Is globalisation undermining the welfare state?

This paper analyses the evolution of the welfare states in themajority of OECD countries during the pre-globalisation (1946–80)and globalisation (1980–2000) periods. Our purpose isto find out whether globalisation has produced a convergencetowards a smaller welfare state, funded increasingly by non-mobilefactors such as labour, property and consumption rather thanby mobile factors such as capital. The data presented here challengethe claims about such a convergence, showing that social publicexpenditures and public employment have continued to expandduring the globalisation period in most OECD countries. We alsoshow that the welfare states remain rooted in the politicaltraditions that have governed them.     

In or out? The welfare costs of EMU membership

Sweden and the UK have repeatedly refused to join the European and Monetary Union (EMU). Surprisingly, there is very little work on the welfare consequences of the loss of monetary policy flexibility for these countries. This paper fills this void by providing a framework to evaluate quantitatively the economic costs of joining the EMU. Using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices we investigate the economic implications of the loss of monetary policy flexibility associated with the EMU for each country. The main contribution of our general equilibrium approach is that we can evaluate the effects of monetary policy in terms of welfare. Our findings suggest that these economies may experience sizable welfare losses as a result of joining the EMU. Results show that the cost associated with the loss of the monetary policy flexibility is higher in the presence of persistent government consumption shocks and small trade shares with the EMU.     

Beggar-thyself or beggar-thy-neighbour? The welfare effects of monetary policy

This paper examines whether monetary expansion is a beggar-thyself or beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) show that monetary expansion under producer currency pricing increases domestic and foreign overall welfare, in cases where the cross-country substitutability is high. If the cross-country substitutability is low, then monetary expansion is a beggar-thyself policy that reduces domestic welfare and increases foreign welfare (Corsetti & Pesenti 2001; Tille 2001). In this paper, we will show that regardless of whether the cross-country substitutability is high or low, monetary expansion is always a beggar-thyself policy in the short run.     

How are preferences revealed?

Revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent's observed actions. Normative preferences represent the agent's actual interests. It sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences. But there are many cases where this assumption is violated. We identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences: passive choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-party marketing, and intertemporal choice. We then discuss six approaches that jointly contribute to the identification of normative preferences: structural estimation, active decisions, asymptotic choice, aggregated revealed preferences, reported preferences, and informed preferences. Each of these approaches uses consumer behavior to infer some property of normative preferences without equating revealed and normative preferences. We illustrate these issues with evidence from savings and investment outcomes.     

How Green are Exporters?

There is a well‐established theoretical and empirical literature that shows that exporters are more innovative than otherwise equivalent non‐exporters. In this article, we ask whether this is also true when it comes to the effects of adopting greener production techniques. Using an instrumental variables strategy based on UK firm level data, we find robust evidence that exporters are more likely to report their innovation as having a ‘high/very high’ environmental effect.     

When are voluntary pensions indifferent?

The mandatory pension pillar is usually supplemented by a voluntary one. In our simple model, voluntary pensions partly replace mandatory ones without affecting the outcomes: the voluntary pensions are indifferent. This result may serve as benchmark.     

Where are the rent seekers?

In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question ‘where are the rent seekers?’ Tullock proposed that political accountability and ‘free-riding’ incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock’s explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock’s concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock’s model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.     

How strategy sensitive are contributions?

Summary. We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player's payoffs accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments. None of the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive combination, does so.     

Back to Buchanan? Explorations of welfare and subjectivism in behavioral economics

In light of behavioral findings regarding inconsistent individual decision-making, economists have begun to re-conceptualize the notion of welfare. One prominent account is the preference purification approach (PP), which attempts to reconstruct preferences from choice data based on a normative understanding of neoclassical rationality. Using Buchanan’s notion of creative choice, this paper criticizes PP’s epistemic, ontological, and psychological assumptions. It identifies PP as a static position that assumes the satisfaction of given ‘true preferences’ as the normative standard for welfare. However, following Buchanan, choice should be understood dynamically as a process whereby preferences constantly regenerate. Accordingly, the meaning of welfare emerges from an ongoing quest for individual self-constitution. If this holds true, then rationality axioms cannot serve as a priori normative standards. Instead, creative imagination and learning processes must remain central to any understanding of welfare in economics.     

