Regional versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization,Environmental Taxation,and Welfare

The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries.     

Interest Groups, Trade Liberalization, and Environmental Standards

In considering a country that imposes a minimum standard on an imported polluting good, which generates negative consumption externalities, we construct a common-agency model, in which a domestic environmental group and a foreign industrial lobby can influence the formation of the minimum standard by providing political contributions to the government. This paper investigates the effects of trade liberalization on the political equilibrium environmental standard, the pattern of trade, environmental disutility, and social welfare. We find that trade liberalization tightens the minimum standard, decreases imports of the polluting good, and reduces environmental disutilities. The importing country’s social welfare, however, does not necessarily increase with trade liberalization. The weaker the environmental group’s lobbying efficiency, or the stronger the foreign firm’s lobbying efficiency, the more likely it is that trade liberalization will enhance the importing country’s welfare.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

贸易自由化中并购问题的经济学剖析

在贸易自由化对并购影响进行考察的基础上 ,可以发现 ,贸易自由对于潜在的并购者来说有两种意义 :受到保护的市场中的低效企业此时更容易被并购 ,对相对低效企业进行的并购变得越来越缺乏吸引力 ,不能实际地融合在一起 ,或者如果已经融合在一起的话 ,就出现了 (资源的 )耗散。无论在哪种意义上贸易的自由化都会激发并购活动的发生 ,但其中并不是所有的都符合整个社会的利益     

全球贸易自由化下的环境问题与环境政策

在全球贸易自由化的进程中，对环境既产生了正的影响，也产生了负的影响。但贸易不是产生环境问题的根源，所以不能靠制定与贸易有关的环境政策来解决，而应当在环境污染的发生地实施有关的环境政策，使“外部化”了的费用，纳入生产者的成本中，这才是真正的贸易比较优势。     

政策干预下我国贸易自由化的福利效应

近年来,贸易和环境问题越来越成为各国关注的焦点,传统贸易理论忽视了环境资源的合理使用和保护,给发展中国家带来了严重的环境问题。文章在揭示传统贸易理论在环境资源分析不足的同时,建立了一个政策干预下的发展中国家的自由贸易模型,在此基础上结合我国实际情况分析贸易自由化的福利效应。     

Trade tariff,wage gap and public spending

This paper studies the interplay between wage gap and government spending in a small open economy facing a shock in trade policy. We consider a specific factor model with an export sector, which uses skilled labour, and an import-competing sector, which uses unskilled labour. We find the conditions under which there exists an inverse (direct) relation between trade liberalization (protection), which increases (decreases) the skilled-unskilled wage gap, and the level of government expenditure. We also show how either an unbalanced distribution of political bargaining power, or tariff revenue co-financing public spending may break this inverse relation. Moreover, the direct relation between tariff protection and public goods provision can be strenghtened by progressive taxation and weakened by regressive taxation.     

Trade Liberalization and Gender Wage Inequality in Mexico

Abstract

After twenty years of trade liberalization in Mexico, the relationship between gender wage inequality and trade remains insufficiently studied, in spite of evidence of increasing numbers of women in industrial employment. This study aims to analyze the effects of export orientation and other characteristics that represent the industrial underpinnings of restructuring on gender wage inequality for 2001–5. There is consistent evidence of the negative impact of export orientation on men's and women's wages and the gender wage ratio, signifying that women lose in both absolute and relative terms. This result holds after controlling for women's share of employment and the skills of both genders, contrary to the expected effect from trade on equality. There is also a negative relation between a rise in the proportion of unskilled workers and the gender wage ratio, which suggests that the trade-induced skill hypothesis cannot be considered an adequate explanation for gender inequality.     

The Role of Trade and International Economic Policy in Indian Economic Performance*

India's economic policies have undergone major reforms since the early 1990s. Before that, government regulation and control of economic activity was pervasive, and the trade sector did very poorly. One consequence was that imports were highly restricted and their scarcity was itself a major constraint on growth. After the crisis of the early1990s, trade policy was substantially liberalized. In this paper, the pre‐1990s regime is first briefly described. Thereafter, the economic policy reforms that impinged most directly on the trade sector are set forth, and the response of exports and imports to those changes is outlined. Exports have grown rapidly, from about 5% of the gross domestic product to around 15%, and they continue to grow at an average annual rate of 20%. Improved performance of the trade sector has been a major contributing factor to India's dramatically accelerated growth performance. A final section of this paper assesses the current situation, and sets forth the major policy challenges that will need to be met if that performance is to be sustained, if not improved upon.     

