Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion

It is a striking feature of EU tax policy that countries find it difficult to agree on capital tax coordination. This is in conflict with the prevailing theoretical view, according to which tax coordination is beneficial. This paper develops a political economy argument which may help to explain this puzzle. We consider a model of tax competition where fiscal policy decisions are taken via majority voting and tax evasion is possible but costly. It turns out that tax coordination agreements may fail to generate political support because middle income groups may lose from tax coordination, even if their capital income is below average.     

The Relative Efficiency of Taxes in a Two-Period Model of Urban Growth

In this paper we investigate the differential effects of a wage tax and a land value tax on urban development and economic efficiency. A two-period model has been used to confirm that while a land value tax is distortionary, a wage tax of equal yield is even worse at the level of a single open city where the supply of labor is perfectly elastic to the city. This result suggests that the finding land value taxes are distortionary is of little practical significance.     

A Scheme to Determine Tax Rates Fairly and Quantitatively

A bstract .   This article discusses a scheme to quantitatively determine a personal income tax rate structure based on the principle of democratic voting. Previous attempts to apply the majority voting rule largely call for voting on predetermined tax positions. In the approach presented here, each taxpayer proposes an egocentric rate system encompassing his or her own obligation as well as all other taxpayers' under generally accepted constraints. The egocentric rate systems proposed by all taxpayers are weight-averaged to determine the actual tax obligation for all taxpayers. The weights used for the average are in general proportional to the tax contribution. The rate structure can be quantitatively determined from solving simultaneous equations if the weights are predetermined. Although there are an infinite number of choices for the weights, it is argued that the "fair" manner of averaging ranges from equal representation by all taxpayers to equal representation by all tax contributions. An appropriate rate structure should be a linear combination of the tax rates derived from the two limiting scenarios. Alternative egocentric voting schemes under equal representation by all taxpayers are also discussed. While these alternative schemes are politically more acceptable, measures need to be taken to counterbalance the confiscating nature desired by the majority of the voters. Such measures may marginalize the democratic voting process and produce rate structures less progressive than those assuming equal representation of tax contributions. Although the method discussed here allows flexibility on the marginal rate progressivity, it sets the high limit that the lowest and highest income classes ought to pay.     

The economics of property taxes and land values: The elasticity of supply of structures

Land values are explained by diminishing returns to a variable factor, structure, added to fixed land. The total cost minimizing structural density determined by land value, occurs where the marginal cost of increased density equals the average cost of structure plus land. Structural demand prices equal marginal costs in equilibrium determining land demands. A general equilibrium land price establishes the uses, prices and densities of structures. A simple method of calculating structure supply elasticity and the incidence and deadweight loss of property taxes is developed. Differing property tax rates are found to be efficient.     

Decreasing average cost in private schools,existence of majority voting equilibrium,and a policy analysis for Turkey

The existing models of mixed public–private school systems usually capture only the decreasing average cost faced by public schools, whereas empirical studies find evidence of it for private schools as well. Motivated by this, an equilibrium model of a mixed public–private school system is studied in this paper, whereby private schools also face decreasing average cost over enrollment. In the model, households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously specified income and child’s ability, choose among a public and a private school. Private school charges tuition whereas public school is free. Public school spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households and the tax rate is determined via majority voting. Achievement of a child depends on its ability and education spending. Under the assumptions on the parameters of the model, a joint lognormal distribution of income and ability, and a Cobb–Douglas utility, majority voting equilibrium is numerically shown to exist. The model is calibrated to match certain statistics from the 2013 Turkish data. Using the calibrated model, we compare the benchmark for a mixed public–private school system with a pure public school system to understand the impact of shutting down some of the private schools in Turkey following the July 15 coup attempt. We find that mean achievement and variance of achievement after high school is \(0.039\%\) higher and \(0.013\%\) lower respectively in a pure public school system.     

Land Taxes in Agriculture

A bstract Farmland , which occupies two thirds of America's privately owned territory, provides more than food and fiber. Agricultural uses of land preserve open space, filter and store water, supfwrt wildlife, conserve rural resources, enlarge life style opportunities for an urban society. One instrument for preserving agricultural land from urban developmental pressures is the preferential assessment for real property tax, essentially a two rate tax favoring farming as a land use. Preferential assessment, administered typically at small, nonrollback differentials, has not deterred intensive land use changes. Indeed, it may have had the opposite effect. Changes in the tax on land and buildings are recommended as improvements in the preferential assessment of agricultural land.     

