National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

Abstract. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare‐maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare‐maximizing policy to violate National Treatment.     

Consumption externalities,production externalities,and long-run macroeconomic efficiency

We analyze the effects of consumption and production externalities on capital accumulation. We show that the importance of consumption externalities depends upon the elasticity of labor supply. If the labor supply is inelastic, consumption externalities cause no long-run distortions. Whether there are distortions along the transitional path depends upon consumer preferences. The effects of production externalities are more pervasive; they exert long-run distortionary effects irrespective of labor supply. The optimal taxation to correct for the distortions created by the externalities is characterized. We analyze both stationary and endogenously growing economies, and while there are many parallels in how externalities impact, there are also important differences.     

Market competition,lobbying influence and environmental externalities

In this paper, we contribute to the debate regarding the relationship between lobbying and environmental regulation by explicitly taking into account the role of market competition. We analyse how the number of firms affects both the effectiveness of lobbying in fighting environmental regulation and the individual incentive for firms to switch to green technology. To explore this issue, we present a Cournot oligopoly where firms can choose between abating the environmental externality or lobbying the government to hold a loose regulation. We investigate two alternative government's political objectives. In the first, government aims to only minimise the externality, while in the second, it also cares about the consumers surplus. We find that, in both cases, the higher the number of firms, the higher the incentive to abate. However, while in the first case, either both types of firms coexist or all firms switch to be green, in the other case, there exists a minimum the number of firms below which all firms remain polluting.     

Modeling production externalities in the maquila industry

In the past decade, the maquiladora export industry surpassed both tourism and petroleum products to become the number one source of earned foreign exchange for Mexico. The continued growth of the maquila industry suggests that there may be significant production spillovers into the local environments. Dynamic modeling, using STELLA, provides a framework for quantifying the environmental impacts emanating from the growth of the maquila industry, focusing on wastewater treatment consequences and resulting infrastructural policy considerations. Such detailed modeling of industrial, infrastructural, and ecological linkages has not yet been a feature of research on this region, despite the potential for significant human health ramifications. An environmental model is therefore developed for two focal urban communities, Nogales and Mexicali, facing potential wastewater treatment concerns due to the growth of nearby maquila factories. In the former case, the analysis revealed the inadequacy of the capacity planning for the treatment of effluent; in the latter case, conservative projections reveal that the system upgrades should be able to handle demands through 2020.     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.     

Information regulation: Do the victims of externalities pay attention?

Individuals living in metropolitan areas are exposed to a large number of industrial risks. Information regulation is a new tool to manage such risks. We ask if large-scale information initiatives directed at the general public can affect individual risk perceptions. The answer is affirmative. Using the publication of the Toxics Release Inventory as a case study, we find a decline in predicted property values when new information on pollution became available, indicating that homebuyers adjusted their risk perceptions upward. The response, however, is limited to sources of toxic emissions that are located at a moderate distance from the properties in our sample.      

Utility and production externalities, equilibrium efficiency and leisure specification

This paper analyzes the implications that the specification of the leisure activity has on the equilibrium efficiency in a two-sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. We consider external effects of consumption and leisure in utility, and sector-specific externalities associated to physical and human capital in production. The optimal tax policy to correct for the distortions caused by the externalities is characterized under all the typical leisure specifications considered in the literature: home production, quality time and raw time. We show that the optimal policy depends markedly on the leisure specification.     

Policy persistence in environmental regulation

We study the optimal emission standards under uncertain pollution damages and transaction costs associated with policy changes in a dynamic setting. We consider three alternative forms of transactions costs and show that they can lead to different kinds of delays of policy changes or smaller scales of these changes. Thus, policy persistence can be a rational response of forward-looking policy makers to future transaction costs, rather than an inefficient outcome of the current political process.     

Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition

By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and therefore the emissions decisions, of all firms in the market. This paper examines how the welfare implications of strategic behavior depend on how pollution is regulated. Under an emissions tax, aggregate emissions do not affect the marginal cost of polluting. In contrast, the price of tradable permits is endogenous. I show when this feedback effect increases strategic firms’ output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased emissions locally, thereby substantially reducing the regional tradable permit price. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been even greater.     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

The geography of market failure: Edge-effect externalities and the location and production patterns of organic farming

Perceptions of increasing land scarcity and negative impacts of chemical-based agriculture have led to increasing concern regarding the sustainability of food systems. Incompatible production processes among farming systems may lead to spatial conflicts and production losses between neighboring farms, and the magnitude of such losses may depend not only on the scale of each activity, but also on patterns of land use. Such conflicts can be classified as “edge-effect externalities”—spatial externalities whose marginal impacts decrease as distance from the border generating the negative impact increases. This paper tests the hypothesis that edge-effect externalities have influenced the location and production patterns of certified organic farms, using data from California Central Valley certified organic farmers. Using concepts from landscape ecology and spatial statistics, we investigate difference in parcel geometry and surrounding land uses between organic and non-organic parcels. Using a generalized method of moments (GMM) spatially autoregressive econometric model, we demonstrate that both parcel geometry and surrounding land uses influence the probability of a given parcel being certified organic. We conclude with suggestions for policies to encourage development of organic farming regions.     

