Auditor Expertise and the Estimation of Dollar Error in Accounts

A major task that auditors undertake in formulating their audit opinion is to estimate the dollar error that might exist in accounts in light of their evaluation of internal control strengths and weaknesses. The research that has been undertaken to evaluate the quality of auditor performance on this task, however, has produced mixed results. The current study tries to overcome some theoretical limitations and measurement limitations that have undermined prior studies. Forty practising auditors rated their abilities on fourteen characteristics derived from a model of expertise. They then undertook an experiment where they judged the extent of dollar error that might exist in the inventories of a manufacturing company. They based their judgments on working papers provided to them that contained, among other information, an evaluation of the company's internal control system. An estimate of the 'true' dollar error in the inventories was calculated using a program that simulated the company's internal control and accounting system. This estimate was then used to calculate the accuracy of the auditors' judgments. Their ratings on the expertise characteristics were not related to their judgment accuracy. Their ratings were related, however, to their confidence in their judgment accuracy. Auditors who considered themselves more expert at the task were more confident in their judgment accuracy but they were, in fact, no more accurate than auditors who considered themselves to be less expert at the task.     

The persuasiveness of audit evidence: The case of accounting policy decisions

This study examines how auditors respond to precedents in accounting situations where authoritative guidance does not exist. Three experiments were conducted with practicing audit managers and partners from a Canadian Big Six accounting firm. The results show that auditors rely to a greater extent on precedents that are similar (versus not similar) to the problem situation. When the client's position on the accounting matter was known to the auditor and all available precedents pointed to the same treatment of the accounting issue in question, auditors did not heed the client's position. Rather, they used the available precedents to judge the appropriate accounting. In contrast, when the client's position was known and the available precedents were mixed in their implications for the appropriate accounting treatment, auditors tended to follow the client's position. These results are considered in light of issues of auditor independence and the accounting regulatory environment.     

The influence of judges' attitudes on liability assessments related to failed audits exhibiting significant audit team over-time or significant use of off-shore auditors

This study provides evidence on how audit firms' decisions to use offshore (outsourced) auditors or to assign on-site (local) auditors extensive overtime affect judges' evaluation of auditor legal liability I conduct a behavioral experiment in which actual judges responded to a hypothetical audit lawsuit. The results suggest auditors may be penalized during the litigation process depending on the extent of overtime or off-shoring and judges' attitude toward the public accounting profession. Judges with a positive attitude toward public accounting assessed more liability for an audit firm that used offshore (outsourced) auditors than for the use of extensive overtime for on-site auditors or a control condition. However, judges with a negative attitude toward the auditing profession assessed higher liability for auditors except when on-site auditors bore significant overtime in the final weeks of the audit.     

The influence of process accountability and accounting standard type on auditor usage of a status quo heuristic

There has been considerable discussion about the U.S. reporting standards becoming less rules based, similar to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). One proposed advantage of a change to IFRS is increased comparability across multinational and non-U.S. companies. Additionally, some believe that IFRS afford greater flexibility in its principles, thereby enabling firms’ accounting choices to better reflect the true economic nature of any given transaction (FASB, 2002; SEC, 2003). With fewer rules, both financial statement preparers and auditors would be expected to adjust to having more options with regards to financial reporting. However, some proposed changes leave the option open to implement IFRS (or other principles-based standards) in ways that still follow rules in U.S. GAAP. This paper investigates whether prior year accounting treatments influence the judgment for current year treatments when one way to implement the standard is to follow the prior year treatment. We find that some auditors fixate on prior year scenarios and judgments, even if the current year scenario and applicable accounting standards are different. We find that holding auditors accountable for their decision making process reduces the likelihood of sticking with the prior year treatment most notably when the prior year standards were U.S. GAAP.     

