基于高管变更下的盈余管理研究——以沪市A股上市公司为例

文章以沪市A股上市公司2006²011年数据为研究样本,研究高管变更会导致怎样的盈余管理发生。研究结果显示:在CEO变更当年,企业倾向于采用应计项目负向盈余管理;在CEO变更后的一至二年内,企业倾向于运用应计项目和真实活动正向盈余管理,这源于新上任的CEO急于通过盈余管理调节来增加企业的会计盈余,从而粉饰自己上任后的经营业绩并向高层领导者展示自己的"能力"。     

企业费用支出乘数及其合适度研究——以中国制造业上市公司为例

文章设计出一个反映企业费用支出相对水平的指标:费用支出乘数(EM,Expend iture Mu ltip lier),费用支出乘数是一定时期内的年均营业、管理费用合计与年均主业利润之比,通过对费用支出乘数的研究,达到指导企业合理控制费用支出水平的目的。文章的研究思路是,第一步,选择和确定研究样本,第二步,定义研究指标并分析样本公司费用支出及业绩状况,第三步,分析样本公司费用支出与经营业绩的关系,第四步,确定费用支出乘数合适度,第五步,给出研究结论。本文的研究结论是,我国制造业上市公司的经营业绩水平偏低,     

高管背景对股票发行抑价的影响

本文以2009²011年创业板204个上市公司为研究对象,基于高管背景的社会合法性和政治合法性从创业企业IPO抑价影响的角度进行了研究。结果发现,在创业板中,高管社会合法性与企业IPO抑价水平之间的关系并不显著;高管政治合法性与企业IPO抑价水平之间存在显著的相关关系。这个结果表明:处在转轨经济中的中国,由于政府对企业较强的干预,高管的政治合法性具有更强的信号传递功能。     

行业锦标赛激励与并购业绩承诺达标程度

高管的行业竞赛心理不仅会影响其并购决策行为,还会刺激其关注企业并购整合及并购业绩承诺的履行情况和达标程度。以2011-2019年中国A股上市公司签订业绩承诺协议的并购事件作为研究对象,考察行业锦标赛激励对标的公司业绩承诺达标程度的影响。研究发现行业锦标赛激励与业绩承诺达标程度显著正相关,表明高管受到的行业锦标赛激励效应越强,越有动机和压力督促标的公司提高业绩承诺达标率。进一步研究发现,真实盈余管理在行业锦标赛激励与业绩承诺达标程度之间起到中介作用。行业锦标赛激励对业绩承诺达标程度的提升作用在并购方是非国有企业、并购支付方式为股份支付、承诺补偿方式为股份补偿的情形下更显著。     

一部高度浓缩的中华文明简史——《大中华赋》连载

宋祖^[1]乃真英雄,陈桥兵变^[2],市不易肆^[3],杯酒论心,大将解印^[4],理性开国冠千古;Emperor Taizu^[1],a valiant man indeed,schemed Chenqiao Mutiny^[2]but brought no handover^[3]in business;talking heart-to-heart over a drink,he deprived the generals of their commands^[4]in peace.A rational founder he was revered,incomparable over a thousand years.[1]宋祖:这里指宋太祖赵匡胤（927—976）,宋王朝的建立者。[2]陈桥兵变:赵匡胤夺取后周政权的政变。后周显德六     

一部高度浓缩的中华文明简史——《大中华赋》连载

五霸七雄^[1]各有志,风云激荡,尽显英雄真本色;司马大法^[2]孙武^[3]谋,以战止战,自古攻城非上策。Comparable in ambitions the Five Hegemons and the Seven States^[1]are,proved true heroes in waging wars near and far.The Methods of the Sima^[2]and Art of War^[3],aiming to pre-empt war with war,take it unwise to conquer by force.[1]五霸七雄:五霸,指中国春秋时期先后称霸的五个诸侯,一般指齐桓公、晋文公、宋襄公、秦穆公、楚庄王。七雄是战国时期势力最强的七个诸侯国的统称,即齐、楚、燕、韩、赵、魏、秦。     

关于作业成本法在企业期间费用管理中的研究

对期间费用依照作业成本法的成本动因对其进行费用分配的管理。通过对期间费用的分配,了解企业产品真实成本的构成,以便企业进行产品结构调整时,对期间费用的预算更准确、做出的经营决策更准确。目前,我国期间管理费用问题仍然比较多,文章根据我国企业中最常见的问题通过作业成本法对此分析,探讨企业实行作业成本法期间费用分配制度的意义及其应用一些建议,从而对期间费用的使用作进一步的探讨。     

浅析生产过程的业务核算

料、工、费是指原材料的消耗、员工的薪酬支付、其他直接费用的分摊,凡是与车间一线有关的消耗通过"生产成本"账户棱算:凡是与车间有关但是不直接构成产品实际成本的消耗通过"制造费用"账户核算:凡是与行政管理部门有关的消耗通过"管理费用"账户核算.折旧夤、办公费、修理费、劳动保护用品费等,凡是与车间有关的通过"制造费用"账户棱算:凡是与行政管理部门有关的通过"管理费用"账户核算.     

