A barrier option framework for rescue package designs and bank default risks

Rescue packages adopted to stabilize the banking system are generally divided into three categories: government purchases of distressed assets, government guaranteed debt issuance programs, and direct equity capital injections. Countries afflicted by the recent financial crisis launched general programs in one or two, and even in three different categories. In this paper, we examine that the design of a government rescue package for a distressed bank depends on the expected reduction of the default risk in the bank's equity returns. We find that the bank's default risk is negatively related to distressed loan purchases, and to capital injections, but positively related to guaranteed debt issuance. We also find that the rescue package including all three categories is not guaranteed to increase stability for the rescued bank. Specifically, the combination of distressed loan purchases and capital injections is superior to the package of the three categories in addition to the solo instrument. This suggests that an effective design of a government rescue package for the financial services industry largely depends on its targets.     

Default probability of a captive credit bank with government capital injections: A capped barrier option approach

Auto dealers use floorplan financing to buy cars from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) with credit typically provided by the OEM's captive credit bank. The purpose of this paper is to explicate and model captive bank lending to dealers and determine the loan-risk default probability in equity returns of the captive bank under government capital injections during a financial crisis. The lending function of the captive bank necessitates modeling equity return as a “capped” barrier option. Numerical exercises show that a decrease in the discount rate of the floorplan financing or an increase in the amount of government capital injection decreases the default probability in equity returns of the captive bank. Floorplan or government assistance enables the captive bank to be much less prone to loan risk, specifically with large-scale dealers which can substantially affect the stability of the banking system.     

Assessing bank equity risk under Legacy Loan Program

We study the effects of purchasing distressed loan on bank equity risk under the Legacy Loan Program (LLP), in which the government is in partnership with private investors. The bank may refuse LLP when its knock-out value is too low. When the bank decides to participate in the LLP, the participation of a private investor generates a decrease in bank interest margin and an increase in equity risk, but the knock-out value with the LLP assistance generates an increase in bank interest margin and a decrease in equity risk. Our results suggest that the success of LLP depends critically on the willingness of a weak bank to participate in it. However, the participation of a private investor in LLP does not decrease the weak bank’s equity risk but poses instability to the banking system.     

Optimal bank interest margins under capital regulation in a call-option utility framework

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation when the bank's preference admits an additive call-option representation including both the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. In the call-option utility maximization, an increase in the capital requirement results in an increased amount of loans held by a bank at a reduced margin when loan quality is in distress. We also show that the impact on the bank interest margin from an increase in the capital requirement which ignores the dislike, that we call such behavior call-option equity maximization, leads to significant underestimation. Our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of capital regulation to exert a risk-reducing and return-increasing effect on the bank in particular where loan quality becomes worse, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

Regret theory and the banking firm: The optimal bank interest margin

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate of a bank, when the bank is not only risk-averse but also regret-averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the presence of regret aversion raises or lowers the optimal bank interest margin than the one chosen by the purely risk-averse bank, depending on whether the probability of default is below or above a threshold value, respectively. Regret aversion as such makes the bank less prudent and more prone to risk-taking when the probability of default is high, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

How does equity capital cost affect bank performance during a financial crisis?

This article theoretically examines how equity capital cost affects return performance and safety of a bank and how this effect varies across a financial crisis comparing to a normal time when the bank manager’s performance reveals the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. We derive two main results. First, an increase in the bank’s equity capital cost from an increase of the interest rate of the Federal funds results in a reduced loan risk-taking at an increased optimal bank interest margin, implying better bank performance. Second, by ignoring the dislike, we find that the better performance is reinforced during a financial crisis but is reduced during a normal time. Financial crises and the dislike preference as such contribute a relatively low return and the stability of banking activities.     

The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case

A retrenchment in crossborder credit is under way, the product of both market forces and political pressure on international banks to lend at home (Economist, 2009). In addition, banks, particularly the largest, have also dramatically expanded their retail banking operations over the past few years (Hirtle and Stiroh, 2007). Our goal, in this article, is to study the effects of default risk on equity returns through bank interest margin management under a renewed focus on domestic retail banking, a trend often attributed to the stability of banking activities. Specifically, this article explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on an option-based firm-theoretical model with multiple sources of structural breaks due to political pressure. The model demonstrates how capital regulation and political pressure on foreign lending return and risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We show that a more stringent capital requirement is linked with lower equity return, but higher default risk of the bank in the return to domestic retail banking. An increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending return is linked with higher equity return and default risk of the bank. It is also showed that an increased focus on the political pressure on foreign lending risk decreases the bank's equity return and default risk. We conclude that the return to domestic retail banking may be a relatively stable activity when the political pressure decision impacts only the expected risk of the bank's foreign lending and not the return.     

