投资者保护与出资者财务知情权及控制权

如何有效地加强投资者的利益保护一直是困扰我国资本市场的难题.对企业本身财务运行活动的揭示只是给投资者提供了企业财务活动的知情权,而非企业财务的控制权,投资者作为企业的出资人,为了使投入的资本能保值增值,投资者还要对企业的财务活动进行实质控制,只有获得必要的财务控制权,才能有效地维护投资者的利益.因此,为了切实保护广大投资者的利益,出资者不仅要获得企业财务活动的知情权,更为重要的是还要获得财务活动的控制权.     

出资者财务知情权、控制权的掌握与财务控制体系的构建

如何有效地加强投资者的利益保护一直是困扰我国资本市场的难题,文章认为,对企业本身的财务运行活动的揭示只是给投资者提供了企业财务活动的知情权,而非企业财务的控制权,投资者作为企业的出资人,为了使投入的资本能保值增值,投资者还要对企业的财务活动进行实质控制,只有获得必要的财务控制权,才能有效地推护投资者的利益。因此,为了切实保护广大投资者的利益,出资者不仅要获得企业财务活动的知情权,更为重要的是,还要获得财务活动的控制权。     

创业企业家和创业投资者的控制权争夺

当前各种类型的创业企业非常多,创业企业家是保有其企业控制权还是将控制权交于其他投资者,会受到外界环境和自身条件局限的影响。创业企业家和创业投资者会根据各自利益的不同,结合所处市场环境和自身能力,争夺企业的实际控制权。通过构建企业实际控制权争夺的基本理论模型,本文认为在不确定因素的影响下,创业企业家的风险偏好和创业投资者的投资偏好会影响到企业控制权的初始配置,而控制权的归属是由企业成长过程中绩效的高低程度决定的。     

现金的知情权、控制权与出资者的财务约束

文章认为,对企业本身的现金流量活动的揭示只是给投资者提供了现金流量状况的知情权,而非获得企业现金的控制权,投资者作为企业的出资人,为了使投入的资本能保值增值,投资者还要对企业的现金的流入流出及其运行进行实质控制,只有获得必要的现金控制权,才能有效地推护投资者的利益。因此,为了切实维护广大投资者的利益,出资者不仅要获得企业财务活动的知情权,更为重要的是,还要获得财务活动的控制权。     

终极控制权配置格局的经济后果——基于企业微观视角的分析

在La Porta等(1999)开创终极控制权的讨论以来,众多学者给我们提供了丰富的探索和文献铺垫,显示出公司治理领域对终极控制权配置格局及终极控制权经济后果的关注。这些文献的切入点包括投资者利益保护、企业价值、信息披露质量、融资结构与资金成本、企业风险等。其中,投资者利益保护可视为宏观层面的经济后果,而其他方面则为企业微观方面的经济后果。本文基于微观视角,从企业价值、信息披露质量、融资结构与资金成本、企业风险等方面对终极控制权配置的经济后果进行综述。文献显示,只有对上市公司的隐性终极控制权进行研究,进而与国外研究成果进行比较,真正揭示我国公司治理的深层次问题,才能有针对性地提出完善公司治理机制、规范证券市场的制度安排。     

财务契约理论文献综述

本文回顾了财务契约理论的演变过程,重点分析了财务约束、重新协商、控制权配置和索取权多样化等主要模型。认为保护投资者权益的根本机制是财务约束,即投资者要求企业给以足够的投资回报,否则就夺取企业的控制权从而使当前的控制人失去控制权利益。债务在公司治理中的作用一是迫使管理者支出自由现金,减少在职消费和低效投资;二是作为一种控制权转移机制,在股东和债权人之间转移企业的控制权,以实现最高经济效率。     

完善公司治理结构加快现代企业制度建设

经济学家谈论公司治理结构时,狭义地讲是指投资者(股东)和企业之间的利益分配和控制关系,包括公司董事会的职能、结构、股东的权利等方面的制度安排;广义地讲是指关于公司控制权和剩余索取权,即企业组织方式、控制机制和利益分配的所有法律、机构、制度和文化的安排。它所界定的不仅是所有者与企业的关系,而且包括相关利益集团(管理者、员工、客户、供货商、所在社区等)之间的关系。现在我们讲公司治理结构时是指广义的公司治理结构。公司治理结构就是企业制度安排问题,决定企业为谁服务(目标是什么),由谁控制,风险和利益如何在各个利益集团…     