从权责发生制核算看企业经营遇到的问题

权责发生制,是以收益和费用是否已经发生为标准,确定本期经营收入的一种制度。由于在企业经营活动中,存在着货币资金(包括现金、银行存款、有价证券等。下同)流动与经济活动不一致的情况,作为以盈利为目的的经济单位,企业根据其经营特点和管理要求,要真实地反映实际财务状况和经营成果,衡量经营业绩,必须考核取得收入的权力或支付     

浅谈财务风险防范的战略预算管理评价与优化

<正>一、战略预算管理概述企业战略预算管理主要是围绕“销售预测”这个起点,通过企业资本支出如生产成本、现金收支、人工使用等企业资金筹集和使用的过程进行预测,从而进行资金预算、投资预算、业务预算、管理费用预算、工资性支出预算等综合一体化预算管理,并通过编制预测损益表、资产负债表、预计现金流量表等来对某一特定时间内的财务状况和经营成果进行预测性展现和实施战略性管理^[1]。战略预算管理包括企业经营性预算、业务预算、     

基于绩效管理的企业文化塑造

企业文化是绩效管理体系设计和运作的前提,绩效管理可以产生维持和优化企业文化的效果,两者相辅相成。重视两者的结合,将绩效管理渗透于企业文化之中,会使企业文化在企业的发展中发挥更大的作用,为企业创造更大的效益。研究企业文化和绩效管理的关系,找出它们的结合点,分析我国企业绩效文化塑造的必要性,探索基于绩效管理的企业文化塑造的具体内容和途径,建立优秀的企业绩效文化,对我国企业具有重要的现实意义。     

产业集聚与人力资本投资效益——来自中国工业企业的微观证据

长期以来,关于我国本土企业是否存在内生经济增长特有的人力资本溢出效应,一直缺乏直接的微观经验证据。本文首次利用中国工业企业数据库的大样本数据,通过考察产业集聚与企业人力资本投资-绩效敏感性之间的关系,发现我国存在产业集聚带来的溢出效应,但这种效应只是显著存在于中小企业集群中：在中小企业集群地区,产业集聚程度上升将会提高企业人力资本投资的边际收益;而在非集群地区,产业集聚对企业人力资本投资的边际收益没有产生影响。进一步的实证检验表明,地区人力资本投资水平的提高会改善该地区没有人力资本投入的企业绩效;对于中小企业集群地区没有人力资本投入的企业,地区人力资本投资水平给其带来的边际绩效显著高于非集群地区的企业。     

Stakeholder Orientations and Cost Management

We examine the effect of stakeholder orientation on firms' cost management as proxied by selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost stickiness. Using a sample of 19,783 firm‐years, we find that customer and employee orientation are associated with greater SG&A cost stickiness. Furthermore, the effect of customer orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is more prominent in firms where SG&A costs create high future value, growth firms, and firms with strong corporate governance. In contrast, the effect of employee orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is stronger in firms where SG&A costs create low future value, mature firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, the association between customer orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with efficiency considerations (i.e., adjustment costs). In contrast, the association between employee orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with agency motives such as empire building or “a preference for a quiet life.” In sum, we provide evidence that corporate orientation toward different stakeholders can have different efficiency implications in the context of SG&A resource adjustments and cost management.     

Zombie Firms and Soft Budget Constraints in the Chinese Stock Market*

The growth of zombie firms has caused increasing concern. The present study seeks to understand why zombie firms have been emerging in recent 10 years and to further explore the mechanisms of their formation. Based on a dataset of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2016 and empirical analysis, the present study ascribes the prevalence of zombie firms to soft budget constraints. After using a modified identification model in the Chinese context, we concluded that zombie firms have access to some external resources such as credit support from banks and governmental subsidies, substantiating soft budget constraints among zombie firms. To explain this phenomenon, further analysis reveals that zombie firms bear a heavier policy burden by hiring excess employees, which will bring them more subsidies and a stronger relationship with government in return. This result indicates that policy burden is the reason for soft budget constraints, which exacerbates the zombie firm problems in China.     

