Tax incentives and the location of FDI: Evidence from a panel of German multinationals

Using a firm-level panel data set this paper investigates the impact of taxation on the decision of German multinationals to hold or establish a subsidiary in other European countries or abroad. Taking account of unobserved local characteristics as well as firm-specific preferences for potential locations, the results confirm significant effects of tax incentives, market size, and of labor cost on cross-border location decisions. In accordance with Devereux and Griffith (1998) we find that the marginal effective tax rate has no predictive power for location decisions. However, the results indicate a considerably weaker predictive power of the effective average tax rate as compared to the statutory tax rate. JEL Code:H25 ⋅ F23 ⋅ F21 ⋅ R38     

Imperfect competition,indirect tax harmonization and public goods

This paper shows that the welfare implications of indirect tax harmonization in a two-country imperfectly competitive framework, are, in general, indeterminate in the presence of public goods: Both countries can be made either worse off or better off. This holds under both the destination and origin principles of taxation and is in sharp contrast to existing results where revenue effects are not present. A consequence of this indeterminacy is that a precise evaluation of tax-harmonizing policies under both tax regimes requires an explicit consideration of the underlying preferences for private and public goods as well as the oligopolistic sectors’ relative cost structures. JEL code F15⋅ H21⋅ H41⋅ H87     

Pro-poor indirect tax reforms,with an application to Mexico

This paper proposes a methodology for testing for whether tax reforms are pro-poor. This is done by extending stochastic dominance techniques to identify tax reforms that will be deemed absolutely or relatively pro-poor by a wide spectrum of poverty analysts. The statistical properties of the various estimators are also derived in order to make the method implementable using survey data. The methodology is used to assess the pro-poorness of possible reforms to Mexico’s indirect tax system. This leads to the identification of several possible pro-poor tax reforms in that country. It also shows how the pro-poorness of a tax reform depends on one’s conception of poverty as well as on the revenue and efficiency impact of the reform.     

Measuring tax incentives for R&;D

A methodology for measuring the user cost of intangible R&D capital is developed. In contrast to the way in which the Hall–Jorgenson–King–Fullerton (HJKF) approach to measuring the user cost of capital, and the related notion of the effective marginal tax rate on capital, is typically applied to intangible R&D capital, the methodology takes explicit account of the microeconomic foundations of R&D in order to aggregate the user costs of the various inputs used in the production of R&D. Illustrative calculations are presented for Canadian provinces which show that relative to the methodology developed here, the standard approach substantially overstates the tax subsidy offered to intangible R&D capital.      

Food prices,tax reforms and consumer Welfare in Tanzania 1991–2007

This paper analyses the effect of observed food price changes on household consumption (welfare) in Tanzania and from this simulates the welfare effect attributable to tax (tariffs and VAT) reforms. The three rounds of the Tanzania Household Budget Survey (1991/92, 2000/01 and 2007) are used to apply Deaton’s method based on median unit values (prices) and household budget shares. The results indicate that real price increases over 1991–2007 have reduced welfare of the average household by 20 per cent of 1991 income, and the loss was fairly evenly distributed between the 1990s and 2000s. The welfare loss was much greater for the poor, especially the rural poor (a 27 per cent reduction), compared to the non-poor (in particular the urban non-poor, who suffered a five per cent loss). Although we cannot establish explicit links between tax reforms and domestic commodity price changes, to assess the extent to which welfare changes can be explained by tax reforms we simulate the effects of tax changes on domestic price changes. The simulation shows that tax reforms (tariff reductions) offset the welfare losses for all household groups, especially in the 1990s; although the differences were small, the urban poor benefit more in relative terms from tax reforms whereas the rural poor benefit least (the effect on the non-poor was similar irrespective of location).     

Changes in Income Distributions and the Role of Tax‐Benefit Policy During the Great Recession: An International Perspective

In this paper, we examine the impact of the economic crisis and the policy reaction on inequality and relative poverty in four European countries: France, Germany, Ireland and the UK. The period examined, 2008–13, was one of great economic turmoil, yet it is unclear whether changes in inequality and poverty rates over this time period were mainly driven by changes in market income distributions or by tax‐benefit policy reforms. We disentangle these effects by producing counterfactual (‘no reform') scenarios using tax‐benefit microsimulation and representative household surveys for each country. For the first stage of the Great Recession, we find that the policy reaction contributed to stabilising or even decreasing inequality and relative poverty in the UK, France and, especially, Ireland. Market income changes nonetheless pushed up inequality and relative poverty in France. Relative poverty increased in Germany as a result of policy responses combined with market income changes. Subsequent policy reforms, in the later stage of the crisis, had markedly different cross‐country effects, decreasing overall poverty in France, increasing it in Ireland, and giving mixed effects for different subgroups in Germany and the UK.     

