Diversification,coordination costs,and organizational rigidity: evidence from microdata

This paper examines the impact of coordination costs and organizational rigidity on the returns to diversification. The central thesis is that coordination costs offset economies of scope, while organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, further constraining economies of scope. The empirical tests of this proposition identify the effects of coordination and organizational rigidity costs on business unit and firm productivity, using novel data from the Economic Census on taxicab and limousine firms. The key results show that coordination and organizational rigidity costs are economically and statistically significant, while organizational rigidity itself accounts for a 16 percent decrease in paid ride‐miles per taxicab in incumbent diversifiers, controlling for the other costs and benefits of diversification and incumbency. The findings suggest that coordination costs, in general, and organizational rigidity costs, in particular, limit the scope of the firm. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Within‐industry diversification and firm performance—an S‐shaped hypothesis

This study shows that the interplay between “adjustment costs”, “coordination costs” and within‐industry diversification benefits, results in an S‐shaped relationship between within‐industry diversification and firm performance. At low levels of within‐industry diversification, coordination costs are negligible but “adjustment costs” are higher than the synergy benefits of a limited product scope, hence leading to negative performance outcomes. At moderate levels of within‐industry diversification synergies between related product categories substantially increase and outweigh the rise in adjustment and coordination costs, resulting in positive performance outcomes. Yet, extensive within‐industry diversification gives rise to considerable coordination costs, which, coupled with adjustment costs, outweigh synergy effects and hamper performance. The study further shows that a greater change rate of within‐industry diversification results in negative performance outcomes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inter‐temporal economies of scope,organizational modularity,and the dynamics of diversification

The question of whether corporations add value beyond that created by individual businesses has engendered much debate in recent years. Some of this debate has focused on the pros and cons of related vs. unrelated diversification. A standard explanation of the benefits of related diversification has to do with the ability to obtain intra‐temporal economies of scope from contemporaneous sharing of resources by related businesses within the firm. In contrast, this paper deals with inter‐temporal economies of scope that firms achieve by redeploying resources and capabilities between related businesses over time, as firms exit some markets while entering others. The transfer of resources due to market exit distinguishes our treatment of inter‐temporal economies of scope from standard intra‐temporal economies of scope. In addition, these inter‐temporal economies can benefit from a decentralized and modular organizational structure. This ability to obtain inter‐temporal economies of scope via organizational modularity and recombination suggests that corporations do not necessarily need a high degree of coordination between business units in order to benefit from a strategy of related diversification. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Opportunity costs and non‐scale free capabilities: profit maximization,corporate scope,and profit margins

The resource‐based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose ( 1959 ), has focused primarily on the fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction between scale free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting the discourse back to Penrose's ( 1959 ) original argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities. The existence of resources and capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit‐maximizing diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits and profit margins. Firms make profit‐maximizing decisions to increase total profit via diversification when the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively mature. Due to the spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profit‐maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical observations regarding the diversification discount. The self‐selection effect noted in recent work in corporate finance may not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity contexts in which these firms are operating. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Opportunity costs,industry dynamics,and corporate diversification: Evidence from the cardiovascular medical device industry, 1976–2004

This paper examines how demand conditions across alternative markets impact diversification decisions and firm performance by influencing the opportunity costs of deploying non‐scale free capabilities. Using data within the cardiovascular medical device industry, this study shows that: (1) firms with a larger stock of pre‐entry innovation experience are more likely to diversify; (2) firms in a current market with greater relative demand maturity are more likely to diversify; (3) diversification is associated with a performance decrease in the current market; and (4) diversification is associated with a performance increase at the corporate level. These findings shed new light on the self‐selection process of corporate scope, the conceptualization of firm capabilities, and the connection between industry dynamics and resource deployment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intra‐industry diversification and firm performance

We study how intra‐industry product diversity affects firm performance by analyzing the implications of expanding a firm's product line within its core business. We conjecture that increases in product diversity initially undermine performance because of negative transfer effects but then improve it due to economies of scope. We further theorize that this U‐shaped effect of product diversity becomes more pronounced as the firm increases the intensity of its technology investment, yet is likely to be attenuated by the firm's accumulated experience with intra‐industry diversification. Data on 156 U.S.‐based software firms operating from 1990 to 2001 furnish support for these conjectures. Our study advances emerging research on intra‐industry diversification by underscoring some of its contingent performance effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Distinguishing costs of cooperation and control in alliances

Firms simultaneously face the need to cooperate with and control an alliance partner. To complement the transaction cost perspective's emphasis on the need to control and limit opportunistic behavior, we examine the sources and impact of the cooperation costs incurred in order to work with a partner. We propose that these costs increase with greater joint task complexity and interpartner diversity, and perceptions of equitable behavior affect the perceptions of these costs. Hypotheses derived from the framework are tested in a sample of 231 contractual alliances between architects and general contractors in the Hong Kong construction industry. We find that both cooperation costs and transaction costs affect the level of time and effort a manager expends on an alliance, supporting our fundamental proposition that the costs of cooperation and control are conceptually and empirically distinct. We argue that cooperation costs should be incorporated into studies that compare the choice of alternative partners and alliance structures, as well as among the broader categories of market, hierarchy, and hybrid governance forms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between portfolio diversification and firm value: The evidence from corporate venture capital activity

Corporate venture capital (CVC) activity exposes firms to new technologies and markets. An important but as yet unexplored question is the relationship of the industry diversification profile of the portfolio of venture companies to corporate value creation. Insights from options and diversification perspectives support our hypothesis that diversification of a corporate investor's portfolio of venture companies is related to corporate wealth creation in a U‐shaped relationship. We also propose that a corporate investor's financial constraints moderate the relationship between the diversification profile of its CVC portfolio and value creation. When we tested our hypotheses using a sample of CVC investments across multiple industries, we found support for them, and these findings may inform the CVC activities of corporate investors. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product variety,sourcing complexity,and the bottleneck of coordination

Research summary: This paper studies the coordination burden for firms that pursue variety as their main product strategy. We propose that product variety magnifies the tension between scale economies in production and scope economies in distribution, giving rise to complex sourcing relationships. Sourcing complexity worsens performance and poses a dilemma for organization design: A hierarchical structure with intermediate coordinating units such as sourcing hubs reduces sourcing complexity for downstream distribution but creates bottlenecks at the hubs, hurting performance for both the hubs and downstream distribution. We empirically examine operations data for about 300 distribution centers within a major soft drink bottling company in 2010–2011. Results support our hypotheses, illuminating the source of complexity in multi‐product firms and the challenge for organization design in managing complexity. Managerial summary: This paper uses data for about 300 distribution centers within a major soft drink bottling company to study how a large product variety creates complex sourcing networks. We find that, in addition to poor performance (e.g., increased stockouts), complex sourcing networks can cause challenges for organization design. In particular, the benefits of converting an existing distribution center into a sourcing hub (i.e., reduction in sourcing complexity for downstream distribution) and the costs of doing so (i.e., reduction in performance for both the hubs and downstream distribution) are both real and significant. The design of an efficient sourcing network despite its complexity involves important managerial decisions. Experiences in building and managing such networks can be the basis of a dynamic capability. © 2016 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring: The interplay of complexity,organizational design,and experience

This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of implementation that are neglected in strategic decision‐making processes—in the context of services offshoring. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that decision makers are more likely to make cost‐estimation errors given increasing configuration and task complexity in captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, we show that experience and a strong orientation toward organizational design in the offshoring strategy reduce the cost‐estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our findings contribute to research on the effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by stressing the importance of organizational design and experience in dealing with increasing complexity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How do interdependencies among human‐capital deployment,development, and diversification strategies affect firms' financial performance?

Using key insights from the resource‐based view of the firm, we develop and test a theory of how firms can successfully deploy and develop their strategic human assets while managing the trade‐offs in their service and geographical diversification strategies. In a sample of large law firms we find that, even though firms profit from expert human‐capital leveraging strategy and service and geographical diversification strategies individually, pursuing these strategies simultaneously at high levels produces negative interaction effects on firm profitability. In addition, the internally developed, firm‐specific associate human capital strategically fits better with high levels of expert human‐capital leveraging. While lateral hiring helps firms build new knowledge bases and take advantage of growth opportunities, pursuing high levels of both expert human‐capital leveraging and lateral hiring of associates results in lower profitability. To fully capture the economic benefits from strategies of diversification, human‐capital leveraging and lateral hiring, firms should understand and manage the complex interdependencies among multiple levels of strategy. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technological diversity,related diversification,and firm performance

Previous findings that related diversification creates value have been called into question over concerns about methodology and measures. Reviewing existing theory to consider how a firm's knowledge base interacts with its product market activity, I address several of these concerns by creating a measure of technological diversity based on citation‐weighted patents. The measure indicates a firm's opportunity for corporate diversification based on economies of scope in valuable knowledge assets, is defined for both single‐ and multibusiness firms, and is not correlated with more fundamental aspects of diversification, such as the number of businesses in the corporate portfolio. Evidence from a large sample of firms shows the positive relationship between diversification based on technological diversity and market‐based measures of performance, controlling for R&D intensity and capital intensity as further indicators of the type of assets underlying diversification. Results hold when controlling for the endogeneity of diversification and performance in a cross‐sectional sample or when controlling for unobserved factors using panel data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Linking corporate strategy to capital structure: diversification strategy,type and source of financing

This study examines the relationship between corporate strategy and capital structure, specifically the diversfication and financing strategies of a firm. The results show that equity financing is preferred for related diversification and unrelated diversification is associated with debt financing. Additionally, firms diversifying through acquisitions are more likely to use public sources of financing and those emphasizing internal development of new businesses depend primarily on private sources of financing. Using simultaneous equation estimation, we found a reciprocal relationship between a firm's financial strategy and its corporate diversification strategy. Mode and nature of diversification are also reciprocally interrelated. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structure and process of diversification,compensation strategy,and firm performance

This study tests six hypotheses on the extent to which a match between compensation and diversification strategies affects firm performance. Using both archival and survey data, results generally support the notion that a firm's compensation strategies make a greater contribution to firm performance if these are attuned to extent and process of corporate diversification. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future research on compensation-diversification strategy relations and their interactive effect on firm performance.