推行领导干部廉政家庭监督制

一、提高认识,增强推行领导干部廉政家庭监督制的自觉性.推行领导干部廉政家庭监督制,是警示在先,从源头上预防腐败的需要.从源头上预防腐败,首先要对领导干部进行党风廉政教育,做到教育和预防在先.对领导干部实施家庭监督,是重要的治本之举.     

新形势下国有企业预防腐败对策研究

腐败总是与缺乏有效监督的权利相伴而生,发生在国企中的腐败则总是与企业的经营管理权密切相关。国有资产大量流失,国企经营效益和效能低下,甚至濒临破产。究其产生的原因,除了宏观层面的因素之外,主要就是监管制度的缺失和执行不力。现阶段要从源头上治理发生在国企中的腐败,就必须加强监管制度的执行力度,不断强化制度创新,坚持标本兼治,惩防并举。     

关于国企从源头上防治腐败的几点思考

从源头上预防和治理腐败,加大治本力度,是当前党风廉政建设的重要内容和显著特征。下面笔者就新形势下,国有企业如何从源头上预防和治理腐败,谈谈自己的认识。一、注重实效抓教育,逐步实现“不想腐败”邓小平同志指出：“反腐败,一靠教育,二靠法制,”反腐败的实践也证明：发生违法违纪行为,通常具备两个因素,一是主观心理动机;二是可供利用的外部条件。一个人无论职位高低,资历深浅,如果理想信念动摇了,放松对自己世界观的改造,就不能抵御腐朽思想的侵蚀,就会在一定条件下产生腐败。因此,国有企业从源头上预防和治理腐败,…     

勇于探索 不断创新

随着社会的发展，行政事业单位经济方式日趋多元化，致使预防和治理腐败迫在眉睫。2000年中央纪委、监察部把试行会计委派制度作为从源头上预防和治理腐败的一项重要措施。本文就乌鲁木齐市教育会计核算中心的性质、人员配备、具体操作办法、管理模式、取得的效果等方面进行介绍。     

公务卡改革与高校党风廉政建设

公务卡制度的推行和实施是我国财政预算制度的一项重要举措。作为一种现代化的支付结算工具,公务卡不仅使用方便,而且对从源头上预防和控制腐败、对高校党风廉政建设起到了积极的促动作用。文章结合高校在公务卡推行过程中的问题,提出了几点建议,以便更好地促进高校公务卡的改革,发挥公务卡的积极作用。     

加强财务收支关口监管从源头上预防腐败和财务风险

面对高校发展的新形势、新特点、新任务,根据国家财政改革、财政监督和反腐倡康的要求,如何依法规范财务管理,加强财权运行的有效监管,确保教育经费安全和使用效益,遏制高校经济案件发生发展的势头,在财务收支的关口处从源头上预防腐败和财务风险。     

国有企业开展廉洁风险防控管理的实践与探索

廉洁风险防控是将风险管理理论和质量管理方法引入反腐倡廉工作，通过加强源头预防，规范权力运行来促进惩治和预防腐败．达到从源头上预防腐败的目的。国有煤矿作为国有企业，可以借用廉洁风险防控管理．不断加强反腐倡廉力度．构建惩防体系，控制和减少腐败行为的发生，促进企业的健康发展。     

腐败应从源头抓起

反腐倡廉是我党的一项长期任务,廉政建设是我国公务员队伍建设的一项长期目标.要想根除腐败这一顽症,必须从其滋生的源头抓起;要使广大干部能自觉地端其行、廉其政,必须从制度抓起,使腐败根除于源头.     

浅谈高较政府采购工作

中华人民共和国政府采购法是我国在完善社会主义市场经济体制中建立的一种用财政资金采购管理的新型制度。它强调采购的公正、公开、公平，讲求经济效益、维护公共利益等原则。全面实施高校的政府采购制度，对于强化高校资产管理，提高各类资金使用效率，从源头上预防和铲除腐败，树立诚信高校形象，具有十分重要的意义。[第一段]     

高校管理创新及腐败风险防范研究

腐败是当前我国高校存在比较突出的问题之一,文章从高校管理创新以及腐败风险防范研究的必要性和现实意义出发,研究了高校腐败现象,最后提出加强高校管理创新,杜绝高校腐败的措施。     

浅谈新形势下国有企业如何预防腐败

文章分析了当前国有企业反腐倡廉建设面临的新形势及国有企业产生腐败问题的原因,在此基础上提出了国有企业预防腐败的对策。     

交通运输系统廉政风险防控机制初探

交通领域的腐败问题,给社会带来了巨大危害。为遏制交通腐败,降低廉政风险,本文把现代风险管理理论和质量管理办法引入预防腐败体系建设,为建立科学、可行、可持续的预防腐败廉政风险防控机制探索思路。     

