Competing Research Joint Ventures

Research and development (R&D) competition among firms has recently been extended to R&D competition involving research joint ventures. It was previously shown that in an industry conducting cost-reducing R&D followed by competition in the product market, if all firms both fully share R&D information and coordinate investments to maximize pint profits, final products prices are lower, and firms' profits are higher than with information shriving alone, joint profit maximization alone, or no cooperation. In this paper we question whether a single research joint venture (RJV) cartel is the best form of industry R&D coordination. We show that there are circumstances in which splitting a single RJV cartel into several competing ones yields lower product prices. Moreover, we show that in these circumstances, splitting the industry into exactly two competing RJV cartels would be best.     

The Welfare Effects of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and the National Cooperative Production Amendments (NCPA) of 1993

A bstract .   Cooperative R&D and production joint ventures may enable firms to achieve significant cost efficiencies. However, they can also be a means of controlling industry output and raising product prices. A review of the literature on the welfare implications of allowing rival firms to cooperate in the R&D and production stages indicates that the issue is controversial from a theoretical perspective. There is need to examine the motivations of R&D and production joint ventures in order to assess the welfare implications of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and National Cooperative Production Amendments (NCPA) of 1993, which relaxed the antitrust treatment of R&D and production joint ventures. Using samples of 127 cooperative R&D joint ventures and 342 cooperative production joint ventures announced by U.S. domestic firms during 1979–1999, this article finds that these endeavors do not meet the criteria for collusive behavior specified by the market power doctrine. We interpret these findings as suggesting that cooperative R&D and production joint ventures are motivated by cost efficiencies and are, therefore, welfare enhancing. Our results pose some challenges to the doctrine that antitrust actions by regulatory authorities are always welfare improving.     

Fostering product innovation: Differences between new ventures and established firms

This study combines insights from the entrepreneurship, competency-based view and innovation policy literature to analyze the relationships among different types of public incentives designed to foster innovation and product innovation at both new ventures and incumbent firms. To test our hypotheses, we ran a system of regression models on a cross-national sample comprised of 5238 firms from 29 European countries and found a different pattern for new ventures and incumbents. Our results suggest that support for attendance or participation in trade fairs and networking with other companies are the most effective methods of promoting product innovation for new ventures. However, for incumbent firms, we found that the most effective policies consisted of tax reduction for R&D expenditures and subsidies for acquiring buildings or other infrastructure(s) for innovation activities. This distinction prompts interesting insights related to theory development in research on entrepreneurship and innovation policy.     

Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers: The case of labor-managed firms

This research focuses on the behavior of not-for-profit enterprises. In particular, using a familiar model of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers, we examine strategic interactions between labor-managed firms in a duopoly. Research spillovers have not been previously considered in the context of labor-managed firms. Among four market scenarios involving (i) competition in research and production; (ii) cooperation in research and production; (iii and iv) competition or cooperation in research and the reverse in production, our results show that research is greatest under full cooperation, while output is greatest under full competition. Output and R&D are the lowest in the case when firms compete in research, but form a production cartel. The degree of research spillovers has a crucial bearing upon these rankings. Some of these results differ from those for profit-maximizing firms. The effects of changes in research spillovers on employment (output) are shown to depend upon the nature of the underlying production technology. Policy implications are discussed.     

Cooperative R&D ventures: Strategic behavior versus transactional efficiency

This paper examines a sample of 48 cooperative R&D ventures announced in the period 1983–1990 to determine their impact on the stock price of the announcing firms. It finds that the venturing firms earn statistically significant positive abnormal returns over periods surrounding the announcement date. These gains are greater than those that result from announcements of increases in expenditures on in-house R&D. The cross-sectional analysis reveals that abnormal returns to the venturing firms are independent of industry concentration, larger in international ventures than in domestic ventures, and equal in cooperative agreements and equity joint ventures. These results support the transactional efficiency perspective of cooperative R&D ventures and suggest that the relaxation of antitrust laws as they apply to cooperative R&D ventures in 1984 is a welfare-improving policy.     

