Advertising, Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets

The effect of price regulation on generic market entry and welfarein the presence of (persuasive) advertising is analysed. Anincumbent has the possibility to invest in advertising targetedat the physician. Advertising creates vertical product differentiationbetween brand-name drugs and its generic substitutes. This differentiationcreates the possibility to make positive profits for both firms.The presence of price regulation, however, reduces the anticipatedgeneric profits. If price regulation is too strict, then thegeneric firm will refrain from market entry. Hence, the modelconfirms the empirical observation that generic market sharesare lower in countries with strict price regulation. (JEL: I11,L13)     

The price premium of generic to brand-names and pharmaceutical price index

The price premium of generic pharmaceuticals to brand-names is examined under different competitive market situations. The result of this study shows that the number, market share, and the age of both brand-name and generic products have the most explanatory power for explaining the price premium. This study further applies this method to a pharmaceutical price index in order to explain ‘Drug Price Index Perplexities.’     

Can health insurance coverage explain the generic competition paradox?

In the context of a three-stage model with consumers differing in their health insurance coverage, the paper shows that there exist conditions under which the price of brand-name drugs increases following the entry of generic drugs.     

The links between international parity conditions and Granger causality: a study of exchange rates and prices

This article provides a simple equilibrium model of a futures market. Since the futures market is a zero sum game, some firms will, in equilibrium, end up being ‘speculators’ who bet against ‘hedgers’. We show it is firms that have high initial capital and/or poor production opportunities that are the most likely candidates to bet against the hedgers. In equilibrium, these groups earn a premium in order to provide this insurance so that speculating increases value. We also provide some results that imply an inverted U shaped relationship between trading volume and the level of futures prices. Empirical evidence from the S&P futures contract provides strong empirical support for this theoretical result.     

Niche products, generic products, and consumer search

We endogenize product design in a model of sequential search with random firm-consumer match value à la Wolinsky (Quart J Econ 96:493–511, 1986) and Anderson and Renault (RAND J Econ 30:719–735, 1999). We focus on a product design choice by which a firm can control the dispersion of consumer valuations for its product; we interpret low-dispersion products as “generic” and high-dispersion products as “nichy.” Equilibrium product design depends on a feedback loop: when reservation utility is high (low), the marginal customer’s match improves (worsens) with more nichy products, encouraging high (low) differentiation by firms. In turn, when firms offer more nichy products, this induces more intense search; depending on search costs, this could raise or lower consumers’ reservation utility. Remarkably, when the match distribution satisfies a hazard rate condition, firm and consumer interests align: equilibrium product design always adjusts to the level that maximizes utility. When this condition is not met, either multiple equilibria (one nichy, the other generic) or one asymmetric equilibrium (generic and nichy firms coexist) can arise; we argue that the former is more likely for common specifications of consumer preferences.     

Information Provision by Interest Groups

We investigate interest groups’ incentives to inform consumers about the damaging practices of firms and the impact such an IG has on firms’ technology choices. The IG aims to reduce the production of some bad, say pollution. It can at a cost investigate firms’ production practices and inform consumers about its findings. Since consumers care about the environment, revealing differences in pollution levels between firms leads to vertical product differentiation. The information, by shifting sales from ‘dirty’ towards ‘clean’ firms, reduces pollution. We show that the IG is most inclined to investigate firms in relatively competitive industries and that the threat of being unmasked as a polluter prompts dirty firms to adopt a clean technology.     

ON THE TIMING OF PRODUCTION DECISIONS IN MONETARY ECONOMIES

In most macroeconomic models inflation tends to be harmful. In this article, we show that by simply changing the timing of production decisions by firms from “on demand” to “in advance,” some inflation can boost welfare as long as goods are sufficiently perishable. The main conclusion from this research is that by effectively hiding the strategic interaction between supply and demand, assuming production on demand is not without loss of generality.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

Production and hedging decisions under regret aversion

In this paper, we investigate regret-averse firms' production and hedging behaviors. We first show that the separation theorem is still alive under regret aversion by proving that regret aversion is independent of the level of optimal production. On the other hand, we find that the full-hedging theorem does not always hold under regret aversion as the regret-averse firms take hedged positions different from those of risk-averse firms in some situations. With more regret aversion, regret-averse firms will hold smaller optimal hedging positions in an unbiased futures market. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional expectations, we show that banning firms from forward trading affects their production level in both directions.     