网络反腐:借助高科技手段惩治腐败的利剑

胡锦涛总书记在第十七届中央纪委五次全会上首次提出了提高反腐倡廉建设科学化水平这一重大任务,在如今信息化社会,科技反腐的重要性日益凸显,科技反腐有多种灵活多样的形式,网络反腐是其中的重要形式,近年来的一些网络反腐的成功案例充分显示了网络监督的强大合力。网络反腐是把"双刃剑",在大力推动反腐舆论监督的同时,网络本身客观存在的非理性因素很容易导致过激和极端行为的发生。对此,我们必须理性对待,我们应该加大对网络监督和网络反腐的研究与应对,做到既不硬性打压,又不放任自流。     

以科学发展观为指导 加快推进国有企业惩治和预防腐败体系建设

当前,随着社会主义市场经济体制的建立和不断完善,我国政治、经济、文化等领域都发生了深刻变革,认真研究新形势下的新情况、新问题,积极寻求党风廉政建设和反腐败新途径,建立健全教育、制度监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系,是社会主义市场经济条件下开展党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争提出的新要求,是加大从源头上防治腐败的根本举措。     

广西南宁凤凰纸业有限公司惩治和预防腐败体系建设问题初探

加大预防腐败力度，是党中央对反腐倡廉工作做出的重大决策。广西南宁凤凰纸业有限公司在坚决遏制腐败蔓延的同时，不断加大从源头上防治腐败的力度，取得了一些成果，文章对此展开了探讨，并总结出一些好的经验和做法。     

Deforestation, corruption, and private ownership in the forest sector

One of the remedies launched in combating corruption in the forest sector is privatization of state forests (and private forest ownership). We hypothesized that privatization could reduce deforestation through reducing corruption. We found a statistically significant strong positive relation between corruption and deforestation for the period between 1995 and 2008 by using two different corruption indices and panel data, a highly statistically significant negative correlation between private forest ownership and corruption across countries by using univariate and multivariate models for three different corruption indices, and a highly statistically significant negative correlation between private forest ownership and deforestation across countries by using univariate and multivariate models.     

Local Political Corruption: Potential structural malfunctions at the central–local,local–local and intra-local levels

Abstract

Despite growing preoccupation on the part of both the public and researchers with the concept of political corruption and the ‘corruption eruption’ phenomenon, research studies addressing corruption in local government are few and far between. This exploratory research offers a theoretical conceptualization of institutionalized corruption in local government, and identifies structural factors that lead to such corruption. Further, this study empirically assesses institutional corruption at the local level and its correlation to attitudes and characteristics of local authorities and their populations, based on a survey of 1,709 residents of 156 local authorities in Israel and data on the local authorities from a separate database. This article proposes a model according to which local corruption arises from structural factors at three levels: the central–local level (relations between local authorities and the central government); the local–local level (competition between local authorities) and the intra-local level (factors relating to the performance of local councils and local democracy). Our analyses reveal correlations among characteristics of the local authority and community, residents' perceptions of local performance and perceptions of local corruption. Implications of the findings in light of strategies conventionally employed against corruption in local government are discussed.     

GLOBALIZATION AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN ASIAN COUNTRIES: The case for divergence

The globalization of corruption has given rise to the concern in many countries on how to combat corruption and many international conferences on this topic. However, in spite of the sharing of ‘best practices’ in fighting corruption at these conferences, there is still a great deal of divergence in combating corruption in Asian countries because of the different contextual constraints and the effectiveness of their governments' anti-corruption strategies. This article describes and evaluates the three patterns of corruption control in six Asian countries and concludes that the third pattern of anti-corruption laws with an independent anti-corruption agency adopted by Singapore and Hong Kong is the most effective.     

The macroeconomic implications of corruption in the choice to educate

Educational corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, yet its macroeconomic implications are largely unknown. We formulate a fixed-price bribe model to explore the impact educational corruption may have on growth, income inequality and other factors. When using aggregate ability as our measure of growth, our model produces a v-shaped relationship between growth and corruption, suggesting that corruption is detrimental to growth at lower levels of bribery, but growth enhancing at greater levels. A cross-section of countries is used to empirically test our model and provides qualitative support for our modeling structure. Distributional analysis reveals that an increased prevalence of corruption leads to greater income inequality and reduces the ability of education to signal quality.     

CORRUPTION, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATESECTOR : WHY IT MATTERS AND WHAT CAN BE DONE

The author proposes a definition of corruption which requires five conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. The definition is applicable to both the state and private sectors. Empirical work shows that corrupt countries receive less inward investment, pay higher interest on borrowings and achieve lower rates of investment overall. Ways of combating corruption are suggested.