Budget deficits, monetization, and centralbank independence in developing countries

Using various indicators for central bank independence we examinethe relationship between central bank independence and governmentbudget deficits. Using a two-stage procedure we also analyzewhether central bank independence affects the monetization ofdeficits. First, the monetization relation in each country isestimated and then the resulting accommodation coefficientsare related to central bank independence. We conclude that onlyif the turnover rate of central bank governors or the politicalvulnerability mdex is used monetary accommodation of deficitsis negatively related to central bank independence. There isno relationship between independence and the level of budgetdeficits     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, WAGE-BARGAINING STRUCTURE, AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES

The impact of central bank independence and wage-bargainingstructure on inflation and unemployment is explored theoreticallyand tested empirically for a sample of 17 OECD countries overtwo separate periods. The results suggest that inflation islower in economies with greater central bank independence andthat the equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the structureof the labour market. Greater central bank independence doesnot appear to be associated with higher unemployment.     

An Empirical Observation on Central Bank Independence and Real Output

This note reviews the relation between central bank independence and real output for the 1970s and 1980s. A new statistic, based on the total amount of real output available in a decade, is proposed in order to broaden the analysis of the impact of central bank independence on real output. The results show that, although there is no correlation between central bank independence and average growth, central bank independence had a significantly negative impact on the sum of real output during the 1980s. For the 1970s, central bank independence had no influence on the total quantity of real output.     

ARE AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT FOR MONETARY CONVERGENCE?

Central bank independence (CBI) is currently a widely debated and topical issue commanding the centre point of many economical and political debates, filling the pages of many scholarly journals. Both central bank independence and accountability are currently regarded as necessary best practices for achieving price stability. The importance of CBI rests on the premise that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, and that the cost of reducing inflation can be lowered by an independent central bank with credibility. Support for CBI also stems from the argument that the power to create money should generally be separated from the power to spend it. This is even more relevant for countries with weak political institutions. However, various studies (cited below) detected lower inflation in those countries where independence of their central banks is the strongest. Countries all over – including some on the African continent – have increased the independence of their central banks accordingly.     

加强中央银行独立性的重要意义--以日本为实例的分析

以日本为实例的分析表明,如果一国的中央银行缺乏应有的独立性,一般说来并不会像“时间非一致性”理论所分析的那样,会促使政府反反复复地背弃维护物价稳定的承诺,去有意制造通货膨胀,也不会像政治商业周期理论所分析的那样,会引发政府为谋求连任而周期性地运用货币政策愚弄选民。部分西方学者以通货膨胀率的讷氏来分析是否应该加强中央银行独立性的观点是极其片面的。为了使货币政策选择免受个别政治家或某届政府不合理的干预,避免国际压力对货币政策运营产生错误影响,使货币政策真正起到稳定经济运行的作用,必须赋予中央银行以充分的独立性。     

Central bank independence: Only part of the inflation story

Summary Central bank independence: Only part of the inflation story The idea that countries with an independent central bank perform better on price stability is very popular and confirmed by studies investigating the issue empirically. Yet, using the Barro-Gordon model we show that the gains from a more independent central bank are not fixed. They are larger in countries with unstable governments, not committed to fixed exchange rates, and in countries were left-wing parties hold a strong position. The effect of increasing central bank independence is also shown to depend on the level of the natural unemployment rate and the slope of the short-term Phillips curve.We are grateful to Eric Pentecost and two referees of this journal for valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper. Any remaining errors are ours.     

Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor

Controlling inflation is a central problem in transition economies. This paper asks under what conditions or even whether central bank independence helps in this task. The conclusion shows that merely imposing legal independence on the central bank may be ineffective or even counterproductive. It is necessary to make a monetary strategy and the responsibilities and restrictions of central bank policy transparent to the public. In addition, it is important that the right nominal anchor is selected—one that is, or is believed to be, effective and sustainable. Both monetary targeting and inflation targeting are assumed to be unsuitable for most transition countries. Instead, some kind of dynamic exchange rate targeting appears to be the most reasonable choice.     

Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence

Disinflation Costs, Accelerating Inflation Gains, and Central Bank Independence. - This paper considers the impact of central bank independence on both the costs of disinflation and the gains of accelerating inflation. For this purpose, sacrifice ratios for disinflation episodes and benefice ratios for accelerating inflation episodes are constructed by using a new method. The ratios are calculated for 19 industrial countries over the period 1960–1992. The results indicate that central bank independence only matters during disinflation episodes: Sacrifice ratio and output loss are higher, the more independent the central bank is; whereas during accelerating inflation episodes, central bank independence has no influence on either the benefice ratio or the output gain.     

