Channels of redistribution: Inequality and poverty in the Russian transition

Contrary to popular perception, Russia entered the transition with significant inequality. Using the large Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey dataset, we demonstrate that inequality has subsequently risen yet further and by end-1996 was roughly comparable to inequality in Mexico, Colombia or Malaysia. Driving this increase has been not only wealth transfers through privatization but also changes in government expenditure and a sharp growth in earnings dispersion. There has been a large, associated shift in the structure of income. The paper also looks at the incidence and depth of poverty over the period 1992-96. At the start of transition, roughly half the population of households fell below the poverty line. While this has subsequently declined, at end-1996 nearly 40 per cent of households were below the poverty line and a substantial stratum of households were locked in chronic poverty.     

Inequality,financialization, and economic decline

The objective of this article is to argue that the labor productivity slowdown experienced in recent years by several advanced countries can be explained, following a Kaldorian-Classical approach, by a weak gross domestic product (GDP) performance and by a decline in the wage share. Moreover, drawing inspiration from recent post Keynesian literature, the authors identify the ongoing worsening in income equality and the increase in the degree of financialization as other major explanatory factors of sluggish productivity. The article will provide a brief literature review concerning nonmainstream attempts to endogenize labor productivity, beginning from the famous Verdoorn-Kaldor law (Verdoorn, 1949 Verdoorn, P.J. “Fattori che Regolano lo Sviluppo della Produttività del Lavoro.” L’Industria, 1949, 1, March, 3–10. [Google Scholar]) and the Kaldor technical progress function (Kaldor, 1961 Kaldor, N. “Capital, Accumulation and Economic Growth.” In F.A. Lutz and D.C. Hague (eds.), The Theory of Capital. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1961, 177–222.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) and including Sylos Labini’s productivity equation (Sylos Labini, 1984 Sylos Labini, P. The Forces of Economic Growth and Decline. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. [Google Scholar], 1999 —. “The Employment Issues: Investment, Flexibility and the Competition of Developing Countries.” BNL Quarterly Review, 1999, 52 (10), 257–280. [Google Scholar]). The authors will then discuss how labor flexibility and shareholder value orientation, one of the main aspects of financialization, can negatively affect equality and labor productivity. Finally, they propose an extended version of the Sylos Labini’s equation, where productivity growth is claimed to depend positively on GDP rate of growth and the wage share, and negatively on income inequality and financialization. They submit to empirical scrutiny their extended productivity equation; the results of their estimations provide support to their theoretical argument.     

Reform,Growth, and Inequality in China*

This paper provides a survey of the literature on inequality in China – level, change, causes, and consequences. It attempts to answer six main questions. How much has inequality risen? What is its relation to poverty alleviation? What has happened to wealth inequality? What are the main dimensions of rising income inequality? The dimensions examined are: the rural–urban divide; urban labor market reform; regional divergence; rural–urban migration; and entrepreneurship, rent‐seeking, and corruption. Was it inevitable that inequality should rise so much? Does it matter that inequality has risen? Income distribution in China is bound up with both economic reform and economic growth. This paper concludes by considering the countervailing forces that will determine the path of inequality in future years.     

The Inherited Inequality: How Demographic Aging and Pension Reforms can Change the Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth

The role of inherited wealth in modern economies has increasingly come under scrutiny. This study presents one of the first attempts to shed light on how demographic aging could shape this role. It shows that, in the absence of retirement annuities, or for a given level of annuitization, both increasing longevity and decreasing fertility should reduce the inherited share of total wealth in a given economy. Thus, aging is not likely to explain a recent surge in this share in some advanced economies. Shrinking retirement annuities, however, could offset and potentially reverse these effects. The paper also shows that individual bequests will be more unequally distributed if aging is driven by a drop in fertility. In comparison, the effect of increasing longevity on their distribution is non‐monotonic.     

The link between economic growth and growth volatility

This paper investigates the relationship between economic growth and growth volatility through simultaneous equations system. By employing the identification through heteroskedasticity method of Rigobon (Rev Econ Stat 85:777–792, 2003) and using a panel of 158 countries over the period 1960–2010, we find that output volatility is detrimental to economic growth, suggesting that stabilization policies to mitigate short-run economic fluctuations contribute to long-run economic growth. And economic growth accelerates output variability, supporting the feedback effects from growth to the volatility. The evidence is robust to a number of sensitivity tests.     

