The effects of economic growth on income inequality in the US

The paper analyzes the relation between growth and income inequality in the US during the post-war years (1953–2008). We show that the income of the top income groups is more sensitive to growth, defined broadly as current growth and changes in expectations of future growth, compared to the income of the lower income groups. We provide evidence that this increased sensitivity arises for two reasons: (a) the top income groups receive a large portion of their income from wealth, which is more sensitive to growth than labor income and (b) the top income groups receive a large portion of their labor income in the form of pay-for-performance (equity compensation), which is also sensitive to growth. Consequently, we conclude that growth and income inequality are positively associated.     

The rich, the poor, and the middle class: Thresholds and intensity indices

This paper contributes to the literature on the measurement of social classes by providing a wealth threshold for distinguishing the rich from the middle class and an intensity index for measuring the extent of affluence within a country. The empirical applicability of this approach is then illustrated with household-level survey data from the Bank of Italy; the results show an unambiguous decline in poverty and an increase in affluence in Italy between 2002 and 2004. Moreover, the findings indicate that social class is statistically linked to age, gender, marital status, household size, education, employment, and geography.     

Behind rising inequality and falling growth

This paper investigates why the upsurge of top income shares has coincided with economic slowdowns in the US since the late 1970s. I argue that a fast-growing unearned income from ‘wealth residual’ – the unexplained increase in wealth that is not accompanied by any increase in real output – lies behind them. To support this hypothesis, I measure wealth residual from the national accounts and associated statistics, and then perform a set of panel regressions using a comprehensive panel dataset of the US at the state level. The estimation results demonstrate that the rapid growth of wealth residual during the last four decades has contributed to a co-evolution of fast-growing inequality and falling growth.     

Measuring lnequality in the Middle East 1990–2016: The World’s Most Unequal Region?

In this paper we combine household surveys, national accounts, income tax data and wealth data in order to estimate income concentration in the Middle East for the period 1990–2016. According to our benchmark series, the Middle East appears to be the most unequal region in the world, with a top decile income share as large as 64 percent, compared to 37 percent in Western Europe, 47 percent in the US and 55 percent in Brazil (see Alvaredo et al. 2018). This is due both to enormous inequality between countries (particularly between oil‐rich and population‐rich countries) and to large inequality within countries (which we probably under‐estimate, given the limited access to proper fiscal data). We stress the importance of increasing transparency on income and wealth in the Middle East, as well as the need to develop mechanisms of regional redistribution and investment.     

Wealth inequality in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from household survey and rich lists’ data combined*

We study how the problem of the ‘missing rich’, the underrepresentation of the wealthiest in household surveys, affects wealth inequality estimates for the post‐socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The survey data from the second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) are joined with the data from the national rich lists for Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. Pareto distribution is fitted to the joined survey and rich lists’ data to impute the missing observations for the largest wealth values. We provide the first estimates of the top‐corrected wealth inequality for the CEE region in 2013/2014. Despite a short period of wealth accumulation during the post‐1989 market economy period, our adjustment procedure reveals that wealth inequality in the Baltic countries is comparable to that of Germany (one of the most wealth‐unequal countries in Europe), while in Poland and Hungary it has reached levels observed in France or Spain. We discuss possible explanations of these findings with reference to the speed and range of privatization processes, extent of income inequality, and the role of inheritances and wealth taxes in the region.     

Increasing returns to savings and wealth inequality

In this paper I present an explanation to the fact that in the data wealth is substantially more concentrated than income. Starting from the observation that the composition of households' portfolios changes towards a larger share of high-yield assets as the level of net worth increases, I first use data on historical asset returns and portfolio composition by wealth level to construct an empirical return function. I then augment an Overlapping Generation version of the standard neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic labor income risk and missing insurance markets to allow for returns on savings to be increasing in the level of accumulated assets. The quantitative properties of the model are examined and show that an empirically plausible difference between the return faced by poor and wealthy agents is able to generate a substantial increase in wealth inequality compared to the basic model, enough to match the Gini index and all but the top 1 percentile of the US distribution of wealth.     

Top Wealth Shares in Australia 1915–2012

Combining data from surveys, inheritance tax records, and rich lists, we estimate top wealth shares for Australia from World War I until the present day. We find that the top 1 percent share declined by two‐thirds from 1915 until the late 1960s, and rose from the late 1970s to 2010. The recent increase is sharpest at the top of the distribution, with the top 0.001 percent wealth share tripling from 1984 to 2012. The trend in top wealth shares is similar to that in Australian top income shares (though the drop in the first half of the twentieth century is larger for wealth than income shares). Since the early twentieth century, top wealth shares in Australia have been lower than in the U.K. and U.S.     

