Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence

Using a simple model of policy making in a system characterizedby formal separation of powers, judicial dependence on governmentsupport, asymmetric information between voters and the government,and political accountability of the policy branch, I show conditionsunder which rational voters force the government to cede powerover legislative decisions to the courts. Specifically, thepublic uses its ability to hold the elected branches of governmentaccountable to enforce a judicial veto when judicial oppositionto legislation provides more reliable information to votersthan government support for legislation does. The model thusprovides a theoretical justification for, and suggests importantlimits to, the common assumption that disregard for judicialdecisions is politically costly for elected politicians. Themodel also demonstrates how other observed patterns in judicialpolitics—including judicial rubber-stamping of governmentdecisions and government "passing the buck" to courts—canarise as equilibria in the same simple framework.     

Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government

How well any government functions hinges on how good citizensare at making their politicians accountable for their actions.Political control of public officials depends on two factors.First, free and regular elections allow citizens to disciplinepoliticians—the credible threat of losing office in thenext period compels policy makers to respond to the voters'interests. Second, and equally important, the degree of citizeninformation curbs the opportunities politicians may have toengage in political corruption and management. The presenceof a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explainsbetween one-half and two-thirds of the variance in the levelsof governmental performance and corruption.     

Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review,Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

The study investigates how judicial review of policy and judicial independence affect the relative size of government. Judicial oversight of policy is the authority of courts to check the legality of policy measures and annul measures which are incompatible with the constitution or are enacted without following the procedures laid down by the law. Using a model of constitutional political economy, where policy making is subject to judicial oversight, it is predicted that the relative size of the public sector decreases as judicial review and judicial independence increase. The theoretical predictions are tested in an international cross section sample of 52 countries. Controlling for the effects of real income, age dependency, openness of the economy, the legal origins of a country and other socio-political variables the results show that the checks and balances provided by the judiciary lead to a smaller relative size of taxes in the economy.JEL Classifications: D70, D72, D74, D78, H30, K41.     

Accountability and fiscal equalization

A common feature of multi-jurisdictional systems is equalization programs. The implementation of such programs, that is based on some measurement of sub-national fiscal capacity and effort, is particularly complex. Within a political economy model, this paper analyzes the impact of such systems on accountability, identifying a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect arises because with equalized fiscal resources, a consequence of equalization, citizens attach more importance to any remaining variation in public good supplies and so punish rent-taking more severely. This induces politicians to restrain themselves and so accountability improves. The negative effect arises because the complexity of such programs reduces the informational content of observed public good supplies. This introduces a perverse fiscal incentive that reduces accountability. Thus, the overall impact of equalization programs on accountability depends on the balance of these effects.     

Branch banking, entry deterrence, and technology decisions

The paper sets up a theoretical model of banking firms to investigate the relationship between oligopolistic competition and technology structure by using the concept of decentralized operating decisions and centralized investment decisions. It concludes that the representative branch and the new entrant will choose the technology which is deviated from its cost-minimization level if neither of them acts as a quasi-competitive deposit demanders in the case of costless reversibility of capacity decision. In the case of capacity reversed not costlessly, the representative branch will choose the cost-minimizing technology level and the entrant's technology decision depends on its rival's conjectural variation.     

中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制

近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。     

Individual and Aggregate Real Balances in a Random-Matching Model

This article investigates the characteristics of stationary single-price equilibrium in a monetary random-matching model where agents can hold an arbitrary amount of divisible money and where production is costly. At such an equilibrium, agents' money holdings are endogenously determined and uniformly bounded. A refinement of weakly undominated strategies is argued to be necessary. It is shown that a continuum of single-price equilibria indexed by the aggregate real-money balance exists if one such equilibrium exists. Equilibria with different money-holdings upper bounds, hence different distributions, but with identical aggregate real-money balances can coexist.     

Balances of payments and exchange markets: A lost correspondence

The article presents an accounting framework capable of consistently describing on a worldwide scale international money (euro-currency) markets. It also shows that, in such a framework, interest rates on international money markets need not be explained by econometric models specific to such international markets, but could simply result from the appropriate aggregation of national econometric models. Finally, the author emphasizes that in a world in which a country's money can be created by the banking systems of other countries, the correspondence between a country's balance of payments equilibrium and the foreign exchange market for its own money is no longer valid.     

