On Stackelberg competition in strategic multilateral exchange

In this paper, we consider a strategic equilibrium concept which extends Stackelberg competition to cover a general equilibrium framework. From the benchmark of strategic market games proposed by Sahi and Yao (1989), we define the notion of Stackelberg equilibrium. This concept captures strategic interactions in interrelated markets on which a finite number of leaders and followers compete on quantities. Within the framework of an example, convergence and welfare are studied. More specifically, we analyze convergence toward the competitive equilibrium and make welfare comparisons with other strategic equilibria.     

Commodity taxation and imperfect competition : A note on the effects of entry

This paper looks at the effects of allowing the number of firms to vary in Seade's model of oligopoly and taxation. We show that the normative and positive consequences of a specific commodity tax are affected by entry in significant ways.     

The investment effects of price caps under imperfect competition: A note

We examine the impact of price cap regulation on the capacity investments of oligopolistic suppliers facing time-varying demand. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment.     

A Stackelberg Oligopoly with Nonidentical Firms

This paper extends the Stackelberg model to include any number of nonidentical firms and demonstrates significant counterintuitive results. For example, entry of an additional firm may increase the quantities and/or profits of some existing firms; it may also increase the total industry profit.     

A dynamic Stackelberg model with production-adjustment costs

We investigate the (dynamic) stability of a stackelberg oligopoly model of a market of a homogeneous good, with output competition, one Stackelberg leader and a number of identical followers. We assume that each firm incurs quadratic production-adjustment costs if it changes its output. We present a simple necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the model. Using the condition, we compare the stability of this model with the stability of two related Cournot models in which all firms present are followers. It turns out that the Stackelberg model is more stable than these two Cournot models.     

A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time

Routing games are studied to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on efficiency in routing games uses a simplified model where all flows exist simultaneously, and users care about either their maximum delay or their total delay. Both these measures are surrogates for measuring how long it takes to get all of a user's traffic through the network. We attempt a more direct study of network efficiency by examining routing games in a flow over time model. Flows over time are commonly used in transportation research. We show that in this model, by reducing network capacity judiciously, the network owner can ensure that the equilibrium is no worse than a small constant times the optimal in the original network, for two natural measures of optimality. These are the first upper bounds on the price of anarchy in this model for general networks.     

A potential limit on competition

The paper analyzes the ambiguous interplay of some human cognitive dispositions and competitive forces: (a) people have a want for a certain amount of novelty—potentially induced by competition-driven innovation—but emotionally resist an excessive degree of novel mental experiences; and (b) competition-driven change introduces challenges to agents that may result in fluid life states when skills and cognitive resources enable an individual to meet these challenges or in strained life states if this is not the case. As a result, some affective constraints to economic development and potential implications for economic theory development and policy making are identified.      

Heinrich von Stackelberg on joint production

In the 1970s, considerable interest arose into the study of multi-output firms and industries. However, this literature did not seem to be aware of the contribution that von Stackelberg made to the issue almost half a century earlier. This paper outlines von Stackelberg's contribution to the theory of costs under joint production. It critically assesses the place of his contribution in the modern history of the theory of joint production and it suggests an answer to the question of why von Stackelberg's theory of joint production fell into oblivion and even contributed to the abandonment of the issue for decades.     

A Two-stage Price-setting Duopoly: Bertrand or Stackelberg

This paper investigates a two-stage price-setting duopoly with differentiated goods. First, each firm announces its price; second, it chooses its actual price; and finally the market opens. Once a firm announces a price, it is able to discount it but not raise it. The model includes Stackelberg-type and Bertrand-type equilibria as possible outcomes. Whether Bertrand or Stackelberg appears in equilibrium depends on the properties of demand functions crucially. We find three patterns of equilibrium outcomes; one case has Bertrand equilibrium only, another has Stackelberg only, and the other has both equilibria     

Dynamic Stackelberg stability

A model of competition in a single-product market is given. The dynamics are studied using Gersgorin's Theorem under the assumptions of Cournot and Stackelberg behavior. Stability is enhanced by smaller adjustment speeds in the former, but not necessarily in the latter case.     

A note on beneficial emigration

Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay [J. Popul. Econ. 16 (2003) 161] argues that emigration helps promote the knowledge stock of the source country and is always beneficial. If individual heterogeneity of the knowledge stock is taken into account, I find the Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay modified model provides a classical brain drain analysis. Emigration is good to the source country only when a sufficient number of emigrants return.     

A note on modelling tournaments

Existing studies on tournaments utilize different specifications of the production function. Comparison of these results is difficult. This paper shows that the strategic behavior of agents in a tournament can be analyzed more generally using a specification of the production function along the lines of the standard agency model. I also show that in mixed contests, the more able contestant would in equilibrium have a higher probability of winning the contest despite attempts to use effort to compensate for ability by the less able contestant (Proposition 3).The author would like to thank Joseph Stiglitz for suggesting the idea for this paper, Jerry Green for reading an earlier version of the paper, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.     

A note on recursive multiple-priors

This note fills a gap in the proof of recursive multiple-priors utility [L. Epstein, M. Schneider, Recursive multiple priors, J. Econ. Theory 113 (2003) 1-31].     

A note on endogenous transfers

In a competitive and Walrasian stable world with two goods transfer paradoxes are very robust to endogenization (relating the size of the transfer to either the donor's or the recipient's GNP). Donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment occur in very general formulations of endogenization if and only if they occur in the model in which transfers are exogenous (as is usually assumed). Endogenization in practice will probably cause a dampening effect (smaller price and welfare changes than in the case of pure exogenous transfers).An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Econometric Society European Meeting in Munich, 1989, and EADI (European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes) in Oslo, 1990. We are grateful to an anonymous referee, Willem Buiter, Peter van Bergeijk, Richard Gigengack, Jan Pen, Georg Tillmann, Edward Towrr, and Casper de Vries for helpful comments.     

Public Input Competition under Stackelberg Equilibrium: A Note

This paper examines the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compares it with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions, we show that under the Nash equilibrium the more productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first‐mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process.     

A note on linear utility

This note shows how a spectrum of specific axiomatizations for linear utility for decision-making under risk can be integrated under a generalized axiom scheme in which one of the two binary relations used in the axioms parameterizes specific applications.     

A note on nurse self-scheduling

Self-scheduling began in the 1960s and many hospitals have been using it with success. Benefits include saving management time, improved morale and professionalism, and cost reduction on matters related to personnel turnover. For nursing units experiencing scheduling challenges, self-scheduling may be a solution.