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1.
Summary. This paper studies the equilibria of a stochastic OLG exchange economies consisting of identical agents living for two periods, and having the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived asset in constant supply. The agents have uncertain endowments and the stochastic process determining the endowments is Markovian. For such economies, the literature has focused on studying strongly stationary equilibria in which quantities and prices are functions of the exogenous states of nature which describe the uncertainty: such equilibria are generalizations of deterministic steady states, and this paper investigates if they have the same special status as asymptotic limits of other equilibrium paths. The difficulty in extending the analysis of equilibria beyond the class of strongly stationary equilibria comes from the presence of indeterminacy: we propose a procedure for overcoming this difficulty which can be decomposed into two steps. First backward induction arguments are used to restrict the domain of possible prices; then if some indeterminacy is left, expectation functions are introduced to make the forward equilibrium equations determinate. The properties of the resulting trajectories, in particular their asymptotic properties, can then be studied. For the class of models that we study this procedure provides a justification for focusing on strongly stationary equilibria. For the model with positive dividends (equity or land) the justification is complete, since we show that the strongly stationary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For the model with zero dividends (money) there is a continuum of self-fulfilling expectation functions resulting in a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from any admissible initial condition: under conditions given in the paper, these equilibrium paths converge almost surely to one of the strongly stationary equilibria-either autarchy or the stochastic analogue of the Golden Rule. Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: March 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful for the stimulating environment and research support provided by the Cowles Foundation at Yale University during the Fall 2000 when this paper was first conceived. We are also grateful to the participants of the SITE Workshop at Stanford University and the Incomplete Markets Workshop at SUNY Stony Brook during the summer 2001 for helpful discussions. Correspondence to: M. Magill  相似文献   

2.
Global convergence of adaptive learning in models of pure exchange   总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0  
Summary. This paper develops an adaptive learning scheme for a standard version of the OLG model with pure exchange. Perfect forecasting rules which generate perfect foresight orbits are approximated by cubic spline functions. These approximations are successively constructed using historical data only. Trajectories generated by this scheme converge to perfect foresight orbits globally for all initial conditions. This result holds for all parameterizations guaranteeing the existence of a monetary steady state and hence is independent of consumers' savings behavior. It generalizes to all one-dimensional models of the Cobweb type. Received: October 5, 2000; revised version: February 15, 2001  相似文献   

3.
Summary. We study the process of learning in a differential information economy, with a continuum of states of nature that follow a Markov process. The economy extends over an infinite number of periods and we assume that the agents behave non-myopically, i.e., they discount the future. We adopt a new equilibrium concept, the non-myopic core. A realized agreement in each period generates information that changes the underlying structure in the economy. The results we obtain serve as an extension to the results in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1999) in a setting where agents behave non-myopically. In particular, we examine the following two questions: 1) If we have a sequence of allocations that are in an approximate non-myopic core (we allow for bounded rationality), is it possible to find a subsequence that converges to a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy? 2) Given a non-myopic core allocation in a limit full information economy can we find a sequence of approximate non-myopic core allocations that converges to that allocation? Received: May 25, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999  相似文献   

4.
Summary. It is expected that every periodic equilibrium path may exist even under standard assumptions such as low discounting and the concavity of utility functions in infinite horizon models with external effects. Nevertheless, until now no such example has been presented. In this note we will first construct a bounded growth model that has an external effect and every periodic equilibrium path under any discount factor. Next we will study the conditions under which periodic equilibrium paths have a local indeterminacy. Received: December 23, 1998; revised version: April 19, 1999  相似文献   

5.
Summary. This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE. Received: October 30, 1996; revised version: July 7, 1998  相似文献   

