Product Location with Foresight

Traditional location literature concludes that firms will optimally differentiate in order to alleviate a tendency toward competitive pricing. However, it has recently been shown that firms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly) anticipate an absence of price competition. This paper examines the relationship between product location and the sustainability of cooperative pricing, in horizontally and vertically differentiated markets. Further, it describes equilibrium locations when firms are able to choose their locations jointly and when they must choose independently.     

Pricing with customer recognition

This article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour-based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers' preferences is discrete. Consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking. In the static and first-period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies. When price discrimination is allowed, forward-looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition, thus the probability that both will have positive first-period sales decreases as they become more patient. Furthermore, an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists, yielding a 100–0 division of the first-period sales. As a whole, price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare.     

The choice among acquisitions,alliances, and divestitures

This paper investigates how firms choose among acquisitions, alliances, and divestitures when they decide to expand or contract their boundaries. The dataset covers 9276 deals announced and completed by 86 members of the Fortune 100 between 1990 and 2000. Our findings support explanations based on resources, transaction costs, internalization, organizational learning, social embeddedness, asymmetric information, and real options, and suggest that these theories are highly related and complementary. We find less consistent support for theories based on agency costs and asset indivisibilities. The strong role of firm attributes explains in part why firms may pre‐specify whether they will pursue acquisitions, alliances, or divestitures as part of their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour

This paper examines an antitrust enforcement policy of using significant price changes in an industry as a sorting mechanism for the allocation of resources devoted to policing collusion. That is, in either responding to complaints or initiating investigations on their own, I examine the issue of whether an antitrust enforcement policy of inferring possible collusion from significant prices changes is effective in deterring collusion given that antitrust officials have no direct knowledge of the costs of individual firms. Using the imperfect information repeated game of Green and Porter (1984), I show that this investigation strategy if coupled with uniform costs being borne by firms, can reduce the expected profits from the collusive agreement: however, unless the punishment is large enough, it will be ineffective in reducing the frequency of collusion. More importantly, it can have the undesirable effect of reducing the output agreed to by firms, if firms choose quantities, or raise collusive prices if firms are choosing price. Moreover, if the enforcement policy is anticipated by firms, the punishment mechanism adopted to support collusion will be altered to offset the policy.     

A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly

The paper analyzes a simple non-tournament model of R & D where firms are engaged in cost-reducing innovation. It is shown that when spillovers of information are treated as endogenous firms never disclose any of their information when choosing their R & D non-cooperatively. Under cooperative R & D, firms will always choose to fully share their information, i.e., a research joint venture will operate with a maximal spillover value.     

COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE*

There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms can undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why it may be the case that only high‐quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market.     

Risky quality choice

In vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology, firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency. In a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market, the incentives for risk-taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal. In a natural oligopoly (which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes), the relationship between a firm’s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened. This diminishes the firms’ incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together.     

Small Firms and Formality: The Influence of Judicial Efficiency and Regulation Costs

Small firms face three serious problems, namely, the high costs of regulation, of contract enforcement, and of finance. A simple model is developed to explain why in dealing with these problems small firms choose different strategies. Special emphasis is given to the effects of regulation costs and judicial efficiency on these choices. Several propositions concerning these effects are derived from the model and tested with data on Mexican microenterprises. The results support most hypotheses, and show that firms obtain more credit when they either register with official entities or participate in private associations and especially when they do both.     

PROJECT CHOICE AND RISK IN R&D*

We introduce stochastic R&D in the Hotelling model and show that if the technical risk is sufficiently high, all firms focus on the most valuable market segment. We then endogenize technical risk by allowing firms to choose between a safe and a risky R&D technology. Firms either both target the most attractive market with at least one firm using the risky technology or they choose different niche projects and both apply the safe technology. R&D spillovers lead to more differentiated R&D projects and patent protection to less. Project coordination within an RJV implies more differentiation, and may be welfare‐improving.     

Firm Adaptation,Preadaptation, and Sequential Ambidexterity in Firm Boundaries During an Era of Ferment and an Era of Incremental Change

We explore the relation between firms’ internal skills and knowledge from past applications and the mechanism they use to adapt during an era of ferment and then to an era of incremental change in a new technological domain. We extend current research on incumbent firms’ success at facing radical technological change by studying dynamic firm boundaries of incumbents within the industry along a new technological trajectory. We use the concepts of problem, search, and solution from the knowledge‐based view and foundational view of knowledge recombination to develop our theoretical framework. We propose that preadapted firms—the ones with accumulated internal skills and knowledge from past applications that prove relevant by chance to the new technological domain—are more likely to choose internal technology sourcing during an era of ferment (than nonpreadapted firms). Subsequently, firms that choose internal sourcing during an era of ferment are more likely (than firms that source externally) to choose external sourcing during an era of incremental change leading to greater market acceptance for their innovation. Analysis of a longitudinal data set of 161 U.S. banks provides support for our hypotheses. The findings of this study indicate an important temporal dependency between internal and external sourcing, thus contributing to the sequential ambidexterity literature. Our theoretical framework provides support to the foundational view of knowledge recombination and contributes to the knowledge‐based view of the firm.     

纵向一体化的选择及其影响因素——基于能源行业的实证分析

文章研究中国能源行业的纵向一体化状况,以能源企业的纵向并购为例运用Logit模型分析了能源企业选择纵向一体化方式时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,策略效应和交易成本对能源企业采用纵向一体化的意愿影响较大,生产成本和不确定性的影响较小。     

Does experience imply learning?

