What the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation can learn from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

This article attempts to draw attention to some important lessons that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) can learn from the experience of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). FSLIC was the government agency that insured deposits at savings and loan associations until it was replaced in 1989, leaving a massive deficit to be financed by taxpayers. Like FSLIC, the PBGC is a government agency that guarantees a form of private corporate debt. As guarantor of the pension benefits promised by private plan sponsors, the PBGC bears the risk of a shortfall between the value of insured benefits and the assets securing those benefits. There has been a significant change in the attitude and behavior of senior public officials and legislators as a result of the S&L debacle. Directors of the PBGC and the Secretaries of Labor to whom they report have pointed out the weaknesses of some of the pension funds that the PBGC insures and have pursued an active legislative agenda designed to reduce the PBGC's vulnerability to those weaknesses. Those efforts have resulted in a series of laws and amendments to laws that have significantly improved the U.S. pension guarantee system. But the magnitude of the PBGC's exposure to shortfall risk depends on three factors: (1) the financial strength of plan sponsors, (2) the degree of underfunding of insured benefits, and (3) the mismatch between the market-risk exposure of insured benefits (a form of long-term corporate debt) and the market-risk exposure of the assets securing that debt. Only the first two of these have been addressed by past legislative reforms. The third factor appears not to be well understood. It is apparently a widespread belief among policymakers that a well-diversified pension portfolio of equity securities provides an effective long-run hedge against liabilities of defined-benefit pension plans, so that there is no mismatch problem. This belief is mistaken. Equities are not a hedge against fixed-income liabilities even in the long run. Thus, even if the PBGC achieves the goal of full funding at one point in time, the mismatch between the market-risk exposure of the pension benefits that it insures and the pension assets backing them creates the potential for large shortfall losses in the future as the economy and capital market rates change in unpredictable ways. Therein lies an uncomfortable parallel with the S&L debacle.     

Defeasing Legacy Costs*

The authors propose a new way to defease the legacy costs of America's defined benefit pension system that will help ensure its viability. The proposal would allow companies to exchange their legacy pension debt for another liability with more attractive terms—to the benefit of the sponsor, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and the plan participants. The transparency gained by separating the past from future liabilities will give better insight into sponsors' balance sheets. And it could take the PBGC out of the impossible position of insuring against events over which the insured have considerable control.     

Politics, Insurance Regulation, and Unfunded Pension Liabilities

ABSTRACT: Insurance regulators operate in an environment in which resources are scarce and issues are most often complex and not salient to affected persons. Consequently, regulatory agencies, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), need to use resources efficiently by making issues salient and not complex if regulatory goals are to be attained. To further its goal of full funding of defined benefit pension plans, the PBGC annually published a list of the Top Fifty Companies With the Largest Underfunded Pension Liability (LIST). This article investigates the issue of the economic effects of pension plan disclosure by measuring the share price response of the companies included on the LIST; then policy implications are drawn. The event study findings show that, on average, publication of the LIST did not have a negative effect on firm value. However, cross-sectional analysis provides some support for the contention that publication of the LIST had an economic cost on LISTed firms. The authors' results show that the value of large firms on the PBGC's list is less negatively affected at arrival (ARRIVAL) than smaller LISTed firms. Conversely, when firms leave the list (DEPARTURE), the value of large growth-oriented firms is more negatively affected than the value of other firms that reduce their unfunded pension liability. From a policy perspective, as hypothesized by Meier (1991), the PBGC used its scarce resources effectively by publishing the LIST. The issue of unfunded pension liability became less complex and more salient to interested parties. Consequently, consumer groups and political elites provided their support to further the regulatory agency's stated goal, which was the full funding of defined benefit pension plans. Furthermore, increased awareness of the underfunding problem contributed to the passage of the Retirement Protection Act of 1994.     

美国现金余额计划及其对我国的启示

混合型养老金计划是国际养老金计划发展的重要趋势,现金余额计划是美国养老金混合计划中发展较好、规模较大的一种私人养老金计划。该计划具有较低的养老金计划成本、资金筹措较具弹性、养老金给付享受政府担保、较好的激励机制、较强的透明度和携带性、为雇主和关键员工提供更高的福利保障、与其他计划搭配的计划组合效应等特定优势。美国2006年养老金保护法颁布实施后,该计划的年龄歧视、转换期的养老金蚀损、给付贴现则所导致的制度法律风险得以消除,使该计划具有较好的发展前景。美国现金余额计划对中国企业年金发展具有重要借鉴意义。     

Measuring Longevity Risk: An Application to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Plan

