FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE BANKING IMPUTATION IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS*

The banking problem in the National Accounts arises because interest rates paid by banks on deposits are generally lower than the rates charged for loans and service charges levied by banks are generally less than the cost of the banking services provided. This paper offers two explanations for such observations: first there is the new neo-classical theory of private banking and central banking which suggests that they arise because of distorting “taxes” levied by regulating central banks. Second there is the Keynesian theory which accounts for the observations by the fact that the public good services of monetary stabilization supplied directly by the central banks and indirectly by private banks cannot be priced. Both theories account for the empirical observations giving rise to the banking problem. Neither theory lends support to the banking imputation currently carried out in most National Accounts.     

ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES

In order to examine theories of domestic and international trade in banking, information is presented in this paper on the vast array of service charges banks levy on their customers, both resident and non-resident, and the complex of interest rates on deposits and loans that must be collected. Examination is also necessary of collection procedures of the various charges which central banks levy on banks, as well as interest rates paid on reserves, insurance premia on deposits and the like in order to test propositions that international trade in banking is a function of the various monetary policies followed by Monetary Authorities.     

THE TREATMENT OF INTEREST AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: THE OLD "BUNDLE" VERSUS THE NEW "UNBUNDLE" APPROACH

As is widely recognized both in the literature and by the practitioners, the treatment of financial intermediaries has been one of the most controversial issues in national accounting. This has been so largely because no one up to now has been able to define the output of banks and other financial intermediaries. In the present paper, a theory of services in general and of financial services in particular is used to demonstrate that financial intermediaries produce at least six commodity type services. Furthermore, it is argued that in order to solve the banking imputation problem it is necessary to separate the theory of interest rates from the theory of financial services and examine the interdependence between them. The gross interest rate must be unbundled because it contains three distinct components. These are, first, the pure interest rate, which reflects payment for a factor-type service; second, payments for six commodity-type services, which reflect the output of financial intermediaries; and, third, payments for unilateral transfers. The new unbundled approach is contrasted to the old bundle approach used and/or advocated by standard economic theory, the SNA, Sunga and the Ruggleses. Furthermore, it is recommended that payments for the pure interest rate be considered as part of income of the paying enterprise or sector while payments for financial services by enterprises to other enterprises should be considered as intermediate purchases.     

A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization

The unconventional monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve during the recent Global Financial Crisis often involve implicit subsidies to banks. This paper offers a theory of the non-neutrality of money associated with capital injection into banks via nominal transfers, in an environment where banking frictions are present in the sense that there exists an agency problem between banks and their private-sector creditors. The analysis is conducted within a general equilibrium setting with two-sided financial contracting. We first show that even with perfect nominal flexibility, the recapitalization policy has real effects on the economy. We then introduce banking riskiness shocks and study optimal policy responses to such shocks.     

The Structure of Financial Markets and the 'First Principles' of Monetary Economics

There has been a significant degree of financial restructuring over the last few decades, which has prompted a rethinking of the first principles of monetary economics. The focus here is on how four specifications of these principles address such issues as the need for central banks and the potential for separation of the monetary functions. The case is made for one approach, which suggests that the need to establish trustworthy credit relations, in an environment subject to fundamental uncertainty, is at the heart of monetary systems. It is argued that monetary history demonstrates that monetary standards and central banking have indeed tended to be the outcome of the competitive process in the financial sector.     

An activist revival in central banking? Lessons from the history of economic thought and central bank practice

Abstract

We introduce the “minimalist–activist” spectrum as an analytical prism through which to view key aspects of central banking theory and practice. We focus on the activist end of this spectrum, concentrating on economic growth. We explore the theoretical roots of these ideas in the writings of Dennis Robertson. We illustrate central banking practice by detailing some approaches followed by central banks pursuing economic growth and development in the decades following the Second World War. History of monetary thought, monetary theory, and analysis of central bank practices blend together to illuminate key principles and practices of central banking.     

Sovereign Debt Management and the Transformation from Keynesian to Neoliberal Monetary Governance in Britain

ABSTRACT

Private financial markets are central to the implementation of monetary governance. This necessary integration of public and private finance means the way states govern must evolve with developments in financial markets. This article examines how the rise of liability management underpinned a shift to market-based banking and transformed the operation of monetary policy in Britain. It assesses the period of reform between 1967 and 1981 and what this meant for monetary governance. Political economy literature depicts this period as a shift to depoliticised, deregulated governance with public authority giving way to market power. This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it misconstrues the problem policymakers faced. The shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary governance came in response to the change in banking practice with the rise of liability management and a parallel money market. This underpinned an explosion of credit creation that the old system of monetary policy, organised around the Base Rate and ‘primary’ discount market could not fix. As a result, the monetary authorities had to render this new financial environment governable. The period should therefore be reassessed in terms of the capacities the state attempted to construct to conduct monetary governance.     

WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW CAN HURT YOU: KNOWLEDGE PROBLEMS IN MONETARY POLICY

Many economists hold that monetary policy missteps played a role in causing or prolonging the 2007–2008 financial crisis. In light of the perceived failure of monetary orthodoxy, models are being theoretically refined and empirically recalibrated. Absent from these technical debates is a recognition of the immense knowledge burdens inherent in monetary policy. We argue that Fed authorities do not have the knowledge required to achieve their own monetary objectives, given their inability to approximately measure or predict changes in the demand for money. Finally, we evaluate the ability of free banking to overcome this knowledge problem. (JEL E42, E52, E58, E61, P16)     

中国货币政策的区域效应研究——来自信用观点的解释

本文以货币政策的"信用观点"为理论前提,运用VAR模型对我国货币政策的区域效应进行了实证研究.分析结果表明,在我国直接融资还不发达、东、中、西部地区的银行体系特征还存在较大差异的现实背景下,中央银行统一的货币政策通过各地区的银行体系进行传导时,将通过影响各地区银行系统提供信贷的能力而影响各地区私人部门的信用可得性,从而导致各地区的经济发展水平体现出较大的差异,最终表现为货币政策的区域效应.为此中央银行必须实施差别化的货币政策和信贷政策以促进区域经济的协调发展.     

How does capital regulation react to monetary policy? New evidence on the risk-taking channel

Before the subprime crisis, financial stability was a microprudential issue addressed by capital regulation and unrelated to monetary policy. The financial crisis put this paradigm to the test and turned the spotlight on the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy. Hence, the following question arises: how does capital regulation react to monetary policy? This article seeks to answer this question. We analyze the link involving monetary policy and capital regulation through the risk-taking channel in Brazil. The findings suggest that banks react to monetary policy by changing the amount of loan provisions as well as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). An important novelty of the study is the evidence that there is no trade-off between provisions and CAR, which are important tools used by banking supervisors. The key result of the article is that banks react to the macroeconomic environment differently from what is expected by banking supervision, i.e., there exists a paradox between the microprudential view and the macroprudential view. Thus, in terms of practical implication, a banking supervision strategy for financial stability must take into account the effects of monetary policy.     

Still unanswered quibbles with fractional reserve free banking

Anthony Evans and Steven Horwitz readily admit that their own understanding of monetary theory is imperfect, and do not even “attempt a rebuttal of [our] claims.” George Selgin accepts that some of the arguments we put forward in Bagus and Howden (2010) make for “interesting theory”. He fails to rebuff our claim that precautionary reserves are unable to constrain credit creation in a fractional reserve free banking system. While calling for us to provide historical evidence to validate the quibbles we put forward, Selgin himself overstates the evidence. He also claims that we have distorted what he has written, and that we use incorrect monetary theory. These allegations are false.     

The Conceptual Flaw in the Microeconomic Foundations of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models

First-generation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have been criticized for their lack of financial markets but, more perceptively, for their barter properties. This note explains why the second of these criticisms is fundamental. All DSGE models are built on frictionless, perfect barter, Walrasian microeconomic foundations. Introducing money and banks into such models converts them into a ‘friction’ contra the fundamental principle that monetary exchange is more efficient than barter. This insoluble difficulty with the microeconomic foundations of DSGE models arises because theorists ignore the Hahn problem that applies to all monetary models based on Walrasian general equilibrium (GE) microeconomic foundations. The Hahn problem reveals three things. First, a perfect barter GE solution always exists in any ‘monetary’ model erected on Walrasian GE microeconomic foundations. Second, inessential monetary features are easily attached to perfect barter microeconomic foundations but as easily removed, leaving the perfect barter solution intact. Third, attaching such inessential additions leads to logical error; the misuse of language that produces invalid conclusions. A second-generation DSGE model that is intended to increase understanding of financial crises is then examined to show that it suffers from the Hahn problem; it converts banking and financial markets into ‘frictions’, and words and economic concepts take on different meanings. That renders the new DSGE model impossible to interpret or use as a basis for advice on monetary policy.     

BEYOND EMU: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABILITY

A common currency, as envisioned in the Maastricht treaty, is thought to be the surest way to "lock in" commitments to monetary cooperation among sovereign states. But historical evidence suggests otherwise. Comparative analysis of six currency unions demonstrates that while economic and organizational factors are influential in determining the sustainability of monetary cooperation, interstate politics matters most. Compliance with commitments is greatest in the presence of either a locally dominant state, willing and able to use its influence to sustain monetary cooperation, or a broad network of institutional linkages sufficient to make the loss of monetary autonomy tolerable to each partner.     

