Does a Regional Trade Agreement Lessen or Worsen Growth Volatility? An Empirical Investigation

This paper assesses how regional trade agreements (RTAs) impact on growth volatility for a sample of 170 countries over the period 1978–2012. Notwithstanding concerns that trade openness through RTAs might heighten exposure to shocks, RTAs through enhanced policy credibility, improved policy coordination and reduced risk of conflicts can also ease growth volatility. Empirical estimations suggest the benefits outweigh the costs as RTAs are consistently associated with lower growth volatility. In addition, smaller economies benefit more from the reduced growth volatility associated with RTAs than larger ones. The nature of the RTA also matters as shallow agreements such as partial‐scope preferential trade agreements do not appear to have a significant effect on growth volatility, whereas free trade areas and customs unions do. Finally, in investigating the drivers of RTAs, the regression results confirm that countries that are more prone to shocks are more likely to join an RTA, in particular with countries with relatively less volatile growth.     

Forms of democracy and economic growth volatility

Using a panel of 140 countries over the 1975–2007 period, we disaggregate democracies across five institutional dimensions (government forms, electoral rules, state forms, number of veto players, and age of democracies), to study the precise forms of democracy that may explain the lower economic growth volatility (EGV) in democracies compared to dictatorships, usually emphasized by the literature. We find that, while all government forms decrease EGV to the same extent, proportional electoral rules outperform majoritarian and mixed electoral rules, suggesting a role for a more inclusive political decision-making process. In addition, EGV is significantly lower in unitary states, suggesting a role for a limited separation of power between the central government and the local authorities, while the effect of the number of veto players and the age of democracies is significant only in developed countries. Consequently, the choice between various forms of democracy may not be neutral for EGV, and, possibly, for countries' development path.     

Volatility and growth: Governments are key

There exists a persistent disagreement in the literature over the effect of business cycles on economic growth. This paper offers a solution to this disagreement, suggesting that volatility carries not only a positive direct effect, but also a negative indirect effect, operating through the insurance mechanism of government size. Theoretically, the net growth effect of volatility is then ambiguous. The paper reveals the underlying endogeneity of government size in a balanced panel of 90 countries from 1961 to 2010. In practice, the negative indirect channel dominates in democracies, but with less power to choose public services in autocratic regimes the positive direct effect takes over. Consequently, volatile growth rates are detrimental to growth in democracies, but beneficial to growth in autocracies. The empirical results suggest that a one standard deviation increase of volatility lowers growth by up to 0.52 percentage points in a democracy, but raises growth by 1.66 percentage points in a total autocracy. These findings point to a crucial intermediating role of governments in the relationship between volatility and growth. Both the size of the public sector and the regime form assume key roles.     

Fragmented Legislatures and the Budget: Analyzing Presidential Democracies

What impact does party fragmentation have on the likelihood of democracies to run a fiscal deficit? Past research is almost unanimous in finding that as the number of parties in a country's legislature or government grows, so does its probability of overspending. However, this finding is based largely on parliamentary systems, and there is no reason to believe that it should hold when executives are independent. In this article, I develop a theory for the impact of legislative fragmentation on budgetary politics in presidential democracies. I argue that unified presidential systems should tend most toward fiscal solvency but that increasing fragmentation should actually facilitate budget balancing when government is divided. The logic is that presidents, who are likely to prefer balanced budgets due to their broad constituencies, will be better able to craft acceptable governing coalitions from divided legislatures than from ones controlled by a single opposing party. They will also be better able to circumvent such fragmented legislatures should a coalition prove impossible. I test these propositions quantitatively in all presidential democracies from 1976 to 2007. The results provide support for the theory and highlight the contrasting impact of legislative fragmentation on public policy in presidential vs. parliamentary systems.     

