When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?

This paper identifies determinants of compliance with various types of national numerical fiscal rules. Based on 51 fiscal rules in force in EU member states from 1995 to 2015, the analysis identifies determinants among specific rule characteristics and their fiscal frameworks, as well as their political, (socio-)economic and supranational environments. While the average compliance across all rules and countries is around 50%, compliance with rules constraining stock (rather than flow) variables, set out in coalitional agreements, as well as rules covering larger parts of general government finances is significantly higher. Furthermore, independent monitoring and enforcement bodies (issuing real-time alerts) turn out to be significantly associated with a higher probability of compliance. Several theories of the deficit bias of governments due to government fragmentation, decentralization and political budget cycles are also significant with regards to compliance with fiscal rules. However, neither the economic environment or business cycle, nor forecast errors (except for an unexpectedly higher primary balance) on average seem to play a significant role.     

Who do we tip and why? An empirical investigation

An important question about social norms is whether they are created to increase welfare. This is addressed by examining the characteristics of tipped and non-tipped occupations. Tipping prevalence is negatively correlated with worker's income and consumer's monitoring ability and positively with consumer's income and closeness between the worker and the consumer. The results refute a common belief that tipping exists to improve economic efficiency by lowering monitoring costs. Tipping, however, is more prevalent when consumers feel empathy and compassion for workers and want to show gratitude for good service, suggesting that tipping might increase welfare if welfare includes psychological utility.     

When do simple policies win?

We present a simple model of a debate between two interested parties which takes into account the complexity of their policy positions. The two debaters engage in all-pay-auctions to win slots of time/attention to present their positions to a decision-maker. Complexity of a policy is modelled through the number of slots of attention needed to get the policy across. We show that when the number of attention slots is scarce, but still large enough to allow for both sides to fully present their policies, simple policies have an advantage over more complex ones. We show that this advantage of simple policies is diminished only when the number of attention slots is fairly large and when the decision-maker is strongly persuaded by more complex policies.     

When do firms support environmental agreements?

Several firms have recently supported their countries’ participation in international environmental agreements where countries commit to stricter environmental regulation. This paper analyzes the rationale of this conduct by examining equilibrium emission standards with and without environmental treaties. We identify that more stringent environmental regulation produces two effects on firm profits: a negative effect due to larger abatement costs, and a positive effect that arises from the amelioration of duopoly overproduction. We describe under which conditions the positive effect dominates the negative effect, increasing firm profits, and inducing them to support their countries’ participation in environmental treaties.     

When do the USDA forecasters make mistakes?

This study analysed forecasts for all US corn, soya bean and wheat categories published within the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE ) reports over the 1987/88 through 2009/10 marketing years in an attempt to identify patterns and better understand when the USDA forecasters make mistakes. Two general sources of errors were investigated: behavioural and macroeconomic factors. The first objective was to examine how these factors affect the size of the forecast error and the second concentrated on the direction of the error due to these effects. Our findings suggest that the largest increase in the size of USDA forecast errors was associated with structural changes in commodity markets that took place in the mid-2000s. Corn, soya bean and wheat forecast errors also grew during the periods of economic growth and with changes in exchange rates, while inflation and changes in oil price had a much smaller impact. With respect to behavioural sources, we identified patterns consistent with leniency and pessimism across different categories. Predictability of forecast errors based on the information available at the time the forecasts are made provides evidence of inefficiency and suggests that these forecasts may be improved using the findings of this study.     

How do neighboring peer companies influence SMEs’ financial behavior?

Recent research into corporate finances has found that the financial decisions of peer companies are related. Companies tend to “kept an eye” on the decisions of other peer companies, among other things, trying to overcome the limitations caused by the lack of information. This paper further examines these interactions including geographical proximity among companies. With this aim, we use a heterogeneous Partial Adjustment Model on a sample of 12,444 small and medium Spanish manufacturing industrial companies. We find strong nonlinearities in the adjustment processes of liquidity, indebtedness and profitability ratios associated with basic characteristics of the companies such as size, technology, age or financial imbalances. Our results indicate that the influence of the environment on the financial behavior of each company, and its responsiveness, vary in function of neighbor firms’ characteristics.     

When do sell-side analysts switch industries they follow?

Between 1984 and 2014 over 3400 sell-side analysts changed the primary industry they followed. This article documents that analysts are more likely to change their industries when their absolute and relative forecasting accuracy in that industry is low and when the accuracy in the new industry is high. Analysts are more likely to switch industries at the beginning of their careers, after a recent change of an employing brokerage house, and if they have a history of switching industries before. Analysts are less likely to make a switch when their forecasting activity in the industry is high, when the industry is followed by many analysts and when they are employed by a top brokerage house.     

When do we Start? Pension reform in ageing Japan

Japan is faced with rapid demographic ageing and fiscal challenges. This paper simulates pension reform to reduce the replacement rate by 20% and raise the retirement age by 3 years gradually over a 30‐year period. We consider three scenarios with different points in time to initiate reform in 2020, 2030 and 2040, respectively. A delay would suppress economic activities, lowering output by up to 4% and raising tax burden by more than 8% of total consumption. Delaying reform implies a transfer of costs of demographic ageing to the young and deteriorates the welfare of future generations by up to 3% in terms of consumption equivalence.     

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions.     

Are we Austrian economists?

The Review of Austrian Economics - This paper is based on the Presidential Address given at the 2019 Society for the Development of Austrian Economics Annual Meeting. In these remarks, I explore...     

How far an Austrian law and economics should be Posnerian?

The purpose of this note is to stress that Posner??s conception of law and of the role of judges in a legal system might be problematic for an Austrian approach to law and economics, despite the praxeological dimension of his analysis.     

When do more selfish politicians manipulate less,not more?

We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.     

