Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance: A Welfare Comparison

This paper introduces risk-averse preferences in Chariand Jagannathan (1988). A first motivation for thisextension is to give a positive role for a financial intermediaryin the economy, who offers risk-sharing contracts to liquidityseeking individuals. In this framework, both information-inducedan pure panic runs will occur. The second motivation is tocomplete Chari and Jagannathan's welfare analysis by comparingsuspension of convertibility and deposit insurance, given theirrelative benefits and costs (of randomization in meeting liquidityneeds or deadweight taxation). It is shown that the choice betweenthe two contracts depends on the level of risk aversion, theintertemporal discount factor and the attributes about theunderlying technology.     

Deregulation, Deposit Markets, and Banks' Costs of Funds

Deposit interest rate deregulation and financial service innovation have led to dramatic changes in large banks' deposit composition. This paper presentes a statistical cost analysis of changes in unit costs faced by banks under comprehensive financial deregulation. The results of this paper show that the unit cost of retail deposits-demand and passbook savings deposits-has increased relative to wholesale deposits-federal funds, certificates of deposit, and money market time deposits. We show, contrary to conventional wisdom, that changes in unit costs have been caused by processing costs rather than by interest expenses.     

存款保险、市场竞争与银行经营稳健性

本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。     

市场约束、流动性援助与存款保险——基于银行审慎经营的激励兼容分析

银行审慎经营是金融稳定的微观基础，而银行治理过程中利益相关者的动态均衡是银行审慎经营的保证。市场约束是利益相关者参与银行治理的外部机制，流动性援助和存款保险是维护金融稳定的安全设施，市场约束、流动性援助和存款保险的激励兼容才能增加银行审慎经营可能性。在一定的制度设施基础上。完善市场约束，减少流动性援助和存款保险带来的道德风险，建立一个市场约束、流动性援助和存款保险激励兼容的外部框架有利于银行的审慎经营。     

Bank Insolvency, Deposit Insurance, and Capital Adequacy

This paper extends the Dowd (2000) model by introducing a risky investment technology. This assumption allows to introduce the possibility of an insolvency crisis. A banker may earn a positive expected profit by insuring depositors against the technological risk. If the bank has adequate capital, the insurance is credible and an insolvency crisis cannot occur. A public safety net may be unnecessary to prevent insolvency crises.     

Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.     

存款保险、最后贷款人与风险处置

本文从维护区域金融稳定的现实需求出发,通过理论模型分析某个银行机构产生金融风险时,存款保险基金和最后贷款人对其进行救助或处置与否的最优选择和条件,分析比较了不同情形下的中央银行救助或处置策略,为发挥好存款保险和最后贷款人职能作用、共同防控区域金融风险提供参考。     

Deregulation,Pricing Strategies,and Claim Behavior in the Taiwan Automobile Insurance Market

Stringent pricing regulations have long been in effect in the Taiwan automobile insurance market. In April 2009, a pricing deregulation was adopted, enabling insurers to establish their own auto insurance premium rates. This study examines the effects of deregulation in terms of three hypotheses that we propose pertaining to market shares, loading factors, and last policy month claims. The quantitative analysis results show that pricing deregulation prompts insurers to lower their rates. The effects of deregulation for insurers are determined by not only the decision to deduct premiums and the deduction percentages, but also by policy type.     

Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicatesthat a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates thecost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14economies to assess the relationship between the risk-takingbehavior of banks and their corporate governance structure.The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tendto take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownershipengage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, asa proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has somepower in predicting bank distress.     

存款保险制度、银行特征与系统性风险

存款保险制度是推进我国金融市场化改革的重要举措,研究其对银行系统性风险的影响,对于进一步完善存款保险制度具有重要意义.本文选取2010—2019年我国上市银行面板数据,运用动态面板模型分析存款保险制度与银行系统性风险的关系,并就银行特征对二者关系的影响进一步展开研究.结果表明,现阶段我国存款保险制度有加剧银行系统性风险的倾向,提高银行杠杆会强化存款保险制度的风险效应,实行高管债权激励机制和扩张银行规模对此风险效应有抑制效果,但这种调节效应对中小银行并不明显.最后针对性地提出应对策略.     