Configural Information Processing in Auditing: Further Evidence

An important issue in audit judgment research has been how auditors combine information in order to make judgments and, in particular, whether auditors ‘judgments involve configural cue usage. Some recent research (Brown and Solomon, 1990; 1991) has found that under certain conditions, many auditors were able to configurally process information. This paper extends this research by examining some conditions that may facilitate the development of auditors’ ability to configurally process available information. The study found that: (a) the proportion of auditors processing the information configurally was greater than chance; (b) for those that processed the information configurally, the form of the interaction was as predicted, that is, ordinal with a compensatory form; (c) increasing depth of processing by requiring subjects to provide explanations for their judgments did not have a significant effect on the number of auditors processing configurally; (d) the level of consensus was higher for auditors who processed configurally than for those who did not; and (e) the analysis of the explanations provided by configurai cue processors indicated that they saw the relevant cues as being substitutable.     

The Effects of Alternative Justification Memos on the Judgments of Audit Reviewees and Reviewers

Prior research on justification has typically focused on the differences in judgments between auditors required, or not required, to justify their decisions. However, justification memos can be prepared using different approaches. In this study we examine the impact of using three justification memos: supporting, balanced, and component. Using a comprehensive control environment case based on an actual client that experienced fraud, we find that the justification memo used can affect the judgments of auditors preparing the memos as well as the judgments of auditors who review their work. Specifically, the results indicate that auditors using an unrestricted component memo, who were required to write memos for components of their task by providing important positive and negative evidence, thought that the firm's control environment was more likely to prevent fraud as compared with the supporting and balanced memo groups. Additional analyses suggest that the reason for this result is that an unrestricted component memo focuses auditors' attention on a larger percentage of positive control environment characteristics when a firm's underlying evidence set is mostly positive. This may be problematic because firms can have more positive than negative control environment characteristics, even when fraud is present.     

An Investigation of Auditors’ Judgments When Companies Release Earnings Before Audit Completion

The majority of U.S. public companies release annual earnings prior to the completion of audit fieldwork. We investigate this phenomenon in a controlled experiment with audit partners and senior managers. We find that releasing earnings before completion of the audit pressures auditors to adopt the goals of management, thereby reducing the likelihood of post‐announcement audit‐adjustment recommendations. We also examine the effect of audit committee (AC) strength in improving auditors’ judgments after annual earnings are released. When ACs are actively involved in accounting issues and proactively communicating with auditors—characteristics currently lacking in most ACs—the negative effects on auditors’ judgments are completely mitigated. Our study provides evidence on potential unintended consequences of early release of earnings and the importance of investing in high‐quality ACs to mitigate adverse effects of client pressures on audit judgment and financial reporting quality.     

Audit committee quality indices,reporting quality and firm value

We investigate the relation between audit committee (AC) quality indices, financial reporting, internal control quality and firm value using a US dataset for the period 2002–12. The indices are developed by linking firm value with principal component analysis (PCA) factors based on a broad set of 82 AC variables, some of which influence the quality of the AC, but are not addressed in prior literature. Significant AC factors include ‘overlapping directors’, ‘busyness’ and ‘foreign director’, and we use these factors to develop ‘high’ and ‘low’ AC quality indices. We show that low AC quality firms are more likely to manage earnings, be external auditor dependent with respect to non‐audit tax services, and switch to a lower quality auditor. Low AC quality firms are also more likely to have internal control concerns disclosed by predecessor auditors, including accounting issues, financial restatements, audit opinion concerns and deficiencies that undermine internal control effectiveness. Further, they are more likely to receive an audit report containing additional explanatory notes. Conversely, high AC quality firms are significantly less likely to have these concerns. Our findings highlight the value of using AC quality indices in delivering greater oversight of the financial reporting process.     

Corporate employment,red flags,and audit effort

U.S. regulatory agencies and congressional oversight committees have expressed concerns that auditors often neglect red flags embedded in the operating characteristics of firms that misstate their financial reports. This study examines whether labor employment decisions, a major part of a firm’s operations, help predict accounting improprieties and consequently play a role in audit planning and pricing. We find that negative abnormal employment changes are associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent financial restatements, accounting irregularities, and lawsuits related to accounting fraud, and generally require greater effort from auditors as manifested by higher audit fees and longer audit report lags. Positive abnormal employment changes are associated with subsequent restatements and longer audit report lags, but not associated with fraud or audit fees. Taken together, the results are consistent with auditors recognizing the individual misstatement risks pertaining to companies’ employment decisions. These results suggest that standard setters, regulators, and practitioners should devote more attention to operational statistics to identify potential red flags.     