6.
Summary. Pagan and Shannon's (1985) widely used approach employs local linearizations of a system of non-linear equations to obtain asymptotic distributions for the endogenous parameters (such as prices) from distributions over the exogenous parameters (such as estimates of taste, technology, or policy variables, for example). However, this approach ignores both the possibility of multiple equilibria as well as the problem (related to that of multiplicity) that critical points might be contained in the confidence interval of an exogenous parameter. We generalize Pagan and Shannon's approach to account for multiple equilibria by assuming that the choice of equilibrium is described by a random selection. We develop an asymptotic theory regarding equilibrium prices, which establishes that their probability density function is multimodal and that it converges to a weighted sum of normal density functions. An important insight is that if a model allows multiple equilibria, say , but multiplicity is ignored, then the computed solution for the i-th equilibrium generally no longer coincides with the expected value of that i-th equilibrium. The error can be large and correspond to several standard deviations of the mean's estimate. Received: December 7, 1999; revised version: December 4, 2000  相似文献   

7.
Summary. I present a class of address models of product differentiation with unit-elastic individual demand and show the existence of Nash equilibrium in prices under assumptions on utility functions and the taste and income heterogeneity across consumers. This paper complements the work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991, Econometrica), who analyze unit demand models of product differentiation. Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: September 5, 2001  相似文献   

8.
Summary. This note deals with the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial steady-state equilibrium in an overlapping generations (OLG) model with productive capital and altruistic agents. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition for operative bequests which extends Abel (1987) and Weil (1987). Interestingly, we prove that the OLG model with production and altruistic agents always experiences a non-trivial steady-state equilibrium. Received: July 16, 1998; revised version: January 29, 1999  相似文献   

9.
Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation. Received: June 20, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We wish to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fran?oise Forges, Franco Donzelli, Leonidas Koutsougeras, Aldo Rustichini, Rajiv Vohra and Nicholas Yannelis for their comments. Correspondence to: H. Polemarchakis  相似文献   

10.
Summary. In a two-period pure exchange economy with financial assets, a temporary financial equilibrium is an equilibrium of the current spot and security markets given forecast functions of future prices and payoffs. The temporary equilibrium model can then be interpreted as an Arrow-Debreu economy where preferences depend on prices. This identification implies, among other consequences, the existence and the generic determinateness of the financial temporary equilibria associated with given forecast functions. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2001  相似文献   

11.
Summary. We study the implications of optimal dynamic contracts in private information environments for fluctuations in effort and employment across time and productivity states. To this end, we incorporate temporary layoffs and permanent separations as well as on-the-job effort variations into a dynamic model of moral hazard. We consider two different “commitment” environments. In a “full commitment” environment, although the firm can temporarily lay a worker off, neither party can dissolve the contractual relationship once it has been initiated. On the other hand, in a “limited commitment” environment, both parties can dissolve the relationship at the beginning of any period in order to pursue an outside option. We use our model to study the implications of optimal contracts for incentives, employment histories, layoffs and separations across full information, full commitment and limited commitment settings. We compute solutions to the relevant principal-agent problems, endogenously determining the set of states in which separations occur and the domain of the firm's value function, as well as the value function itself. Received: February 28, 2000; revised version: January 21, 2001  相似文献   

12.
Summary. This paper proves the C 1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that the instantaneous utility is C 1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity of the integrand. Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997  相似文献   

13.
Durán  Jorge 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):395-413
Summary. Finding solutions to the Bellman equation often relies on restrictive boundedness assumptions. In this paper we develop a method of proof that allows to dispense with the assumption that returns are bounded from above. In applications our assumptions only imply that long run average (expected) growth is sufficiently discounted, in sharp contrast with classical assumptions either absolutely bounding growth or bounding each period (instead of long run) maximum (instead of average) growth. We discuss our work in relation to the literature and provide several examples. Received: July 26, 2000; revised version: July 10, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am specially grateful to Cuong Le Van and to anonymous referee for detecting an error in a previous version of this paper and for suggestions that sensibly improved the paper. Comments and suggestions are also acknowledged to Michele Boldrin, Raouf Boucekkine, Fabrice Collard, Tim Kehoe, Omar Licandro, and Luis Puch. I am also indebted to participants to the III Summer School on Economic Theory held at the Universidade de Vigo, the Macroeconomics Workshop at the Universitat Autò}noma de Barcelona, and the Econometrics Seminar at Tilburg University. Financial support from the Belgian government, under project PAI P4/01, at the IRES-UCL, from a European Marie Curie fellowship, Grant HPMF-CT-1999-00410, at the CEPREMAP, and from IVIE and Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, under project BEC2001-0535, at the Universidad de Alicante, is gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

