Price and volume effects associated with derivative warrant issuance on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong

This paper examines the price and volume effects of underlying stocks around the announcement date of derivative warrants issued in Hong Kong. In general, the results indicate that underlying stocks are subject to extra buying pressure a few days before the new derivative warrant issuance, which is consistent with our hypothesis about the hedging effect created by the merchant banks that initiate the warrant issuance. Since the prices of underlying stocks peak on the first day after the warrant announcement and are stable thereafter, the information effect associated with the warrant issuance appears to be weak and does not last long. In addition, we find that underlying stocks have abnormal increases in price and volume during the last 5 minutes of trading on the warrant issuance day. This might be due to investors’ buying behavior precipitated by information leakage about the successful warrant issuance and/or to the price manipulation by merchant banks in order to attain a better payoff from the warrant issuing business.     

Impact of warrant introductions on the behaviour of underlying stocks: Australian evidence

The present study examines the impact of first‐time introduction of warrants by third party issuers on the trading behaviour of a sample of underlying stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. We investigate the price, liquidity and volatility impact of underlying stocks after warrant issuance and find considerable differences to those found for option listings. Significant negative abnormal returns on both the announcement and listing date of derivative warrants are reported, followed by a negative price drift. Relative trading volume and price volatility of underlying stocks are found to be significantly higher post‐warrant listing. Interestingly, we find that warrant holders are unable to realize gains for the majority of trading days when they are alive, consistent with the view that banks trade profitability from their issue.     

The Valuation Effects of Warrant Extensions

In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option-pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.     

The financing decisions of REITs: The case of warrant extensions

In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions by REITs. As predicted by option pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to these extensions. The stocks of REITs making the extension announcements experience average abnormal returns that are not significantly different from zero. Thus, total firm value appears to increase, with the gains accruing primarily to the warrantholders.     

The impact of derivatives hedging on the stock market: Evidence from Taiwan’s covered warrants market

We examine the impact of derivatives hedging on the spot market using accurate hedge ratios of covered warrants traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). Results present significant positive abnormal returns and trading volumes before the announcement of a warrant’s issuance, and the effect is stronger when the hedging demand is larger. Moreover, a significantly positive relationship exists between stock return volatility and the price elasticity of hedging demand. Finally, we observe a significantly negative price effect upon the underlying stock after a call warrant has expired in-the-money due to the liquidation of hedging portfolios.     

Unit Ipos: The Who,When, And Why Of Warrant Amendment

Although unit initial public offering (IPO) firms reserve the right to amend the original terms of their warrants, only some choose to extend the exercise period, lower the exercise price, or both. We examine the extent of warrant amendment among unit IPOs and find that the decision to amend is related to the need for cash and is generally employed when share prices are closer to the original warrant exercise prices. Furthermore, extension is less likely when the firm is riskier, whereas higher levels of insider ownership significantly reduce the likelihood that a firm will lower the exercise price.     

Warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets

We develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block; the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block. We prove that the warrant (bond) price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint; and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant (bond) price equals the warrant (bond) price in the block-constrained economy. We illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long.     

Pricing Warrants: An Empirical Study of the Black-Scholes Model and Its Alternatives

This paper uses a sample of over 25,000 daily warrant prices to empirically investigate potential problems with the commonly used warrant pricing model proposed by Black and Scholes as an extension of their call option model. One problem seems to be especially important: the constant variance assumption of the dilution adjusted Black-Scholes model appears to cause biases in model prices for almost all warrants and over the entire sample period. We show that more accurate price forecasts are obtained with a specific form of the constant elasticity of variance model.     

我国认购权证负溢价问题研究

从理论上讲,认购权证的价格应高于其内在价值,即认购权证溢价应为正。然而从实际情况来看,我国的认购权证在2007年却大量出现负溢价的情况。本文将从套利者、投资者、投机者的角度以及权证市场参与者共同存在的一些限制等方面对我国认购权证出现负溢价的问题进行解释,并给出诸如以发行美式认购权证等方法解决这一问题的政策建议。     

The use of stand alone warrants as unique capital raising instruments

This study documents a significant positive announcement effect for a unique capital raising tool, stand alone warrants, in the Australian market. The result is consistent with the models of Schultz [J. Financ. Econom. 34 (1993) 109] and Mayers [J. Financ. Econom. 47 (1998) 83] where a warrant is viewed positively by the market. The results of the model developed to analyse the determinants of the announcement effect, support variants of the information asymmetry hypothesis (proxied by major shareholder pre-commitment and issue size).     