Stochastic dominance and thick-tailed wealth distributions

Right-skewed and thick-tailed wealth distributions have been documented as an empirical regularity across space and time. A key mechanism for explaining these distributional features is proportional random growth. We investigate the comparative statics of a well-defined class of random growth models when allowing for stochastically ordered shifts in the wealth return process. An order-contingent monotone comparative statics property is identified, according to which pure increases in risk (e.g. higher volatility of capital returns) foster top wealth concentration whereas first-order stochastically dominated shifts in the return process (induced by e.g. proportional capital income taxation) rather lower inequality at the upper end of the distribution. Our analysis points to the potentially ambiguous effects on top wealth inequality of introducing or modifying capital income tax treatments in the presence of stochastic returns.     

Closing the Technology Gap?

This paper focuses on the dimensions shaping the dynamics of technology. We present a model where the knowledge stock of a country grows over time as a function of three main factors: innovation intensity, technological infrastructures, and human capital. The latter two variables determine the absorptive capacity of a country as well as its innovative ability. We then carry out an empirical analysis that investigates the dynamics of technology in a large sample of economies in the last two‐decade period, and studies its relationships with income per capita growth. The results indicate that the cross‐country distributions of technological infrastructures and human capital have experienced a process of convergence, whereas the innovative intensity is characterized by increasing polarization between rich and poor economies. Thus, while the conditions for catching up have generally improved, the increasing innovation gap represents a major factor behind the observed differences in income per capita.     

Interest rates,distribution and capital accumulation – A post-Kaleckian perspective on the US and Germany

We analyse the effects of interest rate variations on the rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profit in a simple post-Kaleckian distribution and growth model. This model gives rise to different potential accumulation regimes depending on the values of the parameters in the investment, saving and distribution function. Estimating these core behavioural equations for the US and Germany in the period 1960–2007, we find significant and robust effects of interest payments with the expected sign in each of the equations. Our estimation results imply, both for the US and for Germany, that the effects of changes in the real long-term rate of interest on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profits, are characterised by the ‘normal regime’: rising long-term real rates of interest cause falling rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profits, as well as redistribution at the expense of labour income and hence an increasing profit share in both countries.     

Wealth Inequality in Sweden: What can we Learn from Capitalized Income Tax Data?

This paper presents new estimates of wealth inequality in Sweden during 2000–2012, linking wealth register data up to 2007 and individually capitalized wealth based on income and property tax registers for the period thereafter when a repeal of the wealth tax stopped the collection of individual wealth statistics. We find that wealth inequality increased after 2007 and that more unequal bank holdings and housing appear to be important drivers. We also evaluate the performance of the capitalization method by contrasting its estimates and their dispersion with observed stocks in register data up to 2007. The goodness‐of‐fit varies tremendously across assets and we conclude that although capitalized wealth estimates may well approximate overall inequality levels and trends, they are highly sensitive to assumptions and the quality of the underlying data sources.     

The impact of heterogeneity of discount factors and asset returns on inequality

We investigate the effect of differential access to financial markets, discount factor and wealth endowment on poverty and inequality. We construct a model of educational and savings choice with heterogeneous agents. Motivated by empirical evidence, in this economy the return on savings is a non-decreasing function of the amount saved. As expected, more patient households tend to become wealthier and more educated. The heterogeneity on portfolio returns is shown to be key to our main result: the model closely fits the data on income and wealth inequalities, being able to explain the existing Brazil’s inequality patterns. The model was also calibrated to the US, with similar fit. We then evaluate two types of public policies based on cash transfer schemes (CTSs), that aim to reduce poverty and inequality. We find that the CTS version in which receiving the benefit is conditional on educating the household’s youngster outperforms its unconditional version in almost all dimensions analysed.     

Process of accumulation of Italian human capital

Human capital (HC), from the economical point of view, is defined as a stock variable that represents the capacity of an individual generated by investment in education and work experience to produce a sustained flow of income throughout the life span.The proposed approaches that consider HC as unidimensional latent variable are recent and start from the economic theory specified in Dagum's recursive model [Dagum, C., 1994. Human capital, income and wealth distribution models and their applications to the USA. In: Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, pp. 253–258] which purports to explain the determination and the distribution of income, wealth, debt and HC.The aim of the present article is to generalize the previous approaches to the case of human capital conceived as a latent variable, composed by two main dimensions (Education HC and Work experience HC), underlying the process of determination of earned and capital income. The model is applied to the estimate of Italian household human capital in 2000 and compared with the US household human capital.     

INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION: A MICRODATA ANALYSIS FOR SEVEN COUNTRIES

This paper reports the detailed results of a comparison of the distribution and redistribution of income in seven countries using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. Use of LIS facilitates comparisons of inequality in respect to similarly-defined variables, permits methodological alternatives to be used, and allows the countries to be compared on aspects of income ranking and policy equity in ways not otherwise possible.
The results indicate a pattern of inequality in which Sweden is the most equal, followed by Norway, the U.K. and Canada, while among the less equal countries Israel is generally more equal than Germany-or the USA., whose relative inequality depends on the measure chosen. Use of the LIS database also allows a more detailed explanation of these results, noting, for example, the role of cash benefits in increasing equality in Sweden and the U.K., and in aiding the bottom quintile in Germany; and the important part played by self-employment income in contributing to the high top quintile shares in Germany and Israel, and in rendering the Norwegian distribution less equal than that of its Scandinavian neighbour.
The wealth of the database, however, means that methodological issues need to be treated both more explicitly and more carefully than is possible with more restrictive data. To interpret the data also requires a considerable degree of knowledge about the institutional features of tax and social provisions in each country, so that an income microdatabase could usefully be completed by one focused on the details of such provisions.     