Accounting for Cross‐Country Differences in Wealth Inequality

There is considerable cross‐country variation in levels of household wealth and in wealth inequality. This paper assesses the extent to which these differences can be accounted for by differences in the distributions of households' demographic and economic characteristics. A counterfactual decomposition analysis of micro data from five countries (Italy, U.K., U.S., Sweden and Finland) is used to identify the effects of characteristics on component wealth holdings, their value and their distribution. The findings of the paper suggest that the biggest share of cross‐country differences is not attributable to the distribution of household demographic and economic characteristics but rather reflect strong unexplained country effects.     

The Effect of Labor's Bargaining Power on Wealth Inequality in the UK,USA, And France

This paper analyses the determinants of wealth inequality, measured as the share of wealth owned by the top 1 percent wealthiest individuals. We find that labor's bargaining power is a significant and important determinant of top wealth shares. Using a semi-structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model for the period 1970–2019, we estimate that shocks to labor's bargaining power explain 32 percent, 8 percent and 32 percent of the variation around the long-term trend in wealth inequality in the UK, USA and France, respectively.     

Sustainability and Wealth of Rural Households: Measurement and Inequality Analysis

A small but growing literature is linking well-being with the value of assets, measured comprehensively. This measure, called comprehensive wealth, has appeared as a leading economic indicator of sustainability by reflecting the potential of future well-being. Despite the concerns of sustainability for policy interventions at the micro-level, the existing literature is limited to country-level estimations. This paper applies the general framework of weak sustainability to measure wealth at the household level. Using data from three rounds of household survey, market prices, and yield data from rural Burkina Faso, we measure wealth, income, and consumption per adult. The results show that wealth has consistently increased over time in contrast to income and consumption which have fluctuated. Wealth is also less unequally distributed. Finally, consumption is found to be more correlated with wealth. This suggests that wealth-based interventions are more likely to improve well-being in a sustainable way.     

Inequality and economic growth: the role of initial income

We estimate a panel model where the relationship between inequality and GDP per capita growth depends on countries’ initial incomes. Estimates of the model show that the relationship between inequality and GDP per capita growth is significantly decreasing in countries’ initial incomes. Results from instrumental variables regressions show that in Low Income Countries transitional growth is boosted by greater income inequality. In High Income Countries inequality has a significant negative effect on transitional growth. For the median country in the world, that in the year 2015 had a PPP GDP per capita of around 10000USD, IV estimates predict that a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient decreases GDP per capita growth over a 5-year period by over 1 percentage point; the long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita is around ??5%.     

Income and Wealth Inequality in Asia and the Pacific: Trends,Causes, and Policy Remedies

The Asia–Pacific region's rapid growth and poverty reduction in recent decades have been accompanied by rising income and wealth inequality. Technological progress, globalization, deregulation and market-oriented reform, and financialization have generated many new opportunities, but rewarded capital more than labor, benefited skilled workers more than the unskilled, widened spatial inequality, and produced a growing number of the superrich. For some countries, population aging has also contributed to rising inequality. The present paper provides an update on recent trends of income and wealth inequality in the Asia–Pacific region, examines causes behind rising inequality, and discusses policy actions needed to tackle inequality. It also assesses how the COVID-19 has likely worsened inequality in the region.     

Income inequality and economic growth

Despite the extensive existing literature on income inequality and economic growth, there remains considerable disagreement on the effect of inequality on economic growth. Existing literatures find either a positive or a negative relationship. In this paper, we attempt to theoretically examine that relationship with a stochastic optimal growth model. We make the disagreement clear within a single model. We conclude (i) that both are possible – that is, higher inequality can retard growth in the early stage of economic development, and can encourage growth in a near steady state, (ii) that income redistribution by high income tax does not always reduce income inequality. Income inequality can be reduced by higher income tax in a near steady state, but it cannot be reduced in the early stage of economic development, and (iii) that two government polices – rapid economic growth and low income inequality – can be achieved by low income tax in the early stage of economic development, but both cannot be achieved simultaneously in a near steady state.     

