International spillovers from US forward guidance to equity markets

We quantify the international spillovers of explicit Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy rate guidance used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on international equity markets, considering equity indices of both advanced and emerging economies. We find that stimulatory explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements at the zero lower bound led to higher equity prices in a number of advanced and emerging economies. Moreover, we find that equity indices of economies with lower sovereign ratings rose by more, consistent with the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.     

Effects of explicit FOMC policy-rate guidance on equities and risk measures

We quantify the impact of explicit Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy-rate guidance used as an unconventional monetary-policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on US equity prices, as well as on the risk indicators of credit and CDS spreads, implied volatilities and US equity index risk reversals. We find that explicit FOMC policy-rate guidance announcements at the zero lower bound led to a significant increase in US equity prices, for an aggregate equity index as well as for US commercial bank and US nonfinancial equities. Moreover, we find that they led to a significant reduction in some credit spreads. They also led to a significant reduction in an implied volatility index for US government bonds, as well as in the absolute value of US equity risk reversals, implying a lower perceived risk attached to a large fall in the equity index.     

Financial market effects of FOMC projections

I examine the impact of the forecasts released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the Summary of Economic Projections over the period of April 2011 through March 2019. I find that changes in the median FOMC federal funds rate forecast did impact asset prices, but forecasts of output and inflation did not have any effect, which may be surprising based on the literature regarding the “Fed information effect” channel. Further, the dispersion in the federal funds rate forecast does not affect asset prices though it does impact the degree of uncertainty regarding future monetary policy. Finally, I find that most of forward guidance can be summarized through the change in the median federal funds rate forecast for the end of the following year.     

Evaluating FOMC forecast ranges: an interval data approach

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve publishes the range of members’ forecasts for key macroeconomic variables, but not the distribution of forecasts within this range. To evaluate these projections, previous papers compare the midpoint of the range with the realized outcome. This paper proposes an alternative approach to forecast evaluation that takes account of the interval nature of projections. It is shown that using the conventional Mincer–Zarnowitz approach to evaluate FOMC forecasts misses important information contained in the width of the forecast interval. This additional information plays a minor role at short forecast horizons but turns out to be of sometimes crucial importance for longer-horizon forecasts. For 18-month-ahead forecasts, the variation of members’ projections contains information that is more relevant for explaining future inflation than information embodied in the midpoint. Likewise, when longer-range forecasts for real GDP growth and the unemployment rate are considered, the width of the forecast interval comprises information over and above the one given by the midpoint alone.     

The effect of FOMC statements on asset prices

Given their increased importance during recent years, FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) statements can have a significant impact on asset prices. To capture the effect of FOMC statements on asset prices, an indicator variable is created that takes into account the information content of policy statements. Results show that both ‘interest rate surprises’ and ‘FOMC statements’ affect the mean and the volatility of asset prices. The volatility impact is tent-shaped, jumping within the policy announcement interval and declining before and after the release. FOMC statements have a much more pronounced impact on stock returns, intermediate and long-term yields, while short-term rates are largely driven by target rate decisions. We also find that the evolution of the language of the FOMC statements does matter to market participants and, in particular, the ‘forward-looking’ language adopted in mid-2003 has reduced market volatility associated with ‘interest rate surprises’ on announcement days.     

DID TIME INCONSISTENCY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT INFLATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE FOMC TRANSCRIPTS

We use evidence from detailed records of FOMC deliberations to argue that time inconsistency theory can help explain the excessive monetary expansion that characterized Arthur Burns's tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman (1970–1978). The records suggest that the Fed perceived a Phillips curve tradeoff and political pressures that made it difficult to adopt disinflationary policies; the tendency toward excessively expansionary policy was exacerbated by the short-run planning horizon the Committee faced in each of its meetings. We argue that comparative static predictions of the time inconsistency model are consistent with the rise of inflation during the Burns years and its subsequent fall.     

THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR

This article examines the influence exerted by the Federal Reserve chair on monetary policy decisions. We construct a voting model where the chair selects the proposal that is initially put to a vote but is subject to an acceptance constraint that incorporates the preferences of the median Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) member and the probability of counterproposals. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using real-time data from FOMC meetings. Results for all chairs in our sample show that the chair's proposal is the result of a compromise, reflecting a stable balance of power within the FOMC.     

SHORT-RUN MONETARY POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

This study investigates factors influencing monetary policy decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) over the period 1960–1998. Competing perspectives regarding the process of monetary policy making exist, with some researchers contending the FOMC makes short-run policy decisions based solely on "objective" macroeconomic considerations and others arguing that political and other nonmacroeconomic considerations significantly influence monetary policy voting. Empirical studies support both views in varying degrees. This article presents a model of FOMC decision making which posits that (1) the current/prospective macroeconomic environment at the time of FOMC meetings is the most important consideration of monetary policy makers, and (2) nonmacroeconomic variables receive little attention unless macroeconomic conditions are difficult for policy makers to assess. Probit results support the implications of the model.     

MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES: MEETINGS AND OUTCOMES

Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper, we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behavior of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on preprepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) under Chairman Bernanke. (JEL E58, D71, D78)     

The evolution of the monetary policy regimes in the U.S.

The existing literature on U.S. monetary policy provides no sense of a consensus regarding the existence of a monetary policy regime. This article explores the evolution of U.S. monetary policy regimes via the development of a Markov-switching model predicated on narrative and statistical evidence of a monetary policy regime. We identified five regimes for the period spanning 1956:I?C2005:IV and they roughly corresponded to the Chairman term of the Federal Reserve, except for the Greenspan era. More importantly, we demonstrate that the conflicting results regarding the response to inflation for the pre-Volcker period in the existing literature is not attributable to the different data but due to different samples, and also provided an insight regarding the Great Inflation??namely, that the near non-response to inflation in the early 1960s appears to have constituted the initial seed of the Great Inflation. We also find via analysis of the Markov-switching model for the U.S. real interest rate, that the regime changes in the real interest rate follow the regime changes in monetary policy within 2?years and that the evolution of real interest rate regimes provides a good explanation for the conflicting results regarding the dynamics of real interest rate.     

Taylor rules and the Great Inflation

Can US monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule when policy is evaluated with real-time inflation and output gap data? Using economic research on the full employment level of unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment published between 1970 and 1977 to construct real-time output gap measures for periods of peak unemployment, we find that the Federal Reserve did not follow a Taylor rule if appropriate measures are used. We estimate Taylor rules and find no evidence that monetary policy stabilized inflation, even allowing for changes in the inflation target. While monetary policy was stabilizing with respect to inflation forecasts, the forecasts systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy. We also find that the Federal Reserve responded too strongly to negative output gaps.     

The impact of economic news on expected changes in monetary policy

Asset prices may react to news through changes in expected monetary policy. We examine whether economic news directly affects expected changes in monetary policy, measured by changes in federal funds rate futures prices. Because these prices depend on monthly averages of the effective funds rate, the timing of FOMC meetings relative to news announcements is important and we derive a method of weighting the news that incorporates this timing. We find that the market raises (lowers) its expected change in the funds rate target after news that inflation was higher (lower) than expected or employment was stronger (weaker) than expected.     

BEN BERNANKE AND THE ZERO BOUND

From 2000 to 2003, when Ben Bernanke was a professor and then a Fed Governor, he wrote extensively about monetary policy at the zero bound on interest rates. He advocated aggressive stimulus policies, such as a money‐financed tax cut and an inflation target of 3%–4%. Yet, after U.S. interest rates hit zero in 2008, the Fed under Chairman Bernanke took more cautious actions. This paper asks when and why Bernanke changed his mind about zero‐bound policy. The answer, at one level, is that he was influenced by analysis from the Fed staff that was presented at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of June 2003. This answer raises another question: why did the staff's views influence Bernanke so strongly? I seek answers to this question in the social psychology literature on group decision‐making. (JEL E52, E58)     

THE ASYMMETRIC IMPACT OF “INFORMATIVE” AND “UNINFORMATIVE” FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE STATEMENTS ON ASSET PRICES

This paper examines the effect of the information content of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements on the level and volatility of Treasuries and stock returns. Statements are separated into “informative” and “uninformative” groups with informative statements delivering important information which was not previously anticipated by the consensus. We find evidence that the information content of FOMC statements tends to generate an asymmetric response, with informative statements having a larger effect than uninformative statements. Asymmetries tend to be more pronounced for the conditional mean than conditional volatility. The behavior of volatility is tent‐shaped, spiking during policy announcements and declining before and after the release. We also find that the evolution of the language of the FOMC statements does matter to market participants and that joint releases of target rate changes and informative statements have a distinctly more pronounced impact than other types of announcements. (JEL E52, E58, E65, G12, G14)     

EFFECTS ON INTEREST RATES OF IMMEDIATELY RELEASING FOMC DIRECTIVES

Prior to February 1994, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not officially release its current Domestic Policy Directives to the public until after the next FOMC meeting, a lag of approximately 45 days. Thus, the public never knew the FOMC's latest decisions about short-run monetary policy. On 11 occasions between early 1989 and May 1993, however, the essence of the directives was "leaked" to the Wall Street Journal within one week of an FOMC meeting. This study tests Federal Reserve officials' original assertion that early release of directives would increase volatility in financial markets by creating announcement effects. The study finds some evidence of announcement effects in certain instances, but the assertion that an immediate release would "roil the markets" appears unfounded .     

A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC*

We defend the forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) against the criticism of Christina and David Romer (2008, American Economic Review 98, 230–235) by assuming that the FOMC’s forecasts depict a worst‐case scenario that it uses to design decisions that are robust to misspecification of the staff’s model. We use a simple macro model and a plausible loss function to illustrate how such an interpretation of the FOMC’s forecasts can explain the findings of Romer and Romer, including the pattern of differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published by the staff of the Federal Reserve System in the Greenbook.