Japan's Lost Decade and its Financial System

After briefly explaining the causes of the Japanese asset‐price bubble in the 1980s, this paper analyses why the bursting of the bubble developed into a full‐fledged financial crisis in the late 1990s. In order to cope with this crisis, the Government has injected capital directly into the banking sector and banks have written off enormous amounts of bad loans. However, the Japanese financial sector remains very weak and Japan still faces a number of problems in its financial system. Firstly, the profit margin of banks is too small to cover the increased default risk following the bursting of the bubble, and there are market distortions created by the government‐backed financial institutions and the requirements on new lending to small and medium sized companies. Secondly, banks still have excessive stock investment and crossholding of shares between banks and other companies has weakened the market discipline on entrenched management. Thirdly, the government guarantee of all banking‐sector liabilities should be removed. Once the financial system is stabilised, a risk‐adjusted deposit insurance premium should be introduced so as to strengthen market discipline on banks, and the huge postal saving system should be privatised to create a level‐playing field among deposit taking financial institutions. Besides the foregoing, the weak corporate governance structure of Japanese financial institutions has to be remodelled. The management of banks has shielded themselves by extensive cross‐shareholdings, especially with life insurance companies. There has been extensive mutual provision of capital, most large life insurance companies have weak corporate governance, and many of the large shareholders of banks are life insurance companies. This double gearing between banks and life insurance companies has therefore weakened the market control of Japanese financial institutions.     

Financial Liberalisation and the South Korean Financial Crisis: An Analysis of Expert Opinion

This paper provides a novel analysis of the South Korean financial crisis drawing on the findings of a unique survey of IMF/World Bank and South Korean experts. The survey reveals that over‐optimism and inadequate recognition of financial risks inadvertently led to excessive risk‐taking by Korean financial intermediaries. It also indicates that the sources of over‐optimistic assessments of East Asian economies were mainly to be found outside East Asia and included the Bretton Woods Institutions themselves, Western media and analysts. In Korea, weaknesses in risk management were the result of (i) lack of expertise in relation to handling the risks associated with capital flows, and (ii) disincentives to manage risks emanating from a relatively successful history of government‐provided safety nets for both industry and banking. Financial liberalisation widened risk‐taking opportunities, by allowing Korean financial institutions to both borrow from and lend to institutions outside Korea. It also created additional disincentives for managing risk by intensifying competition and eroding bank franchise values. Weaknesses in prudential regulation allowed bank portfolios to become riskier, especially in terms of increased liquidity risk as a result of maturity mismatches between dollar‐denominated assets and liabilities. The liquidity crisis, which followed the re‐assessment of the South Korean economy by international lenders in late 1997, triggered a full‐blown financial crisis because of the absence of an effective international lender of last resort.     

Promoting sustainable financial behaviour: implications for education and research

The current financial crisis has clearly shown that national financial health is strongly tied to the household financial well‐being, and that most consumers were not well equipped with knowledge they needed to cope with this crisis. The failure of markets, institutions, businesses and households during the current financial crisis also revealed the serious economic risks posed by widespread unethical and irresponsible behaviour. The focus of this paper is to explore how, through financial education, we can improve the economic performance of individuals in the economy, both for their own well‐being and for the well‐being of society at large. However, for that to happen, the current approach to financial education will have to include the discussion of attitudes, values and beliefs that enable us to make financial decision that promote long‐term security for families and communities. After establishing the importance of financial education, the challenges and opportunities of the current status of financial education, with emphasis on the complexity of human and financial behaviour, are discussed. It, then, argues for the promotion of responsible behaviour by integrating fundamental values in financial education. Discussion of how selected learning theories can be used to develop effective teaching approaches and the implications for future research conclude the paper.     

Arguments for and against financial literacy education: where to go from here?

Currently, everyone is brandishing financial literacy education as the answer to the global personal financial crisis. However, there are a few advocates against financial literacy education. There is contention whether financial literacy education actually leads to effective financial behaviours. The purpose of this theoretical article is to state the various arguments for and against financial literacy education and suggest possible guidelines for interventions by governments and institutions in an effort to increase financial well‐being. There are no easy answers to this complex problem and financial illiteracy should not be presented as the sole culprit. Basic financial literacy education is needed to manage day‐to‐day finances; however, specialist areas such as investments and retirement planning should be left to professionals. It is suggested that financial literacy education should focus not only on cognitive factors but also on non‐cognitive and affective factors that might override rational decision making.     