What do ads buy? Daily coverage of listed companies on the Italian press

We match daily data on newspaper coverage of a sample of Italian listed companies with monthly data on the amount of advertising that a given company has purchased on a given newspaper. Controlling for time-invariant features of each newspaper and of each company – and for ownership links between companies and newspapers – we show that newspaper coverage of a company is positively and significantly related with advertising expenditure by that company on that newspaper. The magnitude of this correlation is quite large: when controlling for ownership links, a standard deviation increase in monthly ads expenditure (i.e. 75,000 euros) is on average associated with 8 additional articles per month mentioning that company. We also find that coverage of a company is higher the day after a press release, but especially in newspapers where more ads are purchased. This result on press releases is robust to controlling for time invariant features of each company–newspaper pair, i.e. for (company × newspaper) fixed effects.Moreover, coverage is correlated with past day absolute return and trading volume, and this relationship appears to be steeper for those newspapers where more ads are purchased, especially in the case of positive returns.     

When do thick venture capital markets foster innovation? An evolutionary analysis

In this paper, we examine the trade off between different effects of the availability of venture capital on the speed of technological progress in an industry. We consider an evolutionary industry simulation model based on Nelson and Winter (1982), in which R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate technological know-how embodied in key R&D employees, who might use this know-how to found a spinoff of the incumbent. Venture capital is needed to finance a spinoff, so that the expected profits from founding a spinoff depend on how easily venture capital can be acquired. Accordingly, thick venture capital markets might have two opposing effects. First, incentives of firms to invest in R&D might be reduced and, second, if spinoff formation results in technological spillovers between the parent firm and the spinoffs, the generation of spinoff firms might positively influence the future efficiency of the incumbent’s innovation efforts. We study the manner in which this tradeoff influences the effect of venture capital on innovation expenditures, speed of technological change and evolution of industry concentration in several scenarios with different industry characteristics.     

Comparing alleged incommensurables: Institutional and Austrian economics as rivals and possible complements? ∗

The purpose of this article is to explore the changing relationship between Austrian and Institutional economics and the common ground that they appear increasingly to share. It is maintained that both parties have something to learn from each other - there are gains to be made from intellectual trade and inter-research tradition discourse. Neither Austrian economics nor institutional economics presently provides a sufficiently robust or sophisticated approach to individual and group problem-solving activity within institutional-knowledge constraints and historical time dynamics, yet they are both beginning to seriously grapple with such issues. The gulf between the Austrian and Institutional research traditions is narrowing given that there is some convergence toward a middle ground where it is recognized that individuals do not exist in a vacuum and that institutions both constrain and enable purposeful behaviour. Through increased interaction Austrians may learn to take ‘institutional’ frameworks even more seriously whilst Institutionalists may learn to be even more earnest in their treatment of ‘individual’ action within a historical time continuum.     

When do in‐service teacher training and books improve student achievement? Experimental evidence from Mongolia

This study presents evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Mongolia on the impact of in‐service teacher training and books, both as separate educational inputs and as a package. It tests for complementarity of inputs and nonlinearity of returns from education investment, as measured in students’ test scores. The result suggests that the provision of books, on top of teacher training, raises students’ achievement substantially. However, teacher training and books weakly improve test scores when provided individually. This study sheds light on the relevance of supplementing teacher training schemes with appropriate teaching materials in resource‐poor settings.     

Why should Austrian economists be pluralists?

Peter Boettke (2007) argues that economists need not act pluralistically in order for pluralism to thrive in the marketplace of economic ideas. From a market process perspective, Boettke sees intellectual diversity and openness as catallactic outputs, not inputs—emergent by-products of academic specialization and trade. To expect individual scholars to behave in a pluralistic manner is unnecessary and “completely inappropriate” since it detracts from their central task: “to commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly, even in the face of great doubt and resistance by one’s peers” (Boettke 2007). This paper proposes a Smithian revision of Boettke’s position. The author argues that scholarly pluralism is best understood as a constitutional rule of academic life—a virtue ethic that promotes learning and intellectual freedom by mitigating tyranny and autarky in the republic of science. Drawing from the writings of Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Deirdre McCloskey, Bruce Caldwell, James Buchanan, Don Lavoie, and Boettke himself, the author argues that scholarly pluralism has been, and continues to be, a necessary condition for the flourishing of Austrian economists as free, responsible, efficacious thinkers.     

When is a Nation? Comparing Lithuania and Georgia

The article uses a constructivist reformulation of the question 'when is a nation?' as a parameter of comparison for the analysis of nationalist discourses on history in post-socialist Lithuania and Georgia. It shows that Lithuanian nationalists, by means of a critical reassessment of national history, described the nation as something that still had to be created, whereas Georgian nationalists referred to the unchallenged image of a glorious past and so treated the nation as something to be simply picked up from history. It is also argued that these diverging historiographical narratives correspond to different conceptualisations of the notion of the nation. While Lithuanians nationalists conceptualised the nation in the tradition of the French Revolution as a category that aims at the reconfiguration of state-society relations, Georgian nationalists identified it with traditional modes of organising social relations.     

When is the Nation? Constituent Elements and Processes

Two types of approach to the question 'When is the Nation?' are discussed: conditional and temporal. The relationship between the two approaches are analysed on three levels. First, through an analysis of various theories of nation and nationalism, it argues that determination of the emergence of the nation through enumeration of different 'constituent elements' fails to distinguish the nation from other social groups. Second an analysis of Croatian nationalist ideologies reveals numerous potentialities to define the same nation by emphasizing various, and sometimes contradictory, constituent elements. Finally, a survey conducted on a sample of Croatian population shows that there is no final set of constituent elements that could define the same nation in a specific historical moment. Therefore, the article concludes that the question 'When is the Nation?' could be answered mainly by identifying specific social processes.