Economic Deregulation and Trade Liberalization in Kenya,Tanzania and Uganda: Growth and Poverty

With economic growth as a principal target, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have implemented deregulation and trade liberalization policies. By tracing the trends in major economic aggregates, the progress of these economies is reviewed. While acknowledging the conceptual arguments supporting the measures adopted, constraints in both the international economy and domestically have resulted in disappointing outcomes. International trade rules and practices, particularly in the agricultural sector, have worked against all three countries. Moreover, their domestic economies lack crucial resources. The results suggest that it may be a long time before the deregulation policies lead to a reduction in poverty.     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models

The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future.     

影响我国环境库兹涅茨曲线的外贸与环境政策分析

环境库兹涅茨曲线(EKC)体现了一国经济增长与环境污染的关系.本文以1990～2005年我国工业污染的数据为基础,描绘出我国EKC是"N"字型波浪式上升的,阐述了产生这一特点的贸易政策和环境政策的影响因素,肯定了政府的环保政策对于环境恶化的控制效果,但认为政府的直接干预只是协调经济增长与环境污染关系的外部手段,提高经济运行效率才是解决问题的根本途径.     

Trade Liberalization in Agriculture in Developed Nations and Incidence of Child Labour in a Developing Economy

This paper is an attempt to analyse the consequence of trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed countries on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy in terms of a three‐sector general equilibrium model with informal sectors. Adult labour and child labour are substitutes for each other in the two informal sectors of the economy and are used together apart from capital in producing two exportable commodities. The interesting result that appears from the analysis is that agricultural trade liberalization in the developed countries may be effective in bringing down the incidence of child labour in the system. The paper substantiates the desirability of trade liberalization in agriculture in the developed nations from the perspective of the developing economies for reasons other than welfare improvement.     

Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period

What precisely were the causes and consequences of the trade wars in the 1930s? Were there perhaps deeper forces at work in reorienting global trade prior to the outbreak of World War II? And what lessons may this particular historical episode provide for the present day? To answer these questions, we distinguish between long‐run secular trends in the period from 1920 to 1939 related to the formation of trade blocs and short‐run disruptions associated with the trade wars of the 1930s. We argue that the trade wars mainly served to intensify pre‐existing efforts toward the formation of trade blocs which dated from at least 1920. More speculatively, we argue that the trade wars of the present day may serve a similar purpose as those in the 1930s, that is, the intensification of China‐ and US‐centric trade blocs.     

US Trade Policy in the Trump Administration

President Donald Trump has emphasized three recurring themes regarding trade policy: the importance of trade balances, including bilateral trade balances, currency manipulation to gain unfair advantage in trade, and “disastrous” trade agreements. Asia figures prominently in these concerns. Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans‐Pacific Partnership, is increasing contingent or process protection, demanding the renegotiation under duress of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Korea‐United States Free Trade Agreement. These policies are modeled quantitatively and results generated for sectoral output and employment at the state and metropolitan area level.     

Politics of Trade in the USA and in the Obama Administration: Implications for Asian Regionalism

Over the next four years, the Obama administration will face a series of strategic choices in forging policies to respond to a growing momentum for advances in Asian regional structures. Though faced with domestic political challenges; not least from within his own Democratic party – President Obama and his advisers will need to set a course for the reassertion of US leadership in constructing a trans-Pacific vision, through new US-based free trade agreements, signing on to existing agreements such as the P-4 (Singapore, New Zealand, Brunei, the Philippines), or consolidating existing free trade agreements among Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) nations. In pursuing this vision, the US should take advantage of the fact that the next three APEC leaders meetings are in Singapore (2009), Japan (2010), and the USA (2011); a sequence ripe for synergistic teamwork.     

Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly

This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting*

This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of “global” pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non‐cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.     

Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?*

We suggest a novel perspective on the relationship between the stringency of environmental policies and foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a political economy model with imperfect product market competition where local and foreign firms jointly lobby the local government for a favorable pollution tax. FDI is found to affect environmental policy, and the effect is conditional on the local government's degree of corruptibility. If the degree of corruptibility is sufficiently high (low), FDI leads to less (more) stringent environmental policy, and FDI thus contributes to (mitigates) the creation of a pollution haven. Our empirical results using panel data from 33 countries support the predictions of the model.