对外反倾销措施提升中国企业绩效了吗

本文选取1999-2007年度中国对外反倾销措施涉案产品数据以及与之相关的中国工业企业数据,构建微观面板数据模型,定量研究对外反倾销措施对中国进口竞争性产业内企业绩效的实际救济效果。研究结果表明:第一,对外发起反倾销调查当年对进口竞争性企业绩效的影响不明显;第二,不同于以往的研究结果,总体而言,中国反倾销措施的肯定性仲裁结果会降低企业绩效,否定性仲裁结果会提升企业绩效。最后,本文据此提出中国对外反倾销措施的实施在规制国外企业的不正当竞争行为的同时,应以提高国内进口竞争性企业绩效为根本目的。     

Has the Byrd Amendment Affected US Imports?

The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), also known as the Byrd Amendment, allows the US government to distribute revenues from antidumping duties to domestic firms alleging harm. Prior to the amendment these revenues were not distributed to firms. In this article, we formally test the hypothesis that the Byrd Amendment effectively provides double protection to US firms to the extent that it further restricts US imports, as argued by the EU and 11 other US trading partners. Using a rich panel of 362 US manufacturing industries for the period 1998 to 2003, we find that whether or not the Byrd Amendment restricted US imports depends crucially on the level of competitiveness in the import‐competing industry. Specifically, we find that the Byrd Amendment served to restrict imports only in industries where competition is relatively weak, while the amendment is associated with an increase in imports in more competitive industries.     

US Antidumping Law and Competition in International Trade

It is usual to argue that the US antidumping code and legal practice have become a substitute for tariffs now severely limited by GATT and, somewhat like these displaced tariffs, they are intended to limit the extent of price competition by foreign sellers. However, there is one set of conditions under which the regulations and duties, and the accompanying increase in market price they bring about, increases domestic producer surplus more than they decrease consumer surplus and therefore increase domestic welfare. As is shown, these conditions require antidumping duties to exclude foreign manufacturers from the domestic market in a specific inverse relationship to the prevailing market price. While the duties imposed with an antidumping violation implicitly set out an exclusion rate for foreign manufacturers, there is little in the US code or legal practice which suggests that the duties and exclusion rates are established with this specific rule in mind.     

Heterogeneous responses of firms to trade protection

This paper estimates the effect of antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic import-competing firms. Two key results emerge. First, the productivity of the average firm receiving protection moderately improves, but this is never sufficient to close the productivity gap with firms never involved in antidumping cases. Second, allowing for firm heterogeneity reveals that domestic firms with relatively low initial productivity - laggard firms - have productivity gains during protection, while firms with high initial productivity - frontier firms - experience productivity losses during protection. These results are consistent with recent theories showing that trade policy affects firms differently depending on their initial productivity.     

Heterogeneous responses of firms to trade protection

This paper estimates the effect of antidumping protection on the productivity of domestic import-competing firms. Two key results emerge. First, the productivity of the average firm receiving protection moderately improves, but this is never sufficient to close the productivity gap with firms never involved in antidumping cases. Second, allowing for firm heterogeneity reveals that domestic firms with relatively low initial productivity – laggard firms – have productivity gains during protection, while firms with high initial productivity – frontier firms – experience productivity losses during protection. These results are consistent with recent theories showing that trade policy affects firms differently depending on their initial productivity.     

Multiproduct firms and antidumping duties: Evidence from India

ABSTRACT

With the growing availability of high-quality higher-dimension data in international trade, many new stylized facts have also emerged. One such stylized fact is that multiproduct firms play a significant role in international trade. In this paper, we investigate the effect of US antidumping duties on the exports of Indian multiproduct firms. In particular, we study whether US antidumping duties lead the Indian exporter to alter their product-scope to third country markets (aka to trade partners other than the US). Using a unique transaction-level data from India, we find that firms affected by US antidumping duties increased the number of products exported to other destinations by about 0.7 products, on average. This translates to a substantial 40% increase in the product-scope of these firms because a typical Indian exporting firm exported an average of 1.8 products to a given destination in our sample. We also find that firms whose products spanned multiple sectors drove most of this increase. However, we do not find any difference in the product-scope response of firms producing differentiated vs. those producing homogenous products. We find our results to be robust across various specification and sample size changes.     

Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?

This paper examines how the country-breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import-competing and foreign exporting firms. The contribution of the analysis is to show how firm-level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country-breadth. I show that a country-specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import-competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade. In contrast, a broadly-applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow-down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms. Because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm's adoption of new technology, the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed.     

Corporate Lobbying in Antidumping Cases: Looking into the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act

Is protection for sale? In this research, we examine the effect of corporate lobbying on the disbursement of proceeds of the recent antidumping petitions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, the so-called Byrd amendment. With the use of novel U.S. Customs Service data on the disbursements of the antidumping duties to the injured firms, we find that the petitioning firms that spend more on lobbying gain larger proceeds. We conclude that firms that lobby are the ones that get protection, not necessarily the healthy ones.     

The First Review of European Union Antidumping Reviews

The literature on antidumping (AD) has documented various aspects of this protectionist tool. However, a peculiar feature of AD has not received much attention: these measures are endogenous to the behaviour of the exporting firms, which can adjust the dumping margin by changing their export price and ask the authority to amend the AD measures accordingly. The objective of this paper is to fill part of this gap in the literature by analysing the AD reviews conducted by the European Union for affirmative petitions initiated in 1980–2009. To this end, a novel data set of all such reviews has been assembled. Summary statistics reveal that more than a third of all petitions concluded with the imposition of AD measures are reviewed at least once before their expiration, and most reviews lead to lower AD duties (although, almost 20 per cent of the firms investigated through interim reviews see their duties increase). There are significant differences in the outcome of the reviews depending on the party requesting them (i.e. reviews lodged by European producers are less likely to lead to lower duties). These conclusions are confirmed by the econometric analysis, which also shows that Chinese firms see their duties reduced significantly less than those of firms from other countries.     

Inflation,R&D and growth in an open economy

This study explores the long-run effects of inflation in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We find that increasing domestic inflation reduces domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic and foreign technologies, increasing foreign inflation also affects the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates are generally higher than the optimal inflation rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. Under the CIA constraint on R&D (consumption), a larger market power of firms amplifies (mitigates) this inflationary bias. We use cross-country panel data to estimate the effects of inflation on R&D and also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and the US to quantify the welfare effects of decreasing the inflation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level.     

Antidumping as Anticompetitive Practice Evidence from the United States and the European Union

This paper discusses and develops certain observable indices of the nature and effects of dumping and antidumping policy. The object is to analyze each antidumping procedure introduced by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) for the 1998–2001 period. Using conservative criteria, we find that 68.2% of the antidumping procedures introduced by the EU appear to have a questionable economic foundation, meaning that the identified factors suggest that the conduct challenged is unlikely to have any significantly anticompetitive effect. We similarly find a questionable economic foundation in 76% of the analyzed cases in the US. The recommendation that we propose is that it may be appropriate to modify the antidumping law to take into account at a preliminary stage the factors that may indicate the presence or absence of potential anticompetitive effects.     

Die radikalen Steuerpläne der US-Republikaner und die Folgen für die EU

The Republican majority in the US House of Representatives is considering the introduction of a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT). While its global implementation has the potential to substantially increase welfare, a unilateral introduction of such a tax system raises a range of questions due to the existence of source-based taxation systems abroad. We consider the US tax plans from an EU perspective. We show that European exporters may suffer, but European firms with affiliation in the US may benefit from a switch to the DBCFT. American firms will be the likely losers of this policy. Finally, we discuss potential policy reactions by the EU and its member countries as well as legal and economic implications of possible adjustments in EU tax systems.     

Some New Evidence about the Effects of U.S. Antidumping Orders and Their Administrative Reviews on the Prices of Covered Imports

The present article presents evidence from a sample of U.S. antidumping orders that are followed through as many as 15 administrative reviews. The decline in average antidumping duties over the course of successive reviews is entirely the result of firms with higher dumping duties disappearing from the review process (probably ceasing sales in the United States). For given firms surviving to be named in the next review, the antidumping duty actually increases from one review to the next. This article is the first to report direct information about the unit value of covered imports contained in administrative review reports of the United States International Trade Commission. This article is also the first to present information about the large number of firms—more than one-third of those ever assigned a firm-specific duty—that are named in administrative reviews, but not in original antidumping orders.     