Aid, Volatility, and Growth Again: When Aid Volatility Matters and When it Does Not

In previous papers the authors have argued that aid is likely to mitigate the negative effects of external shocks on economic growth (i.e. that aid is more effective in countries which are more vulnerable to external shocks). Recently an important debate has emerged about the possible negative effects of aid volatility itself. However, the cushioning effect of aid may involve some volatility in aid flows, which then is not necessarily negative for growth. In this paper the authors examine to what extent the time profile of aid disbursements may contribute to an increase or a decrease of aid effectiveness. They first show that aid, even if volatile, is not clearly as pro-cyclical as is often argued, and, even if pro-cyclical, is not necessarily destabilizing. They measure aid volatility by several methods and assess pro-cyclicality of aid with respect to exports, thus departing from previous literature, which usually assess pro-cyclicality of aid with respect to national income or fiscal receipts. The stabilizing/destabilizing nature of aid is measured by the difference in the volatility of exports and the volatility of the aid plus export flows. Then, in order to take into account the diversity of shocks to which aid can respond, they consider the effect of aid on income volatility and again find that aid is making growth more stable, while its volatility reduces this effect. They finally show through growth regressions that the higher effectiveness of aid in vulnerable countries is to a large extent due to its stabilizing effect.     

Gross Credit Flows

The paper estimates gross credit flows for the U.S. banking system between 1979 and 1999 and shows that sizable gross flows coexist at any phase of the cycle, even within narrowly defined loan categories, bank size categories, and regional units. To investigate the macroeconomic dimensions of gross credit flows, the paper studies the cyclical behaviour of aggregate credit flows and documents three key cyclical facts. First, excess credit reallocation is countercyclical: for any given rate of change of net credit, gross flows are larger in a recession than in a boom. Second, gross credit flows are highly volatile, with a cyclical volatility which appears more than an order of magnitude larger than GDP volatility. Third, credit contraction is more volatile than credit expansion. Furthermore, the behaviour of gross flows over the 1991 recession suggests that persistent and historically high credit contraction is a key feature of the relatively mild cyclical downturn. The results lend some support to aggregate models that emphasize the asymmetric behaviour of credit expansion and credit contractions.     

CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE ON OUTPUT GROWTH VOLATILITY: NONSTATIONARY VARIANCE AND GARCH MODELS

This paper revisits the issue of conditional volatility in real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates for Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Previous studies find high persistence in the volatility. This paper shows that this finding largely reflects a nonstationary variance. Output growth in the six countries became noticeably less volatile over the past few decades. In this paper, we employ the modified iterated cumulative sum of squares (ICSS) algorithm to detect structural change in the variance of output growth. One structural break exists in each of the six countries after identifying outliers and mean shifts in the growth rates. We then use generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) specifications, modeling output growth and its volatility with and without the break in volatility. The evidence shows that the time-varying variance falls sharply in Canada and Japan, and disappears entirely in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, once we incorporate the break in the variance equation of output for the six countries. That is, the integrated GARCH (IGARCH) effect proves spurious and the GARCH model demonstrates misspecification, if researchers neglect a nonstationary variance. Moreover, we also consider the possible effects of our more correct measure of output volatility on output growth as well as the reverse effect of output growth on its volatility. The conditional standard deviation possesses no statistical significance in all countries, except a significant negative effect in Japan. The lagged growth rate of output produces significant negative and positive effects on the conditional variances in Germany and Japan, respectively. No significant effects exist in Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.     

Exchange rate volatility and export performance: a cointegrated VAR approach

During the last decades Norwegian exporters have–despite various forms of exchange rate targeting–faced a rather volatile exchange rate which may have influenced their behaviour. Recently, the shift to inflation targeting and a freely floating exchange rate has brought about an even more volatile exchange rate. We examine the causal link between export performance and exchange rate volatility across different monetary policy regimes within the cointegrated Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework using the implied conditional variance from a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model as a measure of volatility. Although treating the volatility measure as either a stationary or a nonstationary variable in the VAR, we are not able to find any evidence suggesting that export performance has been significantly affected by exchange rate uncertainty. We find, however, that volatility changes proxied by blip dummies related to the monetary policy change from a fixed to a managed floating exchange rate and the Asian financial crises during the 1990s enter significantly in a dynamic model for export growth–in which the level of relative prices and world market demand together with the level of exports constitute a significant cointegration relationship. A forecasting exercise on the dynamic model rejects the hypothesis that increased exchange rate volatility in the wake of inflation targeting in the monetary policy has had a significant impact on export performance.     

INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKING

This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies.     

Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies

This paper explores the impact of elections on public investment. Working with a sample of 67 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the growth rate of nominal public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs 28 months before elections, and each month closer to the next election the growth rate of public investment declines by 0.7 percentage points. Other political variables, such as cabinet ideology and government fragmentation have less influence on short-term public investment dynamics. Fiscal rules and stronger institutions seem to attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. These results are robust to a number of controls, including for fixed elections.     

Price Volatility and Risk Exposure: On the Interaction of Quota and Product Markets

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is??whether it is ??clean?? or ??dirty????and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, a grandfathering regime??where clean firms are allocated no quotas and dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions??minimizes the impact on firm behavior relative to a risk-neutral benchmark.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour. Allowing for abatement does not change the qualitative nature of our results.     

Winners and losers in the commodity lottery: The impact of terms of trade growth and volatility in the Periphery 1870–1939

Most countries in the periphery specialized in the export of just a handful of primary products for most of their history. Some of these commodities have been more price volatile than others, and those with more volatility have grown much more slowly relative to the industrial leaders and to other primary product exporters. This fact helps explain the growth puzzle noted by Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers more than a decade ago: that the contending fundamental determinants of growth—institutions, geography and culture—exhibit far more persistence than do the growth rates they are supposed to explain. Using a new panel database for 35 countries, this paper estimates the impact of terms of trade volatility and secular change on country performance between 1870 and 1939. Volatility was much more important for growth than was secular change and accounts for a substantial degree of the divergence in incomes within the sample of small, commodity-dependent ‘Periphery’ nations as well as under-performance of the Periphery as a whole relative to such nations as the US and Western Europe, or ‘Core’. One channel of impact seems to be the adverse effect of volatility on foreign investment. It appears that the terms of trade effects were asymmetric between Core and Periphery.     

Output volatility in Australia

A number of papers have documented a significant decline in real GDP volatility in several major OECD economies. Some authors have presented evidence to suggest that this is the outcome of a one-off structural break from a high to low volatility state whilst others have estimated regime switching models that indicate low volatility regime states have dominated in recent years. This article provides further evidence on the general properties of output volatility for Australia, including evidence of a significant moderation in output volatility for the country that occurred in the early 1980s. Estimates of various GARCH models of real GDP growth are also provided to further examine shorter term volatility features of the Australian economy that are associated with its business-cycle. A regime shift dummy is maintained in all models of the conditional variance in order to account for the regime shift in volatility and evidence is found of significant business-cycle effects, including leverage effects and asymmetries that suggest recessions are times of higher output volatility than economic expansions. Overall, it is concluded that the so-called ‘Great Moderation’ in macroeconomic instability, as documented here for Australia, is a result of a myriad of economic, institutional and policymaking changes.     

Political Regimes and Currency Crises

This paper examines the relationship between political regime type and currency crises. Some theories suggest that democratic regimes, owing to their greater political transparency and larger number of veto players, should have a lower risk of currency crisis than dictatorships. Alternative arguments emphasize the advantages of political insulation and rulers with long time horizons, and imply that crises should be most likely in democracies and least common in monarchic dictatorships. We evaluate these competing arguments across four types of political regimes using a time‐series cross‐sectional dataset that covers 178 countries between 1973 and 2009. Our findings suggest that the risk of currency crisis is substantially lower in monarchies than in democracies and other types of dictatorship. Further analyses indicate that the adoption of prudent financial policies largely account for this robust negative association between monarchies and the probability of currency crises. This suggests that political regimes strongly influence financial stability, and perverse political incentives help explain why currency crises are so common.     