An employer that sets up a defined benefit pension plan promises to periodically pay a certain sum to each participant starting at some future date and continuing until death. Although both the future beneficiary and the employer can be asked to finance the plan throughout the beneficiary's career, any shortcoming of funds in the future is often the employer's responsibility. It is therefore essential for the employer to be able to predict with a high degree of confidence the total amount that will be required to cover its future pension obligations. Applying mortality forecasting models to the case of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police pension plan, we illustrate the importance of mortality forecasting to value a pension fund's actuarial liabilities. As future survival rates are uncertain, pensioners may live longer than expected. We find that such longevity risk represents approximately 2.8 percent of the total liability ascribable to retired pensioners (as measured by the relative value at risk at the 95th percentile) and 2.5 percent of the total liabilities ascribable to current regular contributors. Longevity risk compounds the model risk associated with not knowing what is the true mortality model, and we estimate that model risk represents approximately 3.2 percent of total liabilities. The compounded longevity risk therefore represents almost 6 percent of the pension plan's total liabilities.     

FRS17 and the Sterling Double A Corporate Yield Curve

Abstract:   We argue that the appropriate discount rate used to report defined benefit pension plan liabilities in the financial statements is a yield derived from an estimate of a double A corporate yield curve. We show that parsimonious yield curve techniques are easily applicable to the sterling double A corporate bond market. Moreover, we find that with a careful selection of the data an objective and reliable yield curve can be obtained. In all we find that using a yield from a sterling double A corporate yield curve to obtain the value of defined benefit pension plan liabilities is a feasible alternative to the current recommendations of FRS17 .     

Discretion in accounting for pensions under IAS 19: using the ‘magic telescope’?

We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005–2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries. We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

Pension Funding Regulations and Actuarial Gains and Losses

With pervasive pension funding deficits, Korean firms have been under pressure to improve their funding levels. We examine whether firms have incentives to set obligation‐decreasing pension assumptions when they have large pension deficits (pension obligations in excess of plan assets) and when they make insufficient contributions to external pension funds. We find that firms report larger actuarial gains (or smaller actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities when their pension funding ratio (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to defined benefit obligations) is lower and when contributions to plan assets relative to pension service costs are smaller. Next, upon the introduction of a minimum pension funding guideline, we find that the effect of the funding ratio and contributions to pension funds on actuarial gains and losses is more pronounced for firms whose funding ratios are slightly below the minimum funding ratio than it is for firms whose funding ratios exceed or fall short of the minimum by a large margin. Our results indicate that firms opportunistically exercise discretion regarding corporate pension accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards to comply with pension funding regulations, thereby reducing perceived pension deficits.     

Contrasting the information demands of equity- and debt-holders: Evidence from pension liabilities

In the setting of defined-benefit pension liabilities, we hypothesize that equity and debt investors value these liabilities differently. As expected, we find that investors' valuations of equity more closely align with a going concern perspective that emphasizes the long-term funding needs of pension plans. In contrast, as expected, we find that investors' pricing of short-term and unsecured debt more closely aligns with a settlement perspective that emphasizes pension termination costs. For both equity and debt securities, the settlement (going concern) perspective dominates for short-duration (long-duration) pensions. Overall, our evidence suggests that equity and debt investors perceive complex liabilities in predictably different ways that are consistent with their differing information demands, which in turn vary with the characteristics of the obligation.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Do pension buyouts help or hurt employees (retirees)?

This article compares expected pension default losses of employees and retirees before and after pension buyouts. The comparisons are made using a stochastic model calibrated with market data. The analysis shows that the lower protection level provided by the State Guarantee Association relative to that of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a critical factor that explains the welfare reduction, or equivalently, larger expected pension default losses, of most retirees who become annuity holders in the buyouts. The analysis also shows that the employee welfare, or equivalently expected pension default gains or losses, depends on the continued PBGC protection and, critically, their employers' postbuyout default risk and pension funding status. Moreover, these employee welfare changes are quite different for the corporations included in this analysis. Our results suggest that welfare improvements depend on the PBGC and state insurance regulators' cooperation in protecting pension participants and supervising buyout insurers.     

Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?

We calculate the present value of state employee pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect the risk of the payments from a taxpayer perspective. If benefits have the same default and recovery characteristics as state general obligation debt, the national total of promised liabilities based on current salary and service is $3.20 trillion. If pensions have higher priority than state debt, the value of liabilities is much larger. Using zero‐coupon Treasury yields, which are default‐free but contain other priced risks, promised liabilities are $4.43 trillion. Liabilities are even larger under broader concepts that account for salary growth and future service.     

