The Role of Expectation on Job Search and the Firm Size Effect on Wages

We formulate dynamic games which give a rationale to the firm size–wage effect that the sheer firm size increases wages. We postulate that past wages of large firms are known to new employees, while those of small firms are not. Large firms can credibly induce workers to expect high future wages and reduce turnover, while small firms have no choice but to be myopic and pay low wages. The equilibrium wage differential obtains under the same worker characteristics and production function. We provide empirical evidence that workers' expectations depend on firm size and affect wages as predicted by our model.     

Horizontal mergers and product quality

We study the effects of a horizontal merger when firms compete on price and quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric firms, several striking results appear. First, the merging firms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside firm increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but also the average quality. Second, the outside firm benefits more than the merging firms from the merger, and the merger can be unprofitable for the merger partners, i.e., the “merger paradox” may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some consumers may benefit), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings. In a generalized framework with n firms, we identify two key factors for the merger effects: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction and (ii) the cross‐quality and cross‐price demand effects, which determines the intensity of price relative to quality competition. These findings have implications for antitrust policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the firms.     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE

Under the principle of the failing firm defence a merger that would be blocked due to its harmful effect on competition could be nevertheless allowed when (i) the acquired firm is actually failing, (ii) there is no less anticompetitive alternative offer of purchase, (iii) absent the merger, the assets to be acquired would exit the market. We focus on potential anticompetitive effects of a myopic application of the requirement (iii) by studying consequences of a horizontal merger on entry in a Cournot oligopoly with a failing firm. Entry is deterred if the merger is cleared and, when the industry is highly concentrated, consumer welfare is higher under a prohibition because long‐run gains due to augmented competition exceed short‐run losses due to shortage of output.     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS: A SOLUTION OF THE INSIDERS' DILEMMA

We show that in a three‐firm infinitely repeated Cournot game, there exists a stick and carrot strategy equilibrium in which an exogenous bilateral horizontal merger is profitable and the incentive to remain out of the merger disappears. In this sub‐game perfect equilibrium, the merged entity produces the duopoly quantity and the outsider limits its production to half the duopoly quantity. Our stick and carrot strategy entails that the merged entity threatens to produce twice the triopoly quantity for two periods if the outsider does not produce half the duopoly quantity. In this equilibrium, the aggregate price remains high enough to make the merger profitable for the insiders. Also, the quantity produced by the outsider is sufficiently low to eliminate the difference between the profit of the outsider and the merging firm.     

Partial ownership and cross-border mergers

Partial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information. As partial ownership is confined to sharing future merger profits, it cannot achieve complete separation in all cases but improves expected merger gains also in an equilibrium which is not fully separating. Without partial ownership, the foreign firm potentially discriminates against high productivities. In a pooling equilibrium with partial ownership, however, it will potentially discriminate against intermediate productivities.     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

Using a standard differentiated goods quantity competition setting, we show three facts about horizontal two‐firm mergers that are not true for a homogeneous goods Cournot market. First, merger of two firms is profitable for the merging firms provided that goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. Second, merging of two firms can lead to more two‐firm mergers. Third, an initially non‐profitable two‐firm merger can occur in anticipation of subsequent mergers. These facts imply that mergers are more likely to occur in differentiated goods markets than in homogeneous goods markets.     

并购后组织结构设置与并购绩效——基于多重因素的调节效应

并购后对被并购企业的组织地位进行调整是并购后组织结构设置中的一项重要决策.在中国情境下,并购后保留被并购企业的法人资格会比取消其法人资格更有利于主并企业的并购绩效.同时,区域因素、并购前绩效以及相对规模对并购后的组织结构和并购绩效之间的关系具有显著的调节作用,即:当跨区域并购时,并购后保留被并购企业的法人地位对主并企业的并购绩效的积极作用会越大;被并购企业并购前绩效越高,则并购后取消其法人 地位对主并企业的并购绩效的积极作用会越大;被并购企业的相对规模越大,则并购后保留其法人地位对主并企业的并购绩效的积极作用会越大.     

企业并购模式的动态选择

企业并购有横向、纵向、混合三种主要模式。横向并购浪潮促进了资本主义初期企业规模经济的形成与产业集中度提高;纵向并购浪潮促进了西方国家工业化中期企业资本进一步聚集与产业结构升级;混合并购浪潮一方面形成了一批多元化经营的巨型企业,另一方面,使规模小、实力弱的企业重新突出主业。本文将企业并购模式的选择与企业、产业生命周期联系起来考察,提出企业生命周期系数与产业生命周期系数的概念与计量方法;建立了企业、产业生命周期系数与经济周期指数三维坐标系,定量分析了企业、产业及宏观经济处于不同阶段时,如何动态选择并购模式,提高并购绩效。     

