Calibration of Computable General Equilibrium Models from Synthetic Benchmark Equilibrium Data Sets*

The most common procedure for estimating the share parameters of a CGE model is to calibrate the model using a particular year-of-record benchmark equilibrium data set. In this paper we argue the case for calibration from synthetic benchmark equilibrium data sets which portray the economy in a notional typical year. The development of a synthetic agricultural sector in the benchmark equilibrium data set of the ORANI model of the Australian economy is described Finally a comparison is made of the results from ORANI of an across-the-board tariff cut simulation computed with both the synthetic benchmark equilibrium data set and a particular year-of-record data set.     

The choice of foreign market entry mode: An analysis of the dynamic probit model

Based on the official survey data of Taiwanese FDI in China, this study investigates the transaction cost determinants of foreign market entry mode choice. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper constructs a panel data set and makes a dynamic probit analysis on the mode choice between wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. Empirical results indicate that state dependence between current and past modes plays an important role in determining entry mode choice. However, the impact of state dependence will be reduced significantly if the mode adopted in the previous period is associated with poor performance of the parent firm. There is strong linkage between mode performance and future mode choice. Evidence also shows that the hypothesized influences of transaction cost factors on entry mode choice gain support in the dynamic choice process.     

Combination forecasts of tourism demand with machine learning models

The main objective of this study is to analyse whether the combination of regional predictions generated with machine learning (ML) models leads to improved forecast accuracy. With this aim, we construct one set of forecasts by estimating models on the aggregate series, another set by using the same models to forecast the individual series prior to aggregation, and then we compare the accuracy of both approaches. We use three ML techniques: support vector regression, Gaussian process regression and neural network models. We use an autoregressive moving average model as a benchmark. We find that ML methods improve their forecasting performance with respect to the benchmark as forecast horizons increase, suggesting the suitability of these techniques for mid- and long-term forecasting. In spite of the fact that the disaggregated approach yields more accurate predictions, the improvement over the benchmark occurs for shorter forecast horizons with the direct approach.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Choice sets for spatial discrete choice models in data rich environments

Failure to properly specify an agent's choice set in discrete choice models will generate biased parameter estimates resulting in inaccurate behavioral predictions as well as biased estimates of policy relevant metrics. We propose a method of constructing choice sets by sampling from specific points in space to model agent behavior when choice alternatives are unknown to the researcher, potentially infinite, and differ according to spatial and temporal factors. Using Monte Carlo analysis we compare the performance of this point-based sampling method to the commonly used approach of spatially aggregating choice alternatives. We then apply these alternative approaches to modelling location choice in the Pacific groundfish trawl fishery which has a complex spatial choice structure. Both the Monte Carlo and application results provide considerable support for the efficacy of the point-based approaches.     

Optimizing tracking error-constrained portfolios

Active portfolios subject to tracking error (TE) constraints are the typical setup for active managers tasked with outperforming a benchmark. The risk and return relationship of such constrained portfolios is described by an ellipse in traditional mean-variance space and the ellipse’s flat shape suggests an additional constraint which improves the performance of the active portfolio. Although subsequent work isolated and explored different portfolios subject to these constraints, absolute portfolio risk has been consistently ignored. A different restriction – maximization of the traditional Sharpe ratio on the constant TE frontier in absolute risk/return space – is added here to the existing constraint set, and a method to generate this portfolio is explained. The resultant portfolio has a lower volatility and higher return than the benchmark, it satisfies the TE constraint and the ratio of excess absolute return to risk is maximized (i.e. maximum Sharpe ratio in absolute space).     

Regulatory design and technical efficiency: public transport in France

The provision of local public transport in France involves private and public firms and the use of incentive contracts to regulate them. We study the effect of these institutional features on the sector’s efficiency using a long panel data of firms, with a two-stage estimation procedure. First, we use nonparametric data envelopment analysis techniques to estimate input usage efficiency, following a conditional approach that controls for differences in the environments in which the firms operate. Second, we estimate semiparametric censored regressions, using fixed effects to control for unobserved sources of heterogeneity. Our results point to a differential effect of private and mixed public-private companies. In particular, having the performance of public operators as the benchmark, efficiency is relatively higher for private firms, but lower when the service is delegated to a mixed public-private firm. In the latter case, the effects diverge by contract type: when the contract is of the cost reimbursement type, performance is lower than the public firm benchmark, while for other contract types, there are no statistically significant differences.     