The Usefulness of the Wind-Up Measure of Pension Liabilities: A Labor Market Perspective

Financial economists have long favored the use of a wind-up measure of the firm's pension liabilities. Yet the pension liabilities of the firm also represent the pension wealth of its workers. It is reasonable to presume that workers and shareholders have a common view of the pension contract. If the wind-up measure depicts the true pension liabilities of the firm, then the wage concession granted by its workers must reflect the fact that the firm may choose to terminate the plan at any time. Data on the wage-service characteristics of the membership of a sample of final earnings plans in Canada suggest, contrary to the implications of the wind-up measure, that workers' wages do not internalize accruing pension benefits on a year-to-year basis. Instead, the data suggest that pension plans may be a vehicle through which a significant portion of the total compensation of individual employees is deferred until their later work years, and that the wind-up measure may well understate the pension liabilities of an on-going firm.     

INVESTOR EVALUATION OF OVERFUNDED PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS

Hundreds of large firms have terminated overfunded pension plans and obtained substantial cash reversions in the past few years. This study reveals a positive and significant market reaction at the time of the termination announcement. The strongest stock price reaction is for firms with large terminations relative to prereversion income. This study demonstrates that real economic gains result from the termination. Specifically, firms terminating overfunded pension plans tend to have tax loss carryforwards that effectively increase the after-tax returns from termination.     

Empirical Risk Analysis of Pension Insurance: The Case of Germany

The book reserve system is the most widespread method of financing occupational pension plans in Germany. The pension liabilities are mutually insured by the Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein VVaG (PSVaG) against bankruptcy. The PSVaG recently stated that the insurance system needed to be reformed. In the future, risk-adjusted premiums as foreseen for the newly established Pension Protection Fund in the United Kingdom could become feasible. We perform a credit portfolio analysis to determine the risk profile of the PSVaG. The magnitude of a tail risk event suggests that under the current financing system it can only be smoothed out over decades. Under an expected loss pricing plan insurance premiums would vary greatly. In a marginal risk contribution approach the variation of the premiums would be less pronounced.     

Pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities: A contingent claims analysis using Parisian options

We analyze the market-consistent valuation of pension liabilities in a contingent claim framework whereby a knock-out barrier feature is applied to capture early regulatory closure of a pension plan. We investigate two cases which we call “immediate closure procedure” and “delayed closure procedure”. In an immediate closure procedure, when the assets value hits the regulatory boundary, the pension plan is terminated immediately. Whereas in a delayed closure procedure, a grace period is given to the pension fund for reorganization and recovery before premature closure is executed. The framework is then used to construct fair pension deals. Furthermore, we provide rules for deriving the optimal recovery period in pension regulation using utility analysis and interconnect the recovery period to the regulatory liquidation probability.     

Pension Funds and the U.K. Economy

Abstract

The paper considers the impact of U.K. defined benefit (DB) pension plan unding and investment on the U.K. economy. It suggests that many conventional theories are based on incomplete or inconsistent economics. In particular, the author suggests that:

? An economy cannot really gain competitive advantage from high returns on the domestic assets in which pension funds invest.

? DB liabilities are essentially similar for most schemes and can be closely matched with bonds.

? Funding pension liabilities has no primary impact on individuals’ consumption and saving or on firms’ capital investment.

? Pension funds are not natural investors in the equity of new ventures.

The conclusion of the paper is that the most significant impact of pension funds on the U.K. economy relates to the costs imposed by extreme mismatching between their financial assets and liabilities. The author argues that such risks can, in essence, “crowd out” entrepreneurial risk. He asserts that the U.K. economy would gain from greater focus on the matching of these assets and liabilities, and that the best way to stimulate enterprise is by eliminating the frictional costs in the economy arising from current practices.     

Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

公共部门养老保险隐性债务:国际比较

大多数国家针对公共部门工作人员设有单独的养老保险。这些保险未来的财政负担可能相当繁重,因为政府通常是雇用工作人员最多的部门,公共部门的养老待遇相对来讲也更加丰厚,而未来养老金待遇需要直接从国家财政(现收现付制)或积累不足的养老基金(基金积累制)中支付。一些国家有关养老金水平的论证和信息不透明,可能隐含巨额财政债务,将会转移到后代人身上。为了让各国之间就公共部门养老保险财政负担进行公平比较,本文建议根据统一标准对非积累制养老保险的债务进行测评和报告,以提高财政透明度,帮助决策。文章从经济合作与发展组织选取了一些国家,按公允价值估计2008年底的净负债值。这种财政负担也可理解为养老金隐性债务。