Short-term R&D bias,competition on cost rather than innovation,and time to market

Mounting evidence indicates that capital markets often apply short-term pressure on firms to gain short-term results by focusing primarily on reported financial performance. As a result of short termism, it has been argued that companies are likely to cut expenditure on R&D which might otherwise improve longer-term performance. As there is a growing consensus that R&D is critically important to both organizational and national performance, short termism may have significant detrimental organizational consequences. One implication arising from a short-term R&D bias, and examined in this paper, is its effect on market time reduction. Arguments are examined that suggest a dominant R&D strategy is to reduce product time to market. Concerns have been expressed, however, that such a strategy is applicable in specific circumstances only. A review of the literature suggests that analyst and shareholder bias against high-risk, long-term research in favor of lower-risk, short-term product R&D influences organizations to reduce the time it takes to get a product to market when the emphasis in the marketplace is on cost competition rather than product innovation. The findings of the study suggest that when the emphasis on competition on cost rather than innovation is low, short-term R&D bias does not affect market time. In contrast, when the emphasis on competition on cost rather than innovation is high, the results indicate that short-term R&D bias positively influences market time reduction. The study concludes with suggestions for further research.     

Industry influence on firms' R&D and innovation

This paper examines the effect of peers on a firm's research and development (R&D) policy. We show that firms do not make R&D decisions in isolation, and that industry dynamics play an important role in defining a firm's R&D intensity. Using a large sample of 54,393 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2015 in the United States, we find that firms' R&D decisions are mainly driven by their industry peers' R&D policies. Moreover, we find that R&D mimicking is significant only in the presence of strong product market competition, whereas we do not find any evidence of information-based herding in R&D investments. Our additional analysis shows that our main conclusions remain valid even in the presence of financial constraints, and regardless of the firms' market positions. Finally, we provide evidence that R&D mimicking increases firms' future values, future patent outputs, and estimated patent dollar values. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns, and to using alternative sample compositions, R&D intensity proxies, and different industry classifications.     

Research Joint Ventures

Abstract.  Inter-firm collaboration is not new. What is new is that such collaboration has exploded during the past couple of decades, in parallel to the intensification of international competition. Moreover, the nature of collaboration has changed, shifting from peripheral interests to the very core functions of the corporation, and from equity to non-equity forms of collaboration. Importantly, cooperation focusing on the generation, exchange, and/or adaptation of new technologies has risen at very fast rates. Research joint ventures, the focus of this paper, belong in the latter category.
The proliferation of RJVs has created extensive interest among economists, business analysts, and policy decision-makers and led to the profusion of literature on the topic. This paper critically reviews the literature in industrial economics and strategic management that deals with RJV partner motives and RJV outcomes. The paper categorizes the different streams of this literature and indicates the state-of-the-art, synthesizes important understandings, and suggests key nodes of a future research agenda.     

Dynamics in research joint ventures and R&D collaborations

We investigate the short- and long-term effects of different types of R&D collaborations on firms, consumers, and the industry. To that end, we consider a differentiated-product market in which firms compete à la Bertrand and invest in process innovation in order to lower the production cost over time. Investments are stochastic and there can be cartelization or competition strategies among firms at the moment of making the decision on the amount to invest in R&D. Our results show that in equilibrium, the long-run welfare is larger under a research joint venture than under other environments. Discounted present value profits increase with the level of the spillover but there are asymmetries that depend on the firms’ asymmetry on marginal costs.     

IS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE R&D ALWAYS JUSTIFIED? A DISCUSSION BASED ON THE LITERATURE ON GROWTH

Many economists have long held that market failures create a gap between social and private returns to research and development (R&D), thereby limiting private incentives to invest in R&D. However, this common belief that firms significantly underinvest in R&D is increasingly being challenged, leading the rationale behind public support for private R&D to be questioned. In this paper, we attempt to clarify the perspectives of two sources: the theoretical literature on endogenous growth, and its recent developments in integrating a geographical dimension, and the empirical literature that measures the social returns to R&D in relation to the private returns. Ultimately, we are able to clearly distinguish among different types of market failures and compare their relative impact on the gap between the private and social returns to R&D. Two main conclusions are reached. First, systematic firm underinvestment in R&D is not demonstrated. Second, even though instances of underinvestment do occur, they are mainly explained by surplus appropriability problems rather than by knowledge externalities. This suggests the need for a new policy mix that employs more demand‐oriented instruments and is more concentrated on identifying efficient allocations among activities rather than merely increasing global private R&D investment.     

Endogenous Technological Spillovers: Causes and Consequences

We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in which firms can first invest in cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human-capital market for their knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D employees change firms, spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most likely when they increase total industry profits. We use this result to show that innovation incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than for exogenous spillovers and that endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation incentives are stronger under quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D workers.     

