Implementation of social optimum in oligopoly

This paper presents a decentralized mechanism implementing socially optimal output choices by non-cooperatively acting oligopolists. A decentralized mechanism is a vector of balanced transfers among firms determined as a function of firms’ output choices. The mechanism is devised by a regulator with a full knowledge of demand and without any knowledge of the firms’ cost functions. Restricting the set of admissible demand and cost functions such that the firms always have an incentive to produce, it turns out that the socially optimal solution is implementable insofar as the demand function is a polynomial of at most (n−1)th degree, n being the number of firms in the industry. The author is indebted to a referee and an associate editor for their helpful comments.     

Oligopsony/oligopoly power and factor market performance

This paper is concerned with the economic performance of factor markets in an oligopsony/ oligopoly setting. Firm arid industry indexes are developed to measure factor market price distortions caused by exerted oligopsony/oligopoly power. These measures indicate that the elasticity of output demand, the elasticity of input supply, and the input and output conjectural elasticities determine the degree of non-competitive performance in factor markets. It is also shown that under special conditions the firm index equals the Lerner index and the industry index equals the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.     

城市空间的社会与"城市文化资本"论--城市公共空间市民属性研究

城市社会空间作为城市的要素,具有典型的社会关系与社会资本属性,在不同的社会和不同的文化环境中,城市社会空间表现为不同的意义和符号价值.在当代中国城市化高速发展的今天,城市社会空间结构在发生巨变,传统的城市社会空间的意义和理念,被现代意义上的空间意涵所取代,同时,城市化的高速增长,使属于大众的城市社会空间变得越来越狭小,城市社会竞争的本质就是在竞争城市社会空间的占有形式.因此,重新认识城市社会空间的社会属性和文化价值,已经成为城市公共管理的重要内容.本文从城市社会空间属性的角度入手,研究城市社会空间的价值,以求对构建属于市民社会的新型城市社会空间有所裨益.     

城市空间、社会分层与社会和谐

我国90年代以来的城市化浪潮,不仅是一个规模扩展的过程,也是一个利益重构与社会分化的过程,并带来城市居住空间上的"阶层化".这种社会阶层在生活空间上的疏离与隔膜对社会和谐造成负面影响,解决的途径可选择:适度的多样化混居;改造和提升弱区位的公共服务;充分考虑到外来工的生活居住问题等.     

-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model

Q-learning is a reinforcement learning model from the field of artificial intelligence. We study the use of Q-learning for modeling the learning behavior of firms in repeated Cournot oligopoly games. Based on computer simulations, we show that Q-learning firms generally learn to collude with each other, although full collusion usually does not emerge. We also present some analytical results. These results provide insight into the underlying mechanism that causes collusive behavior to emerge. Q-learning is one of the few learning models available that can explain the emergence of collusive behavior in settings in which there is no punishment mechanism and no possibility for explicit communication between firms.     

Testing a discrete switching disequilibrium model of the UK labour market

This paper develops a test procedure for serial correlation for discrete switching disequilibrium models which include both an endogenous price adjustment equation and lagged dependent variables. The tests are applied to a model of the UK labour market and the model is respecified in the light of the test results.     

Nash-equilibria in a heterogeneous oligopoly with fuzzy information

We consider a model of an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous firms and products where neither the cost nor the demand functions are common knowledge. Instead, each firm only has some vague ideas about the price strategies adopted by its competitors which is modelled by a fuzzy set. In analogy to the notion of an "equilibrium of actions and beliefs" we define and characterize a generalized Nash-equilibrium and show its existence under general conditions. Furthermore, the impact of the fuzzy information on the equilibrium outcome is analyzed by means of a comparative static analysis within a particular model framework.Received: 28 May 2002, Accepted: 25 December 2002, JEL Classification: D43, D80, L13We wish to thank Bernhard F. Arnold, the editor Murat Sertel , and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Of course, we are responsible for all remaining errors.     

Administrative interdependence: Measurement and applications

The object of the paper is to apply the methods used in the analysis of input-output tables to the study of interdependence among the different subdivisions of organizations. The term “organizations” is used in a generalized sense that includes examples ranging from, say, a small industry to a country's government. The bases for the analysis are the assumptions that: (a) it is possible to identify the contribution that each subdivision of the organization makes to the other subdivisions: and (b) it is possible to identify the contribution of the organization to its social environment.With the assumptions mentioned above, the methods of input-output analysis can be applied in order to estimate changes in size that should occur in an organization when demands from its environment change. Indices of model in which the methods developed for the study of Flow of Funds matrices are applied to the study of organizations.Data from the Federal Government of the U.S., subdivided into 25 departments and from the Mexican National Productivity Center are used to construct examples of the models presented and their applications.     

