Hayek’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Constitution of Liberty</Emphasis>—a guarded retrospective

Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty is justly regarded as making a comprehensive case for the protection of individual liberty against excessive government intrusion. But even as its ends are correct, its analysis of key conceptions of equality, coercion and monopoly is incomplete because of Hayek’s refusal to adopt a consistent theoretical framework that accounts for the difference between formal and substantive forms of regulation, on the one hand, and why the refusal to deal is critical in competitive markets but subject to regulation in monopolistic ones. His deep skepticism about central planning rests upon an overbroad account of collective ignorance that unwisely understates the dangers of self-interest in collective deliberations. That weakness then leads him to exhibit an excessive skepticism toward written constitutions on both matters of structure and individual rights, which in turn leads him toward undue deference to economic regulation of the economy.     

Prune or cut down: salience and Sugden’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Economics of Rights</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Co</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">operation and Welfare</Emphasis>

In The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (1986), Robert Sugden follows the tradition from Thomas Schelling and David Lewis in ascribing a central role to the notion of salience within his theory of convention. However, against this, Bruno Verbeek (Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002) has argued that an empirically adequate notion of salience may not be incorporated into a generic account of convention without circularity obtains. This paper examines Verbeek’s argument against a background of experimental as well as theoretical work on coordination problems. It finds that the argument fails to consider at least two candidate theories of salience that may be incorporated into the theory of convention without circularity: cognitive hierarchy theory that iterates Sugden’s notion of psychological salience and Schelling salience. Thus, in the end Verbeek’s criticism of the role ascribed to salience in theories of convention may be dismissed, though its discussion draws a fruitful perspective.     

Combination of “combinations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis> values”

We investigate the impact of an uncertain number of false individual null hypotheses on commonly used p value combination methods. Under such uncertainty, these methods perform quite differently and often yield conflicting results. Consequently, we develop a combination of “combinations of p values” (CCP) test aimed at maintaining good power properties across such uncertainty. The CCP test is based on a simple union–intersection principle that exploits the weak correspondence between two underlying p value combination methods. Monte Carlo simulations show that the CCP test controls size and closely tracks the power of the best individual methods. We empirically apply the CCP test to explore the stationarity in real exchange rates and the information rigidity in inflation and output growth forecasts.     

A spatially filtered mixture of <Emphasis Type="Italic">β</Emphasis>-convergence regressions for EU regions, 1980–2002

Assessing regional growth and convergence across Europe is a matter of primary relevance. Empirical models that do not account for structural heterogeneities and spatial effects may face serious misspecification problems. In this work, a mixture regression approach is applied to the β-convergence model, in order to produce an endogenous selection of regional growth patterns. A priori choices, such as North–South or centre-periphery divisions, are avoided. In addition to this, we deal with the spatial dependence existing in the data, applying a local filter to the data. The results indicate that spatial effects matter, and either absolute, conditional, or club convergence, if extended to the whole sample, might be restrictive assumptions. Excluding a small number of regions that behave as outliers, only a few regions show an appreciable rate of convergence. The majority of data show slow convergence, or no convergence at all. Furthermore, a dualistic phenomenon seems to be present inside some States, reinforcing the “diverging-convergence” paradox. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Who pays taxes? Liturgies and the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Antidosis</Emphasis> procedure in Ancient Athens

Ancient Athens developed a constitutional democracy. A core, time invariant political economy problem is that of providing public services when wealth is imperfectly know. I model theoretically a unique institution developed in Ancient Athens known as the Antidosis. It allowed a citizen on the list of tax-payers to challenge a citizen not contributing to replace him and make the public goods contribution. The challenged citizen, rather than allow the claim to go before a jury trial, could choose to swap wealth with the accusing tax payer. I argue this acts as a screening mechanism and improves upon the asymmetric information problem the government has in identifying who is indeed those who have the highest wealth to provide the tax revenue to finance the public services.     

Gains,Losses, and the US-EPA <Emphasis Type="Italic">Economic Analyses Guidelines</Emphasis>: A Hazardous Product?

While offering many useful suggestions to improve economic analyses, the Guidelines take no account of widely reported behavioural economics research findings. Foregoing the opportunities to improve valuations and other analyses offered by this evidence is likely to lead to inappropriate assessments and consequent distortions of damage estimates, policy and regulatory design. JEL classifications: C91, D61, H43 This review is in part based on studies supported by the U.S. Forest Service and has benefited from comments and suggestionss of Bas Donkers, Robin Gregory, the editor, and referee.     