Wealth inequality and financial inclusion: Evidence from South African tax and survey records

Theoretical models show that financial inclusion reduces wealth inequality. Existing empirical models are restricted to estimates using income inequality because of a lack of cross country wealth inequality data. We used 2010-11 and 2014-5 waves of the National Income Dynamics Study combined with South African tax records to estimate wealth and income inequality. Using Re-centered Influence Function regressions on the micro-level records, we confirmed the negative cross-country relationship between financial inclusion and income inequality. Wealth inequality is different. Financial inclusion improved wealth shares of only the middle class. Because of predatory lending, expansion of credit reduced the wealth share of the poor. Improved savings by the middle class, providing better oversight over financial services targeted at the poor and removing impediments to the small business sector are pre-conditions for financial inclusion to reduce wealth inequality.     

Entrepreneurs,jobs, and trade

We propose a simple theory of endogenous firm productivity, unemployment, and top income inequality. High-talented individuals choose to become self-employed entrepreneurs and acquire more managerial (human) capital; whereas low-talented individuals become workers and face the prospect of equilibrium unemployment. In a two-country global economy, trade openness raises firm productivity, increases top income inequality, and may reduce welfare in the country exporting the good with lower relative labor-market frictions. Trade openness reduces firm productivity, lowers top income inequality, and necessarily raises welfare in the other country. The effect of trade on unemployment is ambiguous. Unilateral job-creating policies increase welfare in both countries. However, they reduce unemployment and raise top income inequality in the policy-active country; and reduce top income inequality while increasing unemployment in the policy-passive country.     

MEASURING POVERTY USING BOTH INCOME AND WEALTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SPAIN

We study the correspondence between a household's income and its vulnerability to income shocks in two developed countries: the U.S. and Spain. Vulnerability is measured by the availability of wealth to smooth consumption in a multidimensional approach to poverty, which allows us to identify three groups of households: the twice‐poor group, which includes income‐poor households who lack an adequate stock of wealth; the group of protected‐poor households, which are all those income‐poor families with a buffer stock of wealth they can rely on; and the vulnerable‐non‐poor group, including households above the income‐poverty line that do not hold any stock of wealth. Interestingly, the risk of belonging to these groups changes over the life‐cycle in both countries while the size of the groups differs significantly between Spain and the U.S., although this result is quite sensitive to whether the housing wealth component is included in the wealth measure or not.     

Measuring Economic Insecurity Using a Counting Approach. An Application to Three EU Countries

In this paper, we propose the use of a multidimensional approach to the measurement of economic insecurity in three European countries. We combine six different unidimensional indicators proxying the subjective and objective determinants of economic insecurity into a single index based on a counting approach method, which allows us to measure the incidence and the intensity of the phenomenon. Using longitudinal data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) from 2008 to 2016, we find that the incidence of insecurity falls as income grows, being significantly present in middle-income households both in Spain and France but not in Sweden. Interestingly, in all three countries, the contribution of different dimensions to insecurity changes as household income grows, while for all income levels a higher education and being employed in a non-fixed term contract are strongly related to a lower probability of being economically insecure.     

Children's Opportunities in Germany – An Application Using Multidimensional Measures

Single parents and unmarried couples are increasingly replacing the traditional nuclear family. This paper investigates if the greater variety in living arrangements contributes to increased resource disparities among children in Germany. Children in single parent families are disadvantaged in at least three dimensions decisive for their later achievements: material standard of living, parental education, and parental childcare time. We compute multidimensional inequality and poverty indices using SOEP data from 1991 to 2012. We distinguish between parental and publicly provided childcare, which is an increasingly important in‐kind benefit in Germany. We find that both multidimensional inequality and poverty declined as expanded public childcare strongly reduces resource disparities among children.     

Growth,mobility and social progress

We evaluate social progress on the basis of panel data on individual incomes by comparing the value of social welfare in the observed panel data to its value in a situation where individuals receive their first period income in each period. We derive necessary conditions for the welfare gain to be positive, and show how it can be decomposed in an effect of economic growth, a mobility effect and a cost due to aversion to time fluctuations given individuals’ ranks in the income distribution. The mobility effect, generated by reranking in the income distribution has two components: a cost due to time fluctuations in incomes and a benefit, due to equalization in time averaged incomes. We illustrate the analysis using CNEF data for Australia, Korea, Germany, Russia, Switzerland and the US. Our results indicate that the largest component of social progress is the equalization of time averaged income, induced by reranking. In countries with high growth (Australia, Korea and Russia), the growth effect is larger than the mobility effect, but in countries with low growth (Germany, Switzerland and the US), the opposite holds true. The poor performance of the US is explained by the large costs of income fluctuations and the way economic growth is distributed.