Nonparametric methods for estimating and testing for constant betas in asset pricing models

In this article, we study the performance of a smoothing spline method in estimating and testing for constant betas in two well-known asset pricing models, the usual market model and the three-factor model. The spline estimator is computed taking into account the conditional heteroscedasticity of the errors. Using the right model and estimation procedure for the variance term plays a crucial role in gaining efficiency in beta estimators. A simulation study shows the good performance of our method; in all the scenarios simulated, it outperforms the benchmark rolling estimator. The method enables users to obtain confidence intervals and to test for the significance and constancy of betas. Finally, the method is applied to US data, comprising 25 portfolios formed based on size and the ratio of book equity to market equity. The results show that the time-variability of the betas plays an important role, mainly when sensitivity to the HML factor is considered.     

基于SSM的主导产业选择基准——以南京市为例

在梳理了传统主导产业选择基准理论与偏离-份额分析方法基本原理的基础上,引入了一个主导产业选择基准:偏离份额基准.运用此基准,通过选取南京市1999年和2005年两个时间点的29个制造业产业部门为分析对象,以国家范围内的29个制造业产业部门的情况为参照,对南京市29个制造业产业部门进行份额偏离分量、结构偏离分量和竞争力偏离分量的综合比较分析,筛选出了最有可能成为主导产业的3个产业部门.对结果分析表明此选择基准在主导产业选择中具有基本客观的有效性.     

Impact of electoral competition,swing voters and interest groups on equilibrium policy platforms: Exploring the strategic forces at work

This paper constructs a stylized model of election between two opportunistic candidates who can influence equilibrium policy platforms in exchange for monetary contributions provided by two distinct lobby groups. Two key features are embedded which give rise to a dual uncertainty in the model: the existence of partisan spread across voter groups as well as the embezzlement of campaign funds received by the electoral candidates from the interest groups. We derive and compare the equilibrium platforms of the two office-seeking candidates in three scenarios: none of the above uncertainties exist (benchmark case), only uncertainty about voters’ preferences exist (swing-voter case), and both the uncertainties exist (swing voters and lobby groups case). We find that an opportunistic candidate’s swing-voter tax platform is always lower than the benchmark tax platform. Additionally, the equilibrium tax choice of electoral contenders in the swing voters and opposing lobby groups case is found to be greater than the tax level chosen under the swing-voter case if the lobby group advocating a greater level of tax is sufficiently well-organized such that it outweighs the relative swing-voter effect in that group. Furthermore, we find that when an electoral candidate transitions from being highly corrupt to becoming relatively more honest, the equilibrium level of public good provision adjusts in conformity with the well-organized group’s economic preferences. Finally, if the strength of relative lobbying effect is weaker, a lower partisan bias within that group induces an electoral candidate to choose a tax platform closer to that group’s policy bliss point.     

Approaches to performance measurement in hedonic analysis: Price indexes for laptop computers in the 1990's

This paper estimates price indexes for laptop personal computers using hedonic methods and data taken from PC Magazine technical reviews. We use benchmark test results to construct a measure of system performance that encapsulates factors that have previously gone unmeasured, such as the interactions between hardware components. The resulting hedonic function is parsimonious yet has good explanatory power. A second approach to performance measurement is developed using a set of technical proxies that are shown to closely approximate the benchmark test scores, and are thus nearly perfectly equivalent in terms of resulting price index estimates. While not as parsimonious as a single performance measure, these proxies have the advantage of not requiring direct performance testing, and could thus be applied to larger data sets. Laptops were found to have declined in quality-adjusted price at an average rate of 40% per year for the period 1990-1998.     

Macroprudential consolidation policy in interbank networks

Can consolidation policy be made consistent with macro-prudential supervision? In this study, we seek to provide new insights on this key-question using a network approach. We study how the resilience of a banking network evolves as we shock an initially homogenous competitive market with a sequence of M&A activities that significantly alter the topology of the network. We study how different M&A treatments impact the structural vulnerabilities that can propagate through the system and we show that the severity of contagion and default dynamics depends on the chosen treatment. The desirability of alternative competitive settings (such as a hub-centered market or a more concentrated and yet symmetric market) are assessed against a homogenous benchmark case. We show that the choice depends crucially on the size of the interbank market and the level of bank capitalization. The existence of a large highly connected hub is beneficial in a capitalized network with a well-developed interbank market, but it can significantly weaken the system’s resilience in a poorly capitalized market. Antitrust and competition authorities should adopt a state-contingent approach to M&A activities according to the market conditions in which banks operate.     

Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent

In a delegation problem, an uninformed principal delegates decision‐making powers to a biased and possibly ignorant agent. The principal cannot use monetary payments but can restrict the set of the agent's choices. I show that in the general case, the principal may offer a disconnected set of choices. In a setting with arbitrary bias the uncertainty principle holds—the principal benefits as the likelihood that the agent is informed increases. When the bias is constant, I show that the ally principle holds—the principal benefits as the bias becomes smaller. Finally, when the likelihood of the agent being informed is determined by the agent's effort, then for small biases the principal benefits from limiting the agent's choice. When the agent is sufficiently biased, the principal gives more choice to the agent, so as to to improve incentives for information acquisition.     

Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis

We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the former case but strategic substitutes in the latter one. We tested our predictions in a laboratory experiment. The results confirm the effort ranking but show that in a severe crisis individuals deviate from equilibrium significantly stronger than in other situations. This behavior contradicts the benchmark model and leads to a five times higher survival probability of the department. We develop a new theoretical approach that might explain players׳ behavior.     

MONTHLY GDP FORECASTING USING BRIDGE MODELS: APPLICATION FOR THE FRENCH ECONOMY

This paper presents a model to predict French gross domestic product (GDP) quarterly growth rate. The model is designed to be used on a monthly basis by integrating monthly economic information through bridge models, for both supply and demand sides, allowing thus economic interpretations. For each GDP component, bridge equations are specified by using a general‐to‐specific approach implemented in an automated way by Hoover and Perez and improved by Krolzig and Hendry. This approach allows to select explanatory variables among a large data set of hard and soft data. A rolling forecast study is carried out to assess the forecasting performance in the prediction of aggregated GDP, by taking publication lags into account in order to run pseudo real‐time forecasts. It turns out that the model outperforms benchmark models. The results show that changing the set of equations over the quarter is superior to keeping the same equations over time. In addition, GDP growth seems to be more precisely predicted from a supply‐side approach rather than a demand‐side approach.     

Choice and individual welfare

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a “prior view” about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is.     

Numeraire choice in agricultural supply analysis

Should the choice of numeraire price for modelling profit functions be arbitrary, or is more careful study needed? Here, the choice of numeraire is examined using tests for models specification and out-of-sample predictive accuracy based on the crop and livestock data obtained from Iowa. The results of this study indicate that, for this data set and functional form, it does indeed make a difference which numeraire you choose. This is in contrast to previous studies which, in general, indicated that the choice of numeraire equation is arbitrary or, more commonly, offered no justification for the netput chosen.     

A conditional autoregressive range model with gamma distribution for financial volatility modelling

The commonly used conditional autoregressive range model with Weibull distribution (henceforth WCARR) suffers from serious inlier problem. We conjecture that this problem is due to a misspecified distribution to the disturbance, and propose a conditional autoregressive range model with gamma distribution (henceforth GCARR) to model the volatility of financial assets. In this paper, we first discuss the theoretical properties of the GCARR model and then compare its empirical performance with the WCARR. Empirical studies are performed on a broad set of stock indices in different countries over different time horizons. Consistent with the conjecture, we find that the GCARR model can reduce not only the inlier problem but also the outlier problem of the WCARR model. The results indicate that our GCARR model describes the dynamics of the range-based volatility better than the WCARR model and thus serves as a better benchmark.     

MONOPOLISTIC LOCATION CHOICE IN A TWO‐SIDED HOTELLING MODEL

We analyse the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two arbitrarily located platforms on a two‐sided market. By extending the traditional Hotelling framework, we show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one‐sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single‐ or multi‐homing. In the mixed case (one side single‐homes, the other one multi‐homes), the optimal platform locations are in line with the respective symmetric case. If the monopolist is restricted to choosing the same location on either side of the market, the optimal locations are determined by the relative profitability of the market sides.