A positive analysis of labor-market institutions and tax reforms

In this paper, we investigate the structure of the “Laffer curve” for taxes on labor and other factors of production, under different institutional frameworks of the labor market. Using a Cobb–Douglas production technology allows us to characterize important properties of the “Laffer curve” in terms of the wage share for a competitive labor market, the monopoly union model, the right-to-manage approach, the insider-dominated union, and efficient Nash bargains simultaneously. In this way, we are able to highlight the menu of factor tax systems, and thus of potential tax reforms available to a government, without perfect knowledge of the mechanism of the labor market. In particular, we show that the employment-maximizing tax system features a constant energy tax, while the energy mini-/maximizing tax system features a constant labor tax. We also illuminate to what extent these results must be modified if we either employ a CES production function, or if we allow for an endogenous reservation wage.     

Incomes,Incentives and the Growth of Means-Testing in Hungary

The purpose of this paper is to examine the reform of family benefits and the growth of means-testing in Hungary. From 1996, many family benefits were means-tested for the first time. A new microsimulation model for Hungary, running on recent survey microdata, is used to simulate the impact of the 1996 reforms on government expenditures, the distribution of incomes, the targeting of benefits and effective marginal tax rates. These reforms are found to be largely benign and even progressive, but they also appear to be paving the way for the further extension of means-testing. The model is used to investigate such an extension by simulating the impact of a UK-style system of means-tested family benefits in Hungary. This system achieves some expenditure savings and better targeting of benefits, but also greatly increases effective marginal tax rates on low-income households with children. The paper argues that resulting poverty traps may increase child poverty in Hungary in the longer term and cautions against the overextension of means-testing.     

Taxpayers' responsiveness to tax rate changes and implications for the cost of taxation in Sweden

Historically, labor supply elasticities have been used to evaluate tax policy and predict tax revenue effects. They are likely to underestimate taxpayers' response to tax rate changes, and hence to underestimate changes in potential tax revenues, however, because they measure only how taxpayers alter hours worked. Taxpayers can also respond to tax rate changes by altering, for instance, their work effort and form of compensation. An alternative measure that accounts for these responses as well as hours worked is the elasticity of taxable income. This paper estimates the elasticity of earned taxable income for Swedish taxpayers using two different approaches and a number of control variables and the 1990/1991 tax reform as a “natural experiment”. The preferred elasticity estimates fall in the range of 0.4–0.5, comparable with recent estimates for the U.S. and larger than most of the labor supply elasticity estimates used to evaluate tax policy in Scandinavia previously, which suggests that deadweight losses are two to three times higher than previously thought. JEL Classification H21 · H24 · H31 · J22     

Tax credits,income support,and partnership decisions

This paper considers the potential impact of welfare benefits on the partnership status of women in the UK. Using recent policy reforms to identify the response rate, it was found that a ￡100/week welfare benefit “partnership penalty” reduces the probability of a woman having a partner by seven percentage points. The model is also used to explore the potential effects of the recent tax credit reforms on partnership rates; it was found that while the 1999 WFTC reform improved partnership incentives, this effect was effectively undone by the 2003 WTC/CTC reform.      

Causes,benefits, and risks of business tax incentives

This paper provides an updated overview of tax incentives for business investment. It argues that tax competition is likely to be a major force driving countries’ tax reforms, and discusses tax incentives as a possible response to this. This is complemented by more detailed arguments for and against tax incentives, and by an illustrative analysis of different incentives using effective tax rates. Findings from the empirical literature on tax incentives are also presented. Based on the overview of theoretical and empirical findings, the paper then suggests a matrix of criteria to determine the usefulness of different tax incentives depending on a country’s circumstances.     

The Property Tax as a Tax on Value: Deadweight Loss

Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under a property value tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: τ_V, the tax rate on pre-development land value; τ_S, the tax rate on post-development residual site value; and τ_K, the tax rate on structure value. Arnott (2005) identified the subset of property value tax systems that are neutral. This paper investigates the relative efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value tax systems [(i) “Canadian' property tax system: τ_V = 0, τ _S = τ_K; (ii) simple property tax system: τ_V = τ _S = τ_K; (iii) residual site value tax system: τ_K = 0,τ _V = τ_S; (iv) two-rate property tax system: τ_V = τ _S > τ_K > 0] under the assumption of a constant rental growth rate. JEL Code: H2     