Indivisibilities and interplant transportation cost: Do they cause market breakdown?

This paper considers the ability of the land market to allocate space among activities when economic agents operate subject to scale economies, and when the agents trade with one another, thus incurring transport cost. The structure of the problem is that of Koopmans and Beckmann. The land market fails to clear properly only for certain parameter values. The inability of the land market to work properly is found to result from the failure of the market to properly price accessibility, or alternatively, from the failure to price congestion. It is a standard externality problem.     

Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo, F., [1997. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375–384]. Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents’ previous output. Firms make mistakes and deviate from their decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers.     

Precise computation of a competitive equilibrium of the discrete land market model

This paper provides a finite algorithm to compute a competitive equilibrium of the Alonso-type discrete land market model (known as bid-rent equilibrium) without assuming any condition on the spatial configuration such as monocentricity. The existence of the finite algorithm implies that the discrete land market model is sufficiently tractable for computer simulation analysis (sensitivity analysis) even if the spatial configuration is variable. Specifically, we can evaluate numerically the effects of new routes in a transportation network upon equilibrium rents and commuting mode.     

资本市场审计寻租成本分析

本文对资本市场审计寻租成本进行了研究,分析了审计寻租的成本收益界限,同时建立了审计寻租的成本收益模型,以期为有效抑制资本市场中的审计寻租行为提供帮助.     

Environmental policy and stable collusion: The case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly

We show that the imposition of a Markovian tax on emissions, that is, a tax rate which depends on the pollution stock, can induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. This does not hold for a uniform tax. Thus, accounting for the feedback effect that exists within a dynamic framework, where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time, changes the result obtained within a static framework. Moreover, the cartel formation can diminish the welfare gain from environmental regulation such that welfare under environmental regulation and collusion of firms lies below that under a laissez-faire policy.     

Perceived insecurity in the public space: personal,social and environmental variables

Perceived insecurity in the public space: Personal, social and environmental variables. This paper explores perception of insecurity among the users of Barcelona’s public space. It describes the results of a research aimed to determine the key variables for the understanding of subjective insecurity. Structural equation models have been applied for this purpose. Results show low relative indices of causality for environmental variables, whereas those related to space representation, residential satisfaction and urban identity, social support and personal competences offer high predictive potential. It is concluded that insecurity perceptions in the public space are therefore strongly linked to social interaction processes and to the social construction of insecurity. Other results, like the influence of gender or age, are consistent with previous findings.     

Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly: A correction

This paper shows that there is no interior solution in Mai–Hwang's 1992 oligopolistic location model with free entry when the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. The comparative static results of the impact of a demand change on the location decision only apply to the case where the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale. It re-examines the impact of a demand change on the location decision of an oligopolistic firm and corrects the propositions derived by [C.C. Mai, H. Hwang, Production-location decision and free entry oligopoly, Journal of Urban Economics 33 (1992) 252–271. Reprinted in: M.L. Greenhut, G. Norman (Eds.), The Economics of Location, vol. I: Location Theory, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995].     

Bertrand oligopoly in a spatial context: The case of quantity independent transportation costs

The theory of spatial competition [for a review, see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1985)] is usually based on the assumption of transportation costs which are proportionate to distance and quantity. In reality, however, there exist frequently considerable economies of scale, especially with respect to the conveyed quantity of goods. A good case in point is transportation cost incurred by a consumer patronizing a shopping area. Cost economies of scale will in general influence consumers' optimal choice with respect to quantities and best market places. In the extreme, consumers' outlays on transportation can be considered independent of the purchased quantity, but approximately proportionate to distance. In the present paper, the impact of this assumption on spatial competition is analysed. It will be shown, that existence and uniqueness of spatial oligopolistic equilibrium is restored. Furthermore, due to some residual monopolistic power, prices do not converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium prices when the distance between the firms shrinks to zero. In conclusion the model exhibits a fundamental difference in the market structure, when the spatial aspect is incorporated.     

The impact of social influence in Australian real estate: market forecasting with a spatial agent-based model

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - Housing markets are inherently spatial, yet many existing models fail to capture this spatial dimension. Here, we introduce a new graph-based...     

Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour markets choose between producing an intermediate good in-house and outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship-specific investment in developing the intermediate. The paper sheds light on the issue of whether international outsourcing offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of domestic unions and on the existence of intra-industry wage dispersion. We show that outsourcing typically increases marginal costs even when it lowers union wages. Despite this, more powerful unions increase the incentive to outsource.