Wage differences between Austrian men and women: <Emphasis Type="Italic">semper idem?</Emphasis>

In most OECD countries, the wage gap between men and women has narrowed during the past two decades. Developments of the last 20 years, e.g., increased labour market attachment of women or the introduction of equal pay laws, may have reduced the gender wage gap. We investigate the extent, persistence, and socio-economic determinants of the gender wage gap in Austria, for the years 1983 and 1997. Using wage decomposition techniques, we find that the average gender wage gap was almost as high in 1997 as it was in 1983. Not accounting for differences, the gender wage gap dropped from 25.5 to 23.3% of men’s wages. Taking observable differences between men and women into account, we estimate that the mean gender wage gap that cannot be explained, i.e., discrimination against women, dropped from 17 to 14% of men’s wages. A decomposition of the gender wage gap over time indicates that both returns to human capital and less discrimination were responsible for the narrowing of the gender wage gap.

Francesco Forte’s Contributions to <Emphasis Type="Italic">Essentials of Fiscal Sociology</Emphasis>

Francesco Forte has made major contributions to many areas of economics with the result that his theoretical work and applications have opened new areas of inquiry. This paper connects Forte’s work with the work of Jürgen Backhaus on fiscal sociology. Positioned at the crossroads of economics and sociology, the answers to these questions helped fill the void which gave rise to the field of fiscal sociology. Fiscal sociology is primarily a study of taxation and fiscal policies which illuminates core issues in the sociology of contemporary capitalism. It includes the causes of poverty and inequality in rich countries and adds to our understanding the basis for the inequality between rich and poor countries. Our paper reviews several of Forte’s papers on Pareto’s fiscal sociology and the failure of European planning for less-developed regions. The paper highlights Forte’s contributions to economic theory focusing on Pareto’s sociological theory and the influence of the European Union on regional development.     

The “hidden catch” in <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Invisible Hook</Emphasis>

In The Invisible Hook, Leeson argues that by devising a complex system of rules (called the “pirate code”) and procedures for electing their leaders, pirate societies created governance structures where the leaders were strong enough to “control the governed” but were not strong enough to break the constraints that bound them. There is, however, a “hidden catch” within The Invisible Hook. There are important differences between pirate crews and societies, between pirate captains and political leaders, and between the pirate code and constitutions. Moreover, understanding these differences is critical for understanding how criminal bands were able to accomplish a feat that still proves problematic for many societies.     

The institutional determinants of self-governance: a comment on Edward Stringham’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

Many pages would be require to discuss Private Governance’s important contributions, so I focus on a relatively minor flaw: chapter 9 on moral beliefs is inconsistent with Stringham’s general treatment of private governance institutions as endogenous. Moral beliefs are essentially depicted as unchanging, but they actually are endogenous too. Individuals can pursue wealth through cooperative interaction, which requires trust, creating incentives to develop beliefs that encourage ethical and benevolent behavior. Alternatively wealth can be taken from others through force and/or guile. Beliefs to facilitate involuntary transfers also are institutionalized. For instance, in order to benefit from coercive wealth transfers “in good conscience,” recipients have incentives to see their victims as enemies to justify a moral “right” to transfers. Changing moral beliefs is costly, however, so they tend to be fixed in the short term. Once it becomes apparent that existing beliefs significantly conflict with an individual’s interests, she is forced to question those beliefs. The impetus for rationalizing new beliefs arises. The direction of evolution can be predicted with a rational decision-making model. To illustrate the endogeneity of moral beliefs, three institutional settings are examined: “dignity culture,” “honor culture,” and “victimhood culture”.     

“Why historians have failed to recognize Mises’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Theory and History</Emphasis>”

Theory and History is often said to be Ludwig von Mises’ least read and least appreciated book. This article argues that historians in the Anglo-American world generally did not understand the German and Austrian traditions that Mises drew on, and that their early reviews of the book therefore fundamentally misunderstood its purpose. Most saw it as a political tract. Some commented on Mises’ contribution to the debate about the autonomy of the discipline of history. Few, however, understood Mises’ apriorism or logical approach. To understand why Theory and History has not been recognized for its a contribution to historical methodology, we must first understand Mises’ place as an outsider in the debates on historiography in the 1950s.     

Trade,Power, and Political Economy: Reason vs. Ideology in Edward Stringham’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

In Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life, Edward Stringham explains that private ordering is sufficient to secure full exploitation of gains from trade within a society. After describing the logic of Stringham’s claim on behalf of private ordering, the remainder of this essay examines an enigma that Stringham’s argument entails: private ordering is sufficient for social coordination and yet public ordering is ubiquitous. The exploitation of gains from trade might offer a useful ideology, but this provides but an incomplete basis for a theory of society. In this respect, societies are rife with antagonism and envy, though these often manifest themselves ideologically as claims about justice and fairness. Politics goes where the money is; private ordering reveals targets that public ordering subsequently exploits. The challenge for political economy is to integrate the autonomy of economizing action with the autonomy of political action, for these dual autonomies provide the crucible out of which emerges the material of political economy. Stringham has deepened our appreciation of what private governance can accomplish, but much unfinished analytical work confronts theorists of political economy.