产品差异与技术差距影响研发溢出的理论探讨——基于企业竞争合作策略视角

在传统研发溢出效应假设基础上,通过技术差距将溢出效应与产品差异有机联系起来,并通过构建双寡头企业两阶段博弈模型对研发卡特尔、生产卡特尔、完全合作等不同形式合作联盟的均衡水平和福利变化进行分析比较。研究证实:当企业间技术差距较小时,完全合作或研发卡特尔能有效提高企业利润和社会福利;而当技术差距较大时,研发阶段的合作不仅无法激励企业进行研发投入,还会抑制企业创新的积极性。此外,与完全合作相比,局部合作具有更强的稳定性和可持续性,尤其是在产品差异程度较大的情况下,研发卡特尔最为稳定。     

产品差异与技术差距影响研发溢出的理论探讨

在传统研发溢出效应假设基础上，通过技术差距将溢出效应与产品差异有机联系起来，并通过构建双寡头企业两阶段博弈模型对研发卡特尔、生产卡特尔、完全合作等不同形式合作联盟的均衡水平和福利变化进行分析比较。研究证实：当企业间技术差距较小时，完全合作或研发卡特尔能有效提高企业利润和社会福利；而当技术差距较大时，研发阶段的合作不仅无法激励企业进行研发投入，还会抑制企业创新的积极性。此外，与完全合作相比，局部合作具有更强的稳定性和可持续性，尤其是在产品差异程度较大的情况下，研发卡特尔最为稳定。     

溢出效应对竞争企业研发投资和政府补贴的影响

运用博弈论的方法研究溢出效应对竞争企业研发投资和政府补贴的影响,构建了不同情形下的博弈模型,研究表明:当溢出效应较弱时,合作研发下的政府补贴率最高,但企业更愿意选择集中式决策;当溢出效应中等时,企业的最优策略是合作研发并能够获得较高水平的政府补贴率;当溢出效应较强时,企业的最优策略是选择分散式决策,政府仍会为其设定最优补贴率。分散式决策与合作研发均能使研发投资、消费者剩余和社会福利维持在较高水平;集中式决策不仅会弱化企业的研发投资积极性,还会损害消费者剩余和社会福利。     

不对称R＆D活动下的市场绩效分析——基于有差异产品的寡头市场

为了研究在Stackelberg寡头竞争模型下企业在产品市场是否合作对市场绩效的影响,建立了寡头市场中面向R＆D工艺的两阶段博弈模型。采用逆向归纳法求出了产品市场合作与不合作两种情况下的古诺-均衡解。研究表明,从促进技术进步的角度来看,对于R＆D效率不太高的R＆D项目,产品市场合作策略优于产品市场竞争策略。从提高企业利润的角度来看,对于R＆D效率较高的R＆D项目,当产品差异不大时,产品市场合作策略优于产品市场竞争策略;当产品差异较大时,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。对于R＆D效率较低的R＆D项目,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。从提高消费者剩余以及改善社会福利的角度来看,对于R＆D效率较低的R＆D项目,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。     

基于知识共享和知识溢出的企业R＆D合作策略分析

以D＇Aspremont ＆ Jacquemin模型（以下简称DJ模型）为基础,研究了基于知识共享和知识溢出条件下企业的R＆D合作行为。研究结果表明,在考虑知识共享的作用下,即使当溢出〈0.5时,R＆D合作依然有可能比R＆D竞争具有更高的研发投资、产业总产量和社会总福利。     

基于投资溢出的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究

考虑研发存在投资溢出与技术风险,建立了合作研发博弈模型,研究了在政府研发投入补贴与产品补贴方式下,企业不同的研发和生产策略,通过理论和数值仿真,分析了不同补贴政策下的企业最优策略和相应的社会福利。研究表明,在溢出效应较大时,政府宜采用研发投入补贴来提高社会福利;当创新难度和技术风险较大时,政府宜采用产品补贴方式提高社会福利,但两种补贴方式都不能实现社会福利最大化。     

技术溢出、企业研发路径与政府政策引导

针对技术溢出程度的不确定,建立了三阶段研发博弈模型,研究了企业最优研发路径的选择问题。在此基础上,分析了企业利润最大化与社会福利最大化的目标一致性以及政府的财税政策在纠正两目标差距上的有效性。结果表明:当技术溢出较小时,企业选择的最优研发路径能使两者目标一致;当技术溢出较大时,企业的最优研发路径会使两者目标不一致,此时政府需要对企业进行引导以促进协同创新,其中差异化补贴政策能有效纠正目标差距,政府减免企业所得税能有效缩小目标差距。     

不确定性、溢出效应与R＆D合作

所建立的模型是D＇Asprement和Jacquemin（1988）模型的一个扩展,它构建了两个企业在不确定情形下进行R＆D竞争和合作的理论模型。模型的目的是解释不确定性如何影响研发效率,比较两个企业在R＆D竞争和两种合作模式下技术投入水平、产量以及企业利润的情况。主要结论是企业的R＆D研发（产量）水平总是随R＆D成功概率的增加而增加的。当R＆D溢出较大时,企业合作研发条件下的研发（产量）水平大于竞争条件下的研发水平,也大于联合实验室条件下的研发（产量）水平。     

国际技术外溢对我国工业部门R＆D活动影响的实证研究——国际技术外溢对我国经济发展的影响研究之二

文章运用我国1998年-2002年各省的有关经济数据，分析了国际技术外溢的溢出效应与竞争效应对我国工业部门R＆D活动的影响。我们发现，国际技术外溢对我国工业部门R＆D活动有正向的溢出效应和负向竞争效应，负向竞争效应比正向溢出效应表现的更为显著。研究还发现，国际技术外溢对不同所有制工业部门的溢出效应和竞争效应是不同的：它对我国国有工业部门的R＆D活动有不显著的负向溢出效应和显著的负向竞争效应，对我国三资工业部门的R＆D活动有尽管不显著但表现为正的溢出效应和竞争效应。因此，国际技术外溢对国有工业企业R＆D活动冲击较大，而以外商独资、三资企业为主的工业企业的R＆D活动相对受益。最后，提出了促进国际技术外溢对我国工业部门R＆D活动技术扩散的政策建议。     

双寡头垄断市场中新技术研发与模仿的动态博弈

研究双寡头垄断市场中的率先创新和模仿创新的动态博弈问题,企业选择主动进行R＆D,或者等待其他企业首先进行新技术开发进而模仿,这是个重要的战略问题。假设垄断市场的需求是刚性且需求量保持不变,R＆D的结果导致企业生产成本的降低。分别计算在不完全信息的情况下主动开发和等待模仿的双方的利润和利润均衡点,建立了双寡头新R＆D投资的动态博弈模型。     

R&D subsidy and output subsidy in a duopoly: The role of technology spillover and R&D budget

Technology spillover and research and development (R&D) budget are relevant on government subsidies that aim at improving social welfare through enhancing R&D incentives of firms. However, there has not been related literature considering these two factors. To fill this gap, this paper examines the effect of technology spillover and R&D budget on R&D competition of duopolistic firms and government subsidies by constructing a game-theoretic model. We find that while each firm's profit sometimes increases with R&D budget for low coefficient of technology spillover, this profit may decrease with R&D budget for high coefficient of technology spillover due to the intensified R&D competition. We show that when both R&D budget and the coefficient of technology spillover remain high, R&D subsidy leads to higher social welfare than output subsidy and otherwise R&D subsidy results in lower social welfare.     

THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D*

The precompetitive R&D literature has viewed cooperative and noncooperative R&D as substitutes. In this paper a more realistic approach is taken, where both cooperative and noncooperative R&D are performed in parallel. In the first stage, firms determine the optimal investments in both types of R&D and in the second stage they compete in output. It is found that information sharing between cooperating firms contributes not only to cooperative R&D, but also to noncooperative R&D. The two types of R&D reinforce each other. The level of cooperative R&D may be higher or lower than noncooperative R&D. In a Cournot duopoly, the share of cooperative R&D lies between 20% and 80% of total R&D and this share increases with spillovers and information sharing. It is always optimal to subsidize half the costs of cooperative R&D, while the subsidy to noncooperative R&D is unchanged from the standard model. Consumers prefer intermediate levels of spillovers and information sharing, while firms prefer higher levels of spillovers, which entail lower levels of information sharing.     

收入分布、破坏性创新与社会福利

通过构建破坏性创新企业与在位企业进行市场竞争的双寡头博弈模型,分析在具有不同收入分布特征市场中破坏性创新企业的市场绩效及社会福利。研究发现,在收入差距较大的市场中,破坏性创新企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,社会福利相对较小;相反,在收入水平较高且分布趋向同质的市场中,在位企业获得更大的市场份额和利润,并且,破坏性创新厂商的利润随着收入水平的提高而降低。同时,随着收入水平的提高,两企业的产品质量不断提高,但质量差距不断扩大,社会总福利也随之增加。最后,进一步阐释了破坏性创新更多地发生于贫富差距较大的新兴市场的微观机制,为企业根据不同市场的收入分布特征选择竞争战略提供理论依据,为相关国家基于收入分布特点制定限制或支持破坏性创新创业政策提供理论参考。     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

基于混合溢出效应的产业共性技术研发组织模式研究

研究了共性技术的R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、RJV(ResearchJointVenture)竞争3种基本研发组织模式;在考虑投入溢出和成果溢出共存、溢出总量随时间T变化的基础上,引入研发风险率函数,通过对各组织模式的生产者剩余、消费者剩余和R&D投资率进行比较,总结出更适合共性技术研发和扩散的组织模式。结果表明:市场机制下,企业不一定会选择RJV;从社会福利角度,RJV产生的社会剩余大于R&D卡特尔和R&D竞争模式的社会剩余;为使社会福利最大化,政府应引导企业形成RJV。     

Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated Markets

We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries.

We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a ‘constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers.     

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation. We first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality. Second, we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal: Both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading. Third, there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low. Finally, we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long-run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition (but not on social welfare).     

PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION IN A UNIONISED MIXED DUOPOLY: THE CASES OF SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS*

We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when unions are present. For the case of a unionised mixed duopoly, there exists a dominant strategy only for the public firm that chooses Bertrand competition irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements; there is no dominant strategy for a private firm. Thus, we show that regardless of the nature of goods, social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined in equilibrium, wherein Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot competition. Moreover, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception that when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of a private firm's profit is not reversed, which is in contrast to the standard findings.