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1.
We study the information preferences and information demand of decision-makers facing uncertainty. We focus on monotone decision problems in which the posterior beliefs induced by the decision-maker’s information can be ordered so that higher actions are chosen in response to higher signal realizations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for decision makers with different classes of payoff functions to prefer one information structure to another. We also provide conditions under which two decision-makers in a given class can be ranked in terms of their information demand. Applications and examples are given. 相似文献
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The structure of information networks 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We develop a strategic model of information acquisition in networks where agents pay for all the pieces of information they acquire, including those through indirect links. The cost of information depends on the distance it traverses in the network. We consider two possibilities in this context: (1) costs increasing with distance, and (2) costs decreasing with distance. The paper also examines situations where it is more expensive to acquire information of higher value. We show that there is almost no divergence between the efficient and Nash equilibrium information architectures. We then study the effect of decay in networks where information through longer paths is cheaper. Finally, we also examine a model with costly link formation that combines both types of cost related assumptionsWe are grateful to Hans Haller, Rob Gilles, Susanne Maria Schmidt, Sumit Joshi, Georg Erber, Beth Allen, Mark Machina, Bob Martin, Johanna Francis, Cheryl Long, Raja Kali, Kaz Miyagiwa, Micheal Kosfeld, Bibhudutta Panda and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The paper has further benefited from the comments of participants at Game Theory and Applications Mumbai 2003, Royal Economic Society Meetings 2003, SED 2004 and GAMES 2004. Sudipta Sarangi acknowledges the hospitality of DIW Berlin where a part of this research was carried out. Rajgopal Kannan acknowledges the support of NSF grants IIS-0329738 and IIS-0312632 相似文献
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This work analyzes alternative designs of agri-environmental schemes and how different incentive mechanisms impact on their overall efficiency. It focuses on spatial targeting and delegation in an asymmetric information context. First, the optimal contract under adverse selection is modeled. This model underlines the trade-off between information rents and allocative efficiency. The impact of spatial targeting is then addressed. Disaggregated information structures increase the optimal efforts asked of the farmers. It may also involve higher information rents and may reduce the net contributions of some farmers. Finally, the consequences of delegating authority within the principal-agent relationship are investigated. The results illustrate that spatial targeting and delegation, when combined, have asymmetric impacts on farmers' payoffs. 相似文献
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Subjects update prior information simultaneously versus sequentially. The mean prediction is remarkably close to the correct Bayesian estimate with simultaneous information, but differs significantly conditional on whether good news precedes bad news or vice versa. 相似文献
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Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building
on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we
document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of
uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of
participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a
significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many
others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on
the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision
making in economic situations.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y.
JEL Classification C91, D83 相似文献
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The Wason card selection and the Tversky &; Kahneman frame anomaly are examined in the context of a probabilistic, constructivist biological model of decision-making. Rational choice requires that decision-makers understand the meaning of the choices they confront. In fact, the determination of meaning and the process of rational choice represent two sides the same coin. Further, perception, cognition and action are ill-posed problems. To solve these problems ‘missing data’ must be supplied by the brain. This data is acquired by both ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes. These evolutionary processes facilitate the determination of meaning and as a product of that process also facilitate the construction of rationality. Two interrelated brain systems involved in this construction process are examined: an emotional system that rapidly and non-consciously assigns reward expectancy values to objects in the environment and a sensory-motor system that participates in the discovery of more general information that facilitates environment/body interactions. Jointly, these systems help a naïve agent to find ‘meaning in an unlabeled world’ and to predict the outcomes of future interactions with that world by supplying ‘background’ information, i.e., by supplying the missing data necessary for rational choice. This ‘background’ represents the imprint of the statistical structure of the world on the brain and, as such, embodies the individual’s Bayesian priors. Lack of sufficient background capacities can result in systematic judgment errors and seemingly irrational decisions. Complex culture is a key aspect of the environment that facilitates the construction of rationality, in part, by becoming internalized as background. Culture facilitates the creation of complex social constructs that contribute to cultural evolution, reduce uncertainty, and increase rationality; however, cultural evolution can get ahead of itself—potentially leading to background failure and errors in judgment and choice. Finally, it is not simply complexity or lack of hands-on experience that lead to error: an additional component that might be called semantic opacity is necessary. 相似文献