Are non‐audit services associated with firm value? Evidence from financial information system‐related services

The purchase of non‐audit services from incumbent auditors has generated considerable attention. Surprisingly, limited empirical evidence exists on the association of non‐audit services with firm value. Focusing on services related to financial information system (FIS), we find that the market value of equity is greater for firms that purchase FIS‐related services from their incumbent auditors relative to firms that do not. The levels of FIS fees are also positively related to firm value after controlling for total other fees, or total other non‐audit fees. Hence, despite the negative perception associated with non‐audit services, investors regard FIS‐related services as value‐adding activities.     

Auditor size and audit quality

Regulators and small audit firms allege that audit firm size does not affect audit quality and therefore should be irrelevant in the selection of an auditor. Contrary to this view, the current paper argues that audit quality is not independent of audit firm size, even when auditors initially possesses identical technological capabilities. In particular, when incumbent auditors earn client-specific quasi-rents, auditors with a greater number of clients have ‘more to lose’ by failing to report a discovered breach in a particular client's records. This collateral aspect increases the audit quality supplied by larger audit firms. The implications for some recent recommendations of the AICPA Special Committee on Small and Medium Sized Firms are developed.     

CAP Forum on Enron: Former Audit Firm Personnel as CFOs: Effect on Earnings Management*

Corporate hiring of former audit personnel to fill key financial positions is a practice that has attracted attention from the media, the accounting profession, and regulators. The concern is that the former external auditor who now holds a key position with the client may be able to circumvent the audit or exert pressure on the audit team and adversely influence audit quality. We compare a sample of 172 test companies that appointed to the position of chief financial officer (CFO) personnel who are former employees of the companies' auditors, with a control sample of companies that appointed new CFOs who were not affiliated with their auditors. We investigate whether the level of discretionary accruals is greater for the test sample compared with the control sample during the two years following appointment of the CFO. Both univariate and multivariate results for signed discretionary accruals suggest some support for the hypothesis that firms with affiliated CFOs are associated with greater earnings management than firms with unaffiliated CFOs. Furthermore, the results for signed discretionary accruals suggest that the association is stronger for nonpartners who moved from the audit firm to the client with little or no time gap. On average, the results for absolute discretionary accruals do not suggest differences in earnings management between affiliated and unaffiliated CFOs. However, they do indicate some earnings management relative to unaffiliated CFOs by CFOs who had little or no time gap between leaving the audit firm and joining the client firm, although at a weaker level of significance.     

Auditor's Reputation and Equity Offerings: The Case of Arthur Andersen

The certifying and monitoring role of auditors is valuable to clients. By examining the impact of Arthur Andersen's worsening reputation on its clients, we find a 200 basis point more negative reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements for firms audited by Andersen. The median firm in our sample loses 31.4 million more than a non-Andersen client. We do not find any unusual underpricing for these SEOs, which suggests that any accounting concerns about the issuers are resolved before the issue dates.     

Reporting accountant appointments and accounting restatements: Evidence from UK private companies

In recent years, regulators have exempted an increasing number of companies from the requirement to appoint auditors, yet little is known about the role of the accounting profession in preparing and validating the financial statements of unaudited companies. In this paper, we examine empirically the factors associated with the appointment of reporting accountants. We then provide novel evidence on whether unaudited UK small private companies are less likely to restate their annual accounts when they have been prepared by an external accountancy firm (i.e., a reporting accountant). Based on a cross sectional analysis of a large sample of small private unaudited UK companies, we find that, in accordance with the ‘confirmation hypothesis’, larger companies that voluntarily disclose more financial information are more likely to appoint a reporting accountant. We also find that the accounts of companies with a reporting accountant are significantly less likely to be restated than those without. This result is more pronounced for companies disclosing more financial information and for those employing a larger accounting firm. Given the dwindling number of private companies opting for audits, our findings contribute to debates on the role of the accounting profession in enhancing private company financial reporting quality.     

