Inequality,role reversal and cooperation in multiple group membership settings

Experimental Economics - We investigate the role of endowment inequality in a local and global public goods setting with multiple group membership and examine the effect of temporal role reversal...     

The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation

This paper addresses the evolution of cooperation in a multi-agent system with agents interacting heterogeneously with each other based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. The heterogeneity of interaction is defined in two models. First, agents in a network are restricted to interacting with only their neighbors (local interaction). Second, agents are allowed to adopt different IPD strategies against different opponents (discriminative interaction). These two heterogeneous interaction scenarios are different to the classical evolutionary game, in which each agent interacts with every other agent in the population by adopting the same strategy against all opponents. Moreover, agents adapt their risk attitudes while engaging in interactions. Agents with payoffs above (or below) their aspirations will become more risk averse (or risk seeking) in subsequent interactions, wherein risk is defined as the standard deviation of one-move payoffs in the IPD game. In simulation experiments with agents using only own historical payoffs as aspirations (historical comparison), we find that the whole population can achieve a high level of cooperation via the risk attitude adaptation mechanism, in the cases of either local or discriminative interaction models. Meanwhile, when agents use the population’s average payoff as aspirations (social comparison) for adapting risk attitudes, the high level of cooperation can only be sustained in a portion of the population (i.e., partial cooperation). This finding also holds true in both of the heterogeneous scenarios. Considering that payoffs cannot be precisely estimated in a realistic IPD game, simulation experiments are also conducted with a Gaussian disturbance added to the game payoffs. The results reveal that partial cooperation in the population under social comparison is more robust to the variation in payoffs than the global cooperation under historical comparison.     

The role of risk in contract choice

Structuring contracts to share risk in light of incentive problemsis the central premise of contract theory, yet the risk-sharingimplications have rarely been thoroughly tested using micro-levelcontract data. In this article we test the major implicationsof a principal-agent model of contracts using detailed dataon more than 4000 individual contracts from modern North Americanagriculture. On a case-by-case basis, our evidence fails tosupport the standard principal-agent model with risk aversionas an explanation of contract choice in modern North Americanfarming. At the same time, we find some support for models thatassume risk-neutral contracting parties and stress multiplemargins for moral hazard and enforcement costs.     

发挥商贸平台独特作用创建区域合作更大市场

近年来,以各种制度安排,推动贸易投资自由化和便利化,降低交易成本,实现单一市场和扩大市场规模的区域经济合作,在经济全球化大背景下呈现出前所未有的发展。与此同时,中国内地越来越多地参与和推动各个层次、具有机制性的区域经济合作,这将给中国企业“走出去”提供巨大的商机     

A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution

One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees’ behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.     

Religion, longevity, and cooperation: The case of the craft guild

When the mortality rate is high, repeated interaction alone may not sustain cooperation, and religion may play an important role in shaping economic institutions. This insight explains why during the fourteenth century, when plagues decimated populations and the church promoted the doctrine of purgatory, guilds that bundled together religious and occupational activities dominated manufacturing and commerce. During the sixteenth century, the disease environment eased, and the Reformation dispelled the doctrine of purgatory, necessitating the development of new methods of organizing industry. The logic underlying this conclusion has implications for the study of institutions, economics, and religion throughout history and in the developing world today.     

Competition, cooperation, and the neighboring farmer effect

In this paper we propose a model that explains how cooperation can emerge spontaneously between firms in a highly competitive market environment. The basic idea is that the more competitive is the market, the less costly it is for firms to help each other like good neighbors. Cooperation takes the form of sharing technical know-how, which speeds up the adoption of new technologies (normally developed elsewhere) that spur industrial development. The model comports with the development history of Japan's first example of successful industrial development – its cotton spinning industry – whose conditions match those of firms in small open economies today.     

The international risk sharing puzzle is at business cycle and lower frequency

Abstract We decompose the correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate in its dynamic components at different frequencies. Using multivariate spectral analysis techniques, we show that, at odds with a high degree of risk sharing, in most OECD countries the dynamic correlation tends to be quite negative, and significantly so, at frequencies lower than two years – the appropriate frequencies for assessing the performance of international business cycle models. Theoretically, we show that the dynamic correlation over different frequencies predicted by standard open economy models is the sum of two terms: a term constant across frequencies, which can be negative when uninsurable risk is large; a term variable across frequencies, which in bond economies is necessarily positive, reflecting the insurance intertemporal trade provides against forecastable contingencies. Numerical analysis suggests that leading mechanisms proposed by the literature to account for the puzzle are consistent with the evidence across the spectrum.     

东亚区域合作中的韩国与东盟

韩国是一个新兴的工业化国家,也是东北亚地区的经济强国,2003年GDP总值为5209亿美元,排在全球第12位,人口4860万,早在1967年就加入了GATT,1996年12月成为OECD成员国。在东亚金融危机影响下,韩国经济一度陷入困境。随着近年来经济的恢复,也逐步加强了同东盟的对话合作。东盟作为     

Cores,aggressiveness and the breakdown of cooperation in economic games

The paper develops the use of the core as a solution concept in game theory in two interrelated directions. In the first place, an indicator of aggressiveness of claims is introduced in a modified definition of the core. The modified core may be smaller than the usual core, and may fail to exist if aggressiveness increases beyond some critical level. In the second place the article gives a formulation of a mixed cooperative/non-cooperative game, in which the game will be played cooperatively within coalitions, but non-cooperatively as between coalitions. A mixed cooperative/non-cooperative solution obtains if the grand coalition of all players fail to materialize because the various claims are incompatible. The two directions referred to are interrelated because the level of aggressiveness may be decisive for whether or not the grand coalition, and possibly other coalitions, will break down. The final section of the paper draws some general conclusions and relates the approach to other ideas in the literature.     

