Accounting and Competitive Tendering in UK Local Government: An Institutionalist Interpretation of the New Public Management

The paper applies institutional theory to analyse the changing role of accounting and contracting in UK local government as the compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) regime was extended to white-collar activities such as housing management, finance, legal services and information technology. Employing an organizational fields model, accounting changes were seen to be influenced by a combination of legal coercion, normative and competitive forces, the resistance and manipulation of the large local authorities together with the facticity of the new accounting and contracting regimes. The theoretical framework is applied to field-work carried out in a large metropolitan authority in the north of England where CCT methodologies directly affected housing management but not other services such as finance. Although resisting CCT for finance, the authority subsequently introduced a radical scheme of voluntary competitive tendering for selected finance processes. The paper examines how accounting and contracting may be adapted to emerging trends in the New Public Management associated with Best Value policies.     

Competitive Tendering and Best Value in Local Government

The Government has introduced legislation to replace compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) with a new regime of Best Value (BV) in local government. Although CCT is to be abolished, competitive tendering is retained as part of the BV framework. The specific role of competitive tendering in BV has not been identified—what are the circumstances that determine whether councils should provide services themselves or seek external suppliers? The authors develop a theoretical framework that may help central and local policy-makers to answer this question. The framework emphasises the joint importance of organizational performance and contracting costs. Practical issues that arise in the application of the framework are also identified.     

The Politics of Transaction Costs

This article aims to develop a model for analysing the operation and outcomes of the contracting process as it applies to public services, and to explore the politics of transaction costs involved in this process using a case study of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) in the UK. For this purpose the article deals with the policy outputs from two time periods, 1991 and 1994, which are regarded as the most dynamic years in terms of CCT policy implementation. The article also demonstrates how transaction costs may be manipulated in the contracting process by the interested parties. Finally, it suggests that the politics of transaction costs should be studied systematically in the future.     

Bureaucratic Limits to Markets: The Case of Local Government in Victoria, Australia

Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) was introduced into local government in the state of Victoria (Australia) as the centrepiece of a reform package to make local government more 'business-like' and market-oriented. This article evaluates the extent of changes introduced by the reforms. To some extent, post-bureaucratic organizational characteristics have been adopted, although the degree of change has been limited by several factors, including: the bureau-shaping behaviour of senior managers, the failure of competition to generate contestable environments for all services, and the increased level of formalization which has accompanied the introduction of CCT in local authorities.     

MUNICIPAL CONTRACTING OUT: GOVERNANCE CHOICES,MISALIGNMENT AND PERFORMANCE IN SWEDISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In this paper we apply a Transaction Cost Theory framework to analyse the use and effects of contracting out in Swedish local government. During the last decade Swedish local authorities, like in many other countries, have, to a larger extent, started to contract external subcontractors to fulfil their responsibilities towards its citizens. It is not only in the traditional subcontracting sectors such as housing, infrastructure, and technical services that this trend is evident, but also in policy areas like education, social care, and elderly care. In fact, very little is known about the overall effects of, and the mechanisms underlying, governance choices. The overall results corroborate transaction cost reasoning. Supplier competition and specificity have anticipated effects on municipal de‐integration. Too little, but not too much, use of contracting out, in relation to theoretical predictions, worsens performance. The latter aspect is not fully in accordance with TCE‐propositions.     

Trust,regulation, and contracting institutions

This paper demonstrates that trust directly influences contracting efficiency. We document that trust reduces demand for contract regulation and positively relates to a high‐quality contracting environment, supporting a substitution hypothesis. Furthermore, contract regulation no longer leads to poor contracting outcomes. These findings suggest that lack of trust significantly explains inefficient contracting institutions. Based on interaction effects, we note that trust could complement formal enforcement in countries with weak regulation. As regulation increases, trust substitutes for contract regulation. Overall, trust positively promotes efficient contracting by reducing burdensome regulation and providing an alternative to formal contract enforcement.     

The Changing Nature of Contracting and Trust in Public‐Private Partnerships: The Case of Victorian PPP Prisons

This paper examines shifting constructions of contracting and trust that are manifest between pre‐2000 and post‐2000 public‐private partnerships (PPPs) providing prison facilities and/or services in the Australian State of Victoria. As such, this paper is significant because it outlines longitudinal insights into the nature of changing practices sustaining these PPPs. The post‐2000 period examined reflects a change of government and the policy context. Our examination is based on a range of primary and secondary documents. The primary documents comprise three pre‐2000 Prison Services Agreements and two post‐2000 Facilities Services Agreements. A number of government and other reports constitute the secondary documents consulted. While there are many substantive similarities between the contracts, we find five main areas of changed contracting practices over the period examined. These relate to: first, the objectives of the PPP prisons; second, risk management practices; third, the approach to performance measurement and reporting; fourth, the structuring of incentive and payment mechanisms; and fifth, the emphasis on collaboration. Overall, we find that the post‐2000 contracts promote a more overt development of goodwill trust and relational contracting, building on presumptions of contractual and competence forms of trust. However, quite different outcomes have been achieved from particular contractual contexts. Our study suggests that in complex PPP contracts, the influences of both the transacting parties and the transaction environment have been insufficiently recognized in the literature on PPPs.     

The Impact of Capital Structure on Efficient Sourcing and Strategic Behavior

We model the capital structure choice of a firm that operates under imperfect competition. Extant literature demonstrates that debt commits a firm to an aggressive output stance, which is an advantage to the firm under Cournot competition. However, empirical evidence, indicates that debt is a disadvantage under imperfect competition. We reconcile the theory with the evidence by incorporating firms' relations with their suppliers, in a model of strategic firmrival interactions. Under imperfect competition and incomplete contracting, we show that although debt financing improves a firm's input sourcing efficiency it could also benefit the firm's rivals by lowering their input costs. This effect offsets the benefits due to aggressive product market strategies that result from increased debt. Under certain conditions this subsidy effect is sufficiently strong that debt is suboptimal in equilibrium and leads to an increase in rival's shareholder value.     

Trust, contracting and the prospectus process

This study explores the role of trust and the ways in which trust is created within the prospectus process. It is argued that trust is a necessary condition for economic exchange and that trust must exist prior to contracting. The theoretical analysis provided deconstructs the contract as the original event and points to the limitations of traditional accounting analyses in understanding economic exchange. In addition, examples from the prospectus process are used to illustrate how some of the capital market institutions and institutional practices that we observe create and recreate the trust necessary for exchange.     

The formation and early development of German audit firms

This paper examines the emergence of audit firms in Germany through an analysis of contemporary sources. Special attention is paid to the range of services offered, their legal forms and ownership structure. In Germany, the demand for external audits developed because the corporate supervisory boards had been unable to fulfil their monitoring task satisfactorily. As a consequence of the major economic crisis of 1929-1931 and the collapse of large corporations caused by the fraudulent actions of managing directors, statutory audits for stock corporations were introduced in 1931. The first German audit and trust company, the Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, was established much earlier in 1890. Like other trust companies which emerged from 1905 onwards, it was owned by large banks. After the First World War, large commercial groups on the one hand, and the state on the other hand, started to form their own audit firms. Most of the audit and trust companies used the legal form of a corporation. Originally, the main activities of the trust companies were trustee activities and audits. Subsequently, they also offered tax and business advisory services. These features (a broad range of services offered, the corporation as the dominant legal form, and clients who are also owners) help us to understand key characteristics of modern German audit firms such as their limited liability to third parties.     

Local authority education expenditure in 1982/83: A paper for the expenditure steering group ‐ Education

Central service departments of local authorities (such as personnel and legal services) have had to become more aware of direct service departments as ‘customers’. A proportion of these professional services will be subject to Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) over the next few years. These services have to adapt to being customer‐led, or face the possibility of losing business. One of the earliest responses to this new situation occurred in Newcastle City Council, where the Treasurer's Department undertook a ‘customer‐care’ initiative. This article describes an evaluation of the initiative, showing how the effects can be measured and revealing how clear feedback about areas that might otherwise be neglected can be obtained using survey methods.     

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.     

Money is an experience good: Competition and trust in the private provision of money

The interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money is studied. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a bound on efficiency. Stationary inflation must be non-negative and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be achieved. The quality of money can be observed only after its purchasing capacity is realized. In this sense, money is an experience good.     

Is hospital competition wasteful?

Recent attention has been given to the hypothesis that local hospital competition takes the form of costly duplication of specialized services--the "medical arms race." This contrasts with the hypothesis that the supply of specialized services is determined solely by "the extent of the market." We develop a model predicting the provision of specialized services in local markets. Our analysis of California hospitals provides minimal support for the medical arms race hypothesis while suggesting substantial scale economies for many services. Our results emphasize the importance of properly specifying the extent of the market. Failure to do so leads one to overestimate the importance of competition.     

Ownership and Performance in a Lightly Regulated Environment

This article examines the relation between ownership and performance for New Zealand electricity lines firms over the period 1998 to 2006. The sample is of interest because it represents all firms within a single product industry (local electricity distribution), which is a natural monopoly subject to a light‐handed regulatory regime. Thus we are able to examine the theories of ownership on performance, while controlling for regulation, industry, product market competition, accounting methods and other factors that might impact profitability, such as network reliability and network density. The results suggest that listed firms have similar profitability to council‐owned firms and both listed and council‐owned firms outperform trust‐owned firms. The likely reason for the poorer performance of trust‐owned firms is that they have different agency costs than listed and council‐owned firms and the trustees have lower responsibility than directors. Hence, they have lower incentives to be profitable.     

Trust in UK financial services: A longitudinal analysis

The role and importance of trust for the development and maintenance of relationships in the financial services sector cannot be disputed. In a business to consumer context, this article presents a model for measuring trust for financial services organisations and positions trustworthiness as its key antecedent. The work also presents five important determinants of trustworthiness and ultimately trust. Our work is based on 5 years’ data before and during the ‘credit crunch’, and across the seven main types of product provider in the United Kingdom. The findings show that the overall trust rating for financial services has remained remarkably stable throughout the period of the study. The research also reveals that trust ratings are highest in relation to consumers who are older and that consumers are typically more trusting of brokers than any other type of product provider.     

Trust and distrust in a network-style organisation: GPs’ experiences and views of a Scottish local healthcare co-operative

This paper considers the conditions needed for an organisation to function as an effective network. In particular, the concepts of trust and distrust are explored. Looking at the new labour reforms of 1997, evidence is presented by means of interview responses from GPs, that this powerful group in primary health care lacked sufficient trust in health care managers. In fact GPs seemed to often distrust them. It is unlikely, therefore, that a Scottish local health care co-operative, created as a result of the 1997 reforms to act as an interface between GPs and health care managers could be effective in allocating health care resources. As a result, the reforms did little to improve primary health care services in Scotland despite the increased funding allocated over recent years to this sector.     

Issues and risks in performing SysTrust® engagements: implications for research and practice

This paper identifies issues related to the delivery of SysTrust® services by public accounting firms. We first review the professional and academic literatures relating to trust services, analogizing to the literature on financial statement audits. Our review reveals that there are a number of articles in the professional and academic literatures on trust services relating to user issues, most of which address the nature and extent of the potential demand for these services. However, very little attention has been paid to issues relating to engagement issues for service providers. In contrast, the auditing literature provides a large body of conceptual and empirical research devoted to the management of audit engagement risk. We identify several specific issues relating to trust services engagement risk, including sources of potential expectation gaps and barriers to attestation risk reduction. In order to facilitate further research on providing trust services, we use a case situation to illustrate specific aspects of these issues in a complex client environment.     

New development: The application of incomplete contract theory to documenting Social Impact Bonds

ABSTRACT

Nobel laureate Oliver Hart’s work in developing a theory of incomplete contracting is relevant to explaining the evolution of the pay for success contracts that undergird Social Impact Bonds (SIBs). By its very nature, a pay for success contract that supports a SIB is likely to be functionally incomplete in that it is unable to describe and differentiate in the initial contract all relevant future states of the world in which the contract is to operate. Navigating this incomplete world can be particularly challenging when it comes to government contracting for quality outcomes in social services. Accordingly, Hart’s incomplete contracting framework can help us to think more clearly about how to document a pay for success contract that best supports a SIB transaction.     

地方竞争是否阻碍了地方政府债务绩效的提升？——理论框架及空间计量研究

本文从举债行为策略视角考察地方竞争对地方政府债务绩效的影响。 首先,从不同地区间举债行为策略互动的视角对地方竞争如何影响地方政府债务绩效进行理论诠释,其次,在采用Global超效率DEA方法测度地方政府债务绩效的基础上,突破空间独立性假设,运用空间杜宾模型对地方竞争影响地方政府债务绩效的效果及空间外溢性进行实证检验。研究发现,在地方效用最大化目标导向下,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都对债务增速产生了较为显著的正向影响和空间外溢效应,导致地方采取主动扩大债务规模的举债行为策略。与此同时,随着债务规模的持续增长,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都将对债务绩效产生“规模报酬递减”的负向影响和空间外溢效应,尤其是公共投资竞争的影响效果更加明显。进一步地,如果考虑到可能存在预算软约束现象,地方竞争还将与预算软约束行为相结合,对债务绩效产生了“使用效率递减”的负向影响。本文结论为通过债务合理使用来促进经济高质量发展,防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。