Research summary : Research traditionally uses experiential learning arguments to explain the existence of a positive relationship between repetition of an activity and performance. We propose an additional interpretation of this relationship in the context of discrete corporate development activities. We argue that firms choose to repeat successful activities, thereby accumulating high experience with them. Data on 437 aircraft projects introduced through three governance modes show that the positive performance effect of the firm's experience with the focal mode becomes insignificant after accounting for experience endogeneity. We suggest that in a general case, experience with corporate development activities may be tinged with both learning and selection effects. Therefore, omitting to account for experience endogeneity may lead to incorrect conclusions from an “empirically observed” positive experience–performance relationship. Managerial summary : This paper emphasizes that firms generally choose to undertake the corporate development activities (new product introductions, diversification moves, international expansions, alliances, acquisitions, etc.) with which they have been the most successful in the past and that they expect to be the most successful in the future. Hence, if a firm possesses certain capabilities, it will repeatedly engage in certain activities corresponding to those capabilities, thereby simultaneously achieving high levels of activity experience as well as superior activity performance. This view suggests that an “empirically observed” positive experience–performance relationship may not be due solely to learning‐based enhanced capabilities but may also be driven by astute self‐selection. Overall, we provide a new interpretation of the relationship between experience and performance in the context of infrequent, heterogeneous, and causally‐ambiguous corporate development activities. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Curbing obfuscation: Empower consumers or regulate firms?

This paper develops a market model where consumers refrain from buying products that they are unable to understand and a firm can influence the probability of a consumer understanding its offer. In equilibrium, firms artificially increase product complexity, and firms that offer more transparent products choose on average higher prices. We study two sets of public policies. We show that consumer side policies may have the unintended consequence of encouraging obfuscation while firm side policies are always effective in curbing obfuscation. Interestingly, a consumer side policy can even harm consumers when it protects consumers so much that it greatly increases the marginal effectiveness of obfuscation. Policies on both sides can either increase or decrease social welfare depending on the marginal effectiveness and the marginal cost of obfuscation. Our main insights hold in both asymmetric and symmetric obfuscation equilibria.     

Consumer referrals

In many industries, firms reward their customers for making referrals. We analyze a monopoly’s optimal policy mix of price, advertising intensity, and referral fee when buyers choose to what extent to refer other consumers to the firm. When the referral fee can be optimally set by the firm, it will charge the standard monopoly price. The firm always advertises less when it uses referrals. We extend the analysis to the case where consumers can target their referrals. In particular, we show that referral targeting could be detrimental for consumers in a low-valuation group.     

外包生产模式及其对市场结构影响的分析

本文分析了目前流行的外包(OEM)生产模式的推行条件、激励因素和其对市场结构的影响。从外包生产模式存在的基本条件入手，随后从成本节约的角度分析了外包生产模式对上下游企业的激励因素，指出外包生产模式对生产、销售环节所面临的市场风险的分离以及由此带来的成本节约，是诱导厂商选择外包生产模式的关键因素之一。进而分析了外包生产模式对市场结构的影响，提出我们应该以一种更客观公正的态度评判中国企业以专业代工厂商的身份参与国际产业竞争的意义和价值。     

Knowledge Spillovers,Mergers and Public Policy in Economic Clusters

This paper investigates how market concentration affects research activity in an economic cluster. The firms in the cluster play a two-stage game. In the first stage the firms choose whether or not to engage in costly research that generates technological improvements that spill over to the other firms in the cluster. The more firms engaged in research the richer or more profitable is the pool of knowledge that spills over. In the second stage after the knowledge spillovers have occurred, firms compete in quantities. We solve for the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium to the first stage of the game, and find that too low a degree of concentration in the cluster will destroy firms' incentives to undertake research and so the cluster risks stagnation. We explore whether a merger can stimulate research activity by increasing concentration in the cluster. Finally, we consider a public policy response to stagnation and analyze whether a direct public subsidy to stimulate research is preferable to a self-financing arrangement.     

风险企业薪酬策略研究

本文讨论了基于人员流动研究风险企业薪酬激励的重要性，通过对Paul Oyer的薪酬策略数学模型的分析，讨论了该模型的缺陷并进行了改进，探讨了风险企业的所有者如何选择最优的薪酬策略模式，在保证对员工进行有效的激励的前提下，达到所有者权益最大化的目标。     

Compatibility and Bundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms

I analyze compatibility and bundling choices when one generalist firm offering both components of a system competes against two specialist firms each supplying one component only (but not the same one). I show that the generalist firm may have an incentive to choose incompatibility or engage in pure bundling when one component is less differentiated than the other. In this case, the system is more differentiated than the relatively undifferentiated component, and so under incompatibility the specialist firm that produces the undifferentiated component will relax price competition. This may result in higher profits for some of the competing firms.     

Horizontal concentration and anticompetitive behavior in the central Canadian cement industry: testing arbitrage cost hypotheses

Consider a market with a small number of firms attempting to collude. If they successfully act as a dominant firm, they will raise price. This in turn will expand output by any fringe firms and thus reduce the market share of the colluding group. Thus, higher prices will decrease concentration over time. Here we test this hypothesis, using a modification of Spiller and Huang (1986) and data from the post-1974 Toronto cement market. The weight of the evidence indicates that market price has a negative effect on concentration, implying that the firms in this market act, with significant though limited, success as a cartel.     

Is family leadership always beneficial?

There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the drivers of their performance. Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family firms go wrong; others claim that family management removes costly agency problems and encourages stewardship. Our thesis is that these disagreements can only be resolved by distinguishing among different types of family firms. We argue that family CEOs will outperform in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership and underperform in larger firms with more dispersed ownership; they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more dispersed or firms are larger and ownership is more concentrated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.