Hot spots regulation and environmental justice

This paper analyzes whether regulating “hot spots” of toxic air pollution by increasing the spatial resolution of regulation could address environmental justice (EJ) concerns. To examine this question, this paper develops a decision model of a regulator choosing emission controls within a net cost minimizing framework. An empirical application of the model using air toxic emission data for Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties in Florida estimates the emission standards and spatial distribution of risks at a coarse and a finer spatial resolutions. Implications for EJ are analyzed by combining the simulated spatial risk distributions at the two resolutions with the demographic data. Results indicate that different measures of EJ point to different conclusions regarding the question of whether finer resolution regulation alleviates EJ concerns. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for EJ policy.     

Local environmental regulation and plant-level productivity

This paper examines the impact of environmental regulation on the productivity of manufacturing plants in the United States. Establishment-level data from three Censuses of Manufactures are used to estimate 3-factor Cobb-Douglas production functions that include a measure of the stringency of environmental regulation faced by manufacturing plants. In contrast to previous studies, this paper examines effects on plants in all manufacturing industries, not just those in “dirty” industries. Further, this paper employs spatial-temporal variation in environmental compliance costs to identify effects, using a time-varying county-level index that is based on multiple years of establishment-level data from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey and the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Results suggest that, for the average manufacturing plant, there is no statistically significant effect on productivity of being in a county with higher environmental compliance costs. For the average plant, the main effect of environmental regulation may not be in the spatial and temporal dimensions.     

The effect of environmental enforcement on labor: environmental workers and production workers

Journal of Regulatory Economics - This study examines the effects of environmental enforcement on labor employed by regulated facilities. The empirical analysis uses panel data from an original...     

Voluntary environmental regulation and firm innovation in China

Porter Hypothesis has evoked almost three-decade debate on whether environmental regulation can stimulate firm innovation. However, one missing component in this long stream of literature is the absence of voluntary environmental regulation when defining environmental regulation policy in the first place. We address this gap by examining the impact of the voluntary environmental certification of ISO 14000 on firm innovation. Adopting firm-level survey data, our results show that ISO 14000 certification leads to more innovation input and output in sampled Chinese firms. Therefore, our study sheds light to the debate on Porter Hypothesis and contributes to green innovation literature.     

Awareness and growth: information externalities in endogenous growth

This paper develops a general version of an endogenous growth model due to Barro. The focus is on the level of awareness of the private sector of the fiscal constraints that bind government policies. It is proved that, except in very special cases, optimal tax regimes are not constant and require detailed knowledge by government of technology, tastes and level of awareness; this casts doubts on the robustness of the model and its validity for policy recommendation.     

Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there is a unique equilibrium, in which contract provision is split up into two phases. In phase 1, simultaneous offers at good (though varying) terms are made to a number of agents. In phase 2, offers must be made sequentially, and their values are “discontinuously” lower: they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options. When the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of these, the agents have the power to force delay. They can hold off the principal's overtures temporarily, but they must succumb in finite time. In both models, despite being able to coordinate their actions, agents cannot resist an “invasion” by the principal and hold to their best payoff. It is in this sense that “things [eventually] fall apart”.     

Standards and the regulation of environmental risk

We study regulatory design for a pollution-generating firm who is better informed than the regulator regarding pollution mitigation possibilities, and who chooses an unobservable action when employing a particular mitigation plan. We distinguish among performance, process, and design standards, and study the relative merit of each type of regulatory instrument. Relative to previous work on standards design, we emphasize technology and process verification. An optimal performance standard is relatively strict when regulator and firm preferences are congruent, but the regulator may prefer no performance standard at all if verification costs are sufficiently high. A process standard unambiguously increases expected surplus (relative to no regulation) in some environments, and otherwise improves welfare only when it is unlikely to generate a “bad” technology choice by the firm. A design standard can improve welfare if the regulator is sufficiently well informed about the technological possibilities for pollution control, but only when the firm’s private benefits from technology choice are sufficiently small.