Upstream Mergers,Downstream Competition,and R&D Investments

In this paper, we provide an explanation for why upstream firms merge, highlighting the role of R&D investments and their nature, as well as the role of downstream competition. We show that an upstream merger generates two distinct efficiency gains when downstream competition is not too strong and R&D investments are sufficiently generic: The merger increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices. We also show that upstream firms merge unless R&D investments are too specific and downstream competition is neither too weak nor too strong. When the merger materializes, the merger‐generated efficiencies pass on to consumers, and thus, consumers can be better off.     

Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers

The literature on the incentives for R & D cooperation with spillovers typically deals only with the factors affecting cooperative profits. This paper focuses on the incentives to cheat and the stability of such cooperative agreements in a repeated game framework. It is shown that the stability of cooperation is influenced by the nature and magnitude of spillovers, relative to the nature and degree of product market competition. While cooperative profits are higher with large positive (exogenous, unintended) know-how spillovers, such as in fundamental research, our anslysis shows that it may be easier to sustain cooperation in areas with lower spillovers, such as applied research, because of the smaller incenfives to cheat on the initial agreement, at least when firms produce substitutes. Alternatively, the possibility of technology sharing (i.e., intended or endogenous spillovers), besides R&D coordination, not only increases cooperative profits but also reduces the incentives to defect from a cooperative equilibrium.     

Managerial optimism and investment choice

This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex‐ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial Constraints: Routine Versus Cutting Edge R&D Investment

We analyze financial constraints on R&D, where we account for heterogeneity among investments that has been neglected in previous literature. According to economic theory, investments should be distinguished by their degree of uncertainty, e.g. routine R&D versus cutting‐edge R&D. Financial constraints should be more binding for cutting‐edge R&D than for routine R&D. Using panel data we find that R&D spending of firms devoting a significant fraction of R&D to cutting‐edge projects is curtailed by credit constraints while routine R&D investments are not. This has important policy implications with respect to the distribution of R&D subsidies in the economy.     

Residual income claimancy,monitoring, and the R&D firm: Theory with application to biotechs

This paper models the assignment of residual income claimancy to an R&D manager and applies the model to biotechnology firms. Residual income claimancy provides incentives for the manager to monitor the R&D process. Since the nature of R&D and of monitoring scientific effort is different, our model predicts stark differences in the residual income claimancy of managers and in other aspects of organization for innovative R&D firms like biotechs. In particular, R&D firms are expected to be more owner‐managed, more expert‐managed, and smaller in size. Cross‐sectional data on biotechnology firms is consistent with these implications. Additionally, longitudinal data indicate that as firms alter their focus on biotech research, their organizational structure changes as expected. Our approach suggests a process of firm and industry evolution related to technological maturity and points to the importance of incentives rather than risk sharing in determining organizational form, similar to the original analysis of franchising. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of R&D: The undiscounted case

Will R&D increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time? We examine this issue in the context of a dynamic, alternate-move duopoly model of non-cooperative R&D. The asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market. Utilizing a value loss process constructed from the Optimality Equation of dynamic programming, we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time. We obtain this convergence-to-symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to R&D through the notion that R&D investment cannot be changed instantaneously, by allowing research externalities, complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated R&D, and either increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival R&D.     

Endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly under uncertainty

Including R&D risk, this paper considers the choices of R&D spillovers in a simple non-tournament cost-reducing R&D duopoly game with Bertrand competition. It turns out that the two firms never disclose any of their R&D information when considering their R&D non-cooperatively. However, if the firms decide their R&D cooperatively, we show, though they would always fully share their information when the risk of R&D is low, they would not disclose any of their R&D information when the market competition is fierce, the R&D risk is high and the R&D is efficient.     

Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections

Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework for estimating price‐cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a ‘joint market imperfections parameter’. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978–2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC‐EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right‐to‐manage bargaining in the labor market (IC‐PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC‐MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within‐regime firm differences in the estimated average price‐cost mark‐up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC‐EB), we also relate our industry and firm‐level estimates of price‐cost mark‐up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm‐specific variables respectively. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Policy-driven ecosystems for new vaccine development

This paper examines the relationship between biomedical policies and entrepreneurial R&D strategies. Public health programs have been unable to provide effective and affordable treatment of infectious diseases for the poor. While governments have become more open to private sector contributions to policy objectives, it is rare to find new ventures commercializing healthcare innovations for neglected diseases. Two case studies of entrepreneurial ventures, in the UK and China, provide evidence on how resource-constrained firms mobilize participants in policy-specific ecosystems to achieve their goals of new vaccine development for tuberculosis. Ecosystem analysis reveals how the innovators’ business models can align their strategies with national policy objectives.