The development of an expert system for managerial evaluation of internal controls

Both practitioners and researchers have devoted signi?cant effort to the study of decision aids, especially expert systems, to assist auditors in internal control evaluations. In addition to being used as a decision aid, researchers have long contended that expert systems could be used to train non‐expert users. Even though the professional accounting literature makes it clear that responsibility for maintaining an effective internal control system rests with management rather than auditors, the focus to date has been on expert systems aimed at assisting/training auditors, not an organization's management. In contrast, this study focuses on management as users of an expert system for internal control evaluation. We describe the development process, explain how the resulting system was evaluated, and discuss results of that evaluation. These results suggest that such a system gives a new way to help managers increase effectiveness and ef?ciency of a critical organizational process: the evaluation of internal controls. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’ ineffectiveness at monitoring managers. In a sample of securities class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2010, about 11% of independent directors are named as defendants. The likelihood of being named is greater for audit committee members and directors who sell stock during the class period. Named directors receive more negative recommendations from Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy advisory firm, and significantly more negative votes from shareholders than directors in a benchmark sample. They are also more likely than other independent directors to leave sued firms. Overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.     

Internal auditors’ use of interpersonal likability,arguments, and accounting information in a corporate governance setting

Internal auditors play an important role in influencing managers’ judgments. Yet, the practitioner literature indicates that, because internal audit lacks the client services incentives of external audit, internal auditors often adopt a “policeman approach” that can lead to negative interpersonal relationships with managers. We investigate three variables fundamental to internal auditors’ ability to influence managers: (1) internal auditors’ interpersonal likability, (2) the information used to support their positions, and (3) whether they present that information in a thematically organized argument. We find that managers agree more with an internal auditor who is both likable and uses a thematically organized argument. We find further that this joint effect occurs regardless of whether the internal auditor’s information is relatively supportive or unsupportive of his position. Overall, our theory and findings suggest that an internal auditor can achieve agreement from managers on important corporate governance issues with this fairly straightforward presentation tactic, even when the underlying information is relatively unsupportive and managers otherwise tend not to agree with the internal auditor’s position. Our study contributes to accounting, psychology, and writing and discourse theories with new evidence of the effects of an argument structure (holding the underlying information constant) on users’ judgments, and how those effects depend on the likability of the source of information. Our findings have important implications for internal auditors, managers, external auditors, and others interested in corporate governance.     

Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees and Auditor Going-Concern Reporting Decisions in the United Kingdom

The accounting profession has come under increased scrutiny over recent years about the growing number of non-audit fees received from audit clients and the possible negative impact of such fees on auditor independence. The argument advanced is that providing substantial amounts of non-audit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors concede to the wishes of the client management when difficult judgments are made. Such concerns are particularly salient in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients.
 This study empirically examines audit reports provided to financially stressed companies in the United Kingdom and the magnitude of audit and non-audit service fees paid to the company's auditors. We find that the magnitude of both audit fees and non-audit fees are significantly associated with the issuance of a going-concern modified audit opinion. In particular, financially stressed companies with high audit fees are more likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion, whereas companies with high non-audit fees are less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion. Additional analyses indicate that the results are generally robust across alternative model and variable specifications. Overall, evidence supports the contention that high non-audit fees have a detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments for financially stressed U.K. companies.     

The comparative effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing professional scepticism

Responding to concerns about insufficient professional scepticism in audits (e.g. PCAOB, 2011 , 2012 ; ASIC, 2012 ), we investigate the effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing the level of professional scepticism and the differences in effects across audit experience levels. In our experiment, we manipulate the type of accountability (outcome versus process) for both novice auditors and audit seniors. We examine the effect on four measures of professional scepticism and find that auditors show greater levels of professional scepticism when they are expected to justify their judgment process, rather than their final judgments. Our results also show that the professional scepticism of novice auditors improves to a greater extent than that of more experienced auditors (audit seniors) under process accountability.