Incentive-compatible compensation and regulation

This article uses contingent claims analysis and regulatory constraints to show how a bank can create incentive-compatible compensation for the senior management aligned with the interests of the other stakeholders. For this purpose, the remuneration package takes the form of a ‘call spread’ on the bank’s equity. Unlike regular stock option programmes, a call spread limits the upside potential for the senior management. This prevents unlimited risk taking. Additionally, a maximum regulatory default probability also constrains risk-taking behaviour. We show under which parameterizations the remuneration package and the regulatory constraint offer equal incentives for the senior management.     

Does competition influence bank failures?

There has been a notable debate in the banking literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability. The aim of this article is to provide the first investigation of the role of bank competition on the occurrence of bank failures. We analyse this issue on a large sample of Russian banks for the period 2001–2007, as the Russian banking industry is a unique example of an emerging market which has undergone a large number of bank failures during the last decade. Our findings support the view that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. Thus, measures that increase bank competition could undermine financial stability.     

The transmission of bank capital requirements and monetary policy to bank lending in Germany

We investigate the transmission of changes in bank capital requirements and monetary policy, and their interaction, on German banks’ corporate loan growth and lending rates. Our results show that increases in capital requirements are associated with an immediate decrease in total domestic and cross‐border bank lending. Changes in the euro area's monetary policy stance are positively related to corporate loan interest rates in general. Regarding the interacting effect of national bank capital requirements and euro area monetary policy, we observe that the transmission of accommodative euro area monetary policy to corporate lending rates can be attenuated by contemporaneous increases in bank capital requirements. Moreover, more strongly capitalized banks increase their loan growth in response to accommodative monetary policy whereas, for weaker banks, increasing capital requirements implies a decrease in their corporate loan growth. Our results confirm a tradeoff between higher capital requirements and accommodating monetary policy originating from banks’ capital constraints.     

Sovereign default risk and state-owned bank fragility in emerging markets: evidence from China and Russia

In this paper we investigate the interdependence of the sovereign default risk and banking system fragility in two major emerging markets, China and Russia, using credit default swaps as a proxy for default risk. Both countries’ banking industries have strong ties with their governments and public sector, even after a series of significant reforms in the last two decades. Our analysis is built on the case studies of each country’s two biggest banks. We employ a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VECM) framework to analyse the short- and long-run dynamics of the chosen CDS prices. We use Granger causality to describe the direction of the discovered dynamics. We find evidence of a stable long-run relationship between sovereign and bank CDS spreads in the chosen time period. The more stable relationship is found in cases where the biggest state-owned universal banks in emerging markets are closely managed by the government. But the fragility of those banks does not directly affect the state of public finances. However, in cases where state-owned banks directly participate in large governmental projects, banking fragility may result in the deterioration of state funds, while raising the risk of sovereign default.     

Creditor passivity: The effects of bank competition and institutions on the strategic use of bankruptcy filings

In transition countries, banks often fail to take action against loan defaulters. Using a model of the bank–firm relationship, we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Therefore, asymmetric information between banks is reduced, and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the greater the bank’s incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and increases the probability that all banks offer loans.     

Banking distress in MENA countries and the role of mergers as a strategic policy to resolve distress

This paper studies banking distress in MENA countries and considers the extent to which mergers are used as a solution for resolving individual banking distress. We use a two-level nested logit model to model the interdependence between merger decisions and the distressed state of banks. Both bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables are deployed to predict banking distress. In line with other recent papers, we challenge the view that specific bank indicators such as CAMEL category and bank size are more significant determinants of banking distress than macroeconomic variables. A comparison of model fits and out-of-sample forecasts indicates that the unordered NL model statistically outperforms a standard logit model by substantial margins. Our empirical study shows that 67% of the distressed banks in our sample are involved in merger transactions and that weak financial status systematically increases the likelihood of a bank being involved in a merger. Distressed state-owned banks are less likely to be a target of a merger transaction. However, global economic conditions do not significantly affect the decision of distressed banks to initiate a merger policy.     

