The Liberalisation of Tariff Rate Quotas under Oligopolistic Competition

Several proposals for liberalising agricultural tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have been proposed within the WTO Doha Development Round. The literature suggests that the effectiveness of liberalisation depends upon which of the three elements of a TRQ constrains imports. Most contributions assume perfect competition. This article uses an oligopoly two‐stage capacity constrained model, in which the mode of competition is endogenous, to investigate the impact of different liberalisation options of TRQs, that is, the reduction in the in‐quota and out‐of‐quota tariffs and the expansion of the quota. This article shows that consideration of the nature of competition between traders may provide unconventional conclusions about the effectiveness of the various TRQ liberalisation options; furthermore, the article shows how an increase in the number of rivals, under certain circumstances, may be more effective in increasing trade than reducing tariffs.     

Evaluating the TRQ Import Licensing Mechanisms in the Canadian Chicken Industry

Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were introduced at the end of the Uruguay Round to support market access following the tariffication of nontariff barriers to trade in agriculture. The allocation of import licenses under the TRQ regime in the Canadian chicken industry is currently made according to discretionary criteria. The welfare properties of this import licensing scheme are evaluated in comparison with a less discretionary allocation method such as first-come, first-served (FCFS) using a numerical model. The analysis also provides a welfare evaluation of both methods as the current minimum access commitment for chicken imports is expanded. It is found that total welfare in the Canadian chicken industry is likely to be higher under a TRQ administration method based on nondiscretionary criteria such as firstcome, first-served. However, particular assumptions about the chicken producers'response to increased foreign competition can reverse this finding. Moreover the welfare differences between the two license administration schemes are less important when market access to imports is substantial.     

Dairy Tariff-Quota Liberalization: Contrasting Bilateral and Most Favored Nation Reform Options

A highly disaggregated, "tariff line," source-differentiated, partial equilibrium model of U.S. specialty cheese imports is developed to investigate reform options for tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). A mixed-complementarity framework is used to represent bilateral and most favored nation (MFN) tariff quotas. The impacts of liberalizing U.S. specialty cheese imports via bilateral and MFN quota expansions, out-of-quota tariff cuts, and simultaneous liberalization scenarios are evaluated. We find that the path of liberalization is quite different, depending on the reform approach undertaken, particularly if the United States adopted an MFN quota administration mechanism for specialty cheese imports.     

Market Integration and Market Efficiency under Seasonal Tariff Rate Quotas

Switzerland applies seasonal tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for the import of many fruits and vegetables during the domestic harvest season. We examine how this system affects the relationship between Italian and Swiss tomato prices and test for physical market integration and spatial equilibrium conditions over time. We use detailed, transaction‐based data on trade flows and trade costs and estimate an extended parity bounds model, following Barrett and Li (2002). We confirm that in the summer season, when TRQs are in place, markets are inefficient. While quota holders receive positive rents, the marginal rents for importers without quota shares are negative. This inhibits trade flows above the in‐quota import quantity allowed by TRQs. Hence, despite leading to inefficiencies and creating rents for importers, seasonal TRQs are effective in protecting domestic production against competing imports.     

Economic issues in tariffication: an overview

The agricultural trade liberalization proposal known as ‘ tariffication’ aims at converting all existing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade into bound tariffs, and to reduce these tariffs over time. This is in tune with the original philosophy of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and it calls for a dramatic overhaul of existing agricultural policies in many developed countries. The main economic issues that arise with tariffication stem from the non-equivalence of tariffs and NTBs in a number of scenarios. This paper analyzes non-equivalence arising from the existence of: imperfect competition in importing countries; price instability in importing and exporting countries; and, inefficient allocation of quantitative restrictions. It is shown that in all these cases the definition of an appropriate 'equivalent tariff to be used in tariffication is not straightforward, and that in general this equivalent tariff cannot be computed on the basis of only observed price differences between countries. Tariff-rate quotas, which are meant to be the main tool of implementation of tariffication according to the existing proposal, are analyzed in some detail. Concerning the relationship between tariffication and the other elements of the trade liberalization package, it is shown that tariffication would limit the scope of export subsidy policies. It is also shown that the existence of production and export subsidies makes observed price gaps between countries of questionable value in setting equivalent tariff levels. Finally, it is argued that the main focus of tariffication should be the conversion of NTBs to acceptable long-run (bound) tariffs rates, and considerable flexibility in this conversion process could be exercised in the transition period.     

The Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Tariff‐Rate Quota System: A Case Study of Rice

This study examines the effect of tariff‐rate quota (TRQ) expansions as have emerged from the international trade negotiations that are designed to ensure market access for many sensitive agricultural products. We extend the existing models on tariff–quota equivalence to a TRQ system. Our theoretical finding indicates that the equivalence of domestic price between out‐quota tariff reduction and quota expansion depends on domestic producer's behavior and on the values of conjectural variation. An empirical spatial equilibrium model of international rice trade is used to examine the price and welfare impacts of replacing quota expansions with tariff reductions. Le présent article examine les répercussions de l’expansion des contingents tarifaires issue des négociations de commerce international pour assurer l’accès au marché de nombreux produits agricoles sensibles. Nous avons élargi les modèles existants d’équivalence entre les quotas et les tarifs à un système de contingents tarifaires. Nos résultats théoriques ont indiqué que l’équivalence de prix intérieur entre la diminution des tarifs hors contingent et l’expansion des contingents dépend du comportement du producteur national et de la valeur des variations conjecturales. Nous avons appliqué un modèle empirique d’équilibre spatial dans le commerce international du riz pour examiner les répercussions du remplacement de l’expansion des quotas par des réductions de tarifs sur le prix et le bien‐être.     

On Exporting by Import State Traders and Peculiar Effects of Negotiated Minimum Access Commitments

It has been alleged that exportation by import state trading enterprises (ISTEs) must involve unfair trade practices. We show that such exporting may result from a rational use of market power by a sufficiently protected price discriminating ISTE. We argue that the flawed design and implementation of the tarffication process initiated in the last GATT agreement is providing ISTEs with incentives to export. The tariffication of import quotas and other related import restrictions was dirty in the sense that it permitted the setting of prohibitively high tariffs on many commodities. More importantly, it failed to eliminate quantitative trade barriers as the previous import quotas were replaced by minimum access commitments (MACs). In this paper, we use a simple partial equilibrium framework to explore the trade and welfare consequences of trade liberalization through tariff reductions and MAC enlargements under the small country assumption when domestic production and imports are controlled by an ISTE. We show that tariff reductions and MAC enlargements have very different effects on the behavior of the ISTE. MAC enlargements induce inefficient trade by encouraging the profit maximizing ISTE to increase its exports. In terms of welfare, MAC enlargements are immiser-izing. We conclude that tariff reductions are to be preferred to MAC increases as a means to liberalize trade .     

Brexit and Tariff Rate Quotas on EU Imports: A Complex Problem

Tariff rate quotas (TRQ s) are a means by which non‐EU suppliers of agri‐food products can be given preferential access to EU markets within a regulated framework of quotas at tariff rates below the Most Favoured Nation rates bound in the GATT . TRQ s are common in governing trade in the meat and dairy sectors of the EU , although they apply to a wide range of other agricultural commodity and processed agri‐food products. Brexit poses a complex set of problems regarding TRQ s in terms of how the respective parties should divide up jointly undertaken commitments within the WTO , since TRQ s have been negotiated by the Commission on behalf of all EU Member States. Whilst individual quota allocations can be allocated to specific third country suppliers, individual Member States receive no specific allocation of the global product TRQ either in total, or from any named preferential supplier. The article outlines the nature of TRQ s in the meat and dairy sectors of the EU , and how a simple partitioning of existing quotas between the EU ‐27 and the UK is unlikely to resolve the complex issue of access rights of third countries to both markets. Possible solutions are explored, including the potential need for reciprocal EU ‐27–UK TRQ s post Brexit.     

Optimal Production Tax and Quota under Time Consistent Trade Policies

This article investigates the policy active importers' incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade policies in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not equivalent, and that each equilibrium depends on whether the trade policy instruments are tariffs or quotas. Under import quotas, the equilibrium policy is to tax domestic production, whereas under a tariff either a production tax or subsidy may be optimal. We also show that a collective agreement to ban production policies is likely to be welfare-improving in many circumstances.     

Do state-owned enterprises benefit more from China's cereal grain tariff-rate quota regime?

In 2016, the United States launched a formal dispute with the World Trade Organization (WTO) concerning China's wheat, corn, and rice tariff-rate quota (TRQs) administration. A formal panel was requested in August 2017, with several major grain exporters, including Canada, joining as third-party members. This study employs two unique micro-level datasets to investigate the role of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises’ (SOE and non-SOE, respectively) in China's agricultural imports. Results suggest that SOEs are noticeably more active in importing quota-bound commodities compared to quota-free imported commodities. Moreover, the larger role of SOEs in China's cereal grain imports is negatively correlated with China's food security targets, as measured by estimated prior year stocks-to-use ratios. Conversely, above average food security targets in China's cereal grain market leads to an important extensive margin adjustment of non-SOE import participation. Finally, we find very little compelling evidence that China's September reallocation of unused TRQ has any economic or statistically significant impact on non-SOE entry into importing or the intensity with which their imports occur.     