权力平等分配是否有利于家族代理效率提升——家族控制、内部股权集中度与代理效率研究

家族企业的两类代理问题是家族企业区别于其他类型企业的特色之一。文章以深市上市家族企业为研究对象,对家族控制权与代理效率之间的关系,以及股权在家族成员之间的配置中的调节作用进行了实证研究。结果表明,控制性家族对企业控制权的增强有助于提高代理效率。内部股权集中度对家族控制权与代理效率之间的关系起到了显著正向调节作用,这表明家族控制权在内部权力分配集中的阶段对代理效率的贡献更强;另一方面也说明家族内部权力分配的不平等性并不一定会损害家族企业的治理效率,对于家族控制权更高的企业,适度的权力集中分配会对家族企业的发展提供有效的支持。     

Shareholdings of Board Members and Corporate Performance: A Panel Quantile Regression Analysis

This paper investigates the impact of board member shareholdings on corporate performance in China and Taiwan, and employs unbalanced panel data over the period 2005–2009. In view of the inconsistent empirical findings in the literature and the limitations of least squares regressions, this study adopts a quantile regression method including fixed effects (FE) models. An important finding is that a significant, positive relationship exists between the shareholdings of board members and accounting measures of performance, and this relationship only exists for the more profitable firms in China, while a uniformly significant and positive relationship exists across all quantiles between the shareholdings of board members and accounting measures of performance in Taiwan. These findings, which cannot be obtained using a FE model, suggest that board members can influence firm performance through holding shares in most Taiwan firms and profitable Chinese firms.     

环境不确定性、高管任期与企业绿色创新

企业是绿色经济发展的主力军,理解环境不确定下高管异质性如何影响企业绿色创新对于我国加快生态文明建设具有现实意义.本文以2010-2019年中国上市公司为样本,实证检验高管任期对企业绿色创新的影响以及环境不确定性在其中的调节作用.实证结果表明:高管任期和企业绿色创新呈倒U型关系,即当高管任期较短时,高管任期会促进企业进行绿色创新,当高管任期较长时,高管任期会抑制企业进行绿色创新.企业环境不确定性对高管任期和企业绿色创新之间的关系具有正向调节作用,企业环境不确定性会加强高管任期和企业绿色创新的倒U型关系.进一步研究发现,环境不确定性的调节作用仅在国有企业中存在.政策不确定性对高管任期和企业绿色创新之间的关系具有正向调节作用,政策不确定性会加强高管任期和企业绿色创新的倒U型关系,这种调节作用在国有企业和非国有企业中均存在,且在国有企业更为明显.绿色补助对高管任期和企业绿色创新之间的关系具有正向调节作用,绿色补助会加强高管任期和企业绿色创新的倒U型关系,但这种调节作用仅在国有企业中存在.本文研究结论对于高管人事聘任和企业绿色创新具有指导意义.     

家族管理涉入如何影响并购战略行为——基于中国上市家族企业的实证研究

相比所有权涉入,家族成员参与企业经营管理将对战略行为产生更直接的影响。基于委托代理理论,文章对2010年-2018年中国上市家族企业的实证研究发现,家族高管参与对企业的并购倾向及横向并购行为具有促进作用,与纵向并购则表现为不显著的负向关系。组织冗余使家族高管参与与并购行为间的正向关系得到增强,而家族二代的进入则削弱了家族高管对企业并购的积极作用。进一步讨论家族权威在企业权力体系高度集中的情境,发现家族成员担任企业董事长及总经理与并购倾向的正向关系变得不显著,冗余资源的正向调节机制亦被抑制,但此时家族二代参与反而表现出正向的调节效应。结果表明跨代情境下家族管理涉入层面的多元化而衍生的不同委托代理问题将约束企业并购行为发生的边界,深化了家族企业谋求家业长青与顺应制度经济转型的讨论,为中国家族企业治理提供实践建议。     

Mixed duopoly,location choice,and shadow cost of public funds

We examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare‐maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit‐maximizing private firm. We introduce shadow costs of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs. We find that in a mixed duopoly, the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare. This result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly, where the level of product differentiation is too high. Finally, we show that when the shadow cost is high, privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare.     

Performance Commitments of Controlling Shareholders and Earnings Management

Since the Split Share Structure Reform took effect in China in 2005, holders of nontradable shares (controlling shareholders) have had to negotiate with holders of tradable shares (minority shareholders) to gain the liquidity right. In a typical deal reached, the controlling shareholder agrees to pay share compensation to minority shareholders and, in many cases, also pledges to meet a specific firm performance target (performance commitments). Using this reform setting, we examine the impact of performance commitments on earnings management behavior, and find the following results. First, less profitable firms have greater incentives to make performance commitments that help to reduce the share compensation that controlling shareholders have to pay. Second, firms entering into such commitments engage in earnings management to meet the promised performance target when actual performance falls short, and firms facing greater default costs tend to manage earnings more aggressively. Third, depending on the performance metric stipulated in the commitment contract, firms employ varying methods to manage earnings. We also find that firms that rely on earnings management to meet their performance targets display inferior performance in the postcommitment years relative to firms that do not. Overall, our evidence is consistent with performance commitment contracts (with costly defaults) between a firm's controlling and minority shareholders causing incentives for earnings management.