14.
Conformism and diversity under social learning   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary. When there are competing technologies or products with unknown payoffs an important question is which technology will prevail and whether technologies with different payoffs can coexist in the long run. In this paper, we use a social learning model with local interactions to study this question. We show that the adoption of technologies as well as the prospects of conformism/diversity depend crucially on the nature of interaction between individuals and the heterogeneity of preferences in a society. Received: May 10, 1999; revised version: February 4, 2000  相似文献   

15.
Summary. For a number of reasons a large class of general equilibrium models from the field of resource economics does not allow for an equilibrium analysis along the lines of the theory of infinite dimensional commodity spaces. The reasons concern the choice of the commodity space and the applicability of properness assumptions with respect to preferences and the technology. This paper illustrates the difficulties and shows for a prototype model how the problems can successfully be tackled by the use of a limit argument on equilibria in the truncated economies. Received: May 2, 1996; revised version: May 13, 1998  相似文献   

16.
Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary. We examine a multistage model of an R&D race where players have multiple projects. We also develop perturbation methods for general dynamic games that can be expressed as analytic operators in a Banach space. We apply these perturbation methods to solve races with a small prize. We compute second-order asymptotically valid solutions for equilibrium and socially optimal decisions to determine qualitative properties of equilibrium. We find that innovators invest relatively too much on risky projects. Strategic reactions are ambiguous in general; in particular, a player may increase expenditures as his opponent moves ahead of him. Received: January 3, 2002; revised version: June 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This is the final version of Judd (1985). The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of anonymous referees, Paul Milgrom, seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, the 1984 Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and Yale University, and the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-8409786, SES-8606581)  相似文献   

17.
Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary. The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk, aggregate uncertainty and moral hazard. There is a large number of households, each facing two individual states of nature in the second period. These states differ solely in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period each household chooses a non-observable action. Higher levels of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower levels of utility. Households' utilities are assumed to be separable in action and the aggregate uncertainty is independent of the individual risk. Insurance is supplied by a collection of firms who behave strategically and maximize expected profits taking into account that each household's optimal choice of action is a function of the offered contract. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the appropriate versions of both welfare theorems hold. Received: December 7, 1998; revised version: October 25, 1999  相似文献   

18.
Summary. We provide a condition for ranking of information systems in agency problems. The condition has a straightforward economic interpretation in terms of the sensitivity of a cumulative distribution with respect to the agent's effort. The criterion is shown to be equivalent to the mean preserving spread condition on the likelihood ratio distributions. Received: November 10, 1999; revised version: February 17, 2000  相似文献   

19.
Summary. We provide a “computable counterexample” to the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium existence theorem [2]. In particular, we find an exchange economy in which all components are (Turing) computable, but in which no competitive equilibrium is computable. This result can be interpreted as an impossibility result in both computability-bounded rationality (cf. Binmore [5], Richter and Wong [35]) and computational economics (cf. Scarf [39]). To prove the theorem, we establish a “computable counterexample” to Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem (similar to Orevkov [32]) and a computable analogue of a characterization of excess demand functions (cf. Mas-Colell [26], Geanakoplos [16], Wong [50]). Received: September 9, 1997; revised version: December 17, 1997  相似文献   

20.
Summary. There are a wide variety of theoretical general equilibrium models with incomplete security markets. In this paper we give a general recipe for using homotopy algorithm to compute equilibria in these models. In many models, taxes, transaction-costs or other market frictions introduce the additional difficulty that equilibrium prices or choices (but not equilibrium allocations) may be undetermined. In order to demonstrate how these difficulties can be dealt with, we develop a globally convergent algorithm to compute equilibria in a model with cash-in-advance constraints, several goods and incomplete financial markets. Furthermore we describe how to implement the algorithm using a publicly available suite of subroutines for homotopy-pathfollowing. Received: October 1, 1999; revised version: December 16, 2000  相似文献   

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