The effects of the property tax: A general equilibrium simulation

This paper uses a general equilibrium model of residential land use to study the effects of the property tax in a closed city. Two different specifications of the production technology for housing are used, and are found to yield similar results. The model is too complicated to be solved in closed form, but an efficient computational technique which utilizes a simplicial search algorithm was developed to solve it numerically. This type of model and computational technique can be applied to a wide variety of practical issues in urban economics.     

Use-Value Assessment Tax Expenditures in Urban Areas

Use-value assessment is the practice of valuing land for property tax purposes in its current use, rather than at its full market value. This practice is widespread in the U.S. and is intended to reduce the property tax burden on agricultural land near urban areas and slow the pace of land development. We examine the foregone property tax revenue, or tax expenditure, due to use-value assessment. Data sets for two case studies are employed in empirical estimation of spatial models of the difference between market value and use value, providing the analytic basis for estimates of tax expenditures.     

The Economic Effects (Neutrality) of Taxes on Land

A bstract A recent review of the economic effects of land taxation by Steven Bourassa created the misleading impression that a tax on land will have pro-development or non-neutral effects where there are non pecuniary returns from land or where there are capital market imperfections preventing developers from obtaining all the land that they want for development This note argues that a tax on land value is generally neutral, and that this will be the case whether or not there are non pecuniary returns and capital market imperfections, provided that the existence and extent of the imperfections are independent of the tax     

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND DOUBLE TAXATION

This paper examines international tax competition, with respect to both corporate income tax rates and tax rules for double taxation. Unlike existing studies, this study assumes that governments set non-discriminatory tax rates on domestic- and foreign-sourced corporate income and can choose no tax allowance as the tax rule. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium outcomes contradict the intuition underlying previous studies: no tax allowance is chosen as the tax rule where world economic welfare can be maximized. A capital-exporting country gains whereas a capital-importing country loses, compared to the case where there is a tax allowance of any kind.     

Who's in charge of the central city? The conflict between efficiency and equity in the design of a metropolitan area

A circular metropolitan area consists of a central city surrounded by a suburb. Households sort over the two jurisdictions based on public service levels and their costs of commuting to the metropolitan center. Using numerical simulations, we show that (1) there typically exist two equilibria: one in which the poor form the voting majority in the central city and the other in which the rich form the majority in the central city; (2) there is an efficiency vs. equity trade-off as to which equilibrium is preferred; and (3) if the central city contains only poor households, equity favors expanding the central city to include rich households. The third result arises not because of a fiscal subsidy from rich to poor households induced by a property tax but rather because of a change in house price capitalization.     

Pennsylvania's Success with Local Property Tax Reform

A bstract Fifteen cities in Pennsylvania are pioneering an innovative approach to local tax reform that harnesses market incentives for urban renewal .
Opting for the so-called "two-rate" or "split-rate" property tax , these cities are lowering taxes on buildings, thereby encouraging improvements and renovations , while raising the tax on land values, thus discouraging land speculation . The resulting infill development as indicated by increased building permits means downtown jobs , efficient use of urban infrastructure, an improved housing stock, and less urban sprawl .
Cities in other states are poised to follow Pennsylvania's example.     

On intermediate utility functions

Intermediate utility functions have been recently introduced by Persson and Tabellini (2000, Political Economics: Explaining Economics Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge) and ensure the existence of a majority voting equilibrium at multi-dimensional voting. Here, we show that monotone transforms of these utility functions also are sufficient for the existence of a Condorcet winner.     

Political Economy of Property Tax Reform: Hawaii's Experiment with Split‐Rate Property Taxation

Economic theory suggests that switching from a general property tax to a split‐rate tax increases land use efficiency and stimulates urban core development while preserving the environment and reducing urban sprawl. Under split‐rate property taxation, land is typically taxed at a significantly higher rate than improvements. Beginning in 1965 Hawaii experimented with a statewide split‐rate property tax system to encourage economic growth and effect land reform. The experiment was ended in 1977. Following the transfer of property taxing powers to the counties in 1978, some counties brought back the split‐rate property tax at times. Since 2006, Kauai County has adopted the unusual practice of taxing improvements at a higher rate than land for most property classes. This article chronicles and explains the rationale behind Hawaii's state and county experiments with split‐rate property taxation.     

基于GIS-Agent模型的武汉市土地利用变化模拟研究

综合利用GIS的空间分析功能和Agent模型的复杂系统模拟预测功能,论文尝试解决土地利用变化的模拟预测问题,以期对科学制定城市与区域规划有所裨益.在典型Agent模型"Repast3.0"基础上,构建了Repast与Openmap相结合的土地利用变化模拟及预测原型系统.基于武汉市土地利用变化的应用结果表明,GIS-Agent一体化技术是模拟预测土地利用分布变化的一种可行方案.     

Income taxes and urban spatial structure

This paper examines the impact of an income tax in a monocentric city where households equilibriate their allocation of time between work, commuting, and leisure. An increase in the income tax rate lowers the implicit value of time, and hence transportation costs. “Compensated equilibrium” comparative statics analysis shows that under certain conditions, this results in a larger, more dispersed urban area, with lower land rents at the city center and less population within any given distance from the center. The welfare effect of an income tax rate change is also studied, and an expression for the marginal excess burden is derived. The income tax produces welfare losses both because it induces substitution in favor of leisure and in favor of travel—the latter accompanied by excessive spatial dispersion and consumption of space. The marginal excess burden depends not only on the compensated demand elasticity for leisure, but also on that for space. Finally, the problem of benefit measurement for transportation projects in this tax-distorted spatial economy is examined. Benefit measures should be deflated to adjust for the fact that further transportation improvements lead to reduction of land use intensity, exacerbating the problem of spatial resource misallocation in an already excessively dispersed urban area.     

The Revenue Potential of Site Value Tax: Extension and Update of General Equilibrium Model With Recent Empirical Estimates of Several Key Parameters

A bstract . Although appealing on the consideration of efficiency, the site ( land ) value tax has been dismissed by some economists as an unviable alternative to the local real estate tax on the ground that it cannot generate sufficient revenue. From earlier work based on a general equilibrium model, however, a switch from a real estate to an equal yield site value tax could result in an increase in equilibrium land prices (and hence the site value tax base). In particular, equilibrium land prices will rise with a site value relative to a real estate tax if: (L+K/L) > e_x. (f_L+ f_k)/f_k. s_x+ e_x. f_L Critical to that theoretical result are the magnitudes of several parameters including the percent land constitutes of total real estate value , (L + K/L), the elasticity of substitution, s_x, the elasticity of demand for real estate e_x, and the output elasticities, f_k and f_L. Based on recent empirical estimates of those parameters, the above stated condition holds.     

Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint

Pairwise majority voting over alternative nonlinear income tax schedules is considered when there is a continuum of individuals who differ in their labor productivities, which is private information, but share the same quasilinear-in-consumption preferences for labor and consumption. Voting is restricted to those schedules that are selfishly optimal for some individual. The analysis extends that of Brett and Weymark (2016) by adding a minimum-utility constraint to their incentive-compatibility and government budget constraints. It also extends the analysis of Röell (2012) and Bohn and Stuart (2013) by providing a complete characterization of the selfishly optimal tax schedules. It is shown that individuals have single-peaked preferences over the set of selfishly optimal tax schedules, and so the schedule proposed by the median skill type is a Condorcet winner.     

Housing as an asset and the effects of property taxation on the residential development process

A model of residential development is constructed recognizing the asset side of land and housing. The equilibrium process is characterized under the perfect foresight assumption, and the effects of a capital gains tax (both unanticipated and anticipated) and a tax on property values are examined.     

Annexation: An Economic Analysis

A bstract . Cost/revenue analysis is used to determine the economic feasibility for annexing various types of land uses into a municipality. Operating costs for municipal services within existing municipal boundaries are apportioned to land uses according to the percent of the service utilized by each. Capital expenditures Site averaged over the expected life of the capital facility Sind then allocated to land uses in the same proportional manner as operating expenditures. Tax yields by land use type are estimated by allocating property taxes and income taxes to land uses which generate them. For example, income taxes are allocated to the commercial and industrial land uses where the employment resulting in tax yields is found. Tax yields are then compared by land use through use of an areal average of one acre. Estimates of revenue to be produced through annexation would result from comparing tax yields with service costs using the same acre average. Thus a city is in a better position to make a decision about the economic merits of specific annexation proposals.