Race in relation to bank depositors and mortgage applications

Data associated with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) are often studied for evidence of discrimination in terms of minority applicants or for home location in minority neighborhoods, with mixed results. The present analysis utilizes a data set covering 2014–2016, combining characteristics of home location and applicants from the HMDA data with information on depositor characteristics from the Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation's Summary of Deposits data and the Census Bureau's American Community Survey. Consistent with predictions from the red-lining literature, loan acceptance rates are adversely influenced by high minority locations, although the effect is larger for minority applicants. The relationship banking literature predicts that community banks will yield higher rates of loan acceptance, and the results support that hypothesis. That same literature suggests that familiarity in terms of similar race/ethnicity characteristics for depositors and home location or loan applicants will yield a loan acceptance advantage; and that hypothesis is not supported. Subsidiary analyses suggest that market competition improves loan acceptance rates for minority applicants, consistent with models of discrimination. Additionally, minority depositors are associated positively with loan acceptance rates, which may reflect higher levels of bank risk, and a risk premium, in those markets.     

Incentive contracts and bank performance

This paper, using unique survey data from the banking industry in rural China, investigates the effect of incentive contracts on performance. In the context of China's economic transition, we find that the incentive contracts have a positive effect on the bank manager's performance in deposit taking and non‐performing loan reduction. This finding is robust when we control for the endogeneity of incentive contracts. Our empirical results present evidence on the positive effects of incentive‐based banking reforms in rural China.     

A reexamination on the effect of bank competition on bank non-performing loans

This article examines whether competition in the deposit and loan markets results in a more stable or fragile banking industry. Following the assumption that deposit and loan competitions are not separable, a simple equilibrium model is developed. Then, using the aggregate time-series data of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-insured financial institutions, we estimate the generalized VAR model of deposit rate (DR), interest margin between the loan and DRs, and non-performing loan ratio. Our results support the competition–fragility hypothesis.     

Banking Competition,Risk and Regulation*

In a dynamic framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, while taking into account regulatory requirements. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade‐off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per‐period profits, and deterioration in the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behaviour. It is shown that risk‐adjusted regulation is effective. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though issuing equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.     

资本账户自由化、信贷扩张与系统性银行危机风险*

本文研究在资本账户自由化下，信贷扩张与资本流入对于系统性银行危机风险的影响。利用89个国家1973—2016年的长面板数据，并控制影响银行危机风险多项因素后，研究发现资本账户自由化有助于降低银行危机风险。进一步研究发现，FDI流入能显著降低银行危机风险；适量的股权投资流入有助于增强银行业稳定性；但当股权投资大量流入时，伴随着信贷过度扩张和资产泡沫，银行危机风险急剧增加；较低的债权投资流入对银行业稳定性无显著影响，但当超过一定规模时，银行危机风险显著增加。     

A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area

This article is the first that applies a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator, to the banking industry. This approach is able to measure competition of bank market segments, such as the loan market, whereas many well-known measures of competition can consider the entire banking market only. Like most other model-based measures, this approach ignores differences in bank product quality and design, as well as the attractiveness of innovations. We measure competition on the lending markets in the five major EU countries as well as, for comparison, the UK, the US and Japan. Our findings indicate that over the period 1994–2004 the US had the most competitive loan market, whereas overall loan markets in Germany and Spain were among the best competitive in the EU. The Netherlands occupied a more intermediate position, whereas in Italy competition declined significantly over time. The French, Japanese and UK loan markets were generally less competitive.     

资本账户自由化、信贷扩张与系统性银行危机风险

本文研究在资本账户自由化下,信贷扩张与资本流入对于系统性银行危机风险的影响。利用89个国家1973—2016年的长面板数据,并控制影响银行危机风险多项因素后,研究发现资本账户自由化有助于降低银行危机风险。进一步研究发现,FDI流入能显著降低银行危机风险;适量的股权投资流入有助于增强银行业稳定性;但当股权投资大量流入时,伴随着信贷过度扩张和资产泡沫,银行危机风险急剧增加;较低的债权投资流入对银行业稳定性无显著影响,但当超过一定规模时,银行危机风险显著增加。