Macroeconomic Policy and Employment Growth in Australia

Abstract
This article, which explores various aspects of macroeconomic policy and employment growth, is prompted by the relative lack of attention given to these issues in the Green and White Papers on unemployment. The problem of hysteresis reinforces the generally recognised need to reduce the excessive volatility of output and employment growth in Australia. International comparisons presented in the article suggest that Australian output and employment growth have been more volatile than those of the three major OECD countries. Reduction in macroeconomic volatility requires more effective short-term demand management than we have had in the recent past, and in turn, means that we must know more about the strength and timing of the effects of major macroeconomic policy instruments on employment growth and unemployment. This article presents employment growth equations for Australia over the period 1979–93 which incorporate domestic macroeconomic policy effects as well as the influences of the international business cycle. We show that monetary and fiscal policy have had a significant impact on the evolution of employment in Australia and, in particular, that tight monetary and fiscal policy contributed substantially to the recession of 1990–92.     

Regime types,ideological leanings,and the natural resource curse

While many consider institutional quality as a central explanatory variable when finding what causes the variance in per capita GDP growth performance of resource-abundant countries, this paper attempts to focus on more structural factors: regime type and its ideological approaches to economic policy. Several joint effects of natural resource abundance and regime type on growth are found. The natural resource curse is likely to be more severe in authoritarian regimes than democratic regimes. Among democracies, it is found that the natural resource curse is more salient in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes. This paper also suggests that the natural resource curse is more likely when a certain type of democratic regime coincides with a particular ideological orientation of the regime with respect to economic policy. Presidential democracies with left-wing economic policy are found to be least growth enhancing among the combinations between regime type and its economic ideology offered, given similar levels of natural resource abundance.     

Inflation targeting in emerging economies: Panel evidence

This paper shows there is no evidence that the inflation targeting regime (IT) improves economic performance as measured by the behavior of inflation and output growth in developing countries. The control of common time effects results in less negative and less significant IT impacts on inflation, inflation volatility and output growth volatility than previously found in the literature. Additionally, our analysis shows robust evidence of lower output growth during IT adoption. On balance, although lower long-run mean inflation signals that the central banks of emerging economies with inflation targeting are more inflation-averse, the costs of disinflation have not been lower than under other monetary regimes.     

Effects of political institutions on air quality

We empirically test existing theories on the provision of public goods, in particular air quality, using data on sulfur dioxide (SO₂) concentrations from the Global Environment Monitoring Projects for 107 cities in 42 countries from 1971 to 1996. The results are as follows: First, we provide additional support for the claim that the degree of democracy has an independent positive effect on air quality. Second, we find that among democracies, presidential systems are more conducive to air quality than parliamentary ones. Third, in testing competing claims about the effect of interest groups on public goods provision in democracies we establish that labor union strength contributes to lower environmental quality, whereas the strength of green parties has the opposite effect.     

Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates

Research about the effects of regime type on economic growth rates did not establish any robust differences in average growth rates between democracies and autocracies. Here, it is suggested that we may have asked the wrong question. There still might be a difference in variances. Democracy implies similar constraints on rulers and thereby might lead to quite similar economic performances. Among autocracies, however, constitutional and institutional constraints are likely to be weak and variable. Moreover, personal inclinations of autocrats might matter much more than personality differences between democratic rulers. Data from the 1960–87 period supply some evidence that there is indeed greater variation in growth rates among autocracies than among democracies.     

Terms of trade volatility,government spending cyclicality,and economic growth

This paper presents estimates of the effects that terms of trade volatility has on real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth. Based on 5‐year nonoverlapping panel data comprising 175 countries during 1980 to 2010, the paper finds that terms of trade volatility has significant negative effects on economic growth in countries with procyclical government spending. In countries where government spending is countercyclical, terms of trade volatility has no significant effect on growth. Conditional on the mediating role of government spending cyclicality, the GDP share of domestic credit to the private sector has no significant effect on the relationship between growth and terms of trade volatility.