现金知情权、控制权与投资者的财务约束

投资者作为企业的出资人,为了使投入的资本能保值增值,要对企业的现金流入流出及其运行进行实质性控制。只有获得必要的现金控制权,才能有效地维护自身利益。因此,出资者不仅要获得企业财务活动的知情权,还要获得财务活动的控制权。     

企业人力资本投资风险及规避策略研究

一、引言 在现代市场经济条件下．企业面临的是一个充满竞争的环境．企业竞争首先表现为产品质量、市场价格和市场占有率的竞争,而这些竞争的背后是人才的竞争、人力资本的竞争。企业要想赢得竞争优势,就需要有针对性的进行人力资本投资,但人力资本又不同于物质资本。它是一种会跑的“资本”,并且它的使用控制权天然由其载体控制,即人力资本投资者与人力资本所有者相分离,意味着人力资本投资风险的存在。     

国企混合所有制改革后控制权实现系数与优化路径

国企混合所有制改革力图通过引进非国有资本激发国有企业的活力,但混改后部分国企控制权旁落或溢出.因此,如何确保国家对企业的控制权,以及最大化实现国有资本的控制功能都非常值得研究.文章以2013-2019年A股上市公司数据为样本,基于Cubbin-Leech概率投票模型构建了控制权实现系数:控股股东持股比例与控股权阈值之比.按照控制权实现系数将混改后的国企分为三类:有效控制型、无效控制型和过剩控制型.研究发现:国企控制权阈值与控制权实现系数均值分别为38.08％和1.0124,到2019年无效控制型国企占同期国企总数的31.93％,国有企业私有化倾向显著,国家应重视并及时根据战略要求考虑是否增持以实现对企业有效控制;同时,过剩控制型国企占比25.54％,国企"一股独大"现象依然严重,对此国家可以根据资金情况适度减持此类企业控股比重.     

创业投资契约机制与机会主义行为

文章从"经济人"的自利性、公平理论和信息不对称等方面分析创业投资活动中道德风险产生的理论原因,并根据投资方和创业方对创业投资契约条款的认知不同,对创业投资契约条款进行分类分析,找出双方的主要分歧,分析创业投资道德风险产生的现实原因。根据道德风险产生的原因,提出建立契约设置的动态调整机制,合理分配投资方和创业方的收益,减少投资方与创业方委托代理关系中的道德风险。这种动态调整机制包括企业价值动态分配机制、信息共享机制、支配权的相机调整机制、双向激励机制和风险分担机制。     

截面特征差异、投资者情绪与企业投资

投资者情绪影响企业投资决策,在此基础上进一步检验企业截面特征差异对投资者情绪与企业投资关系的影响作用。以2004～2009年沪深两市上市公司为研究样本,采用主成分分析法构建投资者情绪综合指数,使用动态面板回归方法,研究发现换手率越高、规模越小、成长性越高、收益波动程度越大、现金持有量越多以及资产负债率越低的上市公司,其投资行为对投资者情绪越敏感。     

A Property Rights Perspective on Venture Capital Investment Decisions

To understand how ownership differences influence specific types of strategic decisions, we examine the investment decisions of venture capital (VC) firms, for which a variety of property rights arrangements exist. We describe how VC firms are characterized by important differences in how and to whom various property rights are allocated. On this basis, we develop a series of hypotheses regarding differences in the range and types of investment opportunities pursued by private, corporate, and bank affiliated VC firms. Evaluating our hypotheses using data on investments carried out by 3557 firms, we find that these types of firm perform distinct roles in the ecology of VC financing.     

The Association of Board Independence and Ownership Concentration with Voluntary Disclosure: A Meta-analysis

In this paper we apply meta-analysis to a sample of 27 empirical studies to clarify the association of board independence and ownership concentration with voluntary disclosure. We examine whether variations in results are attributable to the differences in the corporate governance system, the investor protection rights and the measurement of the governance variables. The findings show that the positive association between board independence and voluntary disclosure only occurs in those countries with high investor protection rights. The findings emphasize the need to consider the legal and institutional setting explicitly when analysing the effect of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure.     

Attracting cross-border venture capital: the role of a local investor

Examining an increasingly prevalent but under-researched phenomenon, cross-border venture capital investments, it is observed that local venture capitalists typically invest first, followed by foreign venture capitalists in later rounds. A model is developed that explains the role of a domestic venture capital investor in attracting foreign investors and which also accounts for the impact of various circumstances on the importance of this role. In our model based on analysis of nine cross-border venture capital-backed companies, local venture capitalists have several important roles in increasing the venture's cross-border investment readiness including advice to operational management and contributing contacts and local market knowledge. The importance of these roles is mitigated if the entrepreneurial team is highly experienced or if the home market is not important for the venture. The prominence of the local investor has signalling value. Finally, the local investor's international social capital facilitates the formation of cross-border syndicates. Overall, the model developed in the paper contributes to a better understanding of cross-border venture capital and in particular to the division of labour between domestic and foreign venture capitalists in international venture capital syndicates. The paper also contributes to the emerging literature on international social capital.     