The role of institutions and immigrant networks in firms’ offshoring decisions

The offshoring of production by firms has expanded dramatically in recent decades, increasing their potential for economic growth. What determines the location of offshore production? How do countries’ policies and characteristics affect a firm's decision about where to offshore? Do firms choose specific countries because of the countries’ policies or because they know them better? In this paper, we use a rich dataset on Danish firms to analyze how decisions to offshore production depend on the institutional characteristics of the country and firm-specific bilateral networks. We find that institutions that reduce credit risk and corruption increase the probability that firms will offshore there, while those that increase regulation in the labour market decrease this probability. We also show that a firm's probability of offshoring increases with the share of its employees who are immigrants from that country of origin. Finally, our analysis reveals that the negative impact of institutions that hinder offshoring is attenuated by a strong bilateral network of foreign workers.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

Environmental issues as threats and opportunities for technological innovation

In this article we deal with how large chemical corporations perceive and handle threats and opportunities deriving from environmental problems. We suggest that coalitions or networks are a useful way to analyse the dynamics of the links between separate aspects of the business. A differentation is made between production, innovation and strategy networks. Networks transcend firm boundaries and an analytical distinction is made between networks that remain inside and those external to the corporation. We concentrate on strategy formulation and implementation and on the role of intra-organizational structures. In a pilot study, we interviewed key persons in five chemical companies in the USA and in The Netherland. Conclusions are that firms increasingly adjust their strategies, that this leads to organizational changes; and that environmental, safety and health (ESH) units play some role in this strategy reformulation by becoming part of networks inside the corporation. Some suggestions for further research are given.     

Relocation and investment in R&D by firms

The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed corporate location decisions when firms invest in R&D to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining their domestic plants. In contrast, we here consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by investing in R&D and likewise by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to relocate.     

Lobbying for Education in a Two‐Sector Model

Firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and the education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly and there is sufficient asymmetry between the sectors, only one sector will exert pressure on the policy‐maker in the attempt to direct resources toward the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity, and price. We also provide some preliminary evidence that lobbying activity by firms may influence the production of skills needed by those firms.     

Mapping the stocks in MICEX: Who is central in the Moscow Stock Exchange?

In this article, we use partial correlations to derive bi‐directional connections between major firms listed in the Moscow Stock Exchange. We obtain coefficients of partial correlation from the correlation estimates of the Constant Conditional Correlation GARCH (CCC‐GARCH) and the consistent Dynamic Conditional Correlation GARCH (cDCC‐GARCH) models. We map the graph of partial correlations using the Gaussian Graphical Model and apply network analysis to identify the most central firms in terms of both shock propagation and connectedness with others. Moreover we analyze some network characteristics over time and based on these we construct a measure of system vulnerability to external shocks. Our findings suggest that during the crisis interconnectedness between firms strengthens and becomes polarized and the system becomes more vulnerable to systemic shocks. In addition, we found that the most connected firms are the state‐owned firms Sberbank and Gazprom and the private oil company Lukoil, while in terms of the top most central systemic risk contributors, Sberbank gave its place to the NLMK Group.     

Wage,foreign-owned firms,and productivity spillovers via labour turnover: a non-linear analysis based on Chinese firm-level data

Using firm-level panel data from Chinese manufacturing firms over the period 2004–2007, this article investigates the impact of the wage gap between local and foreign-owned firms on foreign direct investment (FDI) spillovers in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). We find a non-linear threshold effect that: a low-level wage gap threshold exists, below which FDI spillovers are significantly negative. This is because FDI spillovers via labour turnover are blocked due to the low wages of local firms, which jeopardizes the flow of skilled workers from foreign firms to local firms. In contrast, when the wage gap reaches a high-level threshold, local firms can get benefits from FDI spillovers. The reason is that high wages of local firms attract skilled employees to leave foreign firms, which yields a large magnitude of worker mobility from foreign firms to local firms. Our article provides evidence that labour turnover as the channel of FDI spillovers only works when the wage gap is beyond some threshold. Also, these thresholds vary across regions and firm ownerships.     

FREE VERSUS SECOND‐BEST ENTRY IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLIES WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC NETWORKS

This paper endogenizes the number of firms in an industry with positive network effects, complete incompatibility, and firms that compete in quantity. To this end, we compare two possibilities: free entry and second‐best number of firms (the one that maximizes social welfare). We show that with business‐stealing competition, free entry yields, in general, more firms than the socially optimal solution. In addition, we find that by the nature of the industry with firm‐specific networks, total production may be greater or lower under free entry than with a regulator; moreover, some industries attain their maximum social welfare with a monopoly.