Measuring and Explaining Innovative Capability: Evidence from Southeast Asia

What causes firm‐level product innovation in developing economies? This paper answers this question by emphasizing the role of process improvements that are influential in product innovation. We construct a firm‐level innovative capability score using novel, broad‐based, but detailed data on various process improvement practices obtained from firms in Southeast Asia. We then investigate the factors that may affect innovative capability. We also estimate the effect of the innovative capability score on product innovation controlling for research and development intensity and other firm characteristics. Our empirical investigation identifies a chief executive officer (CEO)'s past experience at a foreign or large firm, and buyer pressure to adopt international standards as key determinants of innovative capability. Novel and unique findings from our examination include: (i) the impact of a CEO's past experience at a foreign or large firm on the innovative capability is larger for local enterprises and small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises; (ii) the impact of share of foreign workers in the upper managerial levels only appears to be significant in foreign firms and larger firms; and (iii) buyer pressure is a more likely contributor to innovative capability compared with capital tie‐ups with multinational enterprises or joint venture buyers that capture vertical technology transfers. Finally, our empirical results show that a firm in Southeast Asia is more likely to achieve product innovation if the firm has had a higher innovative capability.     

企业并购的战略整合

随着经济全球化的来临,全球范围内的企业并购愈演愈烈,但是,相当多的并购案例以失败告终。通过研究表明,并购过程中缺乏有效的整合措施是导致并购失败的关键因素,而其中企业战略的整合尤为重要。本文通过实证分析建立了企业并购中的战略整合模型,诠释了战略整合对企业并购成功的重要作用。     

Networking or not working: A model of social procrastination from communication

This paper provides an explanation for why many organizations are concerned with “e-mail overload” and implement policies to restrict the use of e-mail in the office. In a theoretical model we formalize the tradeoff between increased productivity from high priority communication and reduced productivity due to distractions caused by low priority e-mails. We consider employees with present-biased preferences as well as time consistent employees. All present-biased employees ex-ante are motivated to read only important e-mail, but in the interim some agents find the temptation to read all e-mail in their inbox too high, and as a result suffer from productivity losses. A unique aspect of this paper is the social nature of procrastination, which is a key to the e-mail overload phenomenon. In considering the firm’s policies to reduce the impact of e-mail overload we conclude that a firm is more likely to restrict e-mail in the case of employees with hyperbolic preferences than in the case of time-consistent employees.     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]     

Choice of Technology and Labour Market Consequences: An Explanation of US-Japanese Differences

This paper provides an explanation for U.S.-Japanese differences concerning continuous process improvement, turnover rate, and the level and firm-specificity of human capital accumulation. Connection between continuous process improvement and the firm-specificity of training causes multiplicity of equilibria. In the Japanese equilibrium, each firm conducts continuous process improvement because other firms do so, and as a consequence training provided by such a firm becomes less effective in other firms. This lowers the turnover rate, which, in turn, increases firms' incentives to train employees. In the US equilibrium, training is general, which raises the turnover rate and decreases incentives to train.     

Managerial pay and executive turnover in the Czech and Slovak Republics*

Despite the crucial role played by managers in changing the functioning of labour markets in transition economies, research on the determinants of executive pay and CEO turnover in these countries is almost non‐existent. The current paper aims to add to this minuscule literature. For this purpose I make use of a unique dataset containing relevant firm–manager information from the Czech and Slovak Republics in the late nineties. This allows me to examine the influence of individual and in particular firm characteristics, such as, size, ownership type, industry and region, as well as corporate performance on chief executive compensation levels and changes therein and on the extent of executive turnover.     

自主创新还是引进创新？

创新已成为企业参与市场竞争、获取创新绩效的关键。基于资源来源差异,创新可分为自主创新和引进创新两种。诸多研究探讨了自主创新对企业绩效的正向影响,但自主创新并非适合所有企业,当前缺乏对企业创新模式转换的研究。对177家中国企业数据进行了实证研究,结果发现相比于引进创新,自主创新对企业绩效的正向作用更显著;而当企业与联盟伙伴具有良好的合作关系时,企业更倾向于实施引进创新。同时,还以调研企业为案例研究了合作效率对创新模式转换的影响。将创新理论和联盟理论联系起来,具有一定的理论意义和实践指导价值。     

High‐Performance Management Practices and Employee Outcomes in Denmark

High‐performance work practices are frequently considered to have positive effects on corporate performance, but what do they do for employees? After assessing the correlation between organizational innovation and firm performance, this article investigates whether high‐involvement work practices affect workers in terms of wages, wage inequality and workforce composition. The analysis is based on a survey directed at Danish firms matched with linked employer–employee data and also examines whether the relationship between high‐involvement work practices and employee outcomes is affected by the industrial relations context.     

LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF SMOKING REGULATIONS ON THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY

This paper examines the impact of smoking regulations on restaurant employment in West Virginia, a state with a high rate of smoking prevalence. Using a confidential establishment‐level dataset, our results suggest that smoking bans reduced restaurant employment by between 0.7 and 1.5 workers, depending on model specification. We find that smoking restrictions have heterogeneous impacts across establishments, with the largest impacts on mid‐sized establishments, defined as those with 10–29 employees. Our results also suggest that the impact of smoking restrictions was larger in counties with higher rates of smoking prevalence. (JEL L51, D78, H0)     

TO LIST OR TO MERGE? ENDOGENOUS CHOICE OF PRIVATIZATION METHODS IN A MIXED MARKET

When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare‐enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private‐firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the government's choices concerning privatization.