基于主体视角的国民收入分配格局研究——对中、日两国的实证比较

国民收入在居民、企业和政府之间的分配格局合理与否决定着居民福利水平的提高、企业的持续发展和公共服务的持续发展能否协调共进。中国与日本的国民收入分配格局存在着明显的差异。与日本相比,在国民收入初次分配和再分配中,中国住户部门的所得份额明显偏低,而企业部门和政府部门所得份额明显偏高,中国的国民收入分配格局存在着明显的向企业和政府倾斜的倾向。这对国内消费需求的增长、居民生活水平的提高和产业结构的升级都产生了不利的影响,应该采取提高劳动者报酬收入在国民收入初次分配中的比重、减轻居民税收负担、增加政府对居民的转移支出、放松对企业向职工提供补助和福利的管制等措施,提高居民在国民收入分配中的比重。     

Deficits,full employment and the use of fiscal policy

According to orthodox economic wisdom, fiscal policy is incapable of solving the unemployment problem because government deficits crowd out consumer spending, business investment and net exports. This paper argues that neither theoretical nor empirical support exists for such claims. In addition, misplaced and mistaken fears about government deficits have kept national governments from employing fiscal policy when necessary. By abandoning fiscal policy, national governments have contributed to rising unemployment in the developed world.     

Regulation and rent‐seeking: The role of the distribution of political and economic power

It is shown that the joint distribution of economic and political power plays a key role in determining regulatory and tax policies of national and subnational governments. If both economic and political power are evenly distributed across individuals, then regulatory and tax policies are efficient, but if they are unevenly distributed and positively correlated, then regulatory policy is used by subnational governments to redistribute income in favor of individuals with higher economic and political power at the expense of productivity and output. Consequently, the national government has to raise the tax rate to finance public expenditure. Moreover, if there exists a positive correlation between economic and political power, then the higher the fiscal gap, the larger the gap between equilibrium and efficient policies because subnational governments underestimate more the fall of public revenues caused by inefficient policies.     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

Why countries are fiscally decentralizing

This paper models and empirically investigates underlying forces that promote governmental decentralization, or effective federalism, in the world over the last 25 years. A move to a federal system is based on the demand by hinterland regions for local autonomy, which increases with national income growth, greater relative hinterland population, and increasing national population. It is influenced as well by the degree of democratization nationally and locally. Decentralization is measured by both institutional indices indicating greater devolution of power to local governments and the share of local governments in national government consumption. Empirically, the paper finds that decentralization changes in ways predicted, in particular it increases with economic growth, country size, and population. Institutional structures based on colonial experience and initial constitutional provisions also matter.     

Is Environmental Dumping Greater when Plants are Footloose?

We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two different move structures—where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game.
JEL classification F 1; H 4; L 5; Q 2     

Political structure as a legacy of indirect colonial rule: Bargaining between national governments and rural elites in Africa

Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed in postcolonial Africa. Governments rely on rural elites to control rural regions, guaranteeing them a degree of authority and revenue in return. This paper provides a model to analyze the forging of such alliances. Without cooperation between the national government and rural elite, the power of the two competing authorities to compel farmers’ obedience determines the revenue of the government extracted from cash crop production. Hence, with a powerful rural elite, the national government has a weak bargaining position and agrees to a large transfer to the rural elite. Furthermore, the government’s capacity to compel rural residents’ obedience is endogenously determined by the level of cash crop production and the power of rural elites. Because indirect colonial rule is a significant source of the elite control over residents in rural areas, cross-regional variations in colonial policies lead to various forms of postcolonial alliances between African national governments and rural elites.     

The Political Economy of Social Pacts in the EMU: Irish Liberal Market Corporatism in Crisis

The economic crisis is a collective action problem. In the absence of currency devaluations, eurozone governments are faced with the painful social process of wage devaluations. This paper examines the strategic choices facing the government and organised labour in how they respond to this problem. It will argue that the European Monetary Union contains an implicit neoclassical assumption that labour markets will automatically adjust to downward wage flexibility. This ignores the politics of collective bargaining. Labour relations systems are the most regulated of all markets. Based on this institutional embeddedness, the paper will outline a typology of political choices facing national governments: neoliberal market adjustment, national or sectoral concertation and euro-coordination. Institutional pre-conditions of collective bargaining mediate what strategy governments adopt. It will subsequently examine the case of Ireland that tried and failed to negotiate a national pact in 2009. Social partnership was a central institution of Ireland's political economy for 20 years but could not internalise the adjustment constraints of the current crisis. The voluntary and exclusive nature of Ireland's corporatist wage pacts weakened the power resources of labour and enabled the government to pursue a neoliberal strategy of adjustment. As an institution, it was dependent upon the political executive of the state.     

公共政策对国家创新系统影响研究

国家创新系统的建立与完善需要政府推动,政府使用的重要工具是公共政策。通过探讨公共政策对于国家创新系统的影响和作用,以及对于影响中国国家创新能力的公共政策的分析,提出了政府应用公共政策应注意的问题。     

Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union

Tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy (such as local governments) should not and will not rely on non-benefit taxes, such as the income tax. Yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries, and such reliance changes over time. Evidence from a panel data set of 13 OECD countries over the period 1975-1984 suggests that competition between levels of government (resulting in a vertical fiscal externality) and between governments at the same level (resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality) provide some economic rationale for these changes. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact. These results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the European Union, particularly as the EU continues to evolve. One implication for the EU is that enlargement that increases tax base disparities within the EU (and is not accompanied by an EU-level income tax) will tend to lower national income tax rates, although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population. A second implication is that fiscal expansion of the EU to include an EU-level income tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality, but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries, and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality.     

