Mapping the theory of political representation to the empirics: An investigation for proportional and majoritarian rules

We combine roll call votes and referendum decisions on identically worded legislative proposals to identify the effect of electoral rules on the way Swiss Members of Parliament (MPs) represent their constituents’ preferences. We exploit the fact that MPs in both Houses of Parliament are elected in the same electoral districts (the cantons). Yet, in the Lower House, MPs are elected using a proportional rule, while in the Upper House they are elected employing a majoritarian rule. We find that electoral rules matter strongly for political representation. The voting patterns of MPs are fully in line with three theoretical predictions regarding the influence of electoral rules on representation of constituents’ preferences: 1) The probability that a proportional-elected MP accepts a legislative proposal closely follows the share of voters that accept the proposal in the referendum. 2) In contrast, for majority-elected MPs the probability of acceptance is strongly increasing in the share of voter acceptance if the latter is close to the 50% threshold. 3) The estimated probability that an Upper House MP votes “yes” as a function of the share of voters voting “yes” in the referendum has an S-shape form with an inflection point close to 50%.     

Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power

We match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6% points more than random voting and that a senator’s probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4% points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.     

Masculinity cues,perceptions of politician attributes,and political behavior*

How are masculine‐looking politicians perceived by voters? Are these judgments accurate? We asked Australian survey participants to rate images of unknown‐to‐them Swiss politicians. We find that politicians with prominent markers of masculinity (including facial hair, baldness, and higher facial width‐to‐height ratio) are perceived as less honest and competent. To determine whether these perceptions correlate with political behavior, we exploit two unique features of Swiss politics. First, to check for politician–voter congruence, we match each politician's voting record to that of their constituents on identically worded legislative proposals. We find that bearded politicians are less likely to behave according to constituents' preferences. Second, by exploiting the mandatory disclosure of lobby group affiliations, we show that bearded politicians are less likely to be captured by interest groups. Our results suggest that more masculine‐looking politicians are recognized by both voters and lobby groups as less amenable to being controlled.     

What Does it Take to Sell Environmental Policy? An Empirical Analysis of Referendum Data

We analyze the factors that influence the support for environmental policy proposals. Swiss referendum data show that proposals obtain more yes-votes if they do not restrict consumption possibilities directly, if they are endorsed by the largest business association, if environmental preferences are strong and economic conditions are favorable at the time of the referendum. Also, there are more pro-environmental votes in cantons with higher population density. On the other hand, yes-votes do not seem to depend on whether a proposal involves a tax or not.     

Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration

The separation of powers is endogenous to the politico-economic process, and thus to politicians’ self-interest. Only little is known about what really drives politicians’ behavior when shaping institutional rules with respect to the separation of powers. We econometrically compare votes of parliamentary representatives and their constituents on a popular initiative that directly aimed at weakening the separation of powers in 1922 in Switzerland. We analyze whether the strength of individual ties to the public service affect representatives’ behavior, holding constituents’ preferences constant. Our results indicate that while politicians tend to represent their constituents’ preferences, representatives with ties to the public service have a higher probability of supporting the eligibility of public servants for the legislature. Thus, they favor reducing the separation of powers between legislature and administration.     

Exploring Voter Preferences in Cultural Policy: A Case Study for Austria

The aim of the paper is to explore the demographic, social, economic and politicaldeterminants of voting behavior in a recently held referendum on the constructionof a new theater (``Musiktheater') in the city of Linz (Upper Austria) in 2000. Itwas the first referendum on cultural policy of its kind in Austria, and it led to arejection of the proposal by a majority of the voters (59.70% of ``No' votes).Exploring the determinants of approval or disapproval of the proposition by usingfor group data in communities is thus an interesting question from an economic aswell as a political point of view. We find econometric evidence for the influence ofthe size of the population in the community, the distance of the community from thecity of Linz, income-related variables, variables denoting the economic structure ofthe community, and political variables such as the ratio of the communities' debt torevenues and voters' preferences in the last national election.     

Public Preferences for Government Spending Priorities: Survey Evidence from Germany

Employing data from a representative survey conducted in Germany, this paper examines public preferences for the size and composition of government expenditure. We focus on public attitudes towards taxes, public debt incurrence and public spending in six different policy areas. Our findings suggest, first, that individual preferences for the use of additional tax money can be categorised as either capital‐oriented expenditure or public debt reduction. Second, we find that fiscal preferences differ along various dimensions. Specifically, personal economic well‐being, economic literacy, confidence in politicians, political ideology and time preference are significantly related to individual attitudes towards public spending, taxes and debt. The magnitude of the effects is particularly large for time preference, economic knowledge and party preference. Third, public preferences for public spending priorities are only marginally affected when considering a public budget constraint.     

Politicians and Preferences of the Voter Majority: Does Gender Matter?

Does the gender of political representatives affect the extent to which they adhere to the voter majority's preferences? By matching individual male and female representatives' votes on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues, we obtain a direct measure of divergence. We find that female and male representatives adhere equally close to the majority's preferences if party affiliations are taken into account. This suggests that observed gender differences with respect to the national majority of voters may be reduced to an ideological left–right dimension.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

Economic Growth,Public Debt and Welfare: Comparing Three Budgetary Rules

Abstract. We present an endogenous growth model with externalities of capital and elastic labor supply where we allow for public debt and welfare‐enhancing public spending. We analyze different debt policies as regards convergence to a balanced growth path and their effects on long‐run growth and welfare. Three budgetary rules are considered: the balanced budget rule, a budgetary rule where debt grows in the long run but at a rate lower than the balanced growth rate and a rule where public debt grows at the same rate as all other economic variables but where it guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled.     

Opportunist politicians and the evolution of electoral competition

This paper studies a uni-dimensional model of electoral competition between two parties with two types of politicians. ‘Opportunist’ ones care only about the spoils of the office, and ‘militant’ ones have ideological preferences on the policy space. Opportunist politicians review their affiliations and may switch parties, seeking better election prospects. In this framework, we compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils of office go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils of office are split among the two parties in proportion to their vote shares. We study the existence of short term political equilibria and the dynamics and stability of policies and of party membership decisions. In the long run, it is possible that proportional systems see opportunist politicians spread over all parties, but this situation is unstable in winner-take-all systems.     

Political uncertainty and stock market volatility: new evidence from the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

We investigate the impact of heightened political uncertainty in the run‐up to, and after, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. The conditional volatilities of stock returns of our Scottish index and the FTSE all share index are characterised by the same GARCH parameters for a sample ending in late 2013, but this no longer holds when estimation extends closer to the referendum. The relative volatility of Scottish companies’ stock returns peaked when polls indicated the referendum result was ‘too close to call,’ fell back on the result, but rose again in the run‐up to publication of proposals for further devolution.     

Anchors,endorsements, and preferences: A field experiment

This study investigates how access to political endorsements affects stated preferences for an environmental public good in Switzerland. We developed a contingent valuation survey questionnaire with two valuation questions, the first formulated as a (hypothetical) policy referendum, the second an open-ended WTP question. For the referendum question we solicited endorsements from a range of political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conducted a split-sample mail-survey experiment in which a table listing the endorsements was included with a subsample of the questionnaires. Access to the policy endorsements significantly affected the responses to the open-ended willingness-to-pay question.     

A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre

Participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to understand how participatory democracy operates, and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of Participatory Budgeting implemented in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by Osborne et al. [2000. Meetings with costly participation. American Economic Review 90, 927-943].     

The impact of convertible debt financing on investment timing

We develop a model to examine the timing of investment decisions in relation to the issuance of convertible debt by firms. Our model shows that when the demand shock has higher volatility, the firm finances the investment cost with high-coupon convertible debt. We find that default occurs earlier for firms that finance with convertible debt rather than with straight debt. We also find that firms with high-growth prospection, high volatility, and low capital costs that issue convertible debt tend to defer investments. Furthermore, we examine the investment decisions in which the convertible debt includes a call provision. We show that firms that use callable convertible debt invest earlier than those that use non-callable convertible debt by using suboptimal coupon payments. The opportunity from the forced conversion increases as the volatility increases. These results are consistent with recent empirical evidence.     

Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods.     

Corporate Power and the Scope of Economic Analysis

This paper examines how consumer debt impacts middle-class households. Interest payments on this debt reduce spendable income and household living standards. We argue that it is necessary to account for interest payments on consumer debt when measuring income inequality and the size of the middle class, and then estimate the impact of doing this using the Survey of Consumer Finances datasets since the 1980s. We find that both greater income inequality and rising interest payments on past debt are squeezing the middle class, with interest becoming more important in the 2000s. We conclude with some policy proposals to aid middle-class households.     

Endogenous growth, welfare and budgetary regimes

Within an optimizing endogenous growth model with productive public capital and government debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path a set of welfare-maximizing fiscal rules under different budgetary regimes. It is shown that optimal fiscal policy depends on the specific budgetary stance considered.     

Real-Time Fiscal Forecasting Using Mixed-Frequency Data*

The sovereign debt crisis has increased the importance of monitoring budgetary execution. We employ real-time data using a mixed data sampling (MiDaS) methodology to demonstrate how budgetary slippages can be detected early on. We show that in spite of using real-time data, the year-end forecast errors diminish significantly when incorporating intra-annual information. Our results show the benefits of forecasting aggregates via subcomponents, in this case total government revenue and expenditure. Our methodology could significantly improve fiscal surveillance and could therefore be an important part of the European Commission's model toolkit.     

Stone–Geary preferences in overlapping generations economies under pure exchange: A note

We incorporate Stone–Geary preferences into an overlapping generations economy under pure exchange, and explore stability, indeterminacy, and cycles with positive levels of saving and nonnegative public debt. A stable nontrivial steady state exists for parameter values, for which there does not exist equilibrium in the model with purely logarithmic utility function. We also show the possibility of a period-doubling bifurcation (a two-cycle).