韩国存款保险制度

成立的背景 全球化过程中金融业变得更加自主和自由,也更容易进入海外市场,银行亏损的可能性更大.对这个问题的担忧使韩国国会在1995年12月29日通过了<存款人保护法案>,并在1996年6月1日成立了韩国存款保险公司来建立存款保险制度.     

U.S. Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses, and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income

We estimate the effects of deregulation of U.S. banking restrictions on interstate personal income insurance for the period 1970 to 2001. Interstate income insurance occurs when personal income reacts less than one‐to‐one to state‐specific output shocks. We find that insurance improved after banking deregulation, with a larger effect in states where small businesses are more important and on proprietors' income than on other components of personal income. Our explanation centers on the role of banks as a prime source of small business finance and on the close intertwining of the personal and business finances of small business owners.     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Adequacy Requirements and Interest Rate Dynamics

This paper examines the long run interaction among deposit insurance, bank deposit rates and capital adequacy requirements. Using analysis similar to the price discrimination model of Lott and Roberts (1991) we find that a competitive environment among banks would link the spread between insured and uninsured deposit rates to the size of the insurance premium. We also find that banks that choose to operate at the regulatory minimum capital level, would increase asset risk with increased capital requirements if (1) the implicit interest paid to insured and uninsured depositors is equally sensitive to changes in risk and capital adequacy and (2) the insurance premium is independent of the level of risk and capital adequacy. Under the present risk-based premium structure, asset risk has the potential to decline when the regulatory agency raises capital requirements. Finally, we examine the time series behavior of insured and uninsured interest rates to see if it is consistent with our theoretical model. We find that insured and uninsured rates, along with deposit insurance premiums, are cointegrated series as suggested by our model.     

存款保险制度面面观

从日本和美国的经验来看,其各自成功的秘诀在于根据本国实际客观情况来制定相应的制度,并及时依据实际情况变化做出调整。而我国即将构建的存款保险制度,也必须从当前实际情况出发。[编者按]     

客观认识存款保险制度

随着我国市场经济体制的建立,对外开放的深入,银行业竞争的格局会愈演愈烈,经营风险日益加剧。因此,建立存款保险制度的问题已被提到议事日程上来,且呼声越来越高。目前,我国是否具备了建立存款保险制度的条件,时机是否成熟,我们应该本着实事求是的态度,客观地认识存款保险制度。     

Capital Structure, Agency Problems, and Deposit Insurance in Banking Firms

This paper applies and synthesizes various theories of corporate finance, including capital structure, agency insurance, and regulation, to the case of banking firms and the deposite insurance system. It is argued that a value-maximizing bank would reach its optimal capital structure by minimizing the agency costs of incentive conflicts among stockholders, managers, uninsured depositors, and the deposit insurance agency. Although a regulatory imposed capital requirment may reduce the agency costs inherent in the insurance contact, it cannot produce a universal capital structure that is optimal for all insured banks. The observed capital structure patterns also suggest that banks actively seek an optimal capital structure.     

新加坡将实行存款保险计划

新加坡在存款保险方面做出的有益探索对于我国相关制度的建设无疑有着重要的借鉴意义。本刊特约记者中国银行驻新加坡分行的林沛先生就新加坡实行存款保险计划的情况为我们做了详尽的介绍。     

Market Pricing of Deposit Insurance

We provide an approach to the market valuation of deposit insurance that is based on reduced-form methods for the pricing of fixed-income securities under default risk. By reference to bank debt prices as well as qualitative-response models of the probability of bank failure, we suggest how a risk-neutral valuation model for deposit insurance can be applied both to the calculation of fair-market deposit insurance premia and to the valuation of long-term claims against the insurer.     

Federal Deposit Insurance,Regulatory Policy,and Optimal Bank Capital*

This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk-taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks

Abstract:  Banking sector globalization has caused an expansion in foreign-owned bank assets. In this paper we analyse the effects of a MNB's liability structure upon its investment in a foreign country. We develop a model in which capital adequacy requirements introduce some deliberate underinvestment which counters deposit insurance-induced overinvestment. Diversification is unattractive with fixed bank capital requirements, because it reduces the expected value of the deposit insurance net. This effect applies in multinational banks (MNBs), where shocks to the home country economy alter the value of the deposit insurance net and hence affect overseas lending incentives. Thus, MNBs act as a channel for financial contagion. We discuss the policy implications of our results.