效率与公平兼顾的最优所得税:理论框架及最优税率估计

最优所得税主要探讨税收如何兼顾公平与效率问题,以及给定公平偏好程度下,如何确定最优边际税率水平。即使在崇尚罗尔斯社会福利函数的社会里,政府同时兼顾再分配和财政收入目标的基础上,只要略加考虑税收对劳动供给的效应,哪怕是微弱的考虑和兼顾,最高边际税率都不会达到100%。而且,借鉴斯特恩最优线性所得税模型及美国个人所得税制度,估计我国现行个人所得税最高边际税率还可以适当降低到36%左右。     

HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION

A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

Tax revenues, fiscal corruption and “shame” costs

In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framework. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenues depends on the relevance of the “shame effect” of being detected in a corrupt transaction. In countries with a “low shame” effect, tax revenues grow as the tax rate increases. Moreover, there is a critical tax rate where the growth rate of tax revenues begins to reduce. In countries with a high “shame effect” tax revenues increase up to a threshold value and then decrease.     

The excess burden of tax evasion—An experimental detection-concealment contest

Tax evasion may cause social welfare losses due to the incentives of taxpayers to invest in the concealment and of tax authorities to invest in the detection of tax evasion. Reducing the investment of both parties at the same time would then lead to a Pareto improvement. Given that concealment and detection costs are hardly measurable in reality, we show in a controlled laboratory experiment that the welfare losses from a concealment-detection contest depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the penalty which is imposed in case of detected tax evasion. Hence, policy makers who are concerned about socially inefficient concealment and enforcement costs should focus on tax rates rather than penalty rates.     

A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.     

Effects of supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria

We conduct a field experiment on tax compliance, focusing on newly founded firms. As a novelty the effect of tax authorities’ supervision on timely tax payments is examined. Interestingly, results show no positive overall effect of close supervision on tax compliance.     

Social security and economic integration

This letter analyzes the impact of economic integration on capital accumulation and capital flows when countries differ in their social security systems. Funding and early retirement both foster capital accumulation relative to pay-as-you-go pensions with flexible retirement. When economies integrate, both imply capital outflow possibly resulting in utility losses.     

A voluntary brain-drain tax

A major roadblock to the implementation of Bhagwati's proposal to allow developing countries to tax skilled emigrants residing in developed countries (the “brain drain”) is the administrative problems associated with collecting this tax in the absence of developed-country cooperation. This paper provides a partial solution to these problems, involving the tax treatment of emigrants who return to their countries of origin. The tax system is structured so that returning emigrants who previously paid the brain-drain tax face lower tax payments than those who evaded the brain-drain tax. Given the expected value of this tax benefit, emigrants are willing to pay the brain-drain tax. In the basic model, a source country's optimal tax system includes this brain-drain tax and does not distort migration decisions.     

Accounting for the family in European income tax systems

Tax systems are expected to achieve many things at once andthis paper discusses the trade-offs involved in attempting toreconcile conflicting aims. It surveys the various instrumentsthat are used to take account of marriage and the presence ofchildren and describes the current systems in the 15 EuropeanUnion countries. The impact of alternative tax treatments ofthe family 'borrowed' from other countries is examined for theUK, using the tax-benefit microsimulation model, POLIMOD. Thepaper explores the implications of the alternatives for thetax paid by families of different types and for the work incentivesof individuals in different family situations.     

Can government improve tax compliance by adopting advanced information technology? Evidence from the Golden Tax Project III in China

This paper explores the tax compliance effects of adopting advanced information technology by tax bureau. Although many governments adopt advanced information technology in tax collection, little is known about the effect on tax compliance. Using difference-in-differences method, we exploit a staggered reform in which tax authorities adopt a comprehensive information reporting system in China, the Golden Tax Project III. Employing listed firm level data from 2010 to 2017, using book-tax difference and its remaining component which cannot be explained by earnings management as proxy measures of tax sheltering, we find that the adoption of GTP III decreases tax sheltering levels by a 1.88 percentage point. The effect is stronger for companies with higher tax rate. By exploring channels, our results suggest that the effect works by enhancing third-party reporting and by improving tax enforcement capacity in provinces that lack tax inspectors.     

Is there a relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance?

This paper investigates the relation between labor investment inefficiency and corporate tax avoidance. Employing a large sample of 61,542 U.S. firm-year observations over the 1962–2014 period, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is significantly positively related to tax avoidance. More specifically, we find that a one standard deviation of labor investment inefficiency leads to a 0.71% reduction in the accounting effective tax rate. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative proxy measures of tax avoidance and labor investment efficiency, and additional control variables pertaining to accounting quality and managerial ability. Taken together, our regression results show that labor investment inefficiency is an important determinant of corporate tax avoidance.     

Does a lower (higher) labour force participation rate imply greater (lower) income tax evasion? An exploratory empirical inquiry for the U.S.

This exploratory study seeks to add to the income tax evasion literature by investigating a heretofore ignored potential determinant of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S., namely, the labour force participation rate. It is hypothesized that the higher (lower) the labour force participation rate, the lower (greater) the degree of tax evasion. The empirical estimation supports this hypothesis, finding that a one unit (one percentage point) increase (decrease) in the labour force participation rate leads to a 9.1% decrease (increase) in income tax evasion. Thus, the declining labour force participation in recent years implies increased tax evasion problems for the U.S.