Decomposition analysis of distributive policies using behavioural simulations

For policy makers and analysts, it is important to isolate the redistributive impact of tax-benefit reforms from changes in the environment in which policies operate. When actual reforms are motivated by work incentives, it is also crucial to evaluate behavioural responses and the distributional consequences thereof. For that purpose, I embed counterfactual simulations in a formal decomposition framework to quantify the relative roles of (i)?direct tax-benefit policy changes, (ii)?indirect policy effects due to labour supply responses to the reforms and (iii)?all other factors affecting income distribution over time. An application to the UK shows that the redistributive reforms of the 1998–2001 period have offset much of the rise in market income inequality and contributed to a strong decline in child poverty and poverty amongst single parent households. In the latter group, a third of the headcount poverty reduction (and half of the reduction in the depth of poverty) is on account of the very large incentive effect of the policy changes.     

Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

The “flat tax(es)”: principles and experience

This paper reviews experience with the ‘flat taxes’ that have been adopted in many countries in recent years. It stresses that they differ fundamentally, and that empirical evidence on their effects is very limited. This precludes simple generalization, but several lessons emerge: there is no sign of Laffer-type behavioral responses generating revenue increases from the tax cut elements of these reforms; their impact on compliance is theoretically ambiguous, but there is evidence for Russia that compliance did improve; the distributional effects of the flat taxes are not unambiguously regressive, and in some cases, they may have increased progressivity (including through the impact on compliance); adoption of the flat tax has not resolved common challenges in taxing capital income; and it may have strengthened, not weakened, the automatic stabilizers. A key reason for adoption of the flat tax seems to have been to signal a fundamental shift toward a market-oriented policy regime. Looking forward, as the value of the signal diminishes and familiar political economy forces reassert themselves, the question is not so much whether more countries will adopt a flat tax as whether those that have will move away from it.      

Welfare-Improving Carbon Dioxide Tax Reform Taking Externality and Location into Account

Using Swedish household data from 1992, I analyze whether households disproportionately burdened by an increased carbon dioxide tax can be compensated by changes in other commodity taxes. This is done by searching for Dalton–improving tax reforms (DI-reforms), a method for welfare analysis which requires only ranking of households rather than cardinal comparisons. This application of the method has two features not found in earlier applications. First, the direct value of reduced carbon dioxide emissions is incorporated in the analysis. Second, the method is extended to allow identification of three-dimensional tax reforms, to be able to rank households along three dimensions. It is found that i) incorporating the value of reduced emissions does not unambiguously expand the set of DI-reforms, and ii) DI-reforms exist only when households are ranked in line with expenditures and size. When households' access to public transportation is also considered no DI-reforms are found.     

Capital Mobility and Source-Based Taxation of Capital Income in Small Open Economies

This paper examines the taxation of capital income in a small open economy that faces a highly elastic supply of internationally mobile capital and increasing tax competition. The analysis considers a wide variety of additional factors that affect the determination of capital income taxation policy, including the desire to tax economic rents earned by foreign and domestic firms, the desire to take advantage of any treasury transfer effects, the role played by transfer pricing and other financial accounting manipulations by foreign multinationals, the need for a backstop to the personal income tax and various political concerns. The paper evaluates several potential income and consumption-based tax reforms in this context. JEL Code: H21, H25, H87     

Will the real R&D employees please stand up? Effects of tax breaks on firm-level outcomes

This paper evaluates the effect of tax incentives for research and development (R&D) on R&D spending and employment of R&D staff in a quasi-experimental setting. To do this, I exploit an exogenous reform in UK R&D tax policy, which changed the definition of an SME from firms with fewer than 250 employees to those with fewer than 500 employees. I use the UK Business Enterprise Research and Development Survey (BERD), for which companies do not have an incentive to relabel their ordinary employees or spending as R&D. I find that R&D tax incentives help to increase R&D spending at the company level; this translates to a user cost elasticity between ?0.88 and ?1.18. Further, the additional R&D generated through the tax relief can be attributed entirely to an increase in the number of R&D employees in the companies’ workforce. Together, these results challenge a common narrative on the role of R&D tax incentives.     

Corporate tax revenues in OECD countries

This paper studies variation among OECD countries in the size of corporate income tax revenues relative to GDP over the time period 1979–2002. A decomposition explains such variation as a function of the statutory tax rate, the breadth of the tax base, corporate profitability, and the share of the corporate sector in GDP. Empirical results indicate a parabolic relationship between tax rates and revenues, implying a revenue-maximizing corporate income tax rate of 33% for the whole sample. This revenue-maximizing rate is found to decrease as economies are smaller and more integrated with the world economy. JEL Classification H25, H87     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42