The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis: An Erosion of Ethics: A Case Study

This case study examines five dimensions of the 2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States: (1) the devastating effects of the financial crisis on the U.S. economy, including unparalleled unemployment, massive declines in gross domestic product (GDP), and the prolonged mortgage foreclosure crisis; (2) the multiple causes of the financial crisis and panic, such as the housing and bond bubbles, excessive leverage, lax financial regulation, disgraceful banking practices, and abysmal rating agency performance; (3) the extraordinary efforts of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Department of the Treasury to stem the financial freefall triggered by the crisis and resuscitate financial institutions, (4) the ethical implications of the unprecedented actions by government institutions to rescue financial institutions and drag the country back from the brink of global financial collapse, and the conduct of the various parties contributing to the financial crisis, such as the shoddy behavior of mortgage brokers, the massive securitization of mortgages into overly complex bonds, the excessive leverage of financial institutions, the disgraceful work of bond rating firms, the abysmal risk management systems employed by financial institutions, and the massive operations of the shadow banking and over-the-counter derivatives markets; and (5) the major provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law to in response to the financial crisis and for the purpose of correcting the egregious conduct of major financial institutions.     

Did Investors Herd during the Financial Crisis? Evidence from the US Financial Industry

We examine the herding behavior of investors in the US financial industry, especially commercial banks, S&Ls, investment and insurance firms during global financial crisis of 2008 towards own sub‐sector and market consensus using augmented cross sectional absolute deviation of returns (CSAD) model. After distinguishing between fundamental and non‐fundamental information, we find a greater influence of global financial crisis on spurious herding for commercial and investment banks, and such herding increases in the down market and with conditional volatility of returns, but adverse herding is prevalent among investors during normal period in response to fundamental information. We also find that herding intensity on fundamental information is relatively high with market consensus for all financial institutions except insurance firms in high volatility regime, and intentional herding is only significant and limited to S&Ls and investment banks in high volatility regime. Our findings suggest limited spillover effects of herding when investors face non‐fundamental information.     

The global financial crisis and Islamic finance

The conventional view holds that the current global financial crisis was caused by extraordinarily high liquidity, reckless lending practices, and the rapid pace of financial engineering, which created complex and opaque financial instruments used for risk transfer. There was a breakdown of the lender‐borrower relationship and informational problems caused by a lack of transparency in asset market prices, particularly in the market for structured credit instruments. There was outdated, lax, or absent regulatory‐supervisory oversight; faulty risk management and accounting models; and the emergence of an incentive structure that not only encouraged excessive risk taking but also created a complicit coalition of financial institutions, real estate developers and appraisers, insurance companies, and credit rating agencies whose actions led to a deliberate underpricing of risk. Such a crisis would not have occurred under an Islamic financial system—due to the fact that most, if not all, of the factors that have caused or contributed to the development and spread of the crisis are not allowed under the rules and guidance of Shariah. The current global financial crisis is largely seen as a real test of the resilience of the Islamic financial services industry and its ability to present itself as a more reliable alternative to the conventional financial system. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Financial Globalisation and Emerging Markets Volatility

The volatility of capital flows to emerging market (EM) countries and frequency of financial crises have imposed high welfare costs on the countries involved. The empirical literature provides, at best, a mixed picture on the relationship between long‐run EM country growth and financial integration. Meanwhile, the prevailing policy discourse regarding reform of the international financial system remains incomplete: the focus has largely been on either institutional and policy measures required of EM countries or international crisis‐resolution procedures. The role played by private financial markets and institutions in the developed world has not received adequate attention. This paper describes some of the structural features inherent in today's financial markets that directly contribute to the instability in EM capital flows.     

Inter‐Firm Trade Finance in Times of Crisis

The paper discusses the main features that distinguish inter‐firm international trade finance from alternative sources of financing and evaluates the potential effects of a financial crisis on the use of this form of financing for firms operating in developing countries. It argues that, on the one hand, inter‐firm trade finance could help overcome informational problems associated with other lending relationships, but, on the other, it may contribute to propagate shocks because of the interconnection among firms along credit chains. While these advantages could remain largely unexploited because of poor legal institutions, the disadvantages could be exacerbated because of these firms’ greater exposure to a default chain. Based on these arguments, a menu of choices is identified for policymakers to boost firms’ access to inter‐firm trade finance in times of crisis.     