Entry liberalization and export performance: a theoretical analysis in a multi-market oligopoly model

This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how the entry (costless) of firms in an industry may have a dramatic effect on exports from an industry in a country. The results have tremendous implications for LDCs suffering from resource and BOP constraints but having reservoirs of cheap labor. The welfare effects of such entry liberalization policy (or subsidy) can be stated from the Bhagwati theorem that a reduction in an only (single) distortion is necessarily welfare improving by reducing monopoly or oligopoly distortions. However, we have shown that the entry liberalization policy is welfare superior to an equivalent subsidy policy where equivalent is defined in terms of the impact on exports. As a by product, we have also shown how one can integrate the oligopoly models of trade with the general oligopoly literature. The results on the limiting behaviour of an open economy oligopoly model extend the standard results in the oligopoly theory in a closed economy.     

Long‐term Effects of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis in Goodwin‐type Economies

The existence of an efficiency wage mechanism in Goodwin‐type models may lead to the unexpected appearance of an economically meaningful equilibrium with zero labour share, which is globally stable for some parameter constellation and allows the system to attain its ‘maximal growth'. A subsequent ‘normative’ comparison between the possible long‐term regimes of the economy shows that (1) the zero labour share equilibrium can be the ‘preferred’ equilibrium in terms of welfare; (2) in all the long‐term regimes the welfare is higher than in the original Goodwin model; (3) a point of maximal welfare exists. Moreover, the effects of rational behaviour of firms are compared with the ‘traditional’ situation in which rationality is not explicitly assumed. A striking result appears: myopic rationality can have deleterious effects on the profit of firms and on the overall welfare of the economy.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

反倾销与特保措施经济效应的对比分析

2009年1月1日,中国加入WTO工作组报告第242段到期失效,进口国将不能再据此对我国纺织品出口采取特保措施,我国纺织业面临新的发展机遇,然而由于我国纺织品出口"量大价低"的现状,进口国势必转向反倾销等新贸易壁垒保护本国产业。采用一个进口国两个出口国的模型,将反倾销与特保措施的经济效应对比分析。研究结果表明,与特保相比,反倾销给我国造成的福利损失更大,对我国纺织产业更具威胁;进口国采取反倾销未必能改善本国福利,且对纺织产业的保护效果也值得怀疑。     

Does Antidumping Address “Unfair” Trade?

While antidumping laws were originally developed as the international trade analogue of domestic competition or antitrust policies, most vestiges of competition policy disappeared early in their evolution. Nonetheless, the formal justification for modern antidumping practice remains founded on countering “unfair” trading practices and preserving competitive markets. We update and consolidate a relatively thin literature that has examined this issue formally. Applying a “likelihood of predatory practice” index to the European Union’s use of antidumping proceedings over the period 2001 to 2010, we find more antidumping cases that suggest competition policy concerns than do previous studies, although these are still a minority.     

不完全汇率传递下的货币政策工具规则分析

本文尝试构建一个开放条件下的总供给-总需求模型,通过名义进口价格刚性在模型中引入汇率传递因素。模型对各种货币政策工具规则下社会福利损失函数进行比较,考察在不同的汇率传递程度下的各种货币政策工具规则。研究结果显示,社会福利水平随着汇率传递程度下降而提高;货币政策工具规则对消费者物价指数(CPI)上涨作出反应一定程度上优于对国内制造商品价格上涨作出反应,制定的货币政策工具规则应该以CPI为目标,以使社会福利损失最小。     

Twin dollarization and exchange rate policy

This paper develops a small open economy general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities to study twin dollarization in East Asian economies, a phenomenon where firms borrow in US dollars and also set export prices in US dollars. In this model, we endogenize both the currency of liability denomination and the currency of export pricing. We show that a key factor that affects firms' dollarization decisions is exchange rate policy. Twin dollarization is an optimal strategy for all firms when exchange rate flexibility is limited, which implies that a fixed exchange rate regime may lead to an equilibrium with twin dollarization. Furthermore, we find that twin dollarization can reduce the welfare loss caused by the fixed exchange rate regime, as it helps to cushion the economy against domestic nominal risk.