投资者是非理性的吗——卖空限制下我国权证价格偏离探析

本文研究了影响我国权证价格偏离的主要因素。以往文献的重售动机理论和便利收益理论不能诠释权证定价偏差的不对称性。我们的研究提出理性避险动机是权证价格偏离的主导因素,即我国投资者并不是非理性的进行重售投机,也并没有忽视权证的避险性能。本文避免了以往文献的Black-Scholes模型依赖,在平价准则的基础上构造了非模型的误差度量方法,从而剔除了模型假设导致的价格偏差,保证了研究结果的有效性和准确性。     

Fair Terms and Fair Pricing for Multiple Warrant Issues

Abstract

Some firms utilize one or more tranches of warrant issues to supplement their capital base. Unlike exchange-traded options, the exercise of warrants requires the issuance of stock by the company, resulting in a form of dilution. Some previous studies of warrant valuation relied on “the value of the firm,” which is nonobservable, making it difficult to apply the corresponding valuation formula. This paper derives closed-form formulas to value single and multiple tranches of warrants based on the underlying stock price, its volatility, and other known parameter values. The paper first establishes the equivalence of the Black-Scholes formula for both call options and warrants in the case of a single tranche. Thereafter, it considers the impact on the value of previously issued warrants that results when a new tranche of warrants is subsequently issued, showing in each case that fair treatment of the first-issued warrant holders requires an adjustment (due to dilution) in the terms of those warrants and a corresponding modification in the warrants’ value once a second tranche of warrants is issued. To promote such fair treatment, terms of a warrant indenture would specify the nature of the adjustment required when future warrants are issued or exercised, analogous to the antidilution terms related, for example, to stock dividends. Unlike multiple issues of traded options, which are valued independently of one another, multiple warrant issues will be shown to have prices dependent on other warrants outstanding. Also examined is the sensitivity of the fair-value adjustment to changes in the underlying variables, and the theoretical fair-value prices are compared with Black-Scholes prices and with market prices of warrants in the case of two publicly traded companies, each with two warrant issues outstanding. As warrant issues modify the equity structure of a firm, the methodology of valuing warrants presented here will be useful to investment actuaries in situations in which a comprehensive market value for all of a firm’s securities is called for. In addition, risk management practices may sometimes include the use of warrant transactions to hedge stock positions similar to the way that call options are used for that purpose. This may include hedging the risk in equity-linked insurance contracts when the equity position includes stock in companies that have one or more warrant issues that are traded. The methods developed here are also applicable to multiple issues of executive stock options (ESOs) or to combinations of warrant issues and ESOs.     

Calls of Warrants: Timing and Market Reaction

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.     

WARRANT PRICING USING OBSERVABLE VARIABLES

The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm‐value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm‐value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm‐value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided.     

Determinants of Contract Choice: The Use of Warrants to Compensate Underwriters of Seasoned Equity Issues

The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two-stage logit model to correct for self-selection bias, we find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing.     

沪深权证价格偏离分析

沪深证券市场权证理论价格与权证市场价格的偏离现象主要不是理论定价公式的输入变量误差导致的,而是因为股票收益率与权证收益率之间的相关系数与理论预期不一致,乃至相冲突所导致的。权证理论价格与市场价格偏离的主要原因是在当前的交易制度安排下,由于市场限制(摩擦)抑制了套利交易,导致权证市场投机交易占主导,以致权证市场价格偏离长期均衡水平。     

The Listing, Size, and Value of Equity Warrants

This note examines whether listing on a major exchange raises the value of warrants. Such an increase is plausible, given the generally small size of warrant issues and the enhanced liquidity that organized trading can provide. Using Black-Scholes pricing techniques, the study concludes that listing has a positive and substantial impact on the per unit price of seasoned warrant issues. Moreover, the tests indicate that the impact is so consistently large for small warrant issues that firms should consider listing these securities at the time of issuance.     

EQUITY VALUATION EFFECTS OF FORCED WARRANT EXERCISE

We examine stock price reactions to announced calls of in-the-money warrants and find a significant average devaluation in excess of 4 percent, consistent with the recent literature. We test theoretical predictions based on asymmetric information, agency costs, and corporate control in a cross-sectional model of announcement-period returns and find support for voting rights and ownership dilution as an explanation. We find evidence of some price recovery after the call announcement; however, further evidence of a liquidity-based explanation is mixed.     

Information asymmetry in warrants and their underlying stocks on the stock exchange of Thailand

This paper examines the informational role of warrants based on the unique order data from the Stock Exchange of Thailand, where both warrants and stocks are traded under the same market structure and where warrants are as liquid as stocks. The estimated probability of informed trading (PIN) in warrants is found to be statistically higher than their underlying stocks regardless of order submission type and order size. The PIN explains a substantial portion of the cross-sectional variation in the opening spread beyond trading volume and minimum tick size. We find evidence that a signed warrant trade contains information about the future stock price and that warrants with a higher PIN have greater predictive powers.     

The Pricing of French Unit Seasoned Equity Offerings

Units are bundles of common stock and warrants. By issuing units, firms precommit to a future and uncertain seasoned offering at the exercise price of the warrants. This study shows that the issuance of units seasoned offerings in France is accompanied by significant abnormal returns of on average 9–12%, depending on the computing methods. Underpricing increases with the risk of the issuer and the relative size of the future seasoned equity issue linked to warrant exercises. Our results are consistent with our signaling hypothesis.