监管松弛、过度创新与资产泡沫——对美国金融危机的一个分析逻辑

美国监管层对金融自由化的信奉,导致金融监管松弛;而金融监管松弛诱致甚至怂恿金融机构为追求高额利润而进行过度创新;过度创新导致经济体系中信贷膨胀、资产泡沫;当预期风险增加、信贷收缩时,资产泡沫破灭,便引发全面金融危机。     

Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey

Corporate governance has received much attention in recent years, partly due to the Asian financial crisis. We review the literature on corporate governance issues in Asia to develop region‐specific and general lessons. Much attention has been given to poor corporate sector performance, but most studies do not suggest that Asian firms were badly run. The literature does confirm the limited protection of minority rights in Asia, allowing controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Agency problems have been exacerbated by low corporate transparency, associated with rent‐seeking and relationship‐based transactions, extensive group structures and diversification, and risky financial structures. The controlling shareholder bears some of agency costs in the form of share price discounts and expenditures on monitoring, bonding and reputation building. The Asian financial crisis further showed that conventional and alternative corporate governance mechanisms can have limited effectiveness in systems with weak institutions and poor property rights. Overall, the understanding of the determinants of firm organizational structures, corporate governance practices and outcomes remains limited, however.     

金融机构的内在脆弱性分析

本文认为,信息不对称所导致的储户信心以及金融机构资产选择中的内在问题使得金融中介机构具有内在脆弱性或不稳定性,从而使得金融风险不断产生和积累,并最终可能引发金融危机。增强金融机构的稳定性是金融监管的核心,而通过监管增强金融机构的稳定性,可从五个方面入手,即建立金融机构经营的安全网,尽量减少道德困境,加强金融监管以限制银行承担过度的风险,强化信息披露标准以增强金融机构经营的透明性以及开展金融监管的国际性合作。     

农村金融流动性风险分析及预防

随着近年来金融危机的出现和潜在危机的浮出,流动性风险成为了值得各国、各金融机构关注的风险隐患。通过对部分涉农金融机构的负债情况和机构分布情况进行数据归纳,体现出我国现行农村金融机构信贷质量差,资金的时效性强等多方面的问题。预防农村金融流动性风险,应建立特有的农村金融机构人才培养机制,认真考察不同地区的流动性资金的走向情况,做出合理的流动性风险管理规划,并加强各地区的联系和沟通,组建风险预警体系和完善相应的保险机制。     

后危机时代构建宏观审慎监管的思考

金融监管不足是本次国际金融危机的重要推手,而产品创新过度源于微观审慎监管带来的监管套利,微观审慎监管的顺周期效应、影子银行体系及系统性重要银行监管的缺失则加剧了危机的深度。因此,宏观审慎监管的未来任务需要扩大监管范围,从总体上把握系统性风险,需要央行、金融机构、监管部门的整体配合,需要央行从源头控制流动性这一公共品,需要央行职能的重塑;然而宏观审慎监管的执行也面临一些不确定因素。     

How to Define a Systemically Important Financial Institution — A New Perspective

The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that a failure of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) could seriously damage the stability of the financial system. A precise and consistent definition of a SIFI is pivotal to ensure efficient and effective regulation of the global financial sector. This paper proposes a threefold test that indicates which financial institutions are systemically important across the various industry segments.     

Towards a new international financial order: Why reform progress is so slow

The limited progress made so far in reforming the international financial architecture cannot be attributed to insufficient reform-mindedness of the institutions involved or to a lack of reform proposals in the literature. Rather, progress is slow as almost every step towards reform involves serious trade-offs, which must be analysed carefully before reforms are implemented. Some of these trade-offs are of immediate concern for defining the role of international financial institutions, notably the IMF, with respect to crisis prevention and crisis resolution.     

Oil,debt, banking and the world recession

The threat of a major debt crisis is presently hanging over the international financial community like Damocles' sword. Behind the crisis lies the flood of petrodollars into the financial institutions of the industrial world since the mid 1970s and the consequent large-scale lending to “doubtful customers”. A simple solution to the problem is not in sight.     

金融自由化风险向金融危机转化的可能性分析

本文认为,发展中国家的金融自由化在提高金融机构效率和赢利的同时,会带来许多新的风险,而且在一定条件下有可能导致金融危机。金融自由化带来的乐观预期和大量国外私人资本的内流会使汇率高估,极易遭受投机的攻击。从带来风险到最终引发金融危机,主要有三个风险阶段,即违约风险阶段、到期不能偿还风险阶段和汇率风险阶段。当金融自由化(如利率自由化、金融业务与机构准入自由化和资本账户自由化)带来的新的风险累积到风险临界值时,在受到国内突发事件、国际金融市场波动和投机资本攻击的情况下,金融自由化风险便会向金融危机演变。     

Die aktuellen Entwicklungen der Bankenaufsicht im Lichte der Stabilität des Finanzsystems

The world financial crisis has shown the necessity of an appropriate regulation of banking institutions and the financial sector. In this context, the importance of the stability of the financial system is often considered an indicator for the stability of the economy as a whole. This contribution first goes into the matter of financial stability. Given this background, the current reforms of banking supervision are analysed with regard to an improvement in the stability of the financial system. It is shown that not all provisions are suitable to advance financial stability.