底线伦理与罪恶职责——评审判阿道夫·艾希曼

一个社会仅仅依靠法律是不能够解决所有问题的,没有底线伦理、法律脱离底线伦理就会相应地出现大量非人道立法、非人道执法、非人道司法,随之就会出现大量罪恶职责,并且人们会以此作为自己犯罪的借口,于是一个社会的基本社会准则就被打破,邪恶成为日常生活的基本内容。     

SA8000与企业社会责任

目前在西方发达国家无论是消费者、中介组织、企业以及政府对企业的社会责任已十分重视,SA8000标准也逐渐成为中国企业走向世界的又一张通行证。本文先介绍SA8000标准及其影响,然后过渡到企业的社会责任问题,并就企业社会责任问题分述为企业对员工的责任,对顾客的责任,及对社会的责任。     

UK Utility Regulation: Licences, Commitment and Judicial Review

Abstract ** :  This paper analyses critically the claim made by Levy and Spiller that, in the context of UK utility regulation, licences operate as a 'technology of commitment'. The functional logic of delegation which underpins much principal–agent analyses is discussed, together with the credibility problem emerging from a divergence between a principal's long‐term and short‐term policies. Levy and Spiller contend that the UK has a successful model of utility regulation in part because of the use of licences which restrict the regulator from deviating from the broad substantive principles settled at the time of vesting. This contention is examined through the detailed consideration of five judicial review cases which have cast light on how, and to what extent, the licences restrict regulatory discretion .     

公共品短缺、政府问责与政府负债信息披露

本文着眼于我国日益凸显的公共品短缺问题,剖析公共品供给、政府治理、政府问责与政府负债信息披露之间的关联脉络,构建理论分析框架,并基于公共品视角对我国政府负债信息披露体系的构建进行系统探讨。研究认为,政府作为公共品的主要责任主体,在问责缺位的体制环境下往往存在投机倾向,应辅以健全的政府问责机制进行监督和约束。将公共品供给责任以政府负债的形式予以披露是助力政府问责的有效途径。对于政府公共品负债,应分为中央政府与地方政府两层主体分别进行披露;以政府资产负债表为主要披露载体,并辅以表外披露的形式;依据公共品短缺程度的不同有选择地以渐进式披露为主,稳健式披露为辅;同时要综合兼顾信息披露与绩效评价、政府审计、异体问责等多个层面的协同配合。     

Public Debt,Terms of Trade and Welfare: The Role of Capital Production Shares,External Balances,and Dynamic (In)efficiency

In view of still large external imbalances across the world economy and dramatically risen public debts in major advanced economies, this paper reconsiders the relationship between public debt, the terms of trade and welfare in a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model with technological differences across countries. We find that the terms of trade effect of a public debt shock depends only on international differences in capital production shares and the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy. As in a model with similar capital production shares, domestic welfare rises and foreign welfare decreases when Home has a positive external balance and the Golden Rule holds. Under dynamic efficiency, welfare decreases in the debt-expanding, net foreign creditor country if she has a relatively smaller capital production share, and if the welfare effect through the accumulation channel is negative. In contrast, under dynamic inefficiency she can increase her welfare by debt expansion.     

Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality

This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality.     

Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement

In this paper, we examine the correlation between sectoral shocks and border enforcement in the United States, the U.S. government's main policy instrument for combating illegal immigration. We see whether border enforcement falls following positive shocks to sectors that are intensive in the use of undocumented labour, as would be consistent with political economy models of illegal immigration. We find that border enforcement is negatively correlated with lagged relative price changes in the apparel, fruits and vegetables, and livestock industries and with housing starts in western United States, suggesting that authorities relax border enforcement when demand forundocumented labour is high.
Economie politique, chocs sectoriels et vigilance aux frontières. Dans ce mémoire, les auteurs examinent la corrélation entre les chocs sectoriels et la vigilance aux frontières aux Etats-Unis. La vigilance aux frontières est le principal instrument de politique publique utilisé par le gouvernement américain pour combattre l'immigration illégale. On se demande si la vigilance aux frontières se relâche à la suite de chocs positifs dans des secteurs qui utilisent relativement plus de travailleurs illégaux, ainsi que le suggèrent les modèles d'économie politique de l'immigration illégale. Les principaux résultats indiquent que la vigilance aux frontières est co-reliée négativement (avec un délai) avec les changements de prix relatifs dans les secteurs du vêtement, des fruits et légumes, et du bétail, ainsi qu'avec le nombre de mises en chantier dans la construction domiciliaire dans l'ouest des Etats-Unis. Voilà qui suggère que les autorités relâchent la vigilance aux frontières quand la demande de travailleurs illégaux augmente.     

受托责任·审计·权力控制——审计对权力进行控制的动因分析

审计对权力进行有效地控制是党中央和国务院在新时期对审计工作提出的新要求和新职责.然而,在审计实际中,审计对权力进行控制却缺乏一定的理论作指导.在本文,笔者以讨论权力的概念入手,对审计对权力进行控制的内在动因--受托责任和外在动力--现实需要等理论问题进行了深入的探讨,以飨读者,并试图为审计对权力进行控制提供理论支持.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.