The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness

This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independencein a monetary policy game with a conservative central bankerIt tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independenceand conservativeness by four economic and political determinants,both theoretically and empirically There appears to be a tradeoff between central bank independence and conservativeness.Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness andindependence with the actual degree of independence, we wantto identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for 12 memberstates of the European Union.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence

A Nonnormative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence. — The authors study monetary policy under different central bank constitutions when the labor-market insiders set the minimal wage so that the outsiders are involuntarily unemployed. If the insiders are in the majority, the representative insider will be the median voter. The authors show that an independent central bank, if controlled by the median voter, does not produce a systematic inflation bias, albeit equilibrium employment is too low from a social welfare point of view. A dependent central bank, in contrast, is forced by the government to collect seigniorage and to take the government’s re-election prospects into account. The predictions of their theory are consistent with the evidence that central bank independence decreases average inflation and inflation variability, but does not affect employment variability.     

Central Bank Independence,Wage Bargaining,and Labor Market Performance: New Evidence

Using data on 20 industrial countries over the period 1982 to 2003, this article finds central bank independence to favorably affect both unemployment and employment rates. The size of these effects appears to be substantial, particularly in the long term. In contrast to some of the previous literature, the article finds that the favorable effects of central bank independence do not depend on the degree of wage bargaining centralization or coordination. Furthermore, it finds that higher centralization as well as higher coordination of wage bargaining may also have favorable direct effects on labor market performance.     

Central Bank Behavior and Statutory Independence

This paper integrates the Taylor reaction function literature with the literature on central bank independence (CBI). The central bank??s policy reaction function describes its behaviors, which measures the practical CBI, as opposed to the legal CBI measured by CBI indices. By analyzing the relationship between various legal CBI indices and the central banks?? reactions to inflation for 18 OECD countries, we find that the difference of behaviors among central banks is consistent with the economic measure of independence, which measures how easy it is for the government to finance its deficits by direct access to credit from the central bank.     

Precommitment by central bank independence

The paper addresses the issue of central bank independence. The central argument is that government can precommit to the objective of price stability by providing a constitutional status of independence to the central bank. A sufficient set of institutional elements and the problem of incentive compatibility are discussed. It is argued that the solution is superior to a constitutional money rule as no rule can take adequately into account trend changes in output or velocity.     

Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?

Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decreaseinflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to pricestability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behaviorin a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variationsin disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. Thepaper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflationare lower in countries with independent central banks. It alsofinds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignoragerevenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These resultsraise questions about some explanations of the negative correlationbetween central bank independence and inflation.     

The Sacrifice Ratio and Central Bank Independence Revisited

Several recent studies make use of cross-country data to examine the relationship between a country's sacrifice ratio and the extent to which its central bank is insulated from political influence. These studies report a positive correlation between these two variables. However, these studies employ econometric methodologies that do not account for the measurement error which contaminates their proxies for central bank independence. This paper makes use of an alternative econometric methodology, one that does account for this measurement error, and finds a strong negative relationship between the sacrifice ratio and Central Bank independence.     

Institutionalisation without internalisation. The cultural dimension of French-German conflicts on European Central Bank independence

When accepting the Maastricht treaty, the members of the Euro-zone agreed on the establishment of a very independent European Central Bank (ECB). Over the years, however, French political leaders systematically brought forward proposals undermining the ECB’s independence, much to the dismay of their German counterparts. This pattern of political disagreement on central bank independence has again surfaced during the current sovereign debt crisis, and has contributed to the discord amongst the Euro-zone members on the causes and proper solutions to the problems. This article conducts tests of various factors generally expected to influence the preference for central bank independence. It shows that economic explanations are unable to account for the persistent differences amongst European member-states on this issue. In contrast, national differences in political and economic culture and especially a nation’s score on the dimension Power Distance—its acceptance of centralisation of power in political leaders or institutions—does show a correlation with the different levels of internalisation of the norm of central bank independence. These findings show that institutionalisation of economic norms does not imply their internalisation by the political and the economic elite. In the broader context of current European politics, this may mean that even if European leaders will be able to come up with a common institutional answer to the current crisis, more profound convergence of their underlying economic and political cultures is needed for the successful and sustainable implementation of these solutions.     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

美联储货币政策对中国货币政策的溢出效应研究

文章主要研究了美国货币政策对中国货币政策的溢出效应,理论部分分析了在开放经济条件下两国模型关于货币政策跨国传输等相关问题。货币供给分为国内供给和外部输入,通过中央银行资产负债表中资产负债的变化可以分析外部货币的输入影响到基础货币的被动投放,在流通过程中由于乘数效应影响了货币供给量。外部货币的输入影响央行调控独立性的发挥,外部货币的输入容易形成对国内货币市场和产品市场某种程度的冲击,央行货币政策调控的难度增加。经验分析发现,美元输入对中国货币政策存在溢出效应,影响到中国的基础货币投放,影响到中国的货币政策的独立性以及执行的效果。     

Limits to the independence of the ECB

Review of World Economics - The ECB might seem to be the most independent central bank in the world. Its statutes were carefully designed to ensure independence and they are enshrined in an...