投资者和风险投资家委托代理问题探析

运用委托代理理论对风险投资中投资者与风险投资家之间的委托代理关系进行分析,结合我国风险投资发展现状,并提出促进我国发展风险投资的建议。     

Donating Money to Get Money: The Role of Corporate Philanthropy in Stakeholder Reactions to IPOs

This study examines how stakeholders' investment time horizons interact with information about corporate giving in initial public offering (IPO) firms. Specifically, we build a model that explains how corporate philanthropy affects IPO performance. We find that at the IPO‐preparation stage, corporate giving is negatively related to underwriter prestige, venture capital investment, and IPO financing costs. We also find that at the IPO‐issuance stage, negative media coverage of IPOs moderates the U‐shaped relationship between corporate giving and market premiums. At the IPO‐trading stage, we find that corporate giving only positively influences the market premiums for IPO firms that are the subject of negative media reports. Our findings contribute to the signalling theory by showing how various stakeholders interpret the same signals differently, and they have implications for understanding how the relationship between corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance materializes in the IPO markets.     

WHEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE MATTERS: A REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF INVESTOR HORIZON ON CORPORATE POLICIES

This paper surveys the literature on the impact of investor horizon on corporate policies. While the desire to encourage long-term investor ownership is shared among managers, boards and policy makers, how greater long-term investor ownership benefits corporate decisions and ultimately firm performance is still under academic investigation. The contribution of this paper is twofold. The paper's first contribution is providing an up-to-date review of theoretical and empirical findings. This paper introduces the groups of long-term and short-term investors and the related classification methodologies and investor horizon proxies used to form them. It further reviews the determinants of an investor's horizon. Then, this paper organizes the literature on the impact of investor horizon on corporate policies around three main channels: the short-term pressure hypothesis, the monitoring hypothesis, and the catering hypothesis. The paper's second contribution is identifying six major challenges ahead that need to be addressed to improve the understanding of the impact of long-term (short-term) investor ownership on corporates policies. These challenges represent opportunities for further research.     

A UK `Hands-off' Venture Capital Firm and the Handling of Post-investment Investor--Investee Relationships

Commentators on the UK venture capital industry have observed that it has reached a watershed in its development, with the players of the 1980s having to reassess their positions and possibly, in some cases, their continuing viability as independent operators. It has been suggested that increasing numbers of UK venture capitalists are moving towards a more `hands on' approach to post-investment relationships with investees in the hope of improving performance and investment out-turns. Research in the US suggests that the hoped for improvement by this route is not a foregone conclusion. In this paper we examine how a longstanding and successful UK venture capitalist makes a widely publicised `hands-off' approach work -- and how their investees see the approach working. Our research supports the view that, over time, and by a process of feedback learning from post-investment performance monitoring, investees are selected that are compatible with this particular approach. Our findings demonstrate that mutual trust is one of the most vital elements in successful `hands-off' post-investment relationship building -- and that achieving this requires careful and considered nurturing. Moreover, because `hands-on' involvement can be expensive in terms of investor management resources and against the stated investor policy, relationships of the principal--agent type were kept to a minimum as far as was possible consistent with protecting investments.     

风险投资背景异质性与退出时机选择——基于信任视角的实证研究

退出是风险投资获得投资回报、实现投资目标的关键环节,以我国2009—2016年深圳中小板和创业板IPO公司为研究样本,分析风险投资背景异质性对其退出时机的影响,并进一步检验风险投资机构与创业企业之间的信任在其中的调节作用。研究发现：风险投资背景异质性对其退出存在显著影响,与独立风险投资相比,公司风险投资在创业企业IPO后退出企业时间更晚;无论是基于声誉的信任还是基于制度的信任,风险投资机构与创业企业之间双向的信任都会促使公司风险投资更晚退出创业企业;相对于独立风险投资,公司风险投资更晚退出企业是为了追求战略回报。研究表明创业企业可以通过提升风险投资对其信任度来维护其投资管理,而风险投资机构则可以通过提升创业企业对其信任度来加深互惠互信的合作关系。