海峡两岸服务业合作: 意义、模式及问题

近二十年来,海峡两岸经贸交流呈现出逐年增长的良好势头,但是两岸服务业与服务贸易合作的规模、广度、深度都还很不够.当前,祖国大陆的经济发展强劲,为两岸经济交流合作提供了更为广阔的空间、更强劲的动力和更优越的条件,两岸服务加大合作力度正当其时.     

对外经济合作在贸易结构调整中的作用

对外经济合作是资本、资本品、技术、劳务和管理等一揽子输出的载体。目前,对外工程承包对中国经济的影响基本上可代表对外经济合作对中国经济的影响。利用LINK模型和同步时间序列技术分析的结果表明,对外工程承包对国民经济发展的带动作用是十分显著的。如果将对外经济合作项目所吸引的后续出口和后续技术贸易纳入到统计中,那么对外经济合作对中国GDP的带动作用还要大。以对外工程承包为主体的对外经济合作对改善我国的贸易产品结构同样具有重要意义。贸易的市场结构应由主要依靠发达国家的对外贸易一元结构向与发达国家的贸易和与发展…     

汇丰银行竞争性合作的启示

银行同业的关系已经由单纯的对抗性抗争发展到竞争性合作，英国汇丰集团作为金融界的巨头之一，其采取的竞争性合作战略在其发展壮大中起了重要作用。文章认为，在收购兼并中发展壮大是其竞争性合作的结果，提供金融化的金融服务是其合作优势的体现，全球化的资本运营是其银证合作的成功，这些都对国有商业银行的改革与发展有重要的参考价值．     

Trust, contract and economic cooperation

After providing a brief overview of the standard economic analysisof incomplete contracts in terms of property rights, transactioncosts and self-enforcing implicit contracts, the author showswhy, in the orthodox view, trust is not a pertinent categoryto their negotiation or effectiveness. Drawing on various empiricalstudies which he has undertaken in the area of industrial relations,the author develops an alternative approach to the study ofincomplete contracts in which the concept of trust is central.In this alternative vision, boundedly rational agents with limitedforesight form provisional judgements about the trustworthinessof their trading partners based on the success of their pastencounters. A consequence of this alternative understandingof incomplete contracts is that there is no guarantee that cooperationwill succeed, even when the circumstances appear to promisemutual gain. The author argues, however, that by establishingan appropriate set of procedural rules to guide their responseto the unanticipated, agents can promote the kinds of mutuallearning that contribute to the build-up of trust and that increasethe likelihood of successful cooperation.     

Rotating the Necker cube: A bioeconomic approach to cooperation and the causal role of synergy in evolution

The paradox of widespread cooperation in an intensely competitive natural world has been a major focus of theory and research in evolutionary biology and related disciplines over the past several decades. While much of the earlier work in this vein was gene-centered and grounded in inclusive fitness (or kin selection) theory, more recent developments suggest that it might also be useful to view cooperation (and biological complexity) from a bioeconomic perspective. Here I will briefly explore the case for a paradigm shift, with special reference to the role of functional synergy as a distinct class of interdependent causal influences in evolution. I will argue that synergies of various kinds have been important drivers for cooperation in living systems at all levels. From this perspective, inclusive fitness and other factors may be enablers for cooperation, but the many exceptions show that genetic relatedness is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of cooperative phenomena.     

Social approval,competition and cooperation

Non-monetary rewards are frequently used to promote pro-social behaviors, and these behaviors often result in approval from one’s peers. Nevertheless, we know little about how peer-approval, and particularly competition for peer-approval, influences people’s decisions to cooperate. This paper provides experimental evidence suggesting that people in peer-approval competitions value social approval more when it leads to unique and durable rewards. Our evidence suggests that such rewards act as a signaling mechanism, thereby contributing to the value of approval. We show that this signaling mechanism generates cooperation at least as effectively as cash rewards. Our findings point to the potential value of developing new mechanisms that rely on small non-monetary rewards to promote generosity in groups.     

Social norms,cooperation and inequality

This paper analyzes the outcomes that can be supported by social norms in a society of infinitely lived and patient agents that are randomly matched in pairs every period to play a given game. I find that any mutually beneficial outcome can be supported by a self-enforcing social norm under both perfect information and a simple local information system. These Folk Theorem results explain not only how social norms can provide incentives that support cooperation in a community, providing support to the concepts of social capital and corporate culture, but also how they can support inequality and discrimination.I am grateful to David Levine for invaluable guidance and ideas. I also thank Anna Aizer, Hongbin Cai, Walter Cont, Ernesto Dal Bó, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Federico Weinschelbaun, William Zame, anonymous referees and seminar participants at Universidad de Buenos Aires, UCLA, Universidad T. Di Tella, Harvard Business School and Stockholm School of Economics for very useful comments and discussions     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

The role of intermediaries on technological risk management and business development performance in Korea

This paper examines the strategic use of intermediaries by companies to better meet their technology needs from the resource-based theory and network theory perspectives. The results of this study are based on a sample of Korean IT companies and indicate the particular importance of cooperation with government support organizations and public R&D institutions in building relational assets. Intermediaries played a crucial role in enabling and facilitating joint development projects and promoting technology transfer among the companies in general.The results of this study suggest that intermediaries, as they are linked to other organizations within networks and are centrally situated within those networks where information and resource flow, can coordinate and control the exchange of information and resources within networks and enjoy timely and privileged access to such information, giving them the means to expand their strategic social capital.