The Association between the Legal and Financial Reporting Environments and Forecast Performance of Individual Analysts*

We test the ability of analyst characteristics to explain relative forecast accuracy across legal origins (common law versus civil law). Common‐law countries generally have more effective corporate governance mechanisms, including stronger investor protection laws and inputs provided through higher‐quality financial reporting systems. In this type of environment, we predict that analysts with superior ability and resources in common‐law countries will more consistently outperform their peers because appropriate market‐based incentives exist. In civil‐law countries, where the demand for earnings information is reduced because of weaker corporate governance mechanisms and lower‐quality financial reporting, we predict that analysts with superior ability will less consistently provide superior forecasts. Results are consistent with our expectations and suggest an association between legal and financial reporting environments and analysts' forecast behavior.     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.     

JIT Adoption: The Effects of LIFO Reserves and Financial Reporting and Tax Incentives*

Using matched samples of JIT adopters and nonadopters, we examine the association of JIT adoption with firms' financial reporting and tax incentives, earnings‐management histories, and LIFO reserve levels. We find evidence that adoption decisions are influenced by the interaction of firms' LIFO reserves with their income smoothing, debt covenant, and tax incentives. We also find that adoption is less likely for firms historically engaging in high degrees of earnings management, particularly when such firms have no substantial LIFO reserves. Our study extends earlier research demonstrating a relation between inventory valuation method and year‐end inventory transactions, and documents a relation between earnings‐management incentives and a fundamental supply‐chain design choice.     

The Effects of Financial Statement Information Proximity and Feedback on Cash Flow Forecasts*

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in their joint Financial Statement Presentation project, are reconsidering the basic format of financial statements. The Boards’ preliminary discussions related to this joint project indicate that they intend to modify the required financial statements to increase the proximity of performance‐related information for each reported period. We provide evidence related to this potential change by investigating the effects of financial statement information proximity on investors’ ability to learn the forecast‐relevant time series properties of reported cash flows and accruals. We also examine the role feedback plays in this relationship. Our experimental results suggest that nonprofessional investors are able to more quickly learn the relation between current period cash flows and accruals and future cash flow realizations when financial statement information is presented in a single statement rather than separated into two statements. In addition, we find that nonprofessional investors exhibit lower levels of absolute forecast errors and less forecast dispersion when financial statement information is unified into a single statement. Finally, we provide evidence that nonprofessional investors who receive extensive outcome feedback on a single page initially learn more quickly and later, after learning has leveled off, accurately forecast more consistently than do investors who receive extensive or limited feedback spread across two pages. Overall, our results provide evidence on the effectiveness of alternate financial statement presentation formats and the potential usefulness of receiving more extensive feedback.     

Cherry Picking,Disclosure Quality,and Comprehensive Income Reporting Choices: The Case of Property‐Liability Insurers*

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 130: Reporting Comprehensive Income encourages enterprises to report comprehensive income on a performance statement rather than on a statement of equity. We investigate the reporting decisions of 82 publicly traded property‐liability insurers that are fairly evenly split in their choice. Our results demonstrate that insurers with a tendency to manage earnings through realized securities' gains and losses (that is, cherry pickers), as well as insurers with a reputation for poor disclosure quality, are more likely to report comprehensive income in a statement of equity. Apparently, these insurers face the highest cost of transparency. We do not find a relation between the reporting decision and the volatility of comprehensive income relative to the volatility of net income. Our findings that insurers' comprehensive income reporting choices are a reflection of their proclivity toward cherry picking as well as their level of disclosure quality should be of interest to standard‐setters because of the controversy over standard‐setters' preference for mandating all firms to report comprehensive income in a performance statement.     

The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs*

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade‐off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black‐Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm‐year observations during the period 1993‐95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short‐run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives.     

Evolving Financial Reporting Practices: A Comparative Study of the Nordic Countries' Harmonization Efforts*

Abstract. In the 1960s, a group of culturally similar countries—the Nordic countries—cooperated in harmonizing their companies acts, including their accounting requirements. They even issued a Nordic proposal for new companies acts, intended to be enacted as new laws in each of the Nordic countries. The purpose of the paper is to study this harmonization effort and to suggest future research to enhance our understanding of diverse financial reporting practices. The paper shows that accounting harmonization in this context was difficult, even though the prerequisites for success were excellent. Future research should explore the experiences of accounting harmonization in other contexts. Résumé. Dans les années 60, un groupe de pays de même parenté culturelle — les pays nordiques — ont collaboré à l'harmonisation de leurs lois sur les sociétés ainsi que de leurs exigences en matière comptable. Ils ont même produit une Proposition des pays nordiques relative à de nouvelles lois sur les sociétés, qui devaient être sanctionnées dans chacun des pays participants. Les auteurs ont ici pour but d'analyser cet effort d'harmonisation et de suggérer d'éventuels travaux de recherche qui nous amèneraient à mieux comprendre différentes pratiques en matière d'information financière. Les auteurs expliquent que l'harmonisation comptable, dans ce contexte, s'est révélée difficile, même si les préalables au succès étaient excellents. Les travaux de recherche à venir devraient porter sur l'analyse des expériences d'harmonisation comptable dans d'autres contextes.     

The Difference between Earnings and Operating Cash Flow as an Indicator of Financial Reporting Fraud*

This paper examines the relation between earnings and operating cash flow to derive and test an indicator of financial statement fraud. Accrual measurement concepts indicate that financial statement fraud should be associated with high levels of earnings relative to operating cash flow. We demonstrate that the excess of earnings over operating cash flow is extreme in most fraud cases in years immediately prior to the fraud discovery based on a sample of 56 fraud cases from 1978 to 1991. We compare the distribution of the earnings minus operating cash flow variable for fraud firms with that for a sample of 60,453 firm-years for firms listed on COMPUSTAT. We test a logistic regression model in which the discovery/nondiscovery of fraud is the dependent variable, and earnings minus operating cash flow is the explanatory variable. Other control variables are included in the model based on prior studies. Results are consistent with expectations derived from accrual measurement theory. We then examine the predictive ability of the model using our sample of fraud firms and a sample of nonfraud firms in the same four-digit SIC code industries. Observations for the fraud firms are for the fiscal year prior to the discovery of fraud. Observations for the nonfraud firms are for the same fiscal years as the fraud firms in the same industries. The predictive ability of the model, including the excess of earnings over operating cash flow, is substantially higher than the predictive ability of the model omitting this variable. We conclude that the earnings-operating cash flow relation provides important information for those interested in identifying financial statement fraud, especially when considered in conjunction with other factors associated with fraud risk.     

The Impact of Legal and Voluntary Investor Protection on the Early Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)

Summary Prior studies explain the early adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by firm-specific benefits. However, IFRS adoption also leads to increased disclosure and reduced accounting choices, resulting in a loss of private benefits for company insiders. This paper argues that this loss depends on characteristics of the institutional environment (i.e. the level of investor protection). We find that in countries with strong laws or extensive corporate governance codes IFRS is more likely adopted as the loss of private benefits for company insiders is smaller. Furthermore, corporate governance recommendations are as effective as laws in stimulating IFRS adoption and become more important when laws are weaker. We thank the FWO for the financial support (FWO-project G.0244.02). We gratefully acknowledge the comments of the participants of the 26th Annual European Accounting Association Congress in Seville (2003), and of the International Accounting Section Mid-year Conference of the American Accounting Association in San Diego (2004). We acknowledge the comments of the discussant and participants of the Accounting Research Day in Antwerp (May 2004). Special thanks go to M. Willekens, J. Suys, and W. Landsman and two anonymous referees.     

Relationship between Managerial Compensation and Business Performance in Japan: New Evidence Using Micro Data*

This paper examines the relationship between the level of managerial compensation and the quality of corporate governance in Japan in the period following the bubble burst of 1991–1995. There are three main findings. First, Japanese firms with weaker governance have greater agency problems in that managerial opportunism extracts higher compensation and the firm performs relatively worse. Second, these agency problems were more severe during the recessionary period of 1994–1995. Finally, governance structures in industries with higher managerial compensation are relatively weaker than in other industries.     

The Economic Impact of the Lack of Transparency in Financial Reporting

Off-balance-sheet amounts are in the trillions of dollars, not including all transactions with off-balance-sheet implications. Financial managers and consultants intentionally structure transactions that are abusive of off-balance sheet accounting rules, which leads to a lack of transparency in financial reporting. This paper explores several ways in which companies manipulate off-balance sheet transactions to satisfy personal and business objectives as well as the impact of such manipulations. It is time for regulatory bodies to close the loopholes, eliminate overly rules-based standards, clearly state the economic objective of each standard, and require firms to disclose the economic motivations for the accounting practices they adopt.      

价值财务报告模式:基于会计信息化视角

会计信息化是会计发展的必然趋势,而利用信息技术的优势来提高会计信息的价值,关键还在于会计信息本身的价值。目前研究会计信息化的文章不少,但很少有涉及会计信息价值本身的研究。本文主要从会计信息自身价值提高的角度来研究会计信息的披露载体——财务报告,并在此基础上提出价值财务报告模式的构想。     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.