Is novelty always a good thing? Towards an evolutionary welfare economics

Evolutionary economists are increasingly interested in developing policy implications. As a rule, contributions in this field implicitly assume that policy should focus on the encouragement of learning and innovation. We argue that, from an individualistic perspective, this position is not easy to justify. Novelty and evolutionary change have in fact a rather complex normative dimension. In order to cope with this, the evolutionary approach to policy-making needs to be complemented with an account of welfare the background assumptions of which are compatible with an evolutionary world-view. Standard welfare economics is unsuited to the job, since the orthodox way to conceptualize welfare as the satisfaction of given and rational preferences cannot be applied in a world in which preferences tend to be variable and incoherent. We argue that, in order to deal with the specific normative issues brought up in an evolving economy, welfare should be conceptualized in a procedural way: At the individual level, it should be understood as the capacity and motivation to engage in the ongoing learning of instrumentally effective preferences. Evolutionary-naturalistic insights into the way human agents bring about, value, and respond to novelty-induced change turn out to be a valuable input into this extended concept of welfare. Finally, some implications of this concept are explored.     

Can growth-enhanced monetary policy improve welfare when people seek social status?

This paper examines the growth and welfare effects from an increase in the rate of money supply in an Ak type growth model with a relative wealth-enhanced social status motive, production externalities, and liquidity constraints. When only consumption is constrained by liquidity, fast money supply can hasten output growth unless seigniorage revenue is wasted and production externalities do not exist. We find that even though money growth normally promotes economic growth, it does not improve welfare when capital stock is over-accumulated. In general, an optimal monetary policy minimizes seigniorage. Our results also conclude that the optimal monetary policy rarely follows the Friedman rule.     

Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy

We consider a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition. Firms are price takers in the input market and compete à la Cournot in some or all of the product markets and their technologies display constant returns to scale. We show that an increase in the number of firms in a given sector does not always improve welfare. We also provide a characterization in terms of mark-up rates of the sectors for which entry is welfare enhancing. Our results challenge the common idea that mergers with no cost synergy are not desirable for consumers.     

Insurance and rural welfare: what can panel data tell us?

Assessing the scope for insurance in rural communities usually requires a structural model of household behaviour under risk. One of the few empirical applications of such models is the study by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993 Rosenzweig, MR and Wolpin, K. 1993. Credit market constraints, consumption smoothing, and the accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries: investment in bullocks in India. Journal of Political Economy, 101: 223–44. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) who conclude that Indian farmers in the ICRISAT villages would not benefit from the introduction of formal weather insurance. In this article we investigate how models such as theirs can be estimated from panel data on production and assets. We show that if assets can take only a limited number of values the coefficients of the model cannot be estimated with reasonable precision. We also show that this can affect the conclusion that insurance would not be welfare improving.     

Who was affected by new welfare reform strategies? Microdata estimates from Canada

A heterogeneous mix of aggressive welfare reforms took effect in different provinces and years starting in the 1990s. Welfare participation rates subsequently declined. Previous investigations of these declines focused on cuts in benefits and stricter eligibility requirements. This article focuses instead on work requirements, diversion, earning exemptions and time limits – referred to jointly as new welfare reform strategies – while controlling for benefit levels, eligibility requirements, province-specific labour market conditions and GDP growth, as well as individual-level socio-economic information. Province-year-specific variation in new reform strategies produce estimates implying that their presence is associated with a large decline in welfare participation of 1.3 percentage points (14% relative to the unconditional mean participation rate of 9.2%). Our coding scheme generates new measures of policy variation that distinguish reductions in benefit levels and tighter eligibility restrictions from new welfare reform strategies, helping identify how different subpopulations responded to different kinds of welfare reforms. Estimates from 46 subpopulations demonstrate that immigrants, native Canadians, single parents and disabled people were substantially more likely to be affected by aggressive new attempts to limit welfare participation than other Canadians receiving social assistance.