Inequality and credit growth in Russian regions

We test the Rajan hypothesis using data for Russian regions from 2000 (after the ruble crisis) to 2012 (before the introduction of international sanctions). The Rajan hypothesis predicts that rising income inequality leads politicians to expand credit for the poor, which in turn, fuels a consumer credit boom. Russia provides a unique research opportunity becaise it is a post-communist transition country with 75 diverse regions. We find that a rise in income inequality is positively correlated with personal loan growth in Russia. We also find a statistically weaker, albeit economically larger, relationship between economic inequality and corporate credit. Taken together, our results provide support for the Rajan hypothesis in a country with extreme regional differences and a long history of populist policies.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

Toward an Improved Definition of the Wealthy*

A definition of the wealthy was proposed in this journal [Eisenhauer, J. G. (2008). An economic definition of the middle class. Forum for Social Economics, 37, 103–113]. According to the definition, “the wealthy” are people who could live poorly for a year while living off the interest on their wealth. This paper suggests a more general definition of the wealthy, which encompasses that definition as well as ones based on the ability to live at higher standards of living than the poverty level over longer periods of time than one year while living off interest income alone. Previous empirical work is revisited to show new insights offered by the new definition. The evidence points to the reemergence of a rentier class.     

Climate change and economic growth in Brazil

Brazil has felt the effects of climate change through significant variability in precipitation resulting in droughts and floods (Grimm, Pal, and Giorgi 2007; Verner and Tebaldi, forthcoming). This article contributes to the literature by examining the impact of rainfall variations on GDP growth rates of Brazilian states. The estimates suggest that spring droughts as well as spring droughts combined with summer floods impact Northeastern Brazil most severely. Because the Northeast has historically been the most economically deprived region in the country, the results suggest that climate events could aggravate inequality throughout the nation.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Perceived Inequality

Perception of inequality is important for the analysis of individuals' motivations and decisions and for policy assessment. Despite the broad range of analytic gains that it grants, our knowledge about measurement and determinants of perception of inequality is still limited, since it is intrinsically unobservable, multidimensional, and essentially contested. Using a novel econometric approach, we study how observable individual characteristics affect the joint distribution of a set of indicators of perceived inequality in specific domains. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we shed light on the associations among these indicators and how they are affected by covariates. The approach also gives insights on some results in the literature on inequality. The role of many subjective indicators for the perception of inequality is re‐examined and examples of policy applications are reviewed. The importance of our empirical approach to the measurement of perceived inequality is, in so doing, reinforced.     

Deficits for the Rich: Inequality and Instability

Abstract

Deficit spending has long been understood as a stabilizing counter-cyclical force. The thesis presented herein is that over recent decades, the cumulative deficits of government and non-corporate entities have expanded the inequality of wealth and income, which, over the long haul, contributes to slow growth and potential instability. The thesis builds on the Kaleckian-Minsky insight that deficits create gross profits in excess of new investment expenditures (free cash). Since the 1980s, this free cash has been spilled in the stock market through mergers, dividends and stock buybacks—worsening inequality. As the upper classes have a larger range of discretionary spending options, this expanded inequality has made for more spending volatility and speculative endeavors. The authors call for expanded taxes on the rich to claim the deficit-generated free cash. Such taxes would be in the service of more stability and equity.     

Income Inequality and Technological Adoption

We relate technological adoption (of different technologies) with income inequality. In the process, we discover that some technologies, such as aviation, cell phones, electric production, internet, telephone, and TV, are skill-complementary in raising inequality. We construct standardized indexes of skill-complementary technological adoption for modern information and communication technologies (ICT), older ICT, production and transport technologies. We find strong evidence that older ICT and transport technologies (and less frequently modern ICT) tend to increase inequality. Additionally, we discover that results are much stronger in rich countries than in poor ones. Our results are quite robust to a series of changes in specifications, estimators, samples, and measurement of technology adoption. These results may bring insights into the design of incentive schemes for technology adoption.