THE TRANSMISSION OF THE MONETARY POLICY IN THE EURO AREA: THE ROLE OF THE BANKS’ BUSINESS MODEL

This paper sheds some new light on the incidence of the banks’ business model as a component of the bank lending channel in the euro area. Differently from existing literature, the analysis is led on the basis of the two main macroeconomic regions that today characterize the euro area: its north‐east (German‐centric) and south‐west halves. The observation period is 2008–2013, mainly featured by the financial and economic crisis. The empirical findings evidence that in the north‐east half of the euro area the cooperative banks leveraged the effects of the reduction in the interest rates in terms of new lending. In this respect, they differentiated from commercial and savings banks, which showed a more neutral impact on the transmission of the monetary policy decisions. These results highlight the distinctive role of the cooperative banks in terms of credit provision in Germany and in the whole north‐east half of the euro area. Nevertheless, this cooperative banking effect did not emerge for the south‐west half of the continent, particularly hit by the crisis. This may suggest that the bank's business model tend to be neutral to the transmission of the monetary policy in economies characterized by prolonged recessions.     

Financing Channels and Monetary Policy in a Dual Banking System: Evidence from Islamic Banks in Indonesia

Using Indonesian Islamic banking data from 2003 to 2014, this article employs a panel regression methodology to investigate the responses of Islamic banks to changes in financing rates and monetary policy, which may differ depending on their characteristics. The results suggest that the financing rate has a negative impact on financing at Islamic banks, while bank‐specific characteristics have a positive influence on it. The size and amount of capital have a greater impact than liquidity on financing at Islamic banks. However, changes in monetary policy are insignificant on bank financing, which implies that the transmission of monetary policy through the Islamic segment of the banking sector is weak. Furthermore, the weak impact of monetary policy on bank financing can be explained by the dramatic expansion of Islamic banks during the sample period, which contributed to a substantial increase in deposit growth and a high liquidity position.     

Monetary policy and systemic risk-taking in the euro area banking sector

Available empirical evidence on the significance of the (micro) risk-taking channel of monetary policy is not enough to indicate a threat to financial stability. Evidence of risk-taking with systemic risk implications is necessary. Statistical measures that capture systemic risk in all its forms within a structural factor-augmented vector autoregressive model suggest that conventional and unconventional monetary policies have resulted in systemic risk-taking in the euro area banking sector. Systemic risk has taken the form of an increase in the banking sector’s vulnerability via contagion and interconnectedness. Banks’ balance sheets, however, do not account for the full transmission from (micro) risk taking to systemic risk-taking. The main policy implication is that a persistently accommodative monetary policy may drive a monetary authority with a price stability mandate to consider a possible trade-off with financial stability. At a minimum, coordination between monetary and macro-prudential policies requires serious consideration.     

The size distribution of the banking sector and the effects of monetary policy

In recent years, the industrial organization of the banking system has received a large amount of attention. In particular, it is generally viewed that the size distribution of the banking sector has changed where it is dominated by a small number of large institutions. In this paper, we develop a model of imperfectly competitive banks that differ in terms of the size of their deposit base. Such differences are important for aggregate credit market activity and the effects of monetary policy. Notably, we explain how the optimal size distribution of the banking system involves trade-offs from distortions in credit markets due to imperfect competition across banking markets. Second, the effects of monetary policy on credit market activity are weaker in an economy dominated by a small number of large banks. Empirical analysis examining the role of concentration among the current members of the European Monetary Union is consistent with the predictions of the model.     

美国金融生态的恶化与量化宽松货币政策就业效应的失灵

在量化宽松货币政策下,美国的经济衰退得到了显著遏制,但失业率却持续在高水平运行,表明量化宽松货币政策对降低失业水平无效。研究显示,金融危机造成了美国金融生态的明显恶化,银行体系采取了紧缩信贷的应对措施,因此,美国政府通过量化宽松货币政策释放的流动性被截留在银行体系内部,不能形成满足市场投资需求的流动性供给,国内投资不能扩张,失业率就不可能下降,其结果必然导致量化宽松货币政策就业效应的失灵。     

Budget deficits,money growth and inflation: the Turkish evidence

The paper investigates the long-run relationships between budget deficits, inflation and monetary growth in Turkey considering two alternative trivariate systems corresponding to the narrowest and the broadest monetary aggregates. While the joint endogeneity of money and inflation rejects the validity of the monetarist view, lack of a direct relationship between inflation and budget deficits makes the pure fiscal theory explanations illegitimate for the Turkish case. Consistent with the policy regime of financing domestic debt through the commercial banking system, budget deficits lead to a growth not of currency seigniorage but of broad money in Turkey. This mode of deficit financing, leading to the creation of near money and restricting the scope for an effective monetary policy, may not be sustainable, as the government securities/broad money ratio cannot grow without limit.