网络分割、创新借势与中国国家“创新驱动”发展断裂突破——基于国家竞争优势拓展的视角

在产业全球网络分割下,中国国家钻石体系的"创新驱动力"面临发达国家政府、国际大购买商和跨国生产型公司"三重围堵"而断裂的困境。对此,本文认为,中国国家发展突破"创新驱动"断裂的宏观战略,一是建立中国国家"创新驱动"发展传导保障机制;二是以CAFTA为切入点,拓展中国国家钻石体系"创新驱动"的地理空间,进行创新驱动发展"全球借势"。本文的研究是在产业全球网络化背景下对波特国家竞争优势理论的一个发展。     

Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline

The growing importance of local and provincial governments as providers of public services and the importance of those services for the overall performance of the national economy has led to a careful re-examination of how public resources are allocated by decentralized governments. While the Tiebout model promises efficient local resource allocations, the conditions necessary for such outcomes—many local governments, fully informed and costlessly mobile households, no spillovers, residential head taxes—are rarely met in practice. Lacking a sufficient number of competitive local governments, however, other institutional safeguards must be found. Four such institutions are identified here. First, a stable central government managed by nationally elected political parties or presidents capable of making (second-best) efficient interpersonal redistributions of income while at the same time denying inefficient intergovernmental transfers and /or access to non-resident taxation. Second, a mature banking system and fully integrated national capital markets to minimize the economic consequences of a single government's failure to repay its local debts. Third, informed and sophisticated municipal bond and local land markets capable of evaluating local services and finances so as to shift back onto local residents the full economic consequences of inefficient local government fiscal choices. Fourth, a politically independent judiciary capable of enforcing constitutional rules for spending and tax assignment, local debt repayment, and balanced local budgets. Efficient central governments and efficient land and capital markets are seen here as necessary institutional pre-conditions for an efficient local public sector.     

Fiscal Competition: An Introduction

The papers in this special issue contribute to a rapidly growing literature that departs from traditional public economics by emphasizing that governments (including subnational governments, but also, increasingly, national governments) operate in an environment where labor and capital flow across jurisdictional boundaries. These open–economy considerations raise a host of issues for the analysis of public policy, ranging from practical problems of business taxation in a multi–jurisdictional setting to fundamental conceptual questions about the organizaton of the public sector and the evolution of the institutional structure of governance. The papers in this special issue advance many facets of this broad research program.     

Multi-level Governance and Global Climate Change in East Asia

Climate change is an issue that requires integrated action at multiple levels of government and within the spheres of politics, economics, and society. National, regional, and local governments have both distinct and complementary roles in developing climate mitigation and adaptation strategies. Compared with the attention that has been given to international and national activities in East Asia, relatively limited attention has been paid to the role of urban and regional governments in combating global climate change. Cities and provinces are initiating their own climate action plans, positioning themselves as environmental model cities, and joining local, national, and international networks for climate change. This article examines urban and prefectural climate policies in China, Japan, and South Korea within a multilevel governance framework.     

Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model

We develop a two‐country dynamic trade model with public infrastructure having an “unpaid‐factor”‐type positive externality on private sectors’ productivity. With welfare‐maximizing national governments making infrastructure investment, we show that a country with a smaller labor endowment, a lower depreciation rate of infrastructure, and/or a lower time preference rate will become an exporter of a good that is more dependent on infrastructure and will gain from trade, whereas its trading partner may lose from trade. We consider both the nonstrategic governments case and the case of strategic governments that recognize the effect on the terms of trade.     

县域经济发展比较研究——以山西省忻州市为例

县域经济作为国民经济的基本单元,处于承上启下、连接城乡、沟通各业的重要地位。利用忻州市14个县的统计数据,采用数据包络分析法、偏离份额分析法以及区位商等方法对忻州市县域经济进行了比较分析,并得出以下结论：经济发展取决于产业结构优化下的产业竞争力及其劳动生产率;产业结构调整是县域经济发展的根本;提高劳动生产率及投入产出率是发展县域经济的关键。     

General or central government? Empirical evidence on political cycles in budget composition using new data for OECD countries

Previous studies used general government data to examine whether national governments’ electoral motives and ideology influenced budget composition in OECD countries. General government data includes, however, the state and local level. Using new data for general and central government over the period 1995–2016, I reexamine political cycles in budget composition. The results suggest that, both at the general and central government level, leftwing governments spent more on education and less on public services than rightwing governments. Defense expenditure was somewhat lower under leftwing than rightwing governments and in election years; especially in federal states. Effects of government ideology on the individual expenditure categories are larger at the central than general government level. Scholars need to re-examine results on ideology-induced effects that have been derived from general government data where central government data should have been used.     

A MODEL FOR STANDARD SETTING: HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION

This paper presents a model for high definition television (HDTV) standard setting that can be applied to other technologies. The analysis examines conflict and coordination in the standardization process at three levels: international, domestic, and market. While national governments and firms share common priorities, firms are more likely to require standardization than are governments but are less likely to achieve it unless side payments are possible. Collaboration in standard setting benefits all parties and should be encouraged by the government .     

Social Security: National Policies with International Implications

Social security policies within individual countries are determined independently by national governments, but the resulting outcome is inefficient compared with what would result from the international co-ordination of policies. This is because national social security policies produce international externalities via their effects on world interest rates. An illustrative example suggests that the gains from co-ordination are potentially significant.     

Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries.