‘Better off,as judged by themselves’: a reply to Cass Sunstein

This paper is a reply to Sunstein’s comment on my paper ‘Do people really want to be nudged towards healthy lifestyles?’ The central claim of that paper was that, in their book Nudge, Thaler and Sunstein switch between two different interpretations of the ‘better off, as judged by themselves’ criterion, and that consistent use of one or other interpretation would have blunted the persuasive power of the book. In this reply, I defend that claim against Sunstein’s counter-arguments.     

A comment on “welfare reducing licensing”

This comment points out the existence of flaws in the proof of the main proposition proposed by Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) [Faulí-Oller, R., Sandonís, J., 2002. Welfare reducing licensing. Games Econ. Behav. 41, 192–205] and corrects them.     

A comment on ‘the small country assumption: a note on Canadian export’

Some simple statistical tests of efficiency are applied to limited diversification portfolios that are optimal in terms of minimizing risk measured by variances. These tests are intended to detect in some sense robustness, near-singularity and improvement of a portfolio by revision. The illustrative application considers eleven securities selected randomly from Moody's Handbook over the years 1970–81     

A comment on: “Efficient propagation of shocks and the optimal return on money”

Lotteries are introduced into Cavalcanti and Erosa (2008) [2], a version of Trejos and Wright (1995) [4] with aggregate shocks. Lotteries improve welfare and eliminate the two notable features of the optimum with deterministic trades: over-production and history-dependence. Moreover, the optimum can be supported by buyer take-it-or-leave-it offers.     

Evolutionary economics and the case for a constitutional libertarian paternalism—a comment on Martin Binder, “should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?”

In his article “Should evolutionary economists embrace libertarian paternalism?”(Journal of Evolutionary Economics 24(3), 2014, 515–539) Martin Binder discusses the pros and cons of “libertarian paternalism” (LP) from an explicitly evolutionary viewpoint, concluding that as a general rule, evolutionary economists should be cautious regarding this new and highly influential policy approach. In this comment I argue that Binder starts from an incomplete model of the institutional status quo and neglects an obvious alternative to the standard variant of LP, namely, a constitutionally constrained LP. Most of Binder’s objections do not apply with equal force to such a refined variant of LP.     

Physicians’ views on pay-for-performance as a reimbursement model: a quantitative study among Dutch surgical physicians

Objectives:

To assess the views, knowledge, and experience of Dutch physicians with regard to the general objectives and values of the pay-for-performance (P4P) system, as the Dutch healthcare industry might find it useful, in terms of governance, to explore this approach further.

Methods:

A quantitative cross-sectional survey study was conducted among 48 physicians in surgical specialties in the Netherlands between May 2014 and July 2014. The survey questionnaire was designed to gather information regarding the intensity of feelings, on a 7-point Likert scale, toward statements that address the P4P system. Confidence intervals were calculated using the bootstrap technique with 1000 iterations.

Results:

Physicians see a positive value in P4P for their organizations rather than for personal attainment (mean?=?5.00; 95% CI?=?4.62–5.39), even though they feared that P4P might put financial pressure on them (mean?=?5.03; 95% CI?=?4.50–5.54). They strongly share the view that other colleagues will resist adopting P4P as a business model (mean?=?5.74; 95% CI?=?5.43–6.04). Respondents stated that they would not leave their current jobs if P4P were to be incorporated in their organization.

Conclusions:

Physicians see value in P4P for their organizations, and consider that P4P could provide an incentive for improving medical outcomes. There seems to be potential for the P4P system in the Netherlands as participants expressed positive support for its values. There is an intersection of interests between the value of P4P and the physicians’ aim of achieving quality outcomes; however, further studies would be needed to investigate perceptions about specific design features in a larger sample. In addition, prior to implementing P4P, broad education about the system should be provided in order to counteract pre-conceptions and prevent resistance.     

Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness”

Welfare economics requires a criterion for economic goodness in regard to a society. Unlike conventional criteria, coordination (among independent decisionmakers) does not violate methodological individualism. The coordination criterion can be objectively deployed to judge events or policies, referring only to the given preference rankings of relevant individuals, given their initial positions. An important variant refers not to the attained (or unattained) state of achieved coordination, but to the ability of events or policies to affect the process through which a better-coordinated state may be approached. Several implications of the coordination criterion are explored.     

The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel’s (2011) meta-study

In this paper, we report a replication of Engel’s (Exp. Econ. 14(4):583–610, 2011) meta-study of dictator game experiments. We find Engel’s meta-study of dictator game experiments to be robust, with one important exception: the coding of the take-option (List in J. Polit. Econ. 115(3):482–493, 2007; Bardsley in Exp. Econ. 11(2):122–133, 2008; Cappelen et al. in Econ. Lett. 118(2):280–283, 2013). While Engel reports this as having no statistically significant effect, in our replications, we find an economically and statistically significant negative effect on giving in line with the relevant literature.     

A neo-institutionalism of measurement, without measurement: A comment on Douglas Allen’s The Institutional Revolution

In his elegant book Douglas Allen claims that an improvement in the measurement of Nature made for lower transaction costs and the Industrial Revolution. His argument is a typical example of neo-institutionalism in the style of Douglass North (1990) and North et al. (2009). A fall in a wedge of inefficiency is supposed to provide Good Incentives, and the modern world. But the elimination of wedges lead merely to Harberger Triangles of improved efficiency—not to the factor of 100 in properly measured real income per head, which is the Great Enrichment 1800 to the present to be explained. Allen does yeoman work in explaining some of the peculiarities of British public administration, such as the reliance on aristocratic honor and on the prize system in naval warfare. But he attributes to public administration an implausible effect on private incomes. The merging of power and plenty is mistaken. Further, the alleged increase in a modern ability to measure marginal products is implausible. Large modern enterprises face greater, not smaller, problems of assessing the contribution of individuals. Allen’s book on measurement does not measure, and the probable order of magnitude of the items he focuses on is too small to explain any but the details of administration.     

Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia's Foreign Policy

Civilisations are imagined, ratherm than real, and nations undergoing identity crises typically represent themselves through multiple civilisational visions. Scholars of geopolitics can hardly understand foreign policy without analysing those visions and social contexts, in which they rise and fall. This article selects for analysis three distinct civilisational ideas of Russia – “West,” “Eurasia” and “Euro-East” – associated with Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin, respectively. Russia's foreign policy is best understood as reflecting those civilisational ideas rather than merely material power conditions.