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Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the
precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information
acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications
based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of
heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
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This article provides comparative international evidence on the effect of market timing on corporate capital structures using panel data for US, UK and continental European firms. We document that the empirical regularity found for US firms, that historical market-to-book ratios and corporate leverage correlate negatively does not extend to UK and continental European firms. The latter tend to raise debt rather than equity when stock prices are high, thus sticking more closely to a pecking order in which debt is preferred over external equity. 相似文献
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This article analyses the technical efficiency of Mozambican banks from 2005 to 2014 with a Bayesian stochastic frontier model. The intermediate approach is adopted and the results reveal that efficiency varies amongst the banks analysed. Foreign ownership of Mozambican banks is also analysed, as is public ownership, the role of mergers and acquisitions, big banks and active dividend policy within the context of bank costs. Policy implications are then derived. 相似文献
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We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale. 相似文献
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Yasuhiro Sakai 《Journal of Economic Theory》1985,36(1):36-54
This paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty. It explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers. By comparing the ten possible types of information structures, it is shown that information may be detrimental, that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and/or the consumer, and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival's cost rather than its own. All of these “irregular” results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient. 相似文献
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We carry out two experiments to test a model of herd behaviour based on the work of Banerjee (Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII, 797–817, 1992). He shows that herding occurs as a result of people observing the actions of others and using this information in their own decision rule. In our experiments herding does not occur as frequently as Banerjee predicts. Contrary to his results, the subjects' behaviour appears to depend on the probabilities of receiving a signal and of this signal being correct. Furthermore, Banerjee finds that the pattern of decision making over a number of rounds of the game is volatile whereas we find that decision making is volatilewithin rounds. 相似文献
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Stéphan Marette 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2007,32(3):259-285
This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice with an endogenous market structure. Under duopoly,
firms compete either in prices or in quantities. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring
a cost. A standard may correct a safety underinvestment by firms. It is shown that the market structure (duopoly or monopoly)
linked to the standard depends on the available information. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected
standard is always compatible with competition. The absence of standard due to safety overinvestment by firms only emerges
under competition in quantities and a relatively low cost of safety improvement. Under imperfect information about safety
for consumers, the selected standard often leads to a monopoly situation, essential for covering the cost of safety improvement.
However, for relatively high values of this cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure arising from the lack of information.
相似文献
16.
Tung Lam Dang Thi Hong Hanh Huynh Manh Toan Nguyen Thi Minh Hue Nguyen 《Applied economics》2017,49(44):4482-4500
This article investigates the effect of the firm information environment, characterized by the analyst characteristics, on firms’ capital structure choices and whether this effect varies according to country-level institutional environments. Using a comprehensive international data set that covers 19 939 firms across 41 countries between 2000 and 2010, we document two key findings. First, firms with lower analyst coverage, higher forecast dispersion and higher forecast errors have higher leverage. Second, the effect of the firm information environment on corporate leverage is attenuated in countries with stronger governance mechanism and better information transparency. This result suggests that a firm’s information environment is an important factor influencing its capital structure decision and that country-level institutional environments matter to this effect. 相似文献
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An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [D. Bergemann, M. Pesendorfer, Information structures in optimal auctions, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007) 580–609], who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric. 相似文献
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随着信息技术的广泛的应用,社会对信息管理人才的需求越来越大,因此信息管理与信息系统专业的建设成为当务之急。本文分析了信息管理与信息系统专业的发展现状和存在的问题,并对如何优化该专业的建设提出了几点对策。 相似文献
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In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information. 相似文献