A Comparative Static Analysis of European Union Tariff and Support Policies for Canned Pears

Abstract

A nonlinear, partial equilibrium, Armington model of the European Union canned pear market was built and simulated for reductions in specific EU policies and for reductions in selected combinations of these policies relevant to canned pears: import tariffs, factor subsidies, and an output subsidy. Effects of these policy reductions on the following EU canned pear market variables were comparatively analyzed: own-product consumption, imports, exports, and price. Comparative analyses of these policy-specific effects were conducted from two viewpoints: the absolute magnitudes of completely eliminating, and the marginal effects of incrementally reducing, the EU policies and policy combinations. Among other findings, results suggest that EU tariff reduction enhances EU imports more than EU subsidy reduction, and that EU subsidy reduction increases EU prices more effectively than reducing EU tariffs.     

The Importance of Exchange Rate Policy in Promoting Vietnam's Exports

The analysis in this paper shows that, during the 1990s, the use of tariffs, quotas and export price policy by the State Bank of Vietnam was more effective than devaluation in controlling imports in both the short term and long term, but encouraged Vietnamese exports only in the short term. Given the need for Vietnam to integrate with other economies, particularly with the ASEAN countries, the results suggest an appropriate exchange rate policy should be instituted to achieve export growth consistently in the long run rather than depending on tariffs and quotas.     

EFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH AGRICULTURAL NITRATE POLLUTION STANDARDS

Non-point pollutants such as nitrates are difficult to monitor and hence control. This paper considers nitrate abatement policies for the Tyne catchment in northern England. The analysis is based on an aggregate-level LP model which predicts producers' production decisions and estimates the resulting spatial distribution of nitrogen applications and nitrate emissions. The policy evaluation compares a catchment-level nitrate emission quota, a catchment-level nitrogen input quota and nitrogen input quotas targeted at individual land classes as alternative measures to achieve nitrate concentration standards. The results indicate that targeted nitrogen input quotas provide a feasible and relatively efficient abatement policy when a lack of information on individual farms prevents the use of the least cost emission tax.     

Tariff-Rate Quota Liberalization: The Case of World Price Uncertainty and Supply Management

This paper examines the options for liberalizing tariff-rate quotas when a marketing board controls domestic production and international prices are stochastic. Lowering over-quota tariff and increasing import quota volumes are not equivalent. The trade-offs between the two types of trade reforms are examined through numerical simulations for the Canadian chicken industry. Introducing world price variability results in a distribution of welfare impacts for the different groups in the industry. Consumers and processors gain more with tariff liberalization than with increased import quotas. The difference in producer surplus between liberalization regimes is truncated so that producers only see down-side risk under the tariff liberalization regime.
Le présent article a examiné les options concernant la libéralisation des contingents tarifaires lorsqu'un office de commercialisation encadre la production nationale et que les prix internationaux sont stochastiques. Diminuer le taux de droit hors contingent et augmenter les volumes de contingent d'importation ne sont pas des options équivalentes. Nous avons examiné les deux types de réforme commerciale en effectuant des simulations numériques pour le secteur du poulet au Canada. Incorporer la variabilité du prix mondial provoque une distribution de répercussions sur le bien-être des divers groupes du secteur. Les consommateurs et les transformateurs gagnent davantage en appliquant une libéralisation des droits hors contingent qu'en appliquant une augmentation des contingents d'importation. La différence quant au surplus des producteurs entre les régimes de libéralisation est tronquée de sorte que les producteurs ne voient que le risque de perte sous un régime de libéralisation tarifaire.     

Tariff quota administration in China's grain markets: An empirical assessment

In 2016, the U.S. launched a trade dispute against China at the World Trade Organization, arguing that China has been restricting its grain imports via tariff quota administration. Despite sharp criticisms by the U.S., the extent to which the grain imports were restricted in China remains largely unknown, primarily due to that China's grain import behaviors are still under-researched. The U.S. grain export sector might actually gain little from China's grain trade liberalization in the short run, since China has become less import dependent on the U.S. through the pursuit of import diversification. In this context, this article aims to quantify impacts of the tariff quota administration on China's grain imports from its trading partners. We calculate ad valorem tariff equivalents of the tariff quota administration and then estimate import demand elasticities using a source differentiated import demand model. We find that the tariff quota administration might have reduced China's quota fill rates for the grain commodities by 10–35% during 2013–2017. In particular, the U.S. wheat exports to China were largely negatively affected. We also find that the tariff quota administration in China acts like a variable import levy—its import restrictiveness varies negatively with world prices, leading to lower import demand elasticities.     

A proposal for the reduction of domestic price variability during the phase-in period of trade liberalization

Countries replacing existing trade barriers with a fixed tariff may find that domestic price variability rises to politically unacceptable levels. This paper shows how the tariff-reduction formula can be modified to delay the transmission of world price variability. The importance of this modification is demonstrated by a simple two-country, one-commodity simulation model. The simulation results show that tariffication of existing EC variable levies/export subsidies would dramatically increase price variability within the European Community and that the transmission of this variability can be delayed by slightly altering the ***adjustment formula.     

Quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage in supply‐managed industries

The Canadian dairy, egg, broiler, and turkey industries operate under supply management, a policy regime that sets product prices and allocates production among provinces and ultimately among farms through quotas. The Canadian Farm Products Agencies Act requires that comparative advantage be used to guide the allocation of new quota when increases in consumer demand necessitate increased production. This requirement, however, has not been met in practice. We develop a proposal by Meilke to use quota prices as measures of comparative advantage. We evaluate the quota price approach and other proposed methods, from a Hayekian and Coasean market process perspective. We conclude that quota prices offer an economically justifiable indicator of provincial comparative advantage. We develop an individual‐level general equilibrium model of quota exchange to illustrate the informational content of quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage. We also discuss potential practical challenges of using quota prices as indicators of comparative advantage.     

The Impact of Market Intervention on Quota Mobility: The Case of the Ontario Dairy Industry

We examine the relationship between farm‐level scale efficiency and quota purchases in the Ontario dairy quota market before and after the implementation of a progressive transfer assessment policy and a price cap policy. We find that scale efficiency has a positive effect on net quota purchases and that the two regulations slowed down this effect. The largest deterrent in the movement of quota from less efficient to more efficient producers occurred after the implementation of the capital asset pricing policy. If the capital asset pricing policy remains in effect, it will likely take a longer time to achieve an efficient allocation of quota across producers in the industry. Nous examinons la relation entre l'efficience d'échelle agricole et les achats de quota au sein du marché des quotas laitiers ontariens, avant et après l'implantation d'une politique d'évaluation progressive de transfert, et d'une autre de plafonnement des prix. Nous avançons que l'efficience d'échelle a un effet positif sur les achats nets de quota et que les deux politiques ont freiné cet effet. La plus grande dissuasion au sein du mouvement des quotas de producteurs moins efficients vers ceux qui le sont plus, survient après le plafonnement des prix. Si la politique de plafonnement des prix demeure en vigueur, il faudra attendre encore longtemps avant de réussir une allocation efficiente des quotas parmi les producteurs de l'industrie.     

Price Ceilings on Milk Production Quota Values: Future or Folly?

Since the inception of supply management in Canada during the 1970s, milk production quota has been used to regulate output and participation in the dairy industry. In recent years, milk quota values have increased dramatically, almost tripling in value since the mid 1980s. This led to the Dairy Farmers of Ontario intervening on the milk production quota exchange on two occasions: first, in November 2006 with a progressive transfer assessment and then in July 2009, replacing the former policy with a firm price ceiling—fixing the unit price of quota at $25,000. These policies represent a significant redistribution of economic benefits from milk producers selling their quota to those remaining in the industry. The objective of this study is to first explore the reasons for the increase in production quota values; and second, to assess the welfare and distributional effects of each of the two quota policy schemes. Our results suggest that the increase in quota values were driven by basic economic factors and that the efficiency losses from intervention in the quota exchange are nontrivial. We conclude by suggesting there are several alternative policy options that could minimize efficiency losses while moderating the escalation in quota values. Depuis la mise en place du système de gestion de l’offre au Canada dans les années 1970, les quotas laitiers sont utilisés pour régulariser la production et la participation dans l’industrie laitière. Au cours des dernières années, la valeur des quotas laitiers a fait un bond considérable et a pratiquement triplé depuis le milieu des années 1980. Cette situation a amené la Dairy Farmers of Ontario à intervenir à deux reprises dans le système d’échange de quotas laitiers : en novembre 2006, en imposant l’établissement d’un transfert progressif et en juillet 2009, en remplaçant la politique précédente par l’établissement d’un prix plafond ferme fixéà 25 000 $. Ces politiques permettent une importante redistribution des avantages économiques lorsque des producteurs de lait vendent leurs quotas à des producteurs qui demeurent dans le secteur. La présente étude visait d’abord à examiner les raisons qui sous‐tendent l’augmentation de la valeur des quotas de production et ensuite àévaluer le bien‐être et les effets distributifs de chaque plan de quotas. Les résultats de notre étude autorisent à penser que l’augmentation de la valeur des quotas a été motivée par des facteurs économiques fondamentaux et que les pertes d’efficacité découlant de l’intervention dans les échanges de quotas n’étaient pas sans importance. En conclusion, nous estimons qu’il existe plusieurs politiques de rechange qui pourraient minimiser les pertes d’efficacité tout en modérant l’escalade de la valeur des quotas.