共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Ilaria Ossella 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):597-607
Summary. This paper establishes a ‘turnpike theorem’ for a closed linear model of production with a primitive input requirement matrix.
Optimal programs of resource allocation have a ‘turnpike property’ if the growth factor of every sector in the economy converges,
in the long run, to a common value. The usefulness of such a theorem is due to the fact that the input requirement matrix
for an economy with a large number of goods may be primitive (some power of the matrix is strictly positive).
Received: April 19, 1998; revised version: July 15, 1998 相似文献
2.
Alan Beggs 《Economic Theory》2002,19(2):379-405
Summary. This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results
in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in
a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but
making selection strong does.
Received: January 19, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2000 相似文献
3.
Michael Kosfeld 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):321-339
Summary. The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically
adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that
agents follow a rule of ‘switching to better strategies with higher probability’. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality models of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Moreover, agents stay
with their strategy in case they successfully coordinate with their local neighbors. Our main results show that both strict
Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to invariant distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is
not ergodic but instead depends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium occurs with
probability one whenever the initial fraction contains infinitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of
these agents.
Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: June 21, 2001 相似文献
4.
Summary. The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that
fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to do the computations.
The homotopy path can therefore be followed by several numerical techniques. Moreover, instead of computing some Nash equilibrium,
the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure of Harsanyi
and Selten. As a by-product of our proofs it follows that for a generic game the tracing procedure defines a unique feasible
path. The numerical performance of the algorithm is illustrated by means of several examples.
Received: December 21, 1999; revised version: December 27, 2000 相似文献
5.
Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination
game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents
enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at
low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.
Received: January 10, 2001; revised version: December 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank, without implicating in any way, George Mailath for helpful discussions. Some of the ideas in this paper were
developed during the V Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Ischia, Italy. The NSF provided
financial support.
Correspondence to: T. Temzelides 相似文献
6.
Federico Echenique 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):903-905
Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice
of the joint strategy space.
Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 相似文献
7.
Summary. We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played
simultaneously by the entire population. In these games payoffs, and hence best replies, are determined by a summary statistic
of the population strategy profile. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equilibrium selection depends crucially
on how best responses to the summary statistic remain piece-wise constant. In fact, all the strict Nash equilibria in the
underlying stage game can be made stochastically stable depending on how the best response mapping generates piece-wise constant
best responses.
Received: February 12, 2001; revised version: October 29, 2001 相似文献
8.
Summary. We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic
theory.
Received: April 11, 2002; revised version: June 26, 2002
Correspondence to: K. Shimomura 相似文献
9.
Koji Shimomura 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):501-503
Summary. Based on some elementary results on duality, the paper proposes a much simpler way of deriving the class of non-homothetic
CES production functions which was derived as a solution to a partial differential equation that defines the elasticity of
substitution.
Received: February 11, 1998; revised version: April 28, 1998 相似文献
10.
A simple example of complex dynamics 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Anjan Mukherji 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):741-749
Summary. A discrete tatonnement process is analysed within the context of a two-person, two-good exchange economy where each person
has a Cobb-Douglas utility function. This process is shown to exhibit period doubling bifurcation, topological and ergodic
chaos.
Received: June 22, 1998; revised version: July 15, 1998 相似文献
11.
This paper presents an evolutionary interpretation of Barro-Gordons monetary policy game. The model describes a multi-country setup where governments and private agents are boundedly rational players. The behavioral rule of players decisions leads to the imitation of the strategy giving the highest payoff. In this evolutionary monetary policy game, we show how a low inflation state is reached from an international context dominated by inflationary policies. The analysis explains the convergence towards low inflation rates observed during the past twenty years. Moreover, the low inflation state appears to be the long-run equilibrium of the game under some conditions featuring the observed macroeconomic context.JEL Classification:
E5, C72, C73
Correspondence to: A. dArtigues 相似文献
12.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》2000,15(2):463-468
Summary. Ekeland and Scheinkman (1986) prove the necessity of a standard transversality condition under certain technical conditions.
Their result is one of the most powerful on the necessity of a transversality condition currently available in the literature,
and their proof involves numerous estimations and relies on Ekeland's variational principle and Fatou's lemma. This note relaxes
some of their assumptions and provides a simple proof that uses neither Ekeland's principle nor a convergence result like
Fatou's lemma.
Received: April 24, 1998; revised version: September 8, 1998 相似文献
13.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):427-433
Summary. This note provides a simple proof of the necessity of the transversality condition for the differentiable reduced-form model.
The proof uses only an elementary perturbation argument without relying on dynamic programming. The proof makes it clear that,
contrary to common belief, the necessity of the transversality condition can be shown in a straightforward way.
Received: January 22, 2001; revised version: April 2, 2001 相似文献
14.
Salvador Ortigueira 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):43-62
Summary. The main goal in this paper is to analyze an economic model of endogenous growth where human capital accumulation acts as
the engine propelling economic activity. The added ingredient in our model is that agents derive utility from consumption
and leisure, where leisure is defined as the amount of time devoted to those activities augmented by the level of education.
Under regular conditions we show that there is a unique globally stable balanced growth path. We also provide a characterization
of the behavior of our economic variables along the transition.
Received: May 26, 1998; revised version: September 9, 1999 相似文献
15.
Summary. We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature
of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize
the equilibrium coalition structure and the resulting bids. We do so in a simple model in which the seller may have good reason
to allow joint bidding. In particular, we study a model in which the agents are budget constrained, and are allowed to form
coalitions to pool their finances before engaging in the first price auction. We show that if the budget constraint is very
severe, the equilibrium coalition structure consists of two coalitions, one slightly larger than the other; interestingly,
it is not the grand coalition. This equilibrium coalition structure is one which yields (approximately) the maximum expected
revenue. Thus the seller can induce the optimal (revenue maximizing) degree of cooperation among budget constrained buyers
simply by permitting them to collude.
Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: November 13, 2000 相似文献
16.
Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election
outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each
possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings
allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric
technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious
outcomes.
Received: April 11, 1997; revised version: November 12, 1997 相似文献
17.
A simple characterization of majority rule 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Summary. Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity.
This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskin's, dispenses with another, and contains
weak versions of his other two axioms. It allows the number of voters to be odd or even.
Received: December 23, 1998; revised version: May 10, 1999 相似文献
18.
Thomas C. Ratliff 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):357-372
Summary. In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's Method is designed to find the candidate that is “closest” to being
a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we show that the winner from Dodgson's Method can occur at any position in the ranking
obtained from the Borda Count, the plurality method, or any other positional voting procedure. In addition, we demonstrate
that Dodgson's Method does not satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom.
Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: June 7, 2001 相似文献
19.
Summary. In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and
Mertens (1986). Further the procedure is refined to find the strictly perfect equilibria (if any) of such a game.
Recieved: December 29, 1999; revised version: February 17, 2000 相似文献
20.
Income and wealth distribution in a simple model of growth 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Gerhard Sorger 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):23-42
Summary. This paper studies a deterministic one-sector growth model with a constant returns to scale production function and endogenous
labor supply. It is shown that the distribution of capital among the agents has an effect on the level of per-capita output.
There exists a continuum of stationary equilibria with different levels of per-capita output. If the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is large, a higher output level can be achieved when income inequality is great, that is, when the income distribution
is strongly dispersed. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low, the reverse relation holds. The paper shows
that countries with identical production technologies and identical preferences may have different GDP levels because wealth
is distributed differently among their inhabitants.
Received: January 29, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999 相似文献