ transaction utility if the price charged to past customers is higher (lower) than a new customer’s price. Using an analytical model with vertically differentiated firms, we show that a firm with relatively large market share will reward its past customers with relatively low prices when social price comparisons have a sufficiently large impact on utility. Furthermore, we find that social price comparisons lead to a relaxation of the price competition for new customers. Thus, both firms can earn higher profits when such comparisons are made than when they are absent. We also examine how other factors, such as horizontal competition and strategic customers, interact with social price comparison concerns to impact pricing strategies. Finally, we show how pricing behavior differs when price comparisons are based on historic reference prices rather than on peers’ prices.     

A Welfare Evaluation of History-Based Price Discrimination

We design an asymmetric duopoly model with inherited market dominance such that the dominant firm and the smaller firm can price discriminate based on consumers’ purchase history. We show that uniform pricing softens competition leading to higher industry profits than under history-based pricing. Consumers benefit from history-based price discrimination unless the switching cost is sufficiently high and the inherited degree of dominance is sufficiently weak. A ban on history-based pricing would typically introduce a distributional conflict between consumers and producers. Finally, we establish that the gains to industry profits associated with uniform pricing exceed the associated losses to consumers.     

Can Banning Spatial Price Discrimination Improve Social Welfare?

We analyze a two-stage sequential-move model of location and pricing to identify firm’s location, output, and welfare. We consider two pricing regimes (mill pricing and spatial price discrimination) and, unlike previous literature, allow in each of them for a non-uniform population density, non-constant location costs (i.e., the setup costs, such rental costs and land prices, differ by firm’s location), and endogenous market boundaries. Under constant location costs, our results show the firm locates at the city center under both mill and discriminatory pricing, and that output is larger under spatial price discrimination. Welfare comparisons are, however, ambiguous. Under non-constant location costs, we find the optimal location can move away from the city center, and does not coincide across pricing regimes. Compared with mill pricing, spatial price discrimination generates a higher level of output. We also find that welfare is higher (lower) under mill than under discriminatory pricing when transportation rates are low (high, respectively).     

Pass-Through by Multi-Product Firms

How does cost pass-through to prices depend on the set of products a multi-product firm owns? Using a structural demand model for the Swedish beer market, we simulate equilibrium cost pass-through for varying counterfactual ownership patterns. We find that a firm with a larger number of products in its portfolio and a higher degree of substitutability among these products adopts a lower pass-through of costs. While the direction of results is robust, our simulations show that the muting effect on pass-through is limited when comparing pass-through by stand-alone firms to pass-through under the actual, moderately concentrated market structure.     

Endogenous Market Structures in the Presence of a Socially Responsible Firm

We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. the duopoly comprises a typical managerial firm with a sales delegation and a socially responsible firm (CSR firm) with a linear combination of social welfare and quantity as its managerial delegation contract. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium market structure changes from the case wthere both firms adopt sales delegation contracts to the case wthere one of the firms becomes a CSR firm, after the owners of the firms select their strategic contracts. We show that two market structures that are asymmetric with respect to their strategic contracts can become equilibrium market structures under the pure strategic contract class. Furthermore, we consider a unique mixed strategy equilibrium to examine how the risk domination between the two asymmetric equilibrium market structures affects equilibrium selection. there, we find that the competition wthere the firm with the sales delegation and the CSR firm have a price contract and a quantity contract, respectively, risk-dominates the competition wthere the firms have a quantity contract and a price contract, respectively. Finally, by deriving the order of social welfare among the four subgames, we show that the social incentive does not coincide with the private incentive in the robust equilibrium with respect to risk domination in the endogenous selection game of the strategic contracts of the asymmetric duopoly with the firm with a sales delegation and the CSR firm.     

Regional Patterns in Gasoline Station Rationalization in Canada

The number of gasoline stations in Canada fell by 40 % over the 1990s. Over the same period, the industry evolved from a large number of small stations with full service and automotive service bays, to large self serve stations with car washes and convenience stores. Demand and cost related theories of rationalization can explain the nationwide trends, but seem less able to explain city level variation in the timing and magnitude of rationalization. In this paper, we make use of a brand-level panel data set of station counts, shutdowns and characteristics for 12 Canadian cities from 1990 to 2005 to examine the relative importance of different region-level events and changes to the evolution of gasoline retailing. We find that market structure events and regulations are more strongly associated with the shutdown patterns of independent gasoline retailers than refinery-brand stations.     

Local Market Structure and Strategic Organizational Form Choices: Evidence from Gasoline Stations

An extensive literature shows that agency issues and transaction costs impact vertical integration decisions. Another mature literature indicates that market structure influences competitive behavior. Less consideration has been given to how vertical integration and market structure may interact. I address this gap by focusing on the potential for moral hazard arising from intra-firm competition. Focusing on retail gasoline sales, I argue that when multiple stations share a common brand in a market, a vertically separated station has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy that the brand-owning refiner would prefer. I empirically test this prediction using rich data, and find evidence of both such moral hazard and the desire to avoid it.     

Discriminatory Prices,Predation and Signal-Jamming in a Horizontal Differentiation Model

We study the effects of predation in an asymmetric duopoly model à la Hotelling in which the incumbent is able to price discriminate while the entrant sets a uniform price. We show that when the discount factor is high (low) enough and the incumbent accommodates entrance the incumbent initially sets a uniform price (discriminatory prices) and then engages in price discrimination. Under certain conditions, the entrant prices aggressively in order to discourage predation from the incumbent: predation actually does not occur and all equilibrium prices are lower with respect to the case in which the threat of predation is absent. In a T-period model, we derive conditions under which the equilibrium prices increase over time until they stabilize at the level that would result in the absence of the threat of predation.     

Investigating the unobserved heterogeneity in consumers’ sensitivity to the price of gasoline

We empirically examined how gasoline prices impact consumers’ shopping behaviors. Using individual panel data on gasoline transactions, we found that gasoline prices generally have a statistically and economically significant impact. However, our disaggregate analysis indicated that, across consumers, considerable heterogeneity was present in the underlying sensitivity to the price of gasoline and in the income effect, resulting from fluctuating gasoline prices. More interestingly, the significant effect of gasoline prices was largely driven by the consumers with large purchase volume, and consumers with the highest level of gasoline consumption remained almost perfectly insensitive to the price of gasoline. Such heterogeneity is also present in the effect of gasoline prices on grocery expenditures, and notably, consumers with the largest purchase volume were not associated with statistically significant changes in grocery expenditures. Theoretical background suggests that the financial constraints of consumers and primary vehicle use may explain about the differences in responses to gasoline prices. Results based on individual-level data allowed for a comprehensive understanding of how and how much gasoline prices affect consumer behaviors and showed that inelastic gasoline demand and the considerable income effect due to gasoline prices may not best describe the effect of gasoline prices.     

Constraints on transactions in the futures markets for output and inputs

In previous studies it was shown that the prevailance of a forward market in which a competitive firm can sell and buy unrestricted quantities of its output or of an input in employs in production eliminates the effects of the corresponding price uncertainties on production decisions. In this study we examine the effects on production decisions of narrowing the range of transactions a firm can perform. It turns out that restricting the firm only to hedge either in the output forward market or the input forward market makes the production decisions again sensitive to expected future prices and the attitude of the firm towards risk.     

The multichannel pricing dilemma: Do consumers accept higher offline than online prices?

Whether to unify or discriminate prices in offline and online channels is a controversial topic that can be central to whether offline retailers survive in the marketplace. Field data evidence from a large multichannel retailer reveals a sobering picture. On average, only offline price premiums of approximately 2% seem feasible, and such premiums vary largely by product categories and price levels. High-priced products, which consumers perceive as risky, tend to allow offline price premiums, as do low-priced, takeaway items. However, in between these two extremes, the results show no potential for offline price premiums. Drawing on price fairness theory, we further explore consumer responses to higher offline prices in three experimental studies. In contrast with the assumptions of price fairness theory, the provision of purchase advisory services and communication of the price motive hardly stimulate consumer acceptance of higher offline prices in our context. However, the findings reveal important heterogeneity in consumer responses depending on their market segment, because some market segments indeed respond less negatively to higher offline prices. In addition, consumers accept offline price premiums for unplanned purchases.     

Quality-cum-price sorting

This paper provides new evidence on how export status relates to prices and product quality. Using firm-product-level data on production, exports and imports for a sample of Danish manufacturing firms, we present three key correlations. First, exported varieties are on average sold at lower prices relative to only domestically sold varieties. Second, exported varieties have higher quality measured by ‘demand residuals’ (i.e., they have larger sales conditional on price). Finally, exported varieties are produced using cheaper imported intermediates. We introduce the term ‘quality-cum-price sorting’ to describe this sorting environment. The observed sorting behaviour in terms of output quality and import prices works not just across firms, but also within multi-product firms across the product portfolio. In contrast, the negative exporter premium in terms of output prices vanishes once firm-level unobservables are accounted for—consistent with the idea that unobserved firm efficiency is driving the negative correlation.     

Mixed pricing in online marketplaces

A rich theory literature predicts mixed strategies in posted prices due to standard price discrimination, search frictions, and various other rationales. While typically interpreted as implying occasional sales or price dispersion, online marketplaces enable a firm to truly use randomization as a tool in pricing, and so such behavior should be expected to arise in online settings. We investigate a case of mixed pricing across a large subset of products on a major e-commerce website. We first test for randomizing behavior, and then construct a model of price discrimination that would generate randomization as optimal behavior. We estimate the model and use it to assess pricing effects of a proposed merger in the industry.     

Stock Market Liquidity and Firm Value: An Empirical Examination of the Australian Market

We document a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value. We examine the mechanism through which stock market liquidity enhances firm value by dividing firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q, into three components, namely, operating income to price, leverage, and operating income to assets. Using the switch to broker anonymity as an exogenous shock to market liquidity, we show that the increase in liquidity around the shock leads to an increase in firm value. Our results suggest that higher firm value for